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ABSTRACT
This study investigates and questions Uganda’s development claims and the choice
between confrontation and mutual respect among the people, using Paul VI’s notion of
integral human development in Populorum Progressio and the requisite development
principles, virtues and conditions or factors presented therein. In the study I have argued
that the development claims of Uganda do not, to a significant degree, meet the standards
of human development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. The study shows
that human dignity and its universality and equality precipitate the significance of the
question of integral human development, and consequently necessitate a relevant
anthropology.
The structure of the work is as follows: First, I espoused the influences behind Paul VI’s
vision of human development. These influences shaped his notion of development and
the principles he proposed for authentic human development. They facilitate the
understanding of his doctrine in Populorum Progressio.
Secondly, I highlighted the problems Paul VI was addressing, and thereafter his proposed
solutions, and his understanding of the notion and nature of true development as being
integral – the development of the entire person and of all people. The principle
underlying this vision of development is human dignity. On the basis of the universal
character of this underlying principle, I have argued that integral human development
ought to promote the human dignity of all people irrespective of age, sex, socio-economic
and political status, tribe, nation, race and color. I highlighted and explained other
principles and factors necessary for integral human development and related them to the
most fundamental principle.
Thirdly, I reconstructed an anthropology for integral human development which Paul VI
proposed in Populorum Progressio. This aimed to build and reaffirm the cohesive and
fundamental principle. I argued and concluded that human dignity is de facto the most
fundamental principle that ought to be understood, acknowledged, and underscored. All
other principles or factors for human development are important but they revolve around
human dignity.
Finally, I applied the development principles and factors presented in Populorum
Progressio to the mediating structures of pastoral or religious, socio-economic and
political life and community development in Uganda. Based on an understanding and
respect for human dignity and its relation to other development principles, virtues and
conditions I concluded that the application of the principles of integral human
development is a failure in modern Uganda, to a significant extent, because the
recognition and respect for human dignity is minimal in almost every context or sector of
life. Consequently, among other recommendations, I have proposed education about
human dignity and moral principles that promote human dignity as necessary, and one of
the most crucial challenges to Uganda in this opening decade of the Twenty-First century
and later.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Paul VI introduced the issue of true human development by way of reaffirming
the notion of integral human development initially used by Louis Joseph Lebret. Human
development is a crucial and a perennial notion many people have questioned and
attempted to re-define in the course of human history. In his 2006 Lenten message,
apparently re-echoing Paul VI’s teaching in the encyclical Populorum Progressio about
authentic human development, Benedict XVI referred to the question of development as a
debatable issue.1 Similarly Mark Leopold alludes to development and describes the
notion of development as being often “vague and contested.”2
This work is a study of Populorum Progressio, Paul VI’s ground-breaking
Catholic social encyclical about the development of peoples to which Benedict was
alluding in the 2006 Lenten message. The work treats especially Paul VI’s doctrine of
integral human development, the requisite principles, virtues and conditions to achieve
such a development; and an application of the teaching and the suggestions of the
document to the context of Uganda. It is an attempt to espouse and question the
development claims of Uganda. This will be realized in the attempts to apply the teaching
of the document in the context of Uganda, but the study can help one to interpret other
contexts too. The work is in no way exhaustive of the understanding of the doctrine and
application of Populorum Progressio. It is an attempt to provoke further reflection on the
document and the possibilities for its application in other developmental contexts.

1

Benedictus PP. XVI, “Jesus at the Sight of the Crowds, was Moved with Pity (Mt.9:36)”: Message of
Pope Benedict XVI for Lent 2006 in Arua Diocese Bulletin, No.69, (Arua: Arua Diocese Communication
Department, March 2006), 1.
2
Mark Leopold, Inside West Nile: Violence, History and Representation on an African Frontier, (James
Currey: Oxford, 2005), 147.

1

Paul VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio was written just two years before he
visited Uganda in 1969, which was the first visit of a Roman Catholic Pontiff to Uganda;
and the first papal visit to Africa. A critical reading of the encyclical and a careful
relating of its doctrine to the situation in Uganda, before that visit and since then, would
suggest that in Populorum Progressio Paul VI was only directly addressing the problems
of Uganda when he wrote the encyclical. However, this is not the case because from the
history of his international travels and visits he was never in Uganda before he wrote the
encyclical. His direct intention was to address world problems of human development in
general but the very problems he addressed were and are still obvious in Uganda. The
work reverses the scope of Paul VI’s teaching. While Paul VI dealt with the international
development issues, this work attempts to limit the development issues on national level,
notwithstanding the fact that there is inevitable mutual exchange and relationship
between the two levels – national and international.
Reflecting on some of Uganda’s problems, Anna Mary Kayonga made the
following intriguing and comprehensive statement about Uganda:
It is paradoxical that Uganda, the ‘Pearl of Africa’, so richly endowed with an abundance of
natural resources: in terms of favourable climate, fertile soil; in terms of human resources; as well
as in traditional and Christian values, should have such a large number of poor people. The factors
that have reduced many Ugandans to destitution, are the series of incompetent, corrupt
governments, and civil wars, especially since independence in 1962.3

The above statement almost summarizes the situation, the problems and the needs
of Uganda. It is true even of the Uganda of today. Despite their struggles to develop their
country and the claims that the country - so much blessed by natural resources and good
climate - is developing, Ugandans face development problems. The country is rich in
3

Anna Mary Kayonga, “The Church’s Role in the Care of Orphans and Destitutes” in Church Contribution
to Integral Development. Ed. Joseph Therese Agbasiere and Boniface K. Zabajungu (Eldoret, Kenya:
AMECEA Gaba Publications, 1989), 215-216.

2

many ways. Uganda lies astride the equator, about 2 degrees south and 4 degrees north of
the equator, and stretches “about 400 miles from north to south” and “about 350 miles
from east to west”, covering an area of about “91,134 square miles, of which 16,386
square miles is open water and swamp,” rising from 2000 feet in the north to 4000 feet in
the southwest above sea level, currently with a population of about 27.7 million people.4
Generally, it is agreed that after its independence in 1962 “until 1971, the
Ugandan economy enjoyed a fairly robust growth.”5 The conditions of people were at
least tolerable if not good. When Idi Amin came to power in 1971 the situations changed.
Development was hampered by many factors – exodus of experts from Uganda, the
collapse of the parastatal sector, corruption, incompetence and mal-administration and
ravages caused by war.6 After the collapse of the Amin regime international bodies such
as the IMF financially supported the Obote II regime which soon slipped into mistakes
similar to what prevailed during Amin’s reign. The relapse retarded development and
prompted rebel insurgencies that terminated Obote II regime and four other short-lived
regimes.7 The IMF and Western financial institutions and organizations resumed support
after Yoweri K. Museveni took over power in 1986. According to Ayittey, “by African
standards, Uganda has performed well and President Museveni has made credible,

4

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The First Five Year-Development Plan,
1961/62-1965/66, ( Entebbe, Uganda: Uganda Government, 1961), 1. Also see The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Uganda, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press,
1962), 5. Also see Tom McKnight., Gen.Ed.Graphica: The Complete Illustrated Atlas of the World, (New
York: Barnes and Noble Books, 2004), 366. Also see Oxford World Encyclopedic World Atlas, 6th Edition,
(New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 222. Also see Kakaire A. Kirunda, “Population growth
may fail Development Goals” in Daily Monitor Kampala, Uganda, September 21, 2006.
5
George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Unchained: The Blue Print for Africa’s Future, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005), 204.
6
Ibid., 205.
7
Ibid., 206.

3

serious and continued efforts at reform.”8 It is true that comparatively speaking, after
learning from some of the past mistakes of Uganda’s presidents, Museveni has done
better than his predecessors. Suggestively he raised the level of Uganda’s development.
However, in this work the developmental contributions of all Uganda’s different
governments since its independence will be questioned by the doctrine of Populorum
Progressio.
Human development has consistently been a crucial issue in history. Its notion has
constantly been contentious, a matter of differences of opinions, because diverse views
and fundamental principles of human development have been propounded, some of
which are appealing and others not. Historically, to implement the various views has
practically proven to be difficult or impossible in various countries, including Uganda.
Everywhere there are problems related to the understanding of human development.
With the help of the insights of Louis Joseph Lebret, the protagonist of the
doctrine of authentic human development and personal critical reflections, Paul VI
developed a more comprehensive notion of human development. He termed integral
human development - an holistic development of individuals and all peoples. However,
the application of this notion is fraught with difficulties. This raises the question: Why
has it been and why is it still difficult to implement Paul VI’s teaching about integral
human development? This is one of the central questions to which this work attempts to
suggest answers. Therefore, it is important to examine the theme of integral human
development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio, and to apply it to a specific
context such as that of Uganda where development claims are questionable in light of the
8
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teaching of the document.
The encyclical is related to other Catholic social teachings about human
development but it is different from them, especially those that preceded it, because its
notion of human development and social justice is broader than what earlier documents
advocate. Many authors refer to it as the Magna Carta of Catholic Church’s teaching on
human development. This means Populorum Progressio is a great charter, a fundamental
document of the Catholic Church’s teaching about human development even though it is
not the first Catholic document to deal with this issue. Rerum Novarum of Pope Leo XIII
(1891), Quadragessimo Anno of Pope Pius XI (1931), Mater et Magistra of Pope John
XXIII (1961), Pacem in Terris of Pope John XXIII (1963), and Gaudium et Spes of the
Second Vatican Council (1965) treated some of the same issues Paul VI grappled with in
Populorum Progressio but they were more limited than what Paul VI advocated. The
document is representative of a remarkable advancement in the Catholic Church’s
teaching about human development, although its advance and novelty is a conceptual
one.9 This means Paul VI never articulated or suggested a framework and model for
achieving what he called integral human development.
The notion of human development conceived by Paul VI as presented in
Populorum Progressio is a major contribution, relevant for the time he wrote it and for
the world and time after the encyclical was promulgated. This is suggested by the
Pontiff’s notion of human development and social justice, and his treatise of diverse
issues related to the question of development. He gave a more comprehensive definition
of human development than ever before in any Catholic social teaching on development,
9
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and viewed justice both nationally and globally.10 All human development-related
Catholic social doctrine preceding Populorum Progressio gravitates toward the doctrine
of the document and, those that succeeded it, such as Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, emanated
from the document.11
This study affirms that Paul VI’s vision of human development is directed to the
development of the human person and the practical application of theological
anthropology and other theological principles. It is not as utopian as some critics of Paul
VI claim, because the ultimate purpose of Christ and of theology is integral salvation.12
The human development advocated by Paul VI is, in fact the one reiterated by Benedict
XVI, the salvation of body and soul - material or social and internal salvation.13 It is
development at the service of people. Paul VI himself also emphatically affirmed this.
Theology’s goal is the perfection of human life, vision of God and the ultimate union
with God, using resources God has made available to people. He further said:
Added to this is the fact that the noble harmony of this human nature, which each one by his own
effort and awareness of his duty brings to ever greater perfection, is destined for a higher dignity.
Ingrafted in Christ, the giver of life, man receives a new dimension of life and attains to a
humanism as it is called which transcends his nature and confers on him the greatest fullness of
life to which the perfecting of man looks as to its final goal.14

This work centers the doctrine of Populorum Progressio on a more emphatic
theological anthropology than Paul VI employed. It emphasizes the value of human life,
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the human person, human dignity and rights. In the Proposition on the Dignity and Rights
of the Human Person, the International Theological Commission underscores the gravity
of theological anthropology by affirming that “it is not possible for the Church to omit
preaching the dignity and rights of the human person.”15 Anthropology contributes
greatly to the practice of theological knowledge, especially to a relevant development
education of the masses. Consequently, this study will attempt to advance the
understanding, acknowledgement and appreciation, and the practical application of the
teaching of Populorum Progressio based on the human person, human dignity and human
rights. Therefore, a relevant and compelling anthropology is crucial.
The study will attempt to, specifically, make an application of the doctrine of
Populorum Progressio to Uganda’s development claims. The work attempts to show how
Paul VI’s doctrine in the document challenges Uganda’s development claims; and how it
could best be applied in the context of Uganda. The significance of the study should be
seen in light of Paul VI’s comprehensive teaching about integral human development. It
surpasses most, if not all, teachings on human development. He consistently taught that
integral human development addresses the problem of both material and spiritual poverty.
This teaching is relevant for all people. Therefore, the treatise is relevant to and
significant for the situation in Uganda. People in other contexts can also learn from it and
use it for reflection about their own development.
Denis Goulet, one of the renowned development ethicists, explicitly states that the
United Nations’ documents, development plans and manifestos talk about or deal with
better life, greater equity in the distribution of wealth, and the need to assure social
15
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improvement of all. He further says: “Here is a clear proof of the existence of a ‘demand’
for development ethics.”16 Such concerns outside ecclesial circles, such as of the United
Nations, underscore the importance of the question of human development and indicate
how enduring, all embracing and efficacious the teaching of Populorum Progressio has
been and continues to be.
The work will attempt to establish the foundation for all other principles for
integral human development. The understanding of the human person, human dignity and
human rights is a significant question that touches all people at the core elements of their
being, and they constitute this foundation. Paul VI argued that the centrality of the human
person demands that in our vision of the world the human person must always be at the
center.17 For the human person to be the purpose and center of every activity, education is
necessary. Consequently, the study will advocate that a careful education about integral
human development based on the value of human life, the human person, human dignity
and rights could make a significant difference in efforts to promote human development.
The understanding of the human person and human dignity are crucial for a change of
attitude. It is through this understanding that human dignity can be acknowledged as an
inalienable (God-given) element of the human person.18 This enables people to see the
sense of mutual claims they make. It also helps people to rethink the ways of working for
human development. They may also be helped to adjust their conception of human
development and their action plans and procedures for human development. This way
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human development becomes an activity that challenges and transforms people’s thinking
and practical life. Education of all categories of people about their rights, duties, human
ability and moral or ethical responsibility to alleviate and treat maladies that confront
individuals and society promotes individual and human community.
The study is intended to help educate believers or members of religious
communities, and understanding people, that Theology and Ministry are directed towards
the protection, promotion and enhancement of human life, human person, human dignity
and human rights. The duo are directed to the salvation of the entire person and all
people. As people can be self-destructive or invite suffering and degradation upon
themselves and others, they are also able to reconstruct and develop themselves and
others. Theology and Ministry facilitate this process. The International Theological
Commission succinctly summarized the significance of such and similar assertions when
it stated that
This duty and right of God’s people to proclaim and defend actively the dignity of the human
person is particularly urgent today because of the simultaneous appearance of two challenging
factors: On one hand, there is a deep crisis as to the nature of human and Christian values. On the
other, the modern conscience is profoundly sensitive to injustices perpetrated against human
beings.19

The treatise on Populorum Progressio is significant in the general context of
Christian teaching. This assertion is implied in the preceding paragraphs, in terms of the
relation of the document to other Church social teachings. Populorum Progressio is
foundational in this regard, and a resource to seek out when questions regarding
development are raised. The long-standing Catholic tradition and teaching about love as
the fundamental and the ultimate commandment, the dignity of the human person,
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ownership of property, justice, peace and the confrontation of suffering are related to the
question of development. This study attempts to deal with these and similar issues.
The efforts to elaborate, develop and apply Paul VI’s notion of and principles for
integral human development are not in vain, at least, from a Christian or theological point
of view. Even outside this context there are conflicts, socio-economic and political
differences, imbalances, injustices and violations against the human person; and there is
global suffering including that found in Uganda.
This study offers some insights for reflection in the endeavor to resolve some of
the problems in Uganda; and to make some recommendations to alleviate such problems.
The work reiterates Catholic social teaching and human rights tradition and, in particular,
suggests some ways to confront the renewed challenges presented by Populorum
Progressio and other Catholic social documents dealing with human development.
The work is divided into four chapters. Chapter One deals with the foundations
for understanding integral human development. It espouses the influences behind Paul
VI’s vision of human development: childhood experiences, key personalities behind his
vision, his personal, professional and international experiences; and the encyclical,
conciliar and pastoral tradition that preceded the document. All of these affected him, his
profession and vision of human development. The chapter is vital because it shows the
forces that influenced Paul VI’s trend of thoughts and shaped his notion of true human
development. It shows the implicit and gradual development of the notion of the human
person, dignity, rights and other related notions which culminated in his view of integral
human development. The chapter outlines and explains the notion of human development
and ownership of property in response to human need and suffering. It includes the
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teaching of the Magisterium, papal encyclicals, pastoral letters and reflections of some
theologians.
Chapter Two treats the interpretation and understanding of Paul VI’s teaching in
Populorum Progressio. It outlines and explains the main issues treated by Paul VI in the
document and states how Paul VI attempted to resolve these issues. The chapter reiterates
Paul VI’s vision of true development, which is precisely his acknowledgement of the
vision of Louis Joseph Lebret, one of the drafters of Populorum Progressio, who
advocated the notion and nature of true development as being integral – the development
of the entire person and of all people in a similar fashion. It suggests the necessary
development principles that can, at least, be inferred from a general reading of
Populorum Progressio, and explains the requisite principles for integral human
development.
The thrust of Chapter Three is the anthropology for integral human development.
It underscores the understanding and emphasis of the human person, human dignity and
human rights as forces that compound the significance of Paul VI’s teaching on integral
human development. These will be treated as the most fundamental principles running
through all other principles in the document. One principle is stated and emphasized as
the most outstanding and fundamental – namely, human dignity. Consequently, in the
work I have argued that an anthropology for integral human development as advocated in
Populorum Progressio is an imperative. The anthropology presented in this Chapter
facilitates the acknowledgement of the need for integral human development and the
implementation of all other principles for integral human development. All other
principles stated or implied in Populorum Progressio are necessary for human
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development but human dignity is de facto the basic principle to be understood,
acknowledged and underscored.
Notwithstanding the fact that much has already been written about Uganda’s
religious, cultural, socio-economic and political history, Chapter Four delves into a
general outline of the problems in Uganda without a detailed presentation of Uganda’s
situation and the historical factors that impacted development in Uganda. The chapter
attempts to make an application of the teaching of Populorum Progressio to the Ugandan
context and to demonstrate how it challenges the status quo in Uganda. It is also part of
the task of this chapter to show the implications of the teaching of the document and to
make some recommendations to Uganda.
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CHAPTER ONE
FOUNDATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING INTEGRAL HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO: THE TRADITION THAT
IMPACTED PAUL VI’S LIFE AND THOUGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of human development, historically, is initiated by human
activity and directed to the human person and the human community. It is also
consequent to the prevalent events. Chapter One explains the foundations for
understanding the notion of integral human development as presented by Paul VI in
Populorum Progressio written in 1967. The principal thesis of this chapter is that a
thorough comprehension of Populorum Progressio requires an understanding of the Sitz
im-leben of the author and factors that influenced his thoughts, orientations, aspirations
and personality. The origin of the doctrine of Populorum Progressio is Rerum Novarum:
On the Condition of Labor written by Pope Leo XIII in 1891, but other successive social
encyclicals and church documents also influenced its teachings. Rerum Novarum is
fundamental because it was the first Catholic social encyclical which radically influenced
other ecclesiastical social documents. Commentators on Catholic social thought are
explicit on this issue. Peter Riga says of Pope Paul VI in relation to Populorum
Progressio:
His encyclical continues the clear teaching of his predecessors, from Leo XIII to John XXIII, in
the matter of social justice, that man has been called by God to live in a total fashion: socially,
politically, culturally, economically, morally, and spiritually. 1

Paul VI himself relates Populorum Progressio to preceding encyclicals such as
Rerum Novarum, Quadragessimo Anno, Mater et Magistra, Pacem in Terris and Pope
1
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Pius XII’s radio addresses.2 Pope John Paul II is explicit about such a relationship in his
statement that “. . . the encyclical Populorum Progressio follows directly in the line of
the Encyclical Rerum Novarum, which deals with the condition of the workers.” 3
The document is evidently related to Gaudium et Spes, The Constitution on the
Church in the Modern World, which expanded the range of the social question to all
human relations.4 We shall trace the evolution of Catholic social doctrine about human
development beginning with Rerum Novarum, notwithstanding the fact that other
documents prior to that document and period, including Early Christian teachings,
touched upon the issues of human development in various ways.5 The rationale behind
this genesis is that Rerum Novarum made the initial modern breakthrough in the question
of integral human development with which Populorum Progressio, the magna carta of
Catholic social teaching on human development, fundamentally deals.6 The documents
on Catholic social teaching advocate care for both the material and spiritual dimensions
of the human person, hence, underscoring the significance of integral human
development based on the dignity of the human person. This means that all documents on
Catholic social teaching are founded on the principle of imago Dei, that is the principle of
2
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the dignity of the human person created in the image of God, whether this is explicitly
stated or just implied.7 Therefore, it is appropriate and necessary to start this treatise
about integral human development with the examination, analysis and understanding of
the corpus of Catholic social literature related to human development.
Catholic social teaching is a compendium of works covering a diversity of areas
dealing with issues affecting the human person. This work will treat themes that deal only
with integral human development: development, justice, common good, subsidiarity,
human dignity and human rights, preferential option for the poor, women and feminism,
affirmative action, ownership of property, participation and peace. The most central of
these issues is that of the human person: human dignity and human rights. The
significance of the human person, rights and dignity cannot be emphasized enough
because a relevant political, social, economic and religious system is one that provides
goods and services essential to a life of human dignity.8
This chapter will treat different documents in relation to development principles
presented in Populorum Progressio. The principles feature in Paul VI’s biography, his
pre-pontifical and pontifical writings and the documents that impacted his trend of
thought in Populorum Progressio such as Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum. The study of Paul
VI’s biography and these documents helps in the grasping of his personality and what
influenced him to write Populorum Progressio in the way he did.
The chapter presents the gradual development of the notion of human
development in Catholic social teaching preceding and immediately after Populorum
7
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Progressio. It explains the development of ideas such as the human person, human
dignity, human rights, ownership of property, and the response to human need and
suffering. This chapter includes a biography of Paul VI, the social teaching of the
Magisterium in papal encyclicals and pastoral letters, and reflections of some
theologians. Its principal purpose is to demonstrate the centrality of the notion of the
human person in articulating the question of development.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first deals with the life of Paul VI.
The second addresses the encyclical, conciliar and pastoral tradition which preceded
Populorum Progressio. The third is about the influence of Louis Joseph Lebret on the
document. The fourth section treats significant papal doctrines and statements during the
pontificate of Paul VI.
II. THE BIOGRAPHY OF GIOVANNI BATTISTA MONTINI (PAUL VI)
Social interactions and circumstances at a particular period influence and shape
individuals’ thoughts and responses to the phenomena of life, though they do so
differently. A thorough understanding of Populorum Progressio depends on an
understanding of the influences that affected the author. In the case of Paul VI there was
no logical pattern of life. Peter Hebblethwaite notes this about him:
Ordained priest without having been a seminarian he was made archbishop of the most prestigious
diocese of Italy without having being a parish priest, and his name was put forward as a candidate
for the papacy in 1958 though he was not even a cardinal. His election as pope in 1963 was the
single “logical” event in his life.9

It was the circumstances of Paul VI’s upbringing and life that influenced the
course of these events. Many other contemporary forces helped shape the life of Paul VI
(Giovannni Battista Montini) and made him an important personality in the life of the
9
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Church and society in general. He personally experienced them as he grew up and
interacted with the world in which he lived. According to Hebblethwaite, Giovanni
Battista Montini “…had first-hand knowledge of Modernism, Futurism, Facism, Nazism,
Communism, Thirdworldism, Feminism, Ecology - all the movements that shook and
shaped the century now closing [20th century].”10 All these phenomena impacted Paul
VI’s thoughts, life and actions.
A. Childhood, Educational and Vocational Developments (1897- May 29,1920)
Pope Paul VI, christened Giovanni Battista Enrico Antonio Maria Montini, the
second of three sons, was born on September 26, 1897 at Concesio, Brescia in Lombardy,
in northern Italy, of Giorgio Montini and Guiditta Alghisi, a family initially of lesser
nobility that rose to higher status.11 Giovanni Battista Montini was born to a wealthy
family of ancient and respected elites, professionals, and intellectuals of a profoundly
Catholic background which eventually emerged as upper class nobility. His father,
Giorgio Montini, “was a principal editorial writer and reporter. . . .” 12 though he was
actually a professional lawyer. Clancy had this to say of Giorgio’s influence on his son:
He had profound influence on young Giovanni Battista. The latter’s gifts as an organizer, his
involvement in social questions, his charity, his intense interest in art and philosophy, his love of
writing, his commitment to all the aspects of modern life - these were to come to him from his
father, as in his home he received the most modern educations [sic] free from narrowness and
provincial flavor which characterized so many homes in those years before the First World War.13

The above claim alludes to elements Paul VI would later articulate in Populorum
Progressio: charity and participation, involvement, the diverse social questions and open10
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mindedness, which would be expressed in his idea of integral human development.
Charity or generosity to the poor and interest in public affairs were also qualities that
Giovanni Battista’s mother, Guiditta, exhibited, and so his qualities were partly a blend of
the qualities of both parents.14 This is the trend of life Giovanni Battista Montini would
follow most of his life.
Battista Montini had two brothers and no sisters, yet he grew in the company of
three experienced women - his mother, paternal grandmother and an unmarried aunt who probably helped to shape his attitude towards women. Hebblethwaite suggests such
influence on him and says that “from his student days in 1919 he welcomed women at
conferences, and was always on the lookout for talented women to serve the Church in
what today would be called ‘ministry’.”15
Battista Montini’s early educational life was surrounded by a diversity of
experiences. He was not very outgoing in the early years of his childhood and school.
Initially, he “was only completely at ease in the insulated serenity of his family circle.”16
However, this phenomenon eventually changed. As he grew he became more open and
less shy.
Giovanni Battista Montini was raised in a unique environment, compared to other
places in Italy, because the region was rich and fertile, industrially wealthy, a
reconciliation of diversities, which produced a macrocosm and a “political barometer of
Italy.”17 His family closely associated with advocates and lovers of modernism and
people who looked forward to the day of active involvement and contribution of
14
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Catholics to the socio-economic and political life of Italy, and to an age of harmonious
working of science and religion. The home of his parents had more influence on his
personality than the school environment. It was very hospitable, open to all calibers of
people - clerics, lawyers, politicians and writers - and the family discipline was strict yet
carefully moderated, and it was comprised of various aspects of life including practices
that were spiritual, religious, traditional and cultural. 18
Battistta Montini was a frail and sickly child but intelligent. He received his early
education from the Jesuits of Brescia, his home place.19 In 1903, at the age of six
Giovanni Battista Montini started school at the Jesuit school, Collegio Cesare Arici,
where he studied until 1914.20
In 1914, in accordance with the decision of his parents, Giovanni Battista Montini
had to “leave the Jesuit College of Arici, for health reasons, and finish his education
privately, taking exams at the state high school, Arnaldo da Brescia.”21 He completed his
studies at the Jesuit Institute of Liceo Arnaldo da Brescia at the age of 19. It was during
this same year that he disclosed his intention to become a priest, though this was not “a
surprise but neither was it inevitable” for as a child he never thought of being a priest and
his grandmother, Francesca, wanted him to serve the secular world.22 By making this
decision Battista Montini departed from his family’s traditional vocations of medicine,
law and public service. Initially his dreams were patriotic but were frustrated by his poor
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health despite his efforts to improve it through vacation and rest.23 When he wanted to
join the Italian military to defend his country in 1916, he was found unfit and denied that
service to which he felt he was called, necessitating him to make another choice of
vocation.24 In the same year (1916) he entered the Seminary of Brescia, though, in fact,
he was dispensed from living in the seminary because of his poor health, and he lived and
studied at home, to train to become a Catholic priest. As a seminarian his father involved
him in some extra projects. Giorgio Montini scheduled Giovanni Battista’s life and
involved him to work in his Cucine Economiche, a kind of soup kitchen for the poor
where Giovanni Battista served people with humility, charity, friendliness, and listened to
their problems and treated them humanely.25
In 1917, together with Andrea Trebeschi, Giovanni Battista Montini founded a
student magazine called La Fionda. As editor of the paper he exhibited great
organizational abilities and skills and made numerous contributions, since he was an
intelligent student, often at the top of the class.26 Clancy’s study of Battista Montini’s life
shows that he followed the regular curriculum of the seminary but privately pursued his
own agenda.
While at the seminary he studied the usual courses in Philosophy and Theology and church history
and Scripture, at home he continued to grow in knowledge of political and social forces shaping
the world. . . . There was always a balance in the forces that shaped Giovanni Battista
intellectually.27

Battista Montini manifested a global and comprehensive outlook of life and the
general human situation. This, partially, explains why he thought integrally and wrote
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Populorum Progressio the way he did. According to Barrett “Battista Montini was in
tune with the thinking of his time, politically and philosophically, through his active role
in the discussion groups of Brescia . . . .”28 but from what Clancy states, it is correct to
say that part of his knowledge, experience and standing depended on his private readings,
interests, encounters with the friends of his family and the input of his family members.
All these shaped him and contributed to his attainment of the goal to the priesthood and
of his entire career. He was ordained a priest on November 21, 1920 by Bishop Gaggia.29
B. From Brescia to Rome/Vatican 1920-1953
After ordination Battista Montini’s plan was to get involved in pastoral work and
to experience the actual life of the people. However, on November 10, 1920, because his
bishop wanted him to pursue further studies, he entered the Lombardy Seminary and
enrolled for courses at the Gregorian University and the University of Rome.30 He
pursued advanced studies at these universities and at the Accademia dei Nobili
Ecclesiastici, the Academy of the Noble Ecclesiastics, which he entered during the fall of
the year 1922.31
Battista Montini was soon to leave Rome for a sojourn outside Italy. “In May
1923, Don Battista went to Warsaw, Poland, to act as secretary to the Apostolic Nuncio,
Archbishop Lorenzo Lauri and his assistant Monsignor Carlo Chiarlo.”32 Later in 1924 he
was appointed assistant chaplain for C.U.C.R - the Circolo Universitario Catholico
Romano - “a club for Roman Catholic students, at the University of Rome. . . .” and
28
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according to Hatch, he was made “an assistant chaplain of the University of Rome
Branch of the Federation of Italian Catholic University students generally known as
FUCI.”33 Eventually Pius XI appointed him to be the national moderator of FUCI
(Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana). Although he and FUCI suffered
humiliation from the Facists of Italy, he never abandoned the course of helping young
Catholics as their chaplain and moderator.
From 1932 until 1933 Battista Montini was a member of the Vatican Department
of State, “diplomatic arm of the Holy See”, and he also conducted classes in Accademia
dei Nobili Ecclesiastici.34 Shortly thereafter he was promoted to higher positions. In 1936
he became Papal undersecretary of State, where he served in moments of crisis and
turmoil as one of the central Vatican figures in the struggles against external and
domestic forces, especially during the peak activities of the Nazis and communists and
during the holocaust and the world wars.35
Due to his administrative and leadership abilities Battista Montini earned
important positions in the Vatican. In 1937 Monsignor Montini was summoned to the
office of “Secretary of State and named Sostituto of the Secretariat of the State . . . .”36
(Subsititute for Ordinary Affairs) and from 1944 until 1954 he acted as Secretary of State
for Pius XII. When working in the Vatican he founded a service for prisoners of war,
employed radio as an aggressive means to communicate, established a resettlement for
those displaced and taken to concentration camps, showed mercy to refugees, offered
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hope and assistance to many such people including Jews who lived in fear in the Europe
of 1942.37
In the post-World War II years Battistta Montini was deeply interested and
involved in works of charity and peace. He founded and supported organizations that
worked towards helping the poor, weak and dispossessed, and worked hard for peace and
tried to promote a deeper understanding of the meaning of peace.38 He was entrusted with
the responsibility of preparing for the Holy Year in 1950. He articulated a notion of
authentic peace, which became one of the requisite conditions for integral human
development in his encyclical Populorum Progressio, in the way he had previously
articulated it in 1949. This claim is supported by Clancy, according to whom Battista
Montini emphasized the notion and vitality of peace in the following words:
The world had come to think of peace, he said, as merely a cessation of battle, a failure to resist.
Not this, not the abandonment of principle, not the desire to enjoy life and the compromise making
this possible, and certainly not the enforced peace of totalitarian regimes - none of these was
peace.39

Prior to Populorum Progressio, in 1963, John XXIII wrote Pacem in Terris,
which promoted the notion of peace based on the dignity of the human person. This was
not a surprise because Battista Montini was a contributor to the draft of Pacem in Terris.
He is even said to be the thinking behind this encyclical of John XXIII.40 Peace is
founded on shared human dignity and human dignity is shared because of the common
origin of humanity. Peace can be attained if human dignity is valued, and development is
possible only because human dignity is valued. For this reason the issue of peace was
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crucial to Battista Montini’s agendum of integral human development in Populorum
Progressio. This explains why Paul VI considered development and peace as synonyms,
and called development “the new name for peace.” 41
C. From Vatican (Rome) to Milan, 1954-1963
On November 3, 1954 Monsignor Montini was appointed Archbishop of Milan,
consecrated on December 12 of the same year, and assumed the most challenging
assignment in the whole of Italy.42 It was challenging because of the contextual diversity
in which he worked. The situation was one of industrial growth, enlightenment,
ultramontane, modern civilization, affluence, soulessness, neurosis and despair.43 The
diverse challenges he encountered partly explain why he wrote an encyclical that made
the notion of integral human development central, although his biographies do not make
explicit statements to that effect. This is further manifested in his approach to conflicts.
He did not like conflicts. He preferred persuasion, conversion and peacefully winning
people to his side.44 He sought peace and persuaded people through the translation of
Christian social principles into reality, maintenance of the dignity of people and labor and
provision of hope and vision.45 The dignity of the human person and integral human
development are at the center of the questions he attempted to articulate in Populorum
Progressio. The fact that Battista Montini’s theme of integral human development was
emphatically projected in his life before his pontificate is attested to by what Clancy
recounts him saying:
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I should like to see the workers given every assistance - social, professional, religious. I should
like them to realize not only the wrong done them by forcing on them the materialistic view of
life, but that our own spiritual view of life has far more respect for them as persons and recognizes
in them the boundless treasure of a soul that thinks and prays and believes. I should like to see
technical schools helping them to realize that there can be a vocation, a redemptive value, a
religious dignity in human work . . . . 46

Such expression of attachment to the workers explains why Battista Montini is
sometimes called “the Archbishop of workers.”47 In his attempts to meet the needs of
workers one can notice his holistic approach to their problems. Battista Montini looked at
development from both material and spiritual points of view. He later developed this
vision of true human development in Populorum Progressio, a view which Clancy
affirms, acknowledging with Battista Montini that the two dimensions of the human
person have to grow in a balanced manner to affirm that the person is truly developed.48
Battista Montini’s emphasis on the religious dignity of work is related to the
private ownership of property, which he upholds in a qualified way. According to him
ownership of private property should be disinterested, just and enhancing to the human
condition.49 The questions of human dignity, private ownership of property, justice and
human rights, which eventually featured in Populorum Progressio, are here anticipated.
Giovanni Battista Montini had genuine concern for people, caring about both
material and spiritual dimensions of the human person. As an archbishop, Montini
reorganized diocesan structures, revitalized social action and newspapers and magazines,
inspired and encouraged priests to be involved in spiritual and social acts of charity and
to guide the populace in moments of crisis. He established an archdiocesan office of
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charity, and built inexpensive churches all over the Archdiocese of Milan to care for the
needs of the growing population, and he established an institute for priests to study
sociology and economics to help them explain the social doctrine besides explaining
dogma.50 A comprehensive vision of life and undertakings for development reinforce
Battista Montini’s advocacy for integral human development.
In 1957 Battista Montini initiated an integral mission, one of his most powerful
pastoral initiatives, in the Archdiocese of Milan, that aimed at reaching out to different
categories of people in the community. The project also involved the expertise of people
from different walks of life. It was directed to hospitals, clinics, homes of the sick and the
elderly, women and men, and schools as a priority because education is the means of
transforming people’s life.51 Hatch says of this mission that
Montini’s most spectacular offensive in his battle against the forces of atheism was the Mission of
Milan. . . . starting on November 4, 1957 and lasting for three weeks….52

This mission revealed the mind and intentions of a man who wanted no person
and no aspect of human life to be excluded in the struggle for development. This was
Battista Montini’s outlook from an international or a global point of view. He further
demonstrated this when, in 1957, he founded “the Overseas College especially for
Catholic students from underdeveloped countries, and Indians, Africans, South
Americans, Syrians and Indonesians were among those granted the opportunity for free
education” in the College.53 Here again it is apparent that the future pope had a keen
interest in the development of all people and this was later reflected in Populorum
Progressio. The development he advocated was of the whole person. Here we notice a
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man who tries to strike a balance between faith and material social action, and ensures
that the two are integrated. For Battista Montini when social action is being promoted
traditional Christian teaching should not be compromised or overlooked because both are
essential for an integrated growth of the human person. Hatch confirms this when he
states: “But for all his progressive ideas Montini was firm in preserving the deposit.”54
On December 18, 1958 Battista Montini was named a cardinal. As cardinal he
was enthusiastic and instrumental in the preparation for the Second Vatican Council, and
particularly emphasized the importance of the dialogue of Christianity with the modern
world.55 Alden Hatch says:
Montini’s enthusiasm for the council stemmed from his ardent wish to bring the Church into
harmony with the Kingdom of the Modern World without losing any significant traditions. . . . the
Cardinal Archbishop of Milan was the first member of the Sacred College to publicly hail the
Pope’s move toward the renewal of the Church.56

On January 25, 1959 when Pope John XXIII announced to the College of
Cardinals his intention to convene an Ecumenical Council, the news was not well
received by a majority of the Cardinals, but it was good news for Montini. This partially
explains his contributions during the Second Vatican Council, especially in drafting
Gaudium et Spes. It also helps us to understand why and how the document influenced
Paul VI’s thoughts in his own encyclical, Populorum Progressio. Finally, Battista
Montini’s interest in seeing the Church placed in the modern context demonstrates the
legacy of his contacts with personalities like his father Giorgio, Andrea Trebeschi, Paolo
Caresana, Giulio Bevilaqua, Giovanni Maria Longinotti, Jean Guitton, Jacques Maritain,
Fornari and Henri de Lubac who all looked forward to dialogue between the Church and
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modernism, or at least seeing the Church placed in a context where dialogue could be
fostered.
The preparation of the Second Vatican Council would also provide him with an
opportunity to encounter people who had views similar to his. He would particularly meet
the French Dominican priest, Louis Joseph Lebret, whose vision of life was similar to his
own, and who eventually helped him to draft Populorum Progressio when he was pope.
D. The Return from Milan to Vatican (Rome), 1963-1978
On June 21, 1963, after John XXIII died, Battista Montini was elected to succeed
him as pope and he returned to Rome. He took the name Paul VI, and emphasized the
significance of dialogue between Christianity and the Modern world.57 Due to his travels
and diverse experience, he viewed life and the world comprehensively. He was conscious
that the world consists of “the common man in a diversity of races, beliefs, national and
cultural backgrounds” and he was comprehensively sensitive to the diverse forces
affecting the world of his time, thus making him a “global thinker.”58 His mind was
already reflected in the words of the 1963 encyclical, Pacem in Terris, of John XXIII
whose writing he influenced. According to Clancy, Paul VI had the following to say:
One cannot overlook the fact that even though human beings differ from one another by virtue of
their ethnic peculiarities, they all possess certain essential common elements and are inclined by
nature to meet each other in the world of spiritual values, whose progressive assimilation opens to
them the possibility of perfection without limits. They have the right and duty therefore to live in
communion with one another.59

These words forecast Paul VI’s mind in Populorum Progressio where he shows
that integral development, its necessity and possibility are based on the common origin
and the shared human dignity of all people. Though he did not elaborate, he advanced the
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dignity and rights of the human person as core principles and foundation stones for peace,
justice and development. As one who lived in times of political, social and economic
turmoil, Paul VI was sensitive to peace. Having contributed to the preparation of the 1950
Holy Year, which had the intention of elucidating the idea of peace, and being a
contributor to the drafting of John XXIII’s Pacem in Terris, he had already pushed
forward some of the peace agenda he intended to perpetuate. Hatch describes Paul VI’s
concern for peace when he says:
The pope’s overriding preoccupation beyond, even the work of the Council was World peace, and
in speech after speech, in allocutions and informal talks, he emphasized his intense concern.60

Chronologically, since Pope John XXIII died in 1963 and Giovanni Battista
Montini was elected pope the same year, he bridged the First Vatican Council (1870) and
the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). He brought the Second Vatican Council to
completion in 1965 and implemented the deliberations and the acts of the Council up to
his death in1978. It can be suggested that what he implemented after the Second Vatican
Council was not novelty to him because it was a doctrine to which he contributed.
E. People who influenced Paul VI
The personality of Paul VI was a blend of personalities of some of the people of
the society and time in which he lived, especially those with whom he interacted and who
shaped his life from childhood to adulthood. The main concern of this part of the work is
just to treat some of the significant people who are in this category.
1. PARENTAL AND FAMILY INFLUENCE
Paul VI was aware of the influence of his parents on his life. According to him,
his father Giorgio’s influence was that of courage because he “did not know fear” but
60
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knew how to “be a witness”; and his mother Guiditta’s influence was one of “the sense of
recollection of the interior life, of meditation that is of prayer, of prayer that is
meditation. . . . All her life was a gift.”61 However, the personality of Giorgio was more
dominant in Paul VI than that of Guiditta.
This is not to deny the influence of his mother upon him because spiritually
Guiditta influenced him significantly. This just shows that each of the parents influenced
him differently. Paul VI’s personality and life were, therefore, partly a reflection of a
blend of the character and life of his parents, and partly his own making and the influence
of other people.
2. ANDREA TREBESCHI
There was an enduring relationship between Paul VI and Andrea Trebeschi. Paul
VI first met Trebeschi at the age of 6 at Cesare Arici but they did not become friends
until eleven years later.62 On November 30, 1914 he disclosed to Trebeschi his intention
to become a priest when they met on St. Andrew’s day, and Trebeschi encouraged him to
carry out his plan.63 Trebeschi became one of Battista’s closest friends as a youth, and
also a source of encouragement and mutual support, especially because they shared
similar views of life and the world.
The two, however, at times were separated from each other by life’s demands.
Nonetheless, they were able to work together whenever they had the opportunity. This is
how they founded a student newspaper.64 After the winter of 1917, when Trebeschi was
back from Bologna after pursuit of studies in Law, the two “began to plan a student
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magazine, called La Fionda (The Sling) which had its first issue on 15th June 1918.”65
The magazine was launched “with the aid of other young crusaders, designed to forward
the aims of the Society of Saints Faustina and Giovita,” founded by his father, and “to
combat current evils and serve the cause of Christian democracy.”66
Battista Montini and Trebeschi shared the same confessor, Caresana, who saw the
“faith-potential of their friendship.”67 Their common relationship with Caresana
consolidated their friendship. Even if factors of life separated them they kept
communicating with each other in letters for “Battista knew the need of love, took the
risk of love, was compassionate and deeply vulnerable. Friendship pulled him out of
himself.”68
Trebeschi was an example, comfort and encouragement to Battista in moments of
“darkness and doubt.”69 The relationship between Trebeschi and Battista Montini
continued even though they embraced different vocations. Trebeschi’s article in the
magazine La Fionda, contributed to the issue of 5th Sept 1925, which articulated and
related his Polish experience to the wider world, namely to “concepts such as people,
nation, nationality, country (patria), state, government, patriotism” significantly impacted
Battista Montini.70 According to Hebbelthwaite the influence of Trebeschi on Battista
Montini is evident because
Montini defended patriotism as a fundamental Christian virtue, the concrete expression of “love of
one’s neighbor.” It can be corrupted or go horribly wrong, but patriotism as neighborly love is the
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right place to start. He actually calls it “fraternal solidarity.”
patriotism to take Christian shape. . . . 71

Naturally he expects Polish

This quotation affirms elements striking to and influential upon Paul VI. They
were also eventually reflected in his vision of life. It also shows his wish for the
integration of specific cultural practices with Christian values. This vision of life was
probably facilitated by Paul VI’s short life in the Secretariat of the Nunciature in
Warsaw, Poland, and his encounters with people of different cultural backgrounds.
3. FRANCESCO GALLONI
Francesco Galloni was a priest appointed to Concesio in August 1915. Shortly
after his appointment he became an adopted member of the Montini family and
influenced Battista Montini. He had many plans of which contact with the youth of the
outlying areas was impressive to Battista Montini, but Galloni impressed Battista most
because he “was among other things an authority in Alessandro Manzoni, the nineteenth
century Italian novelist,” and his works, and finally he was a young priest, barely older
than Giovanni Battista himself, and he “was zealous, cultivated and pious.”72
Consequently, Giovanni Battista adopted Galloni as a priest-model and a senior brother.
In May 1915 Italy was at war with Austria, all Italians were called to fight and
there was “no clerical exemption” in the military service. Consequently, Galloni,
Battista’s new friend, enlisted to go and fight, but before his departure Battista requested
to have a retreat with Galloni at Camaldonese hermitage at San Genesio in the Brianza
mountains, and they were joined by Caresana who was also the spiritual mentor of
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Galloni.73 However, on reaching the Hermitage they got a cold reception. The two priests
could stay with the monks, but Giovanni Battista was denied accommodation because he
was a layman, though he was eventually given a “woodshed” to sleep in as instructed by
the superior of the monks.74 This was a learning experience for Giovanni Battista. He
learned to be receptive to all people, and not to alienate and discriminate against
anybody. He has no personal and explicit statement to this effect but this can be deduced
from his life and writings.
Although Galloni went to the barracks and the two were separated from each
other during the war, Battista kept communicating with him and he was in the battlefield with Galloni in spirit, implying that one factor that united Battista and Galloni was
their patrioitic attitudes.75 This also explains how caring and concerned Giovanni Battista
was and how intimate they were, not only as friends but also spiritually.
4. GIULIO BEVILAQUA
Giulio Bevilaqua was an Oratorian priest, born in Verona in the year 1881,
appointed to work in La Pace in Brescia. He was a compulsive and unconventional
person who “disliked learning which was not backed up by experience.”76 According to
Bevilaqua knowledge should be founded on practical life experience and lead to a
practical living. This explains why he was able to see the link between the Church’s
social teaching and liturgy.
Bevilaqua was at first Paul VI’s room-mate and later his confessor, even after
Giovanni Battista became pope. This explains why Paul VI is said to have owed
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Bevilaqua so much wisdom and spiritual inspiration, and why Bevilaqua was later made
Cardinal by Paul VI when he was pope.77 Giovanni Battista was close to Bevilaqua who
constantly extended his cultural and intellectual horizons and taught Giovanni Battista to
look for the signs of the Holy Spirit in the Modern World.78 This eventually played into
Giovanni Battista’s interest in other cultures and his enthusiasm for traveling to other
lands beyond Italy. To Giovanni Battista, Bevilaqua was and remained a source of
support, encouragement and counsel, and a “master and friend” as Paul VI (Giovanni
Battista) himself later said when making Bevilaqua a Cardinal in 1965.79
Bevilaqua guided Battista in his reading of some of the literature of that time but
he left Brescia on February 5, 1917 to serve as an army chaplain, though soon thereafter
he was taken prisoner. However, Bevilaqua had already helped Battista to become aware
that
reading was not a self-indulgent retreat into an aesthetic ivory tower but a way of listening to the
contemporary world. . . . Reading was the first stage towards what would become dialogue. Later
he would present Bevilaqua himself in the figure of “modern man,” the modern thinker, with all
the energy, the weariness, the doubts, the struggles, the discouragements, and the hopes that the
philosophical, scientific, religious and social crises have caused in the exhausted soul of modern
man.80

Bevilaqua taught Battista Montini to read for a purpose, not just as a hobby. In
other words, Battista Montini’s mentor taught him to use what he read to interpret real
life situations confronting people in the current world, and to act to change the status quo
if this was necessary. In their relation Bevilaqua was not just a friend, he was also an
advisor to Battista Montini.81
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5. PAOLO CARESANA
Paolo Caresana, from Pavia province, was a calm diocesan priest who worked
among “the oppressed rice-growers of his province, whose cause he defended, and later
joined the Oratorians in 1912, and became the confessor and spiritual director of Battista
Montini and remained so for life.”82 He was a confessor to both Battista and his friend
Trebeschi, and he asked Battista Montini to help him in his various pastoral ministries.
During the war Caresana employed Battista Montini as his unofficial and unpaid
secretary.83 It is, however, not easy to measure fully how much influence he had on
Battista Montini because their relationship was a spiritual and confidential one, but they
had a long relationship.
Battista Montini met Caresana for the first time during a retreat in 1915 through
his friend Galloni who was also the spiritual son of Caresana.84 Caresana was Bevilaqua’s
oratorian colleague who helped Battista Montini through 1917. He frequented the
Montini family because he helped out in their parish church of San Giovanni. Battista
Montini considered his fatherhood as “my seminary.”85 The relationship between
Giovanni Battista and Caresana was motivated by the similarities in the attitudes of the
two. Like Bevilaqua, Battista Montini was attracted to Caresana, partly because they both
liked the cycling sports. However, their relationship went deeper than sports to real issues
affecting life, both spiritually and materially.
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6. JEAN GUITTON
Jean Guitton’s intellectual qualities influenced Giovanni Battista. Guitton was a
French philosopher to whom Paul VI was partially attracted because he was French. Paul
VI had a great admiration for and attachment to “the French Dominicans and Jesuits who
were Montini’s masters.”86 Paul VI and Guitton first met in 1950 and Paul VI was
probably attracted to Guitton because “Guitton, member of the Academie Francaise was
every inch a French intellectual capable of transmitting the most banal observations by
brilliance of his style.”87 It was Guitton’s intellectual qualities that Giovanni Battista
wanted to and did emulate in his own life.
The two had several intellectual exchanges. Guitton always sent Giovanni Battista
Montini his new publications, and their enduring relationship, which started in 1950,
involved a lot of dialogues initiated the same year.88 These dialogues ultimately proved
useful for and exerted influence on Giovanni Battista.
Giovanni Battista Montini’s encounter with Guitton was helpful to him in his
analysis of situations. It was partly because he looked at life in the light of Guitton’s
vision that he was able to recognize “the experience of modernity” 89 during his sojourn
in Paris when the duo partially discussed the use of intellectual abilities in articulating
issues correctly and to arrive at mutual consensus about issues. From such exercises
Giovanni Battista Montini seemed to have learned to be more open, to learn from others,
to be more objective, and to look at things more critically than ever before.
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7. KARL ADAM
Karl Adam was another influential person upon Giovanni Battista. He was a
leading German Catholic theologian and a reformist Tubingen University Professor who
“represented the best of Catholic thinking at that time.”90 Karl Adam was one of the
people who greatly contributed to Catholic aggiornamento even if this was not
immediately recognized and acknowledged publicly. One of Adam’s influences upon
Battista Montini was through the latter’s reading of Adam’s book, The Essence of
Catholicism, which imprinted an indelible influence on Giovanni Battista Montini’s
ecclesiological thoughts. The final chapter of the work, entitled Catholicism in its
Actuality, made a radical change from the idealistic view of Christianity and Catholicism
to the actuality of Catholicism, which addressed practical and relevant issues like the
place of sin in the Church, and from the “contrast between the ‘essence’ of the Church
and its existential reality Adam deduced that the Church was in need of constant
reform.”91 The works were attractive to Giovanni Battista Montini because he was
interested in the transformation of the life of people when necessary. The Spirit of
Catholicism, in particular, captured his attention because it implied a reform project,
although this was a very controversial issue at that time.92
Robert Anthony Krieg says that “according to Adam, Catholicism embraces all
that is truly human. It is an affirmation of all values wherever they may be, in heaven or
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on earth.”93 Here Adam gives a holistic or integral view of the Church which Paul VI
would accept with ease. The influence of Adam’s writings was significant to Battista
Montini because he lived and worked in a confused world where he wanted to provide a
“theology for committed lay people, giving them a sense of spiritual direction”, and “the
Church to which he introduced students was in need of reform.”94 The ideas of Adam
were useful to Battista Montini when the Second Vatican Council was convoked and
there was a felt need to read and analyze the signs of the times to address the needs of the
world of that time.95 At this juncture, it is correct to suggest that during the Second
Vatican Council the ideas in Adam’s writings influenced Battista Montini’s (Paul VI’s)
contributions in the drafting and deliberations of Gaudium et Spes, which addressed
ordinary life issues and placed the Church in dialogue with the modern world.
8. JACQUES MARITAIN
Jacques Maritain was a French philosopher. He wrote a work entitled La
Primaute du Spirituel. Through this work and other works he had a great influence on
Italian Catholics. This influence was partly facilitated by the translations Battista Montini
made in 1928 and 1934.96 When studying French, Battista Montini met Maritain at the
Institute Catholique or some other place in France, and encountered other outstanding
Frenchmen of different backgrounds during this time.
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Maritain influenced Giovanni Battista Montini who eventually translated and
introduced Maritain’s Three Reformers to Italian readers.97 These were Martin Luther,
Rene Descartes and Jean Jacques Rousseau whose works together resulted in the French
Revolution and a modern world. Battista Montini’s attraction to Maritain was possibly
because in him Battista found somebody with his own type of attitude, an attitude
positive towards reforms. It was the knowledge from the writings of Maritain and other
people that was ultimately attractive to the young students.98
9. HENRI DE LUBAC
Henri de Lubac’s life and writings impacted Battista Montini. He was influenced
by what he knew and read about Henri de Lubac and some of his writings.99 Battista
Montini’s reading of Henri de Lubac’s Meditation on the Church had an impact on his
vision of the church, especially “the doctrine on collegiality in Chapter 3 of Lumen
Gentium.”100 Many of the ideas of Henri de Lubac in this book found their way into
Lumen Gentium, and some of these were the ideas of the centrality of Mary in the church
and ecclesiology, the mysterious nature of the church, and the sacramental character of
the church, instead of viewing the church as a perfect society contesting the “infiltration
of the modern world.”101 Such ideas were assimilated by Giovanni Battista who used
them during the Second Vatican Council and his pontificate. The ideas found their way
into the thoughts of Giovanni Battista Montini because he favored a dialogue between the
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church and the modern world. This was reflected in Gaudium et Spes which influenced
Paul VI’s writing of Populorum Progressio tremendously.
In conclusion, we can say that Giovanni Battista’s various encounters and
experiences with different people were ultimately all important in various moments of his
life. These experiences shaped his philosophy of life. His selfless love and compassion,
deep and caring sensitivity and concern, determination, easy, diversified and on-going
relationships with people of all colors and religions, openness to criticisms, his integral
vision of life and approach to issues, and his well-developed talents were consequent to
his diverse encounters and experiences.102 It was due to such diversity of experience that
Paul VI was able to conceive of an aggiornamento, a reform of the Church, as one of the
aims of the Second Vatican Council, and he “was able to affirm the value of the world
without diminishing the uniqueness of the Church” or “to balance tradition and reform
without compromising either.”103
III. THE ENCYCLICAL, CONCILIAR AND PASTORAL TRADITION PRECEDING
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO
A. Rerum Novarum: On the Condition of Labor (1891) - Pope Leo XIII
Rerum Novarum marks the foundation of modern Catholic social teaching.
According to Donal Dorr the document was a breakthrough and major solution to the
social question and the first Church document to initiate vigorous attempts to resolve
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social problems - a “solid foundation on which the later encyclicals and other Church
documents could build.”104 Barret confirms this assertion by acknowledging that Rerum
Novarum was
one of the world’s great social documents, a high point of Christian thinking on the condition of
the laboring classes and on the relationship between employer and employed.105

The document addressed specific questions about the changes in industry,
physical sciences and labor, disparities between the rich and the poor, and increased selfreliance of workers and moral degeneration which influenced the course of economic
activities.106 The document was the brain-child of Leo XIII, the protagonist of the
framework of modern Catholic social teaching. However, this does not mean that the
problems addressed in Rerum Novarum were not previously addressed. In fact, Christian
social workers and social movements created before 1891 were already dealing with
social problems. Schafer notes that:
The social encyclical Rerum Novarum of 1891 confirmed the beginnings of the solution to the
‘social question’ which had taken shape within the German Catholicism of the nineteenth century
and had been arrived at through disputes and class struggles in society and the church.107

This contention is affirmed by David O’Brien and Thomas Shannon who think
that “in Rerum Novarum, written in 1891, Leo attempted to persuade Catholics to
concentrate less on politics and more on the “social question.”108 The place of the
document in Catholic social thought is certain. According to Peter J. Henriot and others,
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because of the principles which he set forth to guide in the formation of a just society, this
document has become known as the Magna carta for a humane economic and social order.109

In Rerum Novarum Leo XIII attempted to resolve a wide range of issues that
affected human society before and at the time it was written, and even later. Leo XIII’s
teaching about living wages was empathetic and “put the Church squarely on the side of
the workers in the struggle for recognition of trade unions.”110 This resonates with the
alternative English title of the document, “On the Condition of Labor” and confirms the
view that the ‘new things’ Rerum Novarum fundamentally dealt with was the question of
the condition of workers.111 Leo XIII articulated the recurrent contemporary socioeconomic and political problems in society, critiqued the socialist solutions to the
problems, laid out the role of the Church in society, outlined and explicated the rights and
duties of workers and employees, treated the question of just and legitimate ownership
and the just use of money, the duties and the responsibilities of the state, and its limits of
intervention for the common good, the importance of the just wage, and finally he “laid a
solid foundation for the concept of social justice”,112 and the workers’ right of
association. The document was a reaction to both socialism and capitalism. It dealt with
the pitfalls of the opposed socio-economic and political systems and ideologies. The
document’s response was relevant not only for the time and circumstances which it was
addressing, but also for the situations that prevailed later and today.
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In addressing major issues such as the “care for the poor, rights of workers and
employers, return to Christian morals and the role of public authority,”113 Rerum
Novarum placed the social question in the hands of individuals, institutions, groups and
society. Leo XIII introduced the question of the equality of people who are distinct from
other creatures and do not have the honor that people hold. People are the highest
perfection of animal nature. Human persons have to live in mutual esteem and love
because of their equality. This implies that everybody has a duty, role and responsibility
to fulfill. This advocacy was founded on Leo XIII’s contention that all people are created
equal, have a common destiny and have a right to a share of nature’s resources on the
basis of sharing a common origin - God.114 The equality Leo advocated was the equality
of human dignity.
Another question Leo XIII addressed was that of capital and labor. He was
particularly concerned about wages paid to people for their work and advocated that it
should help promote their livelihood.115 Just as he made a distinction between human
persons and the rest of creation below the human person, recognizing human dignity as
an important characteristic of the human person, Leo XIII advocated for the rights of
workers. He in no way advocated that capital and labor are on equal footing. They are
both important factors of production but labor must be given precedence over capital.
This is clear in his argument about the equality and dignity of persons. Consequently, he
contended that the employer, who is the capital owner, may not value himself or capital

113

Henriot et al, 27.
Rerum Novarum, 11,7-8; 12,8 and 38,17-18.
115
Rerum Novarum, 3, 5-6; 9, 7 and 81, 35-36.
114

43

more than a fellow human being who constitutes labor because all people are created
equal in dignity, and all need the basic necessities to live a dignified life.
Leo XIII was aware that some degree of inequality among people is undeniable.
Naturally, people may be unequal in talents even if God has endowed them with the same
dignity.116 This is a pragmatic contention because it is indubitable that individual
differences exist on the basis of personality, character, talents and the ability to perform.
It is impossible to get the same achievements from all people because of their variable
traits.
Leo XIII spoke strongly against socialism, acknowledged the legitimacy of
ownership of private property, which is also for the benefit of other people. He
contended, in accordance with divine design, that other people should have a share of the
private property of an individual. The right is presented here as a natural right. This
contention was in line with the Early Fathers of the Church, and W.E. von Ketteler’s
understanding of the use of natural resources that
in the Christian view human beings have ‘only a God-given right to use the goods of the earth in
the order that is prescribed by him, with the intent that all human beings should receive their
necessary bodily needs from the fruit of the earth.’117

The consistent argument about the ownership and the use of private resources is
that natural resources have a universal destiny – they are for the use of all people. The
right is conversely presented as a natural right to use the goods of nature.
Von Ketteler was acknowledging that divine design, according to Christianity, is
that people are entitled to use natural resources as God willed so that all people receive
the material needs for their survival. This right is, however, limited by moments when
116
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there is a dire need and the person who worked to earn ownership of the property has met
personal basic and crucial needs. Therefore, this right is not absolute because natural
resources are destined for the good of all people, they “all have basically the same and
equal claim to the wealth producing resources of nature.”118 Schafers aptly summarizes
the whole argument of von Ketteler in these words:
Nevertheless, the right to property was not an absolute right since God created nature to nourish
all human beings, and this purpose must be achieved. Therefore, each individual must again make
the fruits of his property a common good in order as far as in him lies to contribute to the
achievement of this determination. Here Christian love of neighbor is enjoined for the poor.119

This is a view Paul VI later promoted in Populorum Progressio where he argued
that in the event that an estate becomes counterproductive to the common good, public
prosperity would demand that it be expropriated and put to a better use.120 Paul VI
advocated that resources should be used appropriately and adequately. It is right to
conclude that like Rerum Novarum, Populorum Progressio restrained the limit of private
ownership by referring to the needs of other people but Paul VI was more vigorous in
limiting the right to private ownership of property than Leo XIII.
According to Leo XIII, society has a crucial responsibility to care for individuals
in the society. Its purpose and duty is to allow, facilitate and promote the common good
as its ultimate end.121 This means authority has the responsibility to serve the entire
community. The contention suggests the significance of the principle of subsidiarity. If
individuals and small groups are not capable of meeting their needs, the civil authorities
have the obligation to intervene to help them to meet their needs. It also demonstrates that
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the wealth of a nation is the fruit of the labor of its working class.122 Civil society should,
therefore, be envisioned as owned by all its members.
This viewpoint is what Paul VI later advanced more vigorously, and it has a
significant implication in the way ownership of wealth or property is understood. On
account of the fact that labor is crucial for the wealth of a nation and individuals, people
have the right to own private property. However, private ownership must be limited
because of the social responsibility of each member of the society. Property should also
serve the common good and provide for other individuals’ needs.
Leo XIII’s argument had a dual foundation. First, the workers’ right to private
ownership of property is grounded in the fact that they have earned what they claim to be
theirs by working. Since they have worked for what they rightly claim, they have the
right to dispose of it as they judge fitting. Secondly, the right of other individuals to claim
the same property is founded on the fact that nature’s resources were not specifically
predetermined for an individual but for the good of all creation. This is the gist of his
theological argument here. However, Leo XIII cautioned “that the just ownership of
money is distinct from the just use of money.”123 This according to him is a significant
teaching of the Church which has been handed down in the church’s tradition, and ought
to observed. It is a caution that governs the use of wealth despite the right to own wealth.
It suggests a responsible use of wealth.
Just ownership and use of property points to the relational character of ownership
and disposition of property. This also means that there is a social dimension of both
personal property and the human person because people share common traits. These need
122
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to be cared for by all. Similarly, the dignity of every individual and his rights need to be
protected by all. According to Curran,
the beginning of modern Catholic social teaching insisted on what might be called today a
relational anthropology that avoided the opposite extremes of individualism and collectivism.124

Curran’s claim is crucial for an understanding, appreciation and application of the
notion of human dignity, human rights and the human person, and ultimately the notion
of integral human development because development cannot be complete unless it is
inclusive. This claim, therefore, typifies integral human development advocated by Paul
VI. It provides a relevant foundation for Paul VI’s teaching on integral human
development because Paul VI is concerned about the development and the good of all. It
is here that the relational concept of a person and the phenomenon of integral human
development challenge the disregard for a relational anthropology, and above all for a
theological anthropology. The Aristotlean dictum that “man is a social being”, not a being
in isolation, should be esteemed as relevant and significant in facilitating our vision of
socio-economic and political issues too.125 The underlying reason here is that a human
person is always part and parcel of the human family.
In sum, the contents of Rerum Novarum were as follows: advocacy for a
movement to develop social conscience and a demand for state intervention in the social
question; freedom of association for workers; ownership of property; a response to
socialism and capitalism; and the role of the Church in social questions.126 The document
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outlined and dealt with the following significant questions and principles for human
development: the principle of imago Dei or human dignity based on the human origin
from God, a principle which implies human equality; the questions of common good,
option for the poor, human rights in general and particularly the right of the workers, the
universal destiny of the goods of nature and the right to private ownership of property,
responsible participation and involvement, and the mutual claims and duties or
obligations of workers and employers. Finally, the document articulated the role of
affirmative action, understood here as aggressive government intervention to redress
injustices against the disadvantaged, because it spelt out the role of the state or public
authority in the enhancement of the human condition.
B. Quadragessimo Anno: Forty Years Later, On the Reconstruction of Social Order
(1931) - Pius XI
Pius XI’s Quadragessimo Anno, written in 1931, was an updating of Rerum
Novarum. At the time it was written the world faced the effects of the destruction of the
First World War, the Great Depression, socio-economic and political turmoil and
anarchy, opposing political economies and social ideologies, systematic socialism and
capitalism, which compounded conflicts and crises. Pius XI responded to help resolve
some of these problems.
In Quadragessimo Anno Pius XI continued Leo XIII’s intervention in the social
question and “reaffirmed the right and the duty of the Church to address social issues”.127
According to him, the Church cannot afford to remain indifferent to the problems of
people for whose good it was instituted. The document dealt with the recurring problems
of the Industrial Revolution exacerbated by the great depression at the end of 1920s and
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its impact on workers.128 Similarly, Henriot and others contend that the document was
written at a time of “severe world wide economic depression” to address “the issue of
social justice and” to call “for the reconstruction of social order” 129 in accordance with
what Leo XIII taught in Rerum Novarum. These views support the idea that in
Quadragessimo Anno Pius XI perpetuated the doctrine of Rerum Novarum about the
defense of workers and their rights-calling for some state intervention, the qualified right to
private property, which also retains its social dimension, and the condemnation of the extremes of
socialism and capitalistic individualism.130

Human dignity, human rights, solidarity and social justice which Pius XI
vigorously introduced into Catholic social teaching were the bases of his “response to the
extremes of totalitarianism and capitalism” which affected people’s way of conceiving
the ownership of property.131 By advocating and emphasizing that there should be “social
responsibilities of private property and the rights of working people to a job, to a just
wage and to organize to claim their rights,” 132 Pius XI lent his support for what Leo XIII
taught in Rerum Novarum forty years earlier. Pius XI also reinforced the issue of a lifesupporting wage initially introduced by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum. He demanded that
remuneration should be adequate to meet the needs of the workers, their families and
dependents. Alegria says of a just wage that “it should be sufficient reward to cover the
human needs of the worker and his family.”133
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As the title of the document suggests, Pius XI contended forty years after Rerum
Novarum that the social order needed to be reconstructed. This endeavor should include
“the positive role of governments in promoting the economic good of all people in
society”.134 He suggested that it was the role of both individual members of the state and
civil authorities to contribute to the growth and well-being of the state according to their
capacities. Pius XI called for application of the principle of subsidiarity, anticipated the
question of ‘option for the poor’, and alluded to what was eventually called the common
good and affirmative action.135 Some scholars are of this same view. Oliver F. Williams,
for example, affirms that Quadragesimo Anno clearly stated that “the role of the state is
to be in the service of society” and “its role is primarily to facilitate the cooperation and
well-being of the “mediating structures.”136 This thought is also in line with the
Aristotlean claim, which has an enormous support among scholars, namely, that “the very
purpose of the state is the good life or happiness of its citizens.”137 Here the purpose, role
and obligation of the State are clearly stated. The government has the duty to oversee the
different activities in the state. In the judgment of Pius XI in specific social contexts,
“economic undertakings should be governed by justice and charity as the principal laws
of social life”.138 This is a duty the state should accomplish by employing the necessary
apparatus.
Pius XI condemned the prevalent unfavorable ideologies of the time. Like Leo
XIII, Pius XI decried capitalism and communism. He condemned capitalism because of
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its “unregulated competition” and he “condemned communism for its promotion of class
struggle and the narrow reliance for leadership on the working class”.139 He contended
that the evil of capitalism is that it creates a gap between the rich and the poor, and the
problem with communism is that it kills initiatives and participation, just as it violates the
right to private ownership of property.
A careful reading of Pius XI suggests that justice and charity underlie his
condemnation of the two antagonistic ideologies of communism and capitalism.
Communism is condemned because it is against justice while capitalism is denounced
because it is uncharitable. This makes sense because love and justice are mutually
inclusive. Justice without love is inconsiderately harsh and love breeds justice. The
absence of justice breeds strife and hatred. He argued for an alternative that would
integrate the positive elements of both communism and capitalism. According to him the
“corporatist principles as an alternative to both capitalism and socialism”

140

is the

solution. Here Pius XI re-echoed the teaching of Leo XIII which was directed against the
dichotomy between the individual and community, capitalism and socialism. This
suggests why he tried to provide an alternative policy that merges the two divergent
ideologies.
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI furthered ideas of Rerum Novarum by proposing
a novel alternative system, “based on corporatist principles”
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as an alternative to

capitalism and socialism, considered separately. This alternative has been criticized by
some scholars. Alegria, for example, argues that creating a corporate order as a solution
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denies to people “freedom of party and association” 142 and is close to the structure of
totalitarian regimes which practically succumbed to and bent towards capitalist interests.
He further contends that this is the reason why the later popes and the Second Vatican
Council remained mute about such a suggestion or this portion of Quadragessimo Anno.
After all, the document had emphasized the right to free and autonomous association.
This makes sense because it would be contradictory to suggest corporate order as an
alternative solution to both capitalism and socialism as it would mean building one
system out of two different and opposed systems. This is impossible and seems a difficult
task because as ideologies they are two opposite extremes.
The teaching of Quadragessimo Anno resembles that of other Catholic social
encyclicals and pastoral doctrines because it addressed questions and advocated
development principles present in these other documents. Quadragessimo Anno, both
implicitly and explicitly, exposed issues, virtues and principles relevant for human
development. These are the principles of human dignity and subsidiarity, human rights,
charity, social justice, affirmative action, free association, the common good, and
participation. Pius XI also treated the question of ownership of private property and its
social orientation, and that of the option for the poor.143 Just as Pius XI demonstrated in
his teaching in Quadragessimo Anno that the Church cares, his successor, John XXIII did
the same in his 1961 encyclical Mater et Magistra.
C. Mater et Magistra: Christianity and Social Progress (1961) - Pope John XXIII
In Mater et Magistra Pope John XXIII continued the encyclical tradition of Leo
XIII and Pius XI. His choice of the title of the encyclical, referring to the Church as
142
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mother and teacher, reechoed the opening paragraphs of Rerum Novarum and
Quadragessimo Anno because it reaffirmed the Church’s right to teach about the meaning
of human life and activities. Mater et Magistra affirmed that “the role of the Church is to
encourage, stimulate, supplement and complement” the efforts of the people.144
Mater et Magistra, however, specifically focused on and emphasized significant
developments that occurred after the Second World War. It focused on “aid to
underdeveloped nations.”145 John XXIII anticipated the fears in Populorum Progressio
when Paul VI saw the need to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich and to
achieve peace. Consequently, he “set forth a number of principles to guide both
Christians and policy makers….” to meet this need.146 John XXIII made a significant
contribution to Catholic social thought as previous encyclicals did:
He called on committed Christians and “all people of good will” to work together to create local,
national, and global institutions which would both respect human dignity and promote justice and
peace. He emphasized that the growing interdependence among nations in a world community
called for an effective world government which would look to the rights of the individual human
person and promote the universal common good.147

The above reading of the document shows a significant contribution from John
XXIII. He articulated crucial principles and conditions necessary for an integral human
development as Paul VI called it in Populorum Progressio. Besides agriculture and the
problems related to it such as agricultural technology, health and crop insurance, price
management and just wage for farmers, John XXIII dealt with the traditional issues and
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conditions - human dignity, human rights, justice, peace, solidarity, subsidiarity, active
government involvement, and the common good.148
Though not explicitly stated, it can be inferred that when the pontiff speaks of
“growing interdependence among nations” it is an allusion to the multiplication of social
relations and a more effective mutual support among governments and peoples of the
various nations, a contention augmented by the fact that John XXIII “argued for state
intervention to ensure that property would achieve its social functions”; and the
underpinning reason for this intervention is that “justice requires that property be used for
the common good.”149 This means the state is an apparatus for ensuring that property is
used to meet the needs of individuals and the society. John XXIII advocated collaboration
at all levels, locally, nationally and internationally.150 When he speaks of effective world
government, one concludes that the principle of subsidiarity and affirmative action151 are
also implied here because the two are mutually inclusive. This observation is stated in
Dorr’s reading and interpretation of the document, and the text of the document itself.152
The two principles need to be viewed as mutually inclusive because state action is
possible only if an institution such as a government exists, and once such an institution is
in place the application of the principle of subsidiarity is essential. In other words, an
establishment of a government necessitates the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and affirmative action, and an establishment of a government is necessitated
by the need to apply the two principles.
148
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In Mater et Magistra “the emphasis on socialization, an increase of network of
relations by which individuals are connected to each other”153 compounds the
significance of subsidiarity, association, justice and solidarity. John XXIII did not
overlook this significant factor. Consequently, the document promoted the question of
human development through
its insistence on socialization: the more complex interdependence of citizens that calls for growing
state intervention because only the state can deal with such issues.154

According to John XXIII authentic development should emphasize the social
dimension of the human person and yet be moderated by the state. This was precisely an
advocacy for emphasis on “economic socialism” or socialization, which means “the more
complex interdependence of citizens that calls for growing state intervention because
only the State can deal with such all embracing issues”, and according to Curran such
emphasis “exists in . . . tension with the older principle of subsidiarity.”155 This means
Curran claims that socialization and subsidiarity are mutual extensions of each other. So
John XXIII’s emphasis continues the previous affirmations of the principle of
subsidiarity. This means that economic socialism - collective ownership - and
socialization - an initiation of one in such a system - does not hinder the application of
the principle of subsidiarity and affirmative action. They are mutually supportive; there is
no opposition between subsidiarity and the emphasis on socialization.
The right to private property and a just wage advocated by Leo XIII in Rerum
Novarum recur in Mater et Magistra. John XXIII advocated the right to own private
property but he also insisted on the social dimension of property and condemned the
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inequality that exists in our world on the basis of ownership.156 Property can be a
possession of an individual but it is also to be shared with the needy. Natural resources
are destined for the good of all. This is one of the reasons for the document’s
condemnation of inequality in the world. Mater et Magistra, therefore, continued the
teaching of Rerum Novarum by stating that there is a social dimension of property as
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI also advocated.
Like the preceding documents, Mater et Magistra grappled with diverse questions
and conditions relevant for the integral development of peoples. These included the
relational character of the human person, human rights, human dignity, human freedom,
peace, justice, subsidiarity, solidarity, participation, the social dimension of property,
common good, affirmative action, and option for the poor.157 Some of these and similar
problems were again expounded in John XXIII’s following encyclical, Pacem in Terris:
Peace on Earth of 1963.
D. Pacem in Terris: Peace on Earth (1963) - Pope John XXIII
Pacem in Terris is the social encyclical that most broadly advocated and
articulated the question of human rights in the context of natural law, at the same time
dealing with other questions such as “the relation between authority and conscience,
disarmament and development of the common good.”158 Although Rerum Novarum,
Quadragessimo Anno and Mater et Magistra treated the question of human dignity and
human rights, Pacem in Terris emphasized human rights and provided other fundamental
conditions for integral human development. John XXIII placed Catholic social teaching
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in an interpersonal context, especially because he clearly emphasized social, economic,
legal and political (civil) rights of the human person.159 This explains the significance of
mutual claims people have upon each other at all levels and in all contexts because they
are human but have a divine origin.
Pacem in Terris demonstrated the significance of mutual claims in a social
context and actually compounded the importance of solidarity in its definition of human
rights. David Hollenbach is of this view. He advocates that solidarity is a precondition for
an adequate theory of human rights.160 The reason for this claim is that a human right is
always restricted, especially when it conflicts with the rights of others who are “less able
to look after themselves.”161 This means human rights should be defined and exercised in
the social context because human beings have a common origin and share human dignity.
This is a generally accepted truth and was confirmed especially after the “United
Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).”162 The United Nations implied
natural law even if it made no explicit reference to it. This is evident in its definition of
rights based on the assumption that all people share human dignity.
Similarly, on the foundation of natural law John XXIII developed principles to
govern human life. Pacem in Terris treated issues of human rights, and initiated a
dialogue between East and West by articulating different ideologies and movements
which deal with socio-economic issues in the two blocs of the world.163 Pacem in Terris
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showed that human life has a dual dimension because humans are both individual and
social.
Pacem in Terris also dealt with the critical question of war and the arms race, and
it underscored the importance of global peace to humankind because the arms race and
war retard both individual and national economic progress.164 Here the question of the
importance of peace for human development is introduced as a vital condition. This
anticipated one of Paul VI’s final appeals in Populorum Progressio, calling development
“the new name for peace” 165 and underscoring its significance. The development of all
demands peace and also means peace for all. This suggests and underscores that the
document is concerned about interpersonal relations. It deals not only with individual
issues but also with questions that affect all people.
The principle of common good was important to John XXIII, especially because
of the social character of the issues with which he dealt. Consequently, he considered
“the common good as a principle of integration” and advocated that each political
community has a common good, called “the Universal common good”, which transcends
the individual good but which cannot be separated from the common good of the entire
human family.166 This notion of common good explains why questions about human
rights, peace, participation, ownership, subsidiarity, option for the poor and affirmative
action are closely related. The common good must be promoted by political authority
because this is the sole purpose for which political authority is established.167 Here John
XXIII insisted after the example of Leo XIII that political authority should intervene if
164
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the interest of some portion of society should suffer some evil or injustice that it cannot
handle. Public authority should intervene to help.168 Both Leo XIII and John XXIII
squarely addressed the question of the role of political authority. If political authority
does not serve the common good it is unjust. This resonates with Aristotle’s commonly
accepted thought that the purpose of civil authority is to serve the citizens.169
In Pacem in Terris John XXIII provided guidelines for ordering relationships
between human beings and articulated the ways of handling the relations between
individuals and the state. John XXIII did not mention the principles of subsidiarity and
affirmative action explicitly in Pacem et Terris though he was explicit in Mater et
Magistra especially regarding subsidiarity. Nonetheless, here, they are implicitly stated
as part and parcel of the question of human development. He also treated the ways of
ordering international relations by defining human rights in a global context.170 This is
significant because human rights were formally defined in terms of social relations and
meant to govern such relations whether between individuals or nations. The definition of
human rights provides for smooth and humane social relations. This is probably why
John XXIII treated relational issues in the world community.171 This is a significant
contibution because integral human development cannot be achieved without good
international and interpersonal relationships.
In Pacem in Terris John XXIII affirmed the following important points for
integral human development. First, human persons are social beings. Secondly, the
understanding of human dignity and human rights should apply to all different possible
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contexts. Thirdly, development is a relational enterprise just as peace is not an
individually isolated pursuit. Fourthly, the important principles presented by John XXIII
in Pacem in Terris are the principles of human dignity, human person and human rights,
peace, justice, subsidiarity, participation, common good, affirmative action, and the
option for the poor. Finally, all issues of human development need to be coordinated,
interrelated and integrated in order to achieve authentic human development.
E. The Second Vatican Council (1962-1965): Two Significant Documents - GS and
DH
To understand the documents of the Second Vatican Council, it is necessary to
grasp the situation prior to the Council and its consequences because the Council was a
moment of transition from one era to another. An understanding of this background is
also crucial for an understanding of the notion of authentic development, which, to a
great extent was misrepresented in the period preceding the Council. Henriot and others
made significant observations to elucidate this point, stating that
In many respects, Vatican II represented the end of one era and the beginning of a new era. The
enthusiasm and energy of the Age of Enlightenment had been spent. This philosophical movement
of the eighteenth century, marked by a rejection of traditional social, religious, and political ideas
and an emphasis on rationalism, had culminated in the holocaust in Europe and in a world sharply
divided. These events had dashed hopes that secular society, based on human reason severed from
religious faith, would lead to unending progress. Instead a misguided rationalism had unleashed
forces which threatened to destroy the world.
The Church had turned inward in reaction to a rationalistic age which demeaned religious belief.
Religion, more and more defined as a “private” affair between the individual and God, was
relegated to a marginal role in society. At the same time, the Church channeled its energies
outwardly to evangelize the “mission lands” in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.172

Despite the very positive and real achievements of the Enlightenment, for instance
its elevation of the importance of reason in facilitating a critical view of life, some people
had misgivings about it. As Henriot and others indicate, prior to the Second Vatican
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Council, there were errors or misconceptions of various kinds and degrees. These
mistakes were a consequence of movements claiming to usher in changes for the better.
Instead what happened was indeed the opposite. Secondly, there was an excessive
emphasis on reason as the only and ultimate source of solutions to problems. Thirdly,
despite the efforts of the Popes to teach people through the various encyclicals, the
doctrines of the ecyclicals were not studied or never reached the majority of people. In
other words, the church’s efforts to address social issues tended to receive inadequate
results – her influence in the world was diminished. There was a dichotomy of world
view, religion, society and politics, and probably the human person, especially between
one who was a Christian and one who was not. Consequently, there was some revolution.
The holocaust occurred in Europe and forces that threatened to destroy the Church were
continuously making their way into the world.
It was this and like situations to which the Second Vatican Council was
responding through Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. The conciliar fathers,
particularly in Gaudium et Spes, dealt with the social questions, human dignity, and the
role of the church in shaping society.
They affirmed that the specifically religious mission of the Church did give it a function, light, and
an energy which can serve to structure and consolidate the human community according to the
divine law.173

Such a reaction is tantamount to acknowledging that the role of the church is
crucial in human development and is still more relevant when considered in terms of
integral human development, which this study advocates as the most authentic notion of
development. The rationale for such a claim is that the church helps contribute to the
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demands of integral human development by providing answers, insights and suggestions
for spiritual growth besides the material growth, which constitutes only a portion of what
is true development.
1. GAUDIUM ET SPES: PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD
(1965)
Gaudium et Spes, one of the sixteen conciliar documents of the Second Vatican
Council, is important reading material for the study of Catholic social teaching in general,
and Populorum Progressio in particular, for three main reasons. First, the two documents
chronologically follow each other; the latter was promulgated soon after the former.
Secondly, as Krier advances, “in Populorum Progressio Paul VI was clearly carrying out
the vision of Vatican II, which sought to be in dialogue with the world, as church and
society addressed current social issues.”174 This view is supported by Richard P. McBrien
and Peter Riga, who have acknowledged that “Progressio….is simply following The
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World of Vatican II.”175 Finally, Gaudium et
Spes is a comprehensive, dependable and authoritative document of Catholic social
teaching on which many discourses can be based.
In Gaudium et Spes the conciliar fathers dealt with the Catholic Church's relation
to the secular world. The rationale in this approach is that the Church, the people of God,
is in the world and part of the world affected by different forces of change. Theologically,
this is the context in which believers practice their faith and non-believers express their
solidarity with the whole of humankind. Consequently, one of the document’s main
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concerns was the paradoxical dichotomy and relationship between faith and practical
life.176
Gaudium et spes “presents justice as central both to the issue of poverty and that
of peace.”177 This means that peace and people’s level of development is determined by
how just society is. The creation of peace and people’s development call for a critical
study of social conditions of the people. The document was fundamentally open to the
contemporary situation, and even emphasized that “the church can learn from this world”
and “must help in the process of evaluating what the world has to offer” whether directly
or indirectly.178 It addressed the question of the role of the church and challenged every
church member to look more critically at the church’s external activity than at her
internal concerns. It challenged people “to read the signs of the times” in the light of the
Gospel message and to act accordingly, especially because of sociological, technological
and other changes that affect the world.179 It advocated that the church has a duty to care
for and protect human dignity amidst such changes.
Gaudium et Spes called for respectful dialogue within the Catholic church, and
with other churches and non-believers. “Respect for others” is crucial because it permits
freedom to operate authentically.180 The council Fathers were keen to note that it is
necessary for the church to interact with the secular world, but they also observed that
church-state relationships should not cause the church to submit to the whims of civil
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authorities because the church has a prophetic role to defend the poor.181 The logic of this
argument is that if the church identifies only with the state and civil authorities, and does
not fulfill its prophetic role or forfeits it, there is no defense for the disadvantaged people.
This is why the Church has always to stand apart and be the conscience of the nation,
reminding people when things are going in the wrong direction.
Gaudium et Spes is officially called the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World. However, the diverse nature of its contents - “personalism, the social
nature of the human person, the relation between the Church and the world, justice, and
development”182 - are relevant issues not just affecting Catholics or Christians, or
believers but all people. Gaudium et Spes treated the fundamental principle for integral
human development, namely human dignity. It placed the human person and human
dignity in the context of “human community, human activity in the world and the role of
the church in the modern world.”183 It was in this spirit that the Council fathers advocated
that “social order and development should always work for the benefit of the individual,
and they require constant improvement.”184
The second half of Gaudium et Spes addressed intriguing issues such as marriage
and family, culture, socio-economic life, the political community and the fostering of
peace.185 Further issues addressed by the document were proper cultural development and
positive intercultural relationships, cultural education, the community of nations,
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international organizations, and international cooperation.186 These are vital elements for
the integral human development because they either deal with institutions that promote
development or they are components of authentic human development.
Gaudium et Spes provided norms of cooperative and moral life. Its guidelines
were for both the developing and developed nations. They are, namely, that developing
nations should aim, unequivocally and expressly, at the total development of their
citizens and they should recognize that the foundation of progress is the work, tradition or
culture and talents of their citizens, the tapping of their local resources, and the good
example of their most influential personalities, not just foreign aid.187 Participation and
justice are implied here as necessary for integral development.
Secondly, wealthier nations have a duty to support “less developed nations to
achieve their own development.”188 This support should, however, be lent with prudence
and mutual consideration of the needs of those to be supported and that of the supporters.
The issue addressed here is that less-developed nations should not expect more support
than can be provided and developed nations are not to support to the detriment of their
own development. In Gaudium et Spes the conciliar fathers advocated that the most
important tasks of the developed nations are “to help the developing nations to fulfill
these commitments”, undertake within limits what is necessary “for the establishment of
world-wide cooperation” and consider “the welfare of the weaker and poorer nations” in
their business relations with them because the poorer nations support themselves out of
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the revenues from such business dealings.189Here the document spells out two requisite
conditions for integral human development: solidarity and justice.
Thirdly, to minimize excessive inequalities between the developed and
developing nations the document calls the international community to be the effective
coordinator and stimulant of development without injustices or violation of the principle
of subsidiarity, thus also calling for organizations that promote and regulate international
commerce.190 Gaudium et Spes addressed the issue of socio-economic justice. It took a
strong stance on the question of international socio-economic justice and cautioned, as
Paul VI did later in Populorum Progressio, that if international justice is not pursued the
wrath of the less-developed peoples will result in their forceful claims for what they need,
which may be a justifiable course of action.191 The implication of this argument is that
there is need for an international institution to regulate the global socio-economic system,
suggesting that the principle of subsidiarity is necessary for the regulation of the
economic system. This is what Paul VI later suggested in Populorum Progressio.
Gaudium et Spes, therefore, identified three vital requisite factors for integral human
development - justice, subsidiarity and solidarity in a spirit of equality.
Fourthly, Gaudium et Spes advocates a major concern of Populorum Progressio,
namely that although it is important to evaluate the economic and social structures,
people must guard against whatever offers “material advantage while militating against
man’s spiritual nature and advancement.”192 Populorum Progressio later makes central
the issue that development is not only material but also spiritual. Gaudium et Spes states
189
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that the implementation of such norms is the duty of all and again underscores the
importance of participation for human development. It advocates that the role of the
church and of every Christian is to support any course of action for international order
and efforts to bridge the gap between the poor and the rich, individually, nationally and
internationally, and any action that protects human dignity, and promotes human life
spiritually and materially.193 This is the responsibility of the church as an institution, and
of every individual Christians and all people including non-believers. This reinforces the
import of the principle of participation, which affirms that authentic integral development
involves everybody and benefits all.
Gaudium et Spes manifests an integral character in its treatment of world
problems and the Church in the modern world. This view suggests that the document was
one of the immediate influences behind Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum Progressio. It
outlines the necessary principles and requirements for a good society and for authentic
development: the human person, human dignity, human rights, justice, peace, common
good, universal solidarity, subsidiarity, affirmative action, option for the poor and
equality.194 All these elements feature in Populorum Progressio. This explains the close
relation between Gaudium et Spes and Populorum Progressio, while Dignitatis
Humanae’s teaching is foundational for both Gaudium et Spes and Populorum
Progressio. However, this relation is better seen in the fact that Gaudium et Spes initiated
the discussion on the theme of development and their treatises are both critically based on
the dignity of the human person.195
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2. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE: DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (DECEMBER 7, 1965)
Dignitatis Humanae centered on two crucial issues - human dignity and human
freedom. The document was conspicuously an affirmation of conscientious religious
freedom but it actually dealt with “the principle of the dignity of the human person and
the freedom of the act of faith.”196 The Council fathers had this to say at the introduction
of Dignitatis Humanae:
Contemporary man is becoming increasingly conscious of the dignity of the human person; more
and more people are demanding that men should exercise fully their own judgment and a
responsible freedom in their actions and should not be subject to the pressure of coercion but be
inspired by a sense of duty.197

While the Council fathers recognized that the Church has a responsibility towards
the wider, secular society, they were also cautious that there should be no disrespect for
religious views and freedom of religious practice. This position was founded on the fact
that all human persons have dignity and rights.198 This was a reason for their advocacy
for religious freedom in Dignitatis Humanae. Freedom is an inherent God-given quality
and participation in divine qualities. This suggests the gravity of the central character of
the human person, human dignity and human rights in the document. Human dignity is
the most imperative principle, a conditio sine qua non, for authentic development.199 The
document, therefore, deals with one of the central and crucial elements for integral
human development. Human dignity per se is the principle, though not emphasized
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adequately and linked sufficiently to other development factors, that guided the
authorship of Populorum Progressio.
The question of the right to religious freedom was influenced by the experience of
the American Church and the American bishops who participated in the Second Vatican
Council, but the specific advocate and developer of the notion of religious freedom was
the American theologian John Courtney Murray.200 The counciliar Fathers adopted the
position advocated by Murray though they were initially apprehensive about his views on
religious freedom. Although the original intention was to address the question of free
practice of religion, there were other implications because attention was drawn not only
to the rights for religious practice, but also to the realization that human rights are at the
center of the life of a human person and interpersonal relationships, including the process
of development. Human rights are founded on human dignity. This is why the foundation
of the teaching of Dignitatis Humanae, namely the dignity of the human person, is the
most fundamental basis for integral human development. The document addresses the
religious-spiritual dimension of the human person by officially acknowledging religious
freedom as “based on the very dignity of the human person as known through the
revealed word of God and by reason itself” but also “based on the rights of all citizens to
be free from external coercion to act against their conscience or preventing them from
acting in accord with their conscience in religious matters”201 both publicly and privately.
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Dignitatis Humanae maintains that religious freedom is important for four main
reasons.202 It is a condition to help people achieve “a fuller measure of perfection with
greater ease”; it is demanded by the common good of society; it safeguards the rights and
duties of the human person in the social context and, finally, the promotion and
protection of religious freedom is an all-embracing responsibility of individuals, social
groups, civil authorities, the Church and other religious communities.
Development principles presented in Dignitatis Humanae revolve around the
human person and relationships. Though not all are explicitly spelled out in the
document, we can infer that the following issues were addressed by the council fathers:
the human person, human dignity and human rights, participation, common good and
solidarity. One could summarize them as “the principle of the dignity of the human
person in the social context.”203 This shows the document’s individual and
communitarian character and approach to human development and the social question.
IV. THE INFLUENCE OF LOUIS JOSEPH LEBRET IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO
To understand the notion of authentic human development as presented by Paul
VI in Populorum Progressio a grasp of Louis Joseph Lebret’s life and vision of true
development is necessary. This section will treat only the most important aspects of
Lebret’s life, his influence and contributions to Populorum Progressio. A significant
foundation for this claim is the comparison of Lebret’s definition of development and that
of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. Paul VI and Lebret define development in a similar
way and Paul VI quotes Lebret almost verbatim in his definition. Paul VI’s views in
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Populorum Progressio many times replicated the thoughts of Lebret.204 It is significant to
study his life in relation to that of Paul VI because the study facilitates our vision of why
they looked at life in a similar way. This claim was supported by Paul VI himself, in
Populorum Progressio, John Paul II, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, and Denis Goulet.205
A. Louis Joseph Lebret and Paul VI
Lebret was a French planner, priest and philosopher and a contemporary of Paul
VI. He was “born in 1897 to a family of fishermen: his birth place was the hamlet of
Minihicsur Rance near Saint-Malo, a major port of Brittany” and at the age of 18 years
Lebret joined the French naval academy and served his country in that capacity.206 He
served in Belgium, Holland and in the Middle East during the First World War, and in
1922 he was made an instructor in the Naval academy. At the age of 26 he changed his
career. He joined the Dominican Order and was later ordained a priest. After ordination
he was appointed a chaplain to a convent in Sain-Malo so that he could recover from his
poor health, but he soon abandoned the responsibility, got involved in the social struggles
of the fishermen of Britanny, and eventually developed an interest in development and
social action because he strongly believed that exploitation and misery at that time were
consequences of structural malpractices.207
Goulet describes Lebret as a man who respected nature, and had immense
“curiosity for lands and cultures other than his own, unshakable common sense in the
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face of life’s tragedies, and a person with ever-fresh willingness to take new risks”, and
one who traveled widely.208 He observed the circumstances in which people lived, their
economic activities, and concluded that structural evils could not just be eliminated
through individual efforts alone but must be fought by concerted efforts. In the words of
Goulet, Lebret believed that:
chronic structural evils cannot be corrected by subjective goodwill, but only by concerted
transformation of structures, a task which presupposes a rigorous and detailed understanding of
how structures work. Lebret refused to accept the simplistic choice: either efficiency or
humanization. He understood that efficiency was indispensable; but he also knew that it had to be
redefined so as to serve human values.209

Lebret advocated a development in solidarity because it takes teamwork to effect
development. He contended that planning for development should involve both “decision
makers at the summit and communities at the grassroots.”210 Both Lebret and Paul VI
strongly invoked participation because the latter concurred with Lebret in Populorum
Progressio where he advocated that every member of society must contribute to the full
development of the society.211 The principle of participation was strongly invoked here.
This involvement, however, demands that the social, economic, political and cultural
circumstances are properly understood. This is why according to Goulet Lebret thinks
that
progress or development takes place when freedoms can find their expression in institutions,
norms of exchange, patterns of social organizations, educational efforts, relations of production
and political choices which enhance the human potential. What is ultimately sought are basic
conditions under which all persons may fulfill themselves as individuals and as members of
multiple communities.212
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A careful reading of Goulet suggests the value he attaches to the concern for the
common good, freedom, education, social relations, mutual respect and viable political
systems. This calls for an analysis and understanding of how the socio-economic and
political systems operate. He places the human person at the center of the question of
development, and makes human dignity and human rights important. Efficient work
toward development must take this into account, and should be judged in terms of how it
promotes the dignity and rights of the human person, both individually and communally.
There are similarities in the life, and ultimately the experiences and vision of
Louis Joseph Lebret and Paul VI. Other than being contemporaries they were both from
families of moderate background, though Paul VI was from a richer family background
than Lebret; they lived during the First World War and were both interested in defending
their countries by fighting during the war, though Paul VI was incapacitated by his poor
health.213 Just as Lebret saw the plight of the fishermen and the third world and had poor
health at one moment, Paul VI experienced the same; they were interested in cultures
other than their own; and they both traveled to many countries in the world, which
definitely affected their outlook on life.214 This explains their interest in the problems
affecting the poor and the Third World nations. Their common interest in socio-economic
and political issues is probably best explained by these facts too. It was not a surprise that
both Paul VI and Lebret would view true development in the same way.
Lebret and Paul VI met during the Second Vatican Council. Paul VI (then
Giovanni Battista Montini) was one of the principal figures in the drafting of Gaudium et
213

Hebbelthwaite, 39.
Hatch, 122-123,195-196, 205-214. also see Goulet, A New Moral Order,30-31; Barret, 222-225, 262263; Clancy, 133-137, Populorum Progressio,4,2-3. Paul VI alludes to his trips to South America in 1960,
to Africa in 1962, and his journeys to Palestine and India where he saw abject poverty.

214

73

Spes, The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, and Lebret himself
was one of those who played an important role in drafting the constitution.215 This, too,
accounts for how Paul VI and Lebret knew each other and why Paul VI enlisted the help
of Lebret in drafting Populorum Progressio.216 Three other reasons possibly account for
their relationship. First, both men were writers and interested in the development of poor
people. Secondly, Paul VI lived in France, learned the language and the culture, which he
liked. Thirdly, they influenced each other through their writings and if Paul VI had to
enlist the help of Lebret in drafting Populorum Progressio, it was because he already
knew Lebret to be an expert in the field of development. These evidences strongly
suggest that Lebret exerted influence on Paul VI, especially in his encyclical, Populorum
Progressio. This view is further supported by Goulet who affirms that
one explicit and detailed formulation of the requirements of authentic development has been made
by the French planner and philosopher, Lebret. Lebret is that rare development expert cited by
name in the 1967 encyclical, the text that is commemorated and amplified in the 1987 papal
document, On Social Concern.217

This is an affirmation of the influence of Lebret on the contents of Populorum
Progressio and Paul VI’s trend of thought in the document. Goulet is explicit and
confirms that “Lebret served as the major expert advisor to Paul VI in drafting On the
Development of Peoples.” 218
Lebret used his experiences to meet the development needs of his time and world.
He founded the Institute for Research and Training in Development (IRFED) in 1958, to
try to resolve some of the socio-economic problems of his time. The institute was
founded “to prepare future leaders of the Third World for the difficult tasks of
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development.”
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Lebret died in 1966, just one year before the encyclical Populorum

Progressio which he helped to draft, was published.
B. Development and The Last Revolution, 1960/ 1965
The Last Revolution, one of Lebret’s major, influential and challenging works was
written and first published in 1960 and reprinted in 1965, two years before the
promulgation of Populorum Progressio. According to George G. Higgins, who wrote the
preface of the 1965 edition of The Last Revolution, Lebret’s main concern was
the essential causes and remedies for economic, social and cultural misery which plagues the so
called underdeveloped countries and poses such ominous threat to the security and peace of all
mankind.220

In the work Lebret impartially critiques what Higgins calls the “established but
fallacious values” of the East and the West or more specifically, of the Soviet Union and
the United States.221 Higgins further affirmed that he was tougher on the United States
than on the Soviet Union because he expected a higher standard of performance from a
nation which claims to be an example of democracy, than from any other nation.
According to Lebret, the economic system which the West created made them rich but it
dissociated the West from “the confidence and the friendship of the underdeveloped
peoples of the world.”222 Lebret was affirming that the West had created not just a gap
but a rift between the rich and the poor together with its own dangers. This vision was
eventually made explicit in Paul VI’s advocacy for integral human development in
Populorum Progressio.
Lebret decried the oppressive market system of the West in their dealings with the
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underdeveloped nations simply because he contended that the West’s desire to become
even wealthier has blinded them from recognizing, respecting and protecting the rights of
other people, especially their rights to the basic essentials of life.223 He further argued that
because there is “greed and immoderate love of possession, there is reluctance of more
advanced and consequently richer peoples to take an objective view of the world
situation”.224 Here Lebret raised the question of social and distributive justice. The
argument of Lebret was that more advanced and rich nations often make decisions to
favor their own interests, while the poor continue to suffer and their situation deteriorates.
As lack of due good poverty is evil though in itself it is not immoral but this kind of
injustice is an offense against those who are in dire need. Lebret affirms this by saying
that “the greatest evil in the world is not the poverty of those who are deprived but the
lack of concern on the part of those who are well off.”225 In other words, the immoral
thing is refusing to do something to alleviate poverty.
According to Higgin’s reading of Lebret, “money has become a yardstick of
everything” and consequently, education, media, art and culture are weighed against
human persons, especially children, in terms of money, not the value of persons.226
Higgins’ interpretation of Lebret raises a question about the understanding of the dignity
and rights of the human person in the Western context. It suggests the conclusion that
according to the Western scale of values human persons other than one’s self and one’s
properties rank last and close to a slave. He aptly demonstrates this contention in his
claim that the West’s “persistent greed has divorced them from the higher values of
223
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human living.”227 In other words, human persons are reduced to “things” and deprived of
their dignity and rights when such a yardstick is used. Here Lebret touches the basic
moral or ethical principle for integral human development, namely the dignity of the
human person.
According to Lebret tampering with such a fundamental principle has a serious
negative implication, namely a revolution, which can erupt spontaneously because of
people’s constant growth in the awareness of the world situation, and their own
dignity.228 This awareness may cause discontent and revolution, but the latter can be
avoided by prudent and patient handling of the socio-economic and political questions.
The West or developed nations should, therefore, be cautious to avoid revolution by
resolving the problem of the gap between the developed nations and underdeveloped
nations or by alleviating the difficulties that confront the poor. He succinctly warned in
the following words:
It is, therefore, clear that if the West resists the change which is being imposed on it, this rejection
is suicidal . . . The West can protect itself only by abandoning its introspective attitude.229

Lebret was in fact stating that the obliging change, not self-chosen by the West
but necessitated by the status quo, is the improvement of the condition of the poor, which
is a guarantee to avoid their violent reaction. This anticipated what Paul VI later ardently
reaffirmed and advanced in strong terms in Populorum Progressio to the developed
nations in different parts of the document, after observing a gap between the developed
nations and the underdeveloped nations.230 Both Lebret and Paul VI were very conscious
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and cautious about the danger of violent reaction from the less fortunate people.
One of the central and critical views of Lebret, which is also reflected in
Populorum Progressio, is the measurement and the concept of authentic development. In
The Last Revolution he argued that the notion of development can be deceptive. True
development needs to be judged by a comprehensive and careful assessment because
something apparent can be claimed to be true development. According to him
Growth expressed in terms of increased national income per inhabitant can disguise an increase in
the incomes of the rich and a corresponding impoverishment and regression in the incomes of the
poor. In this case no development has taken place. Genuine development presupposes, in effect, an
increase in the standard of living and in human standards which affects the huge, deprived mass of
the population. It involves a generalized development of the whole human order, in every man and
in all men.231

In Populorum Progressio Paul VI articulated the notion of integral human
development which Lebret called genuine development. Both Lebret and Paul VI
advocated the development of all people. Lebret advanced one of the significant
arguments about authentic development when he observed that the greatest need is the
development of the entire world, and what is crucial is the advancement of all people
“from a less human form of existence to a more human one” as fast as possible, in
solidarity and in the least costly possible way.232 A careful reading of Populorum
Progressio shows that this exhortation is present in the document. Dorr even testifies that
Paul VI borrowed the concept of development from Lebret, and like Lebret, he
emphasized “being more rather than having more.”233 It is evident that the document
bears the influence of Lebret because it emphasizes “person-centered development” and
argues for the complete development of all people.
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Populorum Progressio and The Last Revolution both emphasize the human
person, human dignity, human rights, equality, justice, option for the poor and solidarity
as necessary development factors. Lebret advocates a global development in solidarity
when he argues that the survival of the West is possible only if it relates liberally without
frontiers.234 The underlying reason here is that the West is not self-sufficient in terms of
resources. It depends on the underdeveloped nations for some of the raw materials for its
industry. The West also averts the anger of the less developed countries by supporting
them. Consequently, the West cannot afford to, absolutely, discard the less developed
nations in its economic or material endeavors.
One of the components of authentic human development, according to Paul VI, is
cultural development.235 This was not absolutely a novelty in the teaching about human
development. Lebret advocated the importance of culture as a component of
development. This is evident in his indiscriminate love for cultures. He confirms this
when he says:
Each group has its roots in a certain part of the earth and must find its own formula for collective
progress. If it uses Western values as its yardstick, the underdeveloped parts of the world can only
lose their zeal for life and lapse into despair.236

The term culture is implied in the term “values”. Culture is the sum total of a
people’s way of living which is in turn determined by their thought patterns and the
values they hold. Western cultures are different from the cultures of underdeveloped
peoples because they hold different values. Development should occur in the context of a
particular culture. It is difficult to attain development out of proper cultural context.
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Lebret was advocating that people should treasure their own cultures and make them an
integral part of the development process, and yet at the same time respect other people’s
cultures because they are valuable too.
For Lebret, authentic development involves all people. He advocated participation
as a necessary principle for integral development. This is why he contended that integral
development is a difficult task even for the wisest person because it calls for “a collective
will” and understanding.237 Paul VI expressed this idea in Populorum Progressio where
he indicated that “every person and all peoples are entitled to be shapers of their own
destiny,”

238

everybody is an agent of human development on a personal, local, national

and international level.
Finally, Lebret advocated “a generous welcome to others” and hospitality to
emigrant workers.239 This was a call for openness to foreigners, a call for solidarity and
freedom of movement. This call reflects his warning against an introspective attitude if
the condition of the underdeveloped people is to be changed, and revolution is to be
avoided. This exhortation is also evident in Populorum Progressio and expressed in
almost the same way The Last Revolution presents it.240
Lebret’s notion of genuine human development, the value of culture in
development and the importance of participation and the requisite conditions for
authentic human development are reflected in Populorum Progressio. These are some of
the significant indicators of the influence of Lebret’s thoughts in the document. The
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significance and influence of Lebret on Populorum Progressio is further ascertained by
the various evidences in the next section.
C. The Influence of Louis Joseph Lebret on Populorum Progressio
Lebret was one of the major influences behind Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum
Progressio. Lebret contributed a great deal to shape the draft of the document. Paul VI’s
idea of integral human development is critical like that of Lebret who
opted for a model of development that promotes community, spiritual fulfillment, and
enhancement of creative freedom over mere material abundance, technological prowess, or
functionally efficient institutions.241

Paul VI himself confirms this in Populorum Progressio where he quotes Lebret
and speaks of him as being an eminent specialist, thus actually invoking the authority of
Lebret’s work to support his own arguments and authoritatively confirming that Lebret
influenced his notion of authentic development. He states:
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.242

Like Lebret, Paul VI “insists that what is in question is the development of each
person and of every person”- integral development - which is the theme that runs
throughout Populorum Progressio and what Paul VI attempts to articulate throughout the
document.243 This explains Dorr’s claims that Lebret had great influence on Populorum
241
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Progressio, and in his treatise on the notion of development Paul VI quoted from Lebret
and followed the approach of Lebret. Dorr contends that “the inspiration of Lebret
pervades Populorum Progressio and some of the statements in the encyclical are taken
almost word for word from Lebret’s writings. He clarifies his point by stating:
At the heart of Populorum Progressio lies a notion of integrated development, which Paul VI took
from Pere Lebret, the Dominican scholar and activist who died some time before the encyclical
appeared.244

Marvin L. Mich Krier affirms this contention when he explains the competing
schools and views of development in the 1960s in relation to Paul VI’s view of
development in Populorum Progressio. According to Krier one of the schools at that time
was the French school that advocated integral development. Making reference to the
French influence on Paul VI, he says:
Because he was something of a Francophile already, it wasn’t hard for Pope Paul VI to side with
the French school. So he asked the French Dominican economist Louis Lebret, O.P., to be the
primary editor. Lebret served admirably in that capacity until his untimely death in 1966. Msgr
Paul Poupard, another Frenchman picked up the reins and brought the process to its conclusion.245

Paul VI was influenced by the French culture which he experienced and admired,
and so it was not a surprise that he would enlist the help of French men like Lebret and
Poupard in the writing of Populorum Progressio. Lebret’s thoughts also affected John
Paul II’s thoughts in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis: On the Social Concerns. Goulet recognizes
and acknowledges the influence of Lebret’s thoughts in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, which
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was written to commemorate the 20th anniversary of Populorum Progressio and he
expressly contends that
Lebret is that rare development expert cited by name in the 1967 encyclical “On the Development
of Peoples, the text that is commemorated and amplified in the 1987 papal document “On Social
Concern”.246

Lebret discussed five essential attributes of true development. The first attribute is
that development must be “finalized”, meaning that development “must serve the basic
ends - that is, build a human economy and satisfy all human needs in an equitable order
of urgency and importance.”247 True development meets human needs according to a
properly arranged scale of values. Secondly, development must be “coherent”, meaning
that it has to address “all problem sectors in a coordinated fashion” without sacrificing
one for the sake of another. Authentic development therefore should not be fragmented or
segmented. This also features in Populorum Progressio.248 Thirdly, authentic
development is “homogeneous.” Here Lebret means that development should not be
imposed. It should respect and include people’s cultural aspirations, their abilities and
their history. Populorum Progressio reechoes this view.249 Fourthly, according to
Goulet’s reading of Lebret, authentic development is “self-propelling.” This means true
development capacitates or empowers people, provides for their autonomy and minimizes
their “dependence, parasitism, passivity and innertia.” This recurs in Paul VI’s
Populorum Progressio.250 Finally, true development is “indivisible.” This means
development should benefit all people, facilitate the attainment of the common good, and
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bridge gaps between rural and urban populations. Lebret’s claim that authentic
development is indivisible resonates with Paul VI’s core statement in Populorum
Progressio about authentic human development and other similar statements spread
throughout the document.251
A careful reading of Populorum Progressio reveals a widespread presence of the
attributes of authentic human development advocated by Lebret.252 Chronologically,
Populorum Progressio was written after Lebret’s death. When Paul VI speaks of
development for each and all, and as the transition from less human conditions to more
human conditions, he does so under the influence of the inspirations of Lebret. This
distinction was initially made by Lebret as Goulet states.
The normative expressions “more human” and “less human” need to be understood in the light of
a distinction Lebret considered vital: the difference between plus avoir (“to have more”) and plus
etre (“to be more”). A society, Lebret contends, is more human or more developed not when men
and women “have more,” but when all citizens are enabled “to be more.” The main criterion of
value is not the production or possession of goods, but the totality of qualitative human
enrichment. Some material growth and quantitative increases are doubtless needed for genuine
development, but not any kind growth or increase at any price.253

Authentic development is enhancement of the quality of the life of all people, not
necessarily an increase in the quantity of goods. These are interpretations of the thoughts
of Lebret but they typically anticipate Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum Progressio. The
Last Revolution and Goulet’s interpretations of the writings and thoughts of Lebret evince
the relation and similarity between the thoughts of Lebret and Paul VI about the notion of
true human development.
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V. SIGNIFICANT PONTIFICAL DOCUMENTS DURING PAUL VI’S PONTIFICATE
A. Humanae Vitae: On the Regulation of Birth (1968)
Humanae Vitae, the last and most controversial papal encyclical of Paul VI, was
written in 1968. The central issue the document dealt with was the regulation of birth.
One reason for reading Humanae Vitae in the light of Populorum Progressio is to throw
some light in understanding the issue of integral human development. Humanae Vitae is
treated here because it dealt with life, which grounds the fundamental right to life, and
human development is all about the necessities for and the quality of human life.
The relationship between Humanae Vitae and Populorum Progressio is explicit in
the question of population and human dignity where Paul VI argues that the problem of
rapid demographic growth should be addressed in such a way that human dignity remains
unharmed.254 As part of the treatise on integral human development Humanae Vitae is
supported by authors like David M. McCarthy who reads the document in the light of
Populorum Progressio and advocates that it says a lot about authentic human
development.
The framework of Humane Vitae is at once social and theological, since it begins with a statement
about our cooperation with God and repeatedly turns to concerns about human community.255

McCarthy contends that Humanae Vitae relates human life to God, the origin and
destiny of life, and relates individual human life to other individuals, and to the entire
human society. In society, lives mutually interact and are affected by God. McCarthy
further argues that in Humanae Vitae
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Paul VI proposes that we cannot make the world a better place by denying the procreative
character of human sexuality. In HV, he relates the issue of contraception to contemporary social
problems, to which contraception is considered by many to be a solution but, in fact, holds out
only hollow promises for the goods of life. Contraceptive practices promise relief in a culture
where child rearing is an economic liability and a risk to one’s personal life style, but Paul VI
warns that we will undercut the basic structure of social life if we abdicate our common calling to
bear and raise children. Modern development strategies promote advancement by means of
eliminating the social and economic drag of having children. Paul VI, in contrast, is convinced
that true development necessarily includes the basic human activities of child rearing. HV fits with
his wider proposals for authentic human development. True human community cannot be attained
at the cost of its own generative character and true development is known through the flourishing
of creation of which this generative character is a part.256

The first fundamental issue addressed here is that of the procreative character of
the human sexuality and the sexual act itself. On the grounds that the sexual act is
procreative in character, the proximate argument is that the procreative element is
progressive because it has the potential of generating new life. This is the fundamental
element of development within the sexual act. It is from this quality that the unfolding of
hidden potentials, properly called development, starts. If this is obstructed, the human
species and the divine design are at stake.
Paul VI views procreation and child-rearing as constituent elements of true
development. According to McCarthy this shows how Humane Vitae is in line with Paul
VI’s comprehensive proposal for authentic human development. Contraceptive practices
militate against integral development because they impede the growth, enhancement and
natural unfolding of life. Paul VI actually made a compelling assertion that procreation is
“fundamental to God’s design, and as such, the procreative character of sexual acts is not
optional.”257 The main problem Paul VI addressed was that of the inherent intended
‘procreative character’ of sexual acts. Whether sexual acts, initially, have such a
character or not is beyond human control. This suggests why Paul VI used strong terms,

256
257

McCarthy, 700-701.
Ibid., 701.

86

though not without exceptions. The gravity of the problem is confirmed by Hatch,
according to whose reading of Paul VI, “the question of birth control represents the most
serious present-day confrontation between Science and the Church” because
contraceptive practices contradict the original divine plan for human persons.258 This
claim is founded on the divine command to “be fruitful, multiply and conquer the
earth.”259 The assertion offers a theological foundation for arguing for human
development, and raises its social implications for development because of the shared
nature and origin of humanity. McCarthy argues that
questions about our nature are always social because they refer to claims about human solidarity,
and these claims are eschatological: true human community is precisely the meaning and mission
of the Church. . . . By abiding in continuity with our supernatural end, we will see creation coming
to fulfillment which is the very possibility of authentic human community. Humane Vitae says
nothing less.260

McCarthy’s argument suggests that the ultimate human community is the
eschatological community, the heavenly kingdom of God, and all earthly expressions of
solidarity in social life anticipate this ultimate community and solidarity. This is the most
authentic and integral human development in the language of Populorum Progressio.261
McCarthy argues that like Populorum Progressio, Humanae Vitae features the
invitation to participate in the divine activity of creation. For him Populorum
Progressio’s call for participation of all in the process of development is reasonable. His
claim is that
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The character of our nature as ordered creation underlies every point and sets the claims of HV
within the framework of our participation in God’s gracious activity and the fulfillment of our
human nature through a supernatural end.262

Creation was initially intended to be orderly - a cosmos not chaos. This order was
initiated by divine action but cooperative human action is to participate in promoting it.
This is why all should participate in the maintenance of this order. Participation presented
in Populorum Progressio is echoed here as necessary for integral human development.263
If divine intention and human collaboration are separated the intended end of creation is
in jeopardy. It is, therefore, important that the rest of Humane Vitae be interpreted with
this link between God’s activity and human involvement, and the supernatural end of
humanity in mind. Collaboration and participation in divine activity is one of the
theological reasons for integral human development whose climax is union with and
participation in the life of God.
Paul VI was concerned about rapid population growth in Southern American and
Asian countries, as his experiences during international trips revealed to him.264 This
concern is relevant because population growth has significant implications for integral
human development and procreation. McCarthy acknowledges that “the transmission of
human life is a most serious role (munus) in which married people collaborate freely and
responsibly with the Creator.”265 Procreation is a vital responsibility of married people
because through it they collaborate in integral development intended by God.
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Population growth has significant social implications because it is “intimately
connected with the life and happiness of human beings”266 Life has a social dimension
because the life of a person affects that of others and vice versa. Humanae Vitae
advocated that the transmission of life is the most serious duty of married people because
human life is always intimately related to other peoples’ lives. Whatever undermines
human life undermines human society, and vice versa, because of this intimate
relationship.
Paul VI observed that population growth raises a number of concerns. The first
problem is that the rapid population increase leads to distress in families and developing
countries. Consequently, civil authorities could take radical measures to curb population
growth that out-paces the requisite resources for decent life, a problem further aggravated
by “modern economic conditions, which put an increasing burden on housing and raising
large families.”267 Such concerns are real but they need to be addressed appropriately.
Paul VI did not consider state-enforced population control an appropriate solution. An
appropriate resolution to the problem of rapid demographic growth is the enforcement of
economic justice, resolving problems of urbanization and the First World consumption,
living in human solidarity, and as John Paul II suggests, taking the question of the
inviolability of human life and dignity seriously because “life is always a good.”268 These
resolutions help promote human dignity because they provide conducive situations for
human life to thrive.
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Secondly, population growth results in concern about the person and dignity of
women, and their place in society. If human progress is to be integral the concern about
women’s place is in the context of “conjugal love in marriage” and the “conjugal acts in
relation to that love”269 This is crucial, especially in the context of contemporary views
about women’s dignity where “reproductive rights (to abortion as well as contraception)
have been hailed as grantors of women’s equality, autonomy, and bodily
integrity.”270According to Paul VI contraception is not true progress because its
repercussions on the dignity of women are negative. These repercussions include
encouragement to disregard the dignity of women, placement of private conjugal life at
the mercy of public authority, lowering of morality, loss of respect, disruption ofwomen’s
psycho-physical equilibrium and reduction of women to instruments or objects of selfish
desires.271 All these consequences are dehumanizing, not enhancing the life and dignity
of women. McCarthy summarizes Paul VI’s concern as follows:
Contraception fosters a lack of reverence for women in so far as it frees up the arbitrary will of
men and violates the limits of control set within creation. In Octogesima Adveniens, Paul VI
rejects “that false equality (for women) which would deny the distinctions laid down by the
Creator himself and which would be in contradiction with women’s proper role, which is of such
capital importance, at the heart of family as well as society. (OA13). Contraceptive practices, Paul,
claims, diminish the dignity of women and the integrity of their bodies.272

The principal concern here is women’s dignity. Contraception dishonors women’s
dignity and integrity. This vision is relevant because it affirms the respect for the very
basic development principle - human dignity.
Aggressive advocacy for liberation of women and promotion of contraception has
been partially prompted by the modern economic system, demanding equality of women
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and men. Liberal advocates call for freedom for women from the burden of child-rearing
so that they may also contribute socially and economically to society. The problem with
such advocacy is that children are considered liabilities to economic freedom and
growth.273 The objection is compounded if economic freedom is preferred to childrearing because human life and dignity are valued less than economic progress. What
emerges here is the issue of human dignity in relation to authentic development.
However, here the threat is only potential, not real, because the issue here is the attempt
to prevent the phenomenon of conception.
Human dignity is the epicenter of true development and defines it. If human
dignity is disregarded in the process of economic progress, the result is not integral and
authentic development. The strength of Humane Vitae precisely lies in its advocacy for
respecting human life because life has dignity.
The last area of concern addressed in Humane Vitae is the human tendency to
claim dominion over self. The issue here is that “humans are attaining control over the
body, the mind, social life and even over laws that regulate the transmission of life, a
concern also expressed by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith nineteen years
later.”274 Reproductive and other technologies come with temptations to manipulate
human life in the name of progress. Paul VI affirms this position in two of his documents.
McCarthy states:
Paul VI challenges this logic of contraception by objecting to its underlying assumptions about
productivity and progress. In Populorum Progressio and Octogesima Adveniens, he argues that
development and progress are false when defined primarily in economic terms. Such progress
actually frustrates growth on both personal and social levels.275
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What Paul advocates here, according to McCarthy, is that contraception excludes
the value of life and economic development may not be considered the only development.
Secondly, human life, the human person and human dignity are the reasons for any kind
of development. Finally, exclusive economic growth falls short of Paul VI’s
understanding of development. The human person is more than material possessions, and
what a person owns does not define the person. Persons are defined by the totality of
what affects their life and destiny. Consequently, true human development transcends
economic progress and embraces all people. This suggests why according to McCarthy
Populorum Progressio teaches that “true progress, then, embraces the whole of human
community, and it is directed to our eschatological (rather than merely temporal)
solidarity.”276 The climax and ultimate realization of integral human development is
eternal life-salvation of body and spirit. This affirmation resonates with Paul VI’s
thoughts about holistic salvation, the ultimate integral human development, in Populorum
Progressio.277
Paul VI’s consistent argument against contraception is that it does not have a
holistic view of the human person as an individual and as a part of the human
community. This point of view explains McCarthy’s concluding statement about the
human tendency to claim dominion over self and develop independently. He says:
If self-development and the procreative character of human life are disregarded, then progress and
human mastery are out of control. The abundance that comes in this reductionist term is
inauthentic, self-serving and unjust.278
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If technology and human culture are defined independently of human persons,
problems develop with regard to human life; “technology is inherently disordered, and
contraceptive technology is likely to be a symptom of social problems rather than a real
solution.”279 The human claims of dominion over self and one’s needs ought to take into
account the social context of the individual persons as well as the entire community.
Paul VI argued that marital love is not limited to the loving interchange between
husband and wife. It must go beyond this to bring new life into being thus meeting the
development of natural potentialities and human social needs.280 Paul VI is emphasizing
that marriage has a social dimension because it is for the promotion of human society. In
support of this view McCarthy contends that
Contraception is certainly a question about the beginning of life, but primarily it is an issue of
human solidarity, in accord with the end of creation and our human community with God.281

If community is to survive it is the duty of everybody including married couples.
This demands that contraception must be treated in the context and application of the
principle of solidarity, according to which we need others ‘to be’ and ‘to become.’
Without this in view married couples disregard their relation to the rest of human
community and the common good. This argument resonates with James P. Hanigan, who
argues that the human person and human actions must be viewed in relation to other
people. Explaining the moral agent within community context he says:
To recognize the social nature of the human person is to recognize that human beings need one
another in order to be what they are-human. Human life is not possible in isolation. . . . Human
development cannot take place apart from a human community. . . . To ignore the social
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dimension of human life, to turn our backs on society, to contemn the social order, is to ignore,
turn away from and contemn ourselves.282

Hanigan supports the idea of solidarity and its significance in human life. Here
two observations are in order in relation to the notion of integral human development
advocated by Paul VI. First, human development that excludes the rest of society falls
short of being integral. It is incomplete. Secondly, excluding society is evil - a lack of due
good - because development is not a negation. It is a promotion of potentialities that lie
deep within individuals and communities.
It is appropriate to conclude that Humanae Vitae re-echoes some of the doctrine
of Populorum Progressio which advocated that technology, increased productivity and
economic growth by themselves are not the whole of development. They are just a quasidevelopment according to Paul VI. They do not fully make the earth a more suitable
living place for human beings. Human fulfillment must be realized within the context of
solidarity with humans and in solidarity with God.283 In true development the human
person works together with God and other people. This is the authentic progress because
it is not opposed to the divine design.
B. Octogesima Adveniens: A Call to Action (On the Eightieth Anniversary of Rerum
Novarum - 1971)
Octogesima Adveniens was written in 1971 to commemorate the eightieth
anniversary of Rerum Novarun and the tenth anniversary of Mater et Magistra. It is an
apostolic letter written by Paul VI “to Cardinal Maurice Roy, president of the Council of
the Laity and of the Pontifical Justice and Peace Commission”.284 The document was
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written typically in the spirit of Gaudium et Spes. It was a response provoked by the
Medellin Conference of the Latin American bishops in 1968, which was itself triggered
by the Second Vatican Council, especially the discussion of Gaudium et Spes.285
Gaudium et Spes treated justice in relation to poverty and peace, and Medellin
carried forward the same theme by advocating the option for the poor as an act of justice,
and the need for liberation. The conference made a shift from merely discussing
economic issues to making the economic question a part of political discussion. Although
the document was directly addressed to Catholics its impact goes beyond the Catholic
community because the community interacts with the world beyond itself. This
contention is supported by what O’Brien and Shannon claim.
Octogesima Adveniens emphasized that action for justice was a personal responsibility of every
Christian, that this responsibility rested on Christian organizations and institutions, but that it
involved both the effort to bear witness to the principles of justice in personal and community life
and acting to give those principles life in society.286

According to Henriot and others “Paul VI acknowledged the difficulties inherent
in establishing a just social order and pointed to the crucial role of the local Christian
communities in meeting this responsibility.”287 The innate difficulty here is the one of
using the same principles, norms, and directives of the Catholic social thought because
the circumstances in which people live are not always exactly the same. Involvement of
people at the grass roots was considered crucial for building a just society. Similarly,
Curran affirms that in this letter Paul VI urged “Christians to participate and contribute to
solving the many problems facing individual countries and the world.”288 Participation
and cooperation or collaboration are necessary prerequisites to resolve the problem of
285
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injustice. Christian communities are, in particular, urged to be involved in critical
examination of the contexts in which they live. This is necessary because of the existing
variable contexts in the different countries.289 It was precisely for this reason that Paul VI
stated that
It is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the situation which is proper to
their own country, to shed on it the light of the Gospel’s unalterable words and to draw principles
for reflection, norms of judgment and directives of action from the social teaching of the
Church.290

The exhortation was written in the spirit of Populorum Progressio’s teaching
about integral human development where Paul VI articulates the issue in terms of the
various individual countries and the world community. This reiterates the argument about
individual and social dimensions of authentic human development, which is actually a
development in solidarity. Paul VI proposes critical analysis of situations in which
Christians find themselves as one of the crucial responses to the problem.291 Here the
emphasis is that people have responsibility to shape their own situations. Like one of its
successor documents, Evangelii Nuntiandi, Octogesima Adveniens called people to a
critical observation, examination and evaluation of circumstances in which they live, to
hear the word of God, and to act on it according to the practical situations of their daily
life. Precisely, their future is determined by them because it is in their own hands.
Paul VI suggests that such a process occurs in three stages or moments:
“evaluation and analysis of their contemporary situation”, “prayer, discernment, and
reflection” on the situation in the light and teachings of the Gospels and the Church, and
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“pastoral action which fights injustices” 292 and positively transforms society. This means
action should be taken to exercise and defend the course of justice. However, effecting
change in the world is the duty of all. This duty ought to be enlightened by and based on
the Gospel.
Paul VI made a leap in addressing the social question in Octogesima Adveniens
because development tended to be limited only to the economic sphere. Paul VI decided
to emphasize liberation because the political question is part of the economic agenda, and
this suggestion was a shift of emphasis from economics to politics.293 He made this move
because he was convinced that political action should check the power of multinational
corporations that create economic difficulties due to their magnitude and power,
outpacing small corporations and private enterprises. There was need for a body that
moderates socio-economic relations. Paul VI “acknowledged the significance of the
political dimension” 294 but also knew and acknowledged that politics is not an end in
itself, it is a means to help achieve human development in different forms.
In Octogesima Adveniens Paul VI also dealt with other issues affecting modern
society. These included urbanization and its contingent consequences. For Paul VI
urbanization and industrialization are not necessarily indicators of human development;
they are occasions for exploitation and need to be carefully weighed because they
sometimes create problems rather than solving them.295 This viewpoint reechoes Paul
VI’s notion of authentic development in Populorum Progressio.
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Octogesima Adveniens also addressed issues of equality and participation. Curran
notes:
This document emphasizes the human aspirations to equality and participation; recognizes some
legitimate aspects in Marxism, especially as a tool of sociological analysis, condemns liberal
ideology, discusses urbanization and mentions environment for the first time.296

Since these aspirations affect human life they need to be addressed squarely. Here
Paul VI addressed various issues in the document and did not favor just one political or
ideological system. Much as he opposed Marxism, he shows that there is also something
good in the Marxist ideology. He also demonstrates that liberal ideology has its own
pitfalls. The integral character of his approach is manifested in his ecological concerns
and in the diverse nature of themes the document dealt with.
Octogesima Adveniens dealt with various issues. These include justice in personal
and community life, participation which expresses personal responsibility in
development, solidarity, equality of human persons, common good, charity, global
ecology, and the principal ideologies behind many political programs, all of which were
treated as significant and necessary for human development.297 By concentrating on the
question of justice Octogesima Adveniens has close ties with Justitia in Mundo, which
was published the same year.
C. Justitia in Mundo: Justice in the World (Synod of Bishops, Rome, 1971)
Justitia in Mundo: Justice in the World is one of the most important documents
issued by Rome on the issue of justice in the history of Catholic social thought.298 It was
published in 1971 after the Synod of Bishops convoked by Paul VI as part of the follow296
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up of the Second Vatican Council, and intended to implement the acts of the Council,
especially to make the Church more active and vigilant in pastoral activities and the
question of “world justice and peace.”299 Justitia in Mundo is like the two documents that
preceded it - the Medellin Conference document and Octogesima Adveniens because of
its contextual approach to social issues and its theme of social justice.300 According to the
Synod of Bishops the church has a duty to bring about change in society when that is
called for. Consequently, the Synod fathers advocated that the transformation of
institutions through involvement in social and political issues is a “constitutive dimension
of the preaching of the gospel.”301
Justitia in Mundo centered on the question of justice in the world to be effected
through pastoral action. It specifically addressed structural injustice as its core agendum
because, according to the bishops, social structures obstruct conversion, structural
injustices affect international economic relations, and people need to be liberated from
such situations.302 Development is suggested here as a means to liberation but it ought to
be noted that liberation itself is actually a process of development. Justice is emphasized
as a constituent element of evangelization and catechesis. The Synod fathers made this
clear when they said that:
action on behalf of justice and participation in the transformation of the world fully appear to us as
a constitutive dimension of the preaching of the Gospel or, in other words, of the Church’s
mission for the redemption of the human race and its liberation from every oppressive situation.303
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Awareness about justice is necessary to help people realize the need to exercise
justice in society. They can learn to practice justice if they are taught. Therefore, people
need to be reminded of unjust situations where they exist. The Synod fathers clearly
stated that “the Church must stand with the poor and the oppressed if it is to be faithful to
the gospel mandate.”304 Here Justitia in Mundo used the language of the Second Vatican
Council, the Medellin conference and Octogesima Adveniens which all admited that
differences in local contexts must be taken seriously when addressing social questions.305
Consequently, the Synod fathers further advocate that pastoral agents who are in touch
with the actual life situations of the people have the duty to discover this and integrate it
into their pastoral actions, including evangelization. This suggests that their preaching
must be down to earth, and it should touch the real issues affecting the people they
minister to. This call also challenges the church as an institution that ministers to society.
Walsh and Davies affirm this when they state that “the Bishops admit that the church has
itself not always been the very best example of that justice which it now preaches.”306
The church ought to reflect on its functions and relation to the people. It is clear that the
document is hinting that the church is also an employer and needs to examine herself
about how she treats people she employs. The church should be the protagonist and a
living justice as she is also the advocate for justice. Curran’s arguments show that this is
evident in the bishops’ statement in Justitia in Mundo.
The bishops call for significant structural change in our world, based on justice and universal
solidarity. The document underscores the need for ecclesial witness to justice in the church’s own
practical life if the church’s teaching is to be credible in the world.307
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The call for changes in social structures was prompted by the fact that
development comes with some negative consequences such as rapid demographic
changes or growth, rural stagnation, lack of land reform, massive rural-urban migration
and the consequent urbanization, and unemployment caused by technological
advancement, from all of which people have to be liberated.308 These are not precisely
measures for authentic development because they are not liberating, they are oppressive,
dehumanizing and do not solve problems. The victims of injustice that come out of such
situations are migrants, refugees, those persecuted for their faith, those whose rights are
restricted, political prisoners, orphans and nations or regions that are not given
opportunities to grow.309 These are typical indicators of underdevelopment and ought to
be overcome.
According to Henriot and others, during the Bishops' Synod in Rome in 1971, the
bishops clearly made their mind known in Justitia in Mundo. The document shows that
the Bishops linked together the dynamism of the Gospel and the hopes of people for a
better world today and in the future.310 What is implied here is that a dynamic
interpretation of the Gospel in accordance with every context is mandatory in the face of
people's desperation about what the future holds for them. In other words, people's
understanding of justice, and their hope to experience it, and a good life are determined
by the way the Gospel is preached in our contemporary world. What the document
advocates is that injustice must be fought by all people in different ways. The document
concentrates on and emphasizes the role of the Church and calls for the Church to
308
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actually witness to justice by example.311 This is evident in its emphasis on integrating
justice and evangelization, yet it puts less emphasis on the role of civil institutions and
individuals. It can be noticed here that the document addresses the problem one-sidedly.
Development or eradication of evil in society involves all people. This is true and
necessary because the principle of responsible participation is vital for joint development
efforts. Populorum Progressio is clear about this but the Synod fathers did not emphasize
this adequately.
Like other preceding documents, including Populorum Progressio, Justitia in
Mundo outlined some basic principles and necessary conditions for integral human
development. These are justice, participation, solidarity and, indirectly, human rights.
The document also alludes to the option for the poor and the relational or social character
of the human person as a necessary consideration.312
D. Evangelii Nuntiandi: Evangelization in the Modern World (1975-Paul VI)
In 1975, ten years after the Second Vatican Council and eight years after
Populorum Progressio, Paul VI wrote his apostolic exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi:
Evangelization in the Modern World. The document was “not primarily a statement of
Catholic social teaching” but is important for the Church’s involvement in socioeconomic and political issues because it emphasized that
salvation ‘is liberation from everything that opposes man’(EN9), thus decisively linking the
proclamation of the gospel to the concern about the sort of life people have to live in this world.313

Salvation and liberation are used as synonyms here. Paul VI cautioned, however,
that evangelization should not be mistaken for human liberation in a political sense, and
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the church should not be identified with any political system of liberation. The church
advocates a holistic liberation but political liberation falls short of a holistic one. As a
mark of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the closing of the Second Vatican
Council, Evangelii Nuntiandi “affirms the council’s teaching on the active role that the
institutional church and individual Christians must play in promoting justice in the
world.”314 The specific aspect of liberation addressed in this case is the liberation from
situations of injustice. This is to be achieved through preaching and living the word of
God. This lends support to the claim that Evangelii Nuntiandi is in continuity with the
teaching of the Second Vatican Council, especially Gaudium et Spes which treated justice
as one of its central themes, and Justitia in Mundo.
Other issues addressed by Evangelii Nuntiandi are human rights, solidarity, peace,
the human person, development and liberation in the dual sense - spiritual and material
liberation. Henriot and others suggest in Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret
that in this apostolic exhortation Paul VI was not just advancing Catholic social tradition,
but was advancing some of the agenda of Populorum Progressio, including his idea of
integral human development.315
Evangelii Nuntiandi emphasized the cultural dimension of liberation.316 This
means besides economic, political and structural change, it called for change in people’s
thought patterns and way of life. The theme of liberation and salvation in Evangelii
Nuntiandi is a resurgence of the same theme of the Medellin Conference and in Justitia in
Mundo. This shows how Evangelii Nuntiandi is in continuity with the issues treated by
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the two documents which preceded it.
Evangelii Nuntiandi and Populorum Progressio are related through Gaudium et
Spes which influenced Paul VI's understanding of authentic human development.
Evangelii Nuntiandi shares with Gaudium et Spes, especially where it dealt with issues
like family life and life in society, besides other issues such as peace, justice and
development. All that Evangelii Nuntiandi did was to advocate that the various
dimensions of life be changed by the Gospel message. The document has conspicuously
manifested notion of integral human development - the growth of the entire person, a
holistic salvation and liberation.
In Evangelii Nuntiandi Paul VI confirmed the profound link between
“evangelization

and

human

advancement”,

“development

and

liberation.”317

Evangelization has an integral character because it is about human liberation and
development. It teaches about human rights, duties, family life, peace, justice,
development and liberation, and shows that human liberation and solidarity depend on
the proclamation of the Gospel message – evangelization - because it creates conversion
and collaborative conscience and ultimately transforms people’s actual life.318 On the
bases of such interlocking relationships and the authorship of the documents it is right to
suggest that the documents are related in their contents. Henriot and others also affirm
this in the following statement:
Here he emphasized that preaching the Gospel would be incomplete if it did not take into account
human rights and the themes of family life, life in society, peace, justice and development.
Liberation - in both its spiritual and its temporal senses - must be proclaimed. The plan of the
redemption includes combating injustice.319
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Even if Evangelii Nuntiandi does not explicitly deal with integral human
development, the tone of the document supports such a conclusion because it is also
related to other Catholic social doctrines. For instance, like Gaudium et Spes, Evangelii
Nuntiandi states that the laity have the role and duty to influence the life, thoughts and
actions of people in their work places or environments of life.320 Similarly, as it explicitly
deals with the question of evangelization, Evangelii Nuntiandi is closely related to
Justitia in Mundo because of its emphasis that “working for social justice is an essential
part of the meaning of the Gospel.”321 This is a significant argument because justice is a
virtue upon which the Gospel teachings are centered. However, the gospel message is
more than justice alone.
Evangelization involves an explicit message, adapted to the different situations constantly being
realized, about the rights and duties of every human being, about family life without which
personal growth and development is hardly possible, about life in society, about international life,
peace, justice and development - a message especially energetic today about liberation.322

The issues with which Evangelii Nuntiandi dealt show how Paul VI continued to
emphasize some of the issues he dealt with earlier in Populorum Progressio. These issues
are social in nature but directed to liberation of all at all levels, and this coheres with the
Christian message of liberation as universal salvation. Evangeli Nuntiandi needs to be
read in the light of the preceding documents.
The following remarks are in order about Evangelii Nuntiandi: First, the
document consistently insisted on the social context of people as vital for evangelization.
Secondly, it dealt with questions like justice, human rights, solidarity, peace, the human
person and human dignity. Thirdly, all the questions articulated were centered on the
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human person and human dignity because this is the object of evangelization, liberation
and total salvation. Fourthly, like other documents of Catholic social teaching, Evangelii
Nuntiandi attempted to address practical life problems. Fifthly, the contextual emphasis
of the document on issues is significant socially, politically, economically and spiritually.
Sixthly, the document and other documents preceding it point to one significant
theological fact: namely, that theology, religion and belief have to be and must be ractical
if they are to achieve their real goals. Finally, they can be practical only if they address
real issues that lead to true or integral liberation or salvation because theology is an
integral enterprise.
VI. CONCLUSION
This chapter dealt with the biography of Paul VI, forces that influenced his trend
of thought, and the development of the Catholic social encyclical and pastoral tradition
since Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum in 1891. The study suggests that Paul VI was a
multifaceted person and a pastor whose life was carefully modeled on the personalities of
people he encountered, interacted with from within and without his family. The study
suggests why Paul VI made the choice to write the encyclical, Populorum Progressio: On
the Development of the Peoples, with an emphasis on the integral character of authentic
development.
The treatise of the encyclical and pastoral tradition from Rerum Novarum (1891)
to Evangelii Nuntiandi (1975), apart from Populorum Progressio, leads to some
significant observations. First, Catholic social teachings prior to and after Populorum
Progressio had progressive influences and relationships. The documents prior to
Populorum Progressio influenced and shaped Paul VI’s thoughts in Populorum
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Progressio and those that succeeded it were in a like manner influenced by it. Secondly,
the arguments that feature in the Catholic social and pastoral tradition gravitate around
the dignity of the human person, whether they treat human life, human rights, justice and
peace, equity, common good, subsidiarity, charity, participation and involvement, option
for the poor, affirmative action, solidarity or ownership of property. This suggests that
human dignity is the fundamental principle of Catholic social teaching about
development. It is the imperative moral principle governing authentic human
development. All other conditions for authentic human development gravitate to and
circulate around human dignity. Thirdly, the historical development of the teaching of the
Catholic social encyclical and pastoral tradition shows that the various questions
mentioned above, which are related to the dignity of the human person, are recurrent.
Fourthly, there have been other social errors in the history of humankind and they seem
to continue to recur. Fifthly, the church, the state and every individual has a responsibility
and role to rectify such errors by way of correction or active intervention. Sixthly, in
order to achieve this, certain principles and guidelines are necessary, and should be
properly articulated, grasped and applied. Seventhly, considering the historically
prevalent circumstances, change or renewal is necessary. This is evident in the study
which shows that Catholic social teaching on human development has been progressive
because each document was either innovative or it clarified the doctrine of the preceding
documents. Finally, such a vision of the Catholic social tradition suggests that resolutions
reached in the past have either been inadequate or inadequately comprehended, applied
and followed. This inevitably suggests that there is some unfinished business, a business
that will be treated in the successive chapters of this work. The next chapter, in particular,
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will present principles, conditions and guidelines for authentic human development as
presented in Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio. The foundation laid by this chapter is,
therefore, necessary for an appropriate understanding of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE DOCTRINE OF POPULORUM PROGRESSIO
I. INTRODUCTION
Chapter one was intended to give a background for understanding Paul VI’s
doctrine in Populorum Progressio on the central theme of integral human development.
The overarching concern of this chapter is the notion of development and the requisite
principles, virtues and conditions for authentic human development. It will focus on Paul
VI’s concern in Populorum Progressio about four distinct issues: he wanted to articulate
the problem of development, outline the significance of a programmatic development for
poor countries, denounce injustice and emphasize the relation between development and
peace.1
The encyclical has been called the Magna Carta of Catholic teaching on human
development.2

It is the the fundamental document of the Catholic Church’s teaching

about human development because the document “represents a remarkable advance on
the previous Church teaching about human development.”3 It is a foundation for the
subsequent teachings on human development. Rerum Novarum of Leo XIII (1891),
Quadragessimo Anno of Pius XI (1931), Mater et Magistra of John XXIII (1961), Pacem
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in Terris of John XXIII (1963), and Gaudium et Spes of Vatican Council II (1965) had
treated some of the issues discussed but they were treated in less depth than in
Populorum Progressio. Unlike the previous documents “written from a predominantly
European perspective, Populorum had international overtones.”4 With the additional
influence of Gaudium et Spes it went beyond the influence of the previous documents.
“The understanding of human development worked out by Paul VI in Populorum
Progressio was a major contribution, relevant” not only for the time he wrote “but also to
the world of 1980s”5 and for our times. This is demonstrated in Paul VI’s understanding
and definition of human development and social justice and his treatment of diverse
issues related to the question of human development. He defined development more
deeply and broadly than ever before in any document of Catholic social teaching on
development, and treated justice from a global, not only national, point of view.6 This is
further evidenced in the statement by the United States Bishops’ Conference that
Populorum Progressio specifically
. . . proposes a Christian vision of the authentic development of people . . . emphasizes the
universal destination of created goods and condemns liberal capitalism . . . . reinforces the idea of
the duty of prosperous nations to help developing nations . . . highlights the widening gap between
the rich and poor, and emphasizes that “development” is the new name for “peace.” 7

The problematic issues in development are as old as human history and involve
both sad and happy memories - suffering and enjoyment, joy and sadness, sufficiency and
4
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insufficiency - involving individuals, nations and the international community and
covering different facets of human life - “political, economic, social, educational,
medical, technical and similar fields.”8 Albert T. Dalfovo further asserts that the question
of development involves both answers or solutions and questions or problems, and “it is
better to reverse the issue and to recognize that development is a question before being an
answer, it is a problem before being a solution.”9
The assertion of Dalfovo is credible because problems precede development.
Development simply comes in as solution. Without problems there would be no need for
solutions and development. Development offers solutions but begins with problems,
which provoke human thinking and search for solutions to problems. Paul VI’s treatise on
the question of development gives this picture. His recognition of the prevalent problems
provoked him to redefine and articulate the subject of human development more
comprehensively than even before Lebret defined it.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one deals with the actual
problems Paul VI was addressing. Part two treats Paul VI’s general response to the
problems and their consequences. Part three deals with ways to attempt to alleviate the
situation or resolve the outstanding problems in the attainment of integral human
development. The requisite principles, virtues and conditions necessary for integral
human development are also discussed in the third part.
II. THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM: THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
In Populorum Progressio Paul VI addressed a number of urgent problems ranging
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from “the gap between rich and poor to the differences and tensions between wealthy and
impoverished countries.”10 This view suggests that the document treated international
development issues. The principal concern of Paul VI was the magnitude of the critical
problem of poverty evident in the ever increasing gap between the rich and the poor, and
its effects on human dignity. His initial statement succinctly summarizes this fact:
The development of peoples who are making very great efforts to free themselves from the
hardship of hunger, poverty, endemic diseases, and ignorance, who are seeking a more bountiful
share in the benefits flowing from civilization demanding that greater value be in fact set upon
their qualities as human beings, and who are constantly giving their attention to great growth is
gladly and encouragingly viewed by the Catholic Church.11

Hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance directly affected less-developed countries.
According to Paul VI the developed nations had contributed to part of the problems. He
stated the core issue regarding integral human development in the following words:
While today we see that men are seeking to find a more secure food supply, cure for diseases,
steady employment, increasing personal responsibility with security from oppression and freedom
from degradation endangering the dignity of man, better education, in a word while men seek to be
more active and consequently to enhance their value, we see at the same time that great numbers
are living in conditions which frustrate their just desires. . . .12

Paul VI was comprehensive in his attempt to address factors that affect true
development. The crucial issues related to authentic development are the questions of
meeting the basic needs of life, human dignity, human rights, responsibility and
participation, education and the ultimate satisfaction of the needs of individuals. Peter
Riga’s observations about the document are helpful for an understanding of the issues
raised by Paul VI. He notes:
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The social encyclical of Paul VI, Populorum Progressio - “On the Development of Peoples” - is
the culmination of the voice of the modern popes on the problems and agonies of the men of our
day. A note of urgency is one of the letter’s outstanding characteristics; Pope Paul obviously
considers the problem of poverty and underdevelopment the most pressing and dangerous issue of
our day. On the resolution of this issue will hang the balance of peace and, indeed the future of
human race.13

The crux of the problem raised by Paul VI was that the human dignity was in
jeopardy. Paul VI was explicit in pointing this out even if he was not consistent in doing
so throughout the document. Human dignity is threatened by the prevalence of misery.
This threat may be aggravated by the apparent absence of peace. Paul VI “addressed in
Populorum Progresio what was clearly the social problem of the age – the division
between the rich and the poor nations.” 14 It must be added that he did so with foresight
and a very close attention to the attendant or related problems. These problems were
practical socio-economic and political issues manifested in the prevalent poverty,
ignorance, hunger and diseases. They were further evident in avarice, inequality,
selfishness, cultural degradation, nationalism, racism, and the adversely affected
epicenter of human development, namely human dignity. All of these were indicative of
the “growing gap between rich and poor nations,”15 and particularly in their
understanding of the human person or their failure to take the true notion of the human
person seriously.
It should be emphasized that these problems and threats to human dignity were
consequences of selfishness, which Paul VI called greed and egoism, besides the problem
of a misconstrued notion of human development, which was partially the cause of the
other problems mentioned above. It must also be emphasized that all of these issues were
13
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related to the human person, and particularly human dignity. Riga reminds us that Paul
VI’s presentation in Populorum Progressio shows that “what must remain as the crux of
social thought is man - every man and all men.”16 Precisely, human dignity stands at the
center of the question, and is crucial to development.
Populorum Progressio focused on human community and individuals, their
relationships and circumstances of life. The encyclical was concerned with major areas
affecting people. These included not only human dignity, but also human aspirations,
structural injustice, the role of the Church in human development, a new vision of
humanism, common good, international socio-economic and political relations, and
peace.17 Here it is relevant to suggest that Populorum Progressio exhibits the spirit of
Gaudium et Spes, which intended to offer joy and hope to people in desperate situations
as the title of the document states.
A. Socio-economic and Political Conditions
The socio-economic and political problems addressed by Paul VI were worldwide. They were rampant that time and being addressed by other religious leaders too.
For instance, in many ways Paul VI grappled with socio-economic and political situations
similar to those confronted by Martin Luther King Jr., although one’s was national (that
of King) and the other’s international (that of Paul VI). Nonetheless, practically, the
issues addressed were intimately related as Hanigan indicates for King.
Concretely for King social evil meant segregation, the second rate status afforded America’s black
citizens, and economic injustice, the simple disparity between the rich and the poor, the fact that
some men had more than enough while others went hungry or homeless. In a formal sense social
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evil comprehended those institutional elements which put restrictions upon or distorted the
development of the human personality.18

These are the same evils Paul VI was addressing in Populorum Progressio. There
is little wonder that there is such a vivid similarity. The two addressed real problems of
the world of the 1960s. They both addressed the question of social injustices, the gap
between the rich and poor, racism and the question of human development. King
advocated the development of all the citizens of the USA in the same manner, and in
different areas of life. The difference between the two is apparently the level at which
they addressed the issues and the methodology they used.
Populorum Progressio opened with a statement on the prevalent phenomenon of

inhuman material or economic conditions of people who are attempting to overcome their
desperation. Paul VI did not limit this problem to just a national level. Instead, he
emphasized the international character of the social question but specifically underscored
the development needs of the developing nations.19 This phenomenon of desperation,
according to Paul VI, is evident in the prevalent hardship caused by hunger, poverty,
diseases and ignorance of people who are struggling to liberate themselves from their
conditions in order to experience greater human values than what they currently
experience.20 The international problem was, therefore, not only caused by desperation in
the underdeveloped countries. It also included the relationship between developed and
underdeveloped countries and the dangers of apathy on the side of the rich nations.21
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1. POVERTY AND AVARICE
Paul VI observed that avarice was one of the causes of the problems. This
explains why he addressed the question of ownership of property. However, a caution is
necessary according to Paul VI, because property is not possessed for the sake of
increasing one’s power, but for enhancing the dignity of the human person. Avarice must,
therefore, be avoided or averted by all. The underlying reason for this global call was that
avarice, whether of individuals or families or nations, equally affects both the rich and the
poor, and “can drive both to materialism which stifles their souls.”22 The ultimate end of
productive work is not avarice or accumulation of material resources, because they are
not an end in themselves but are means to an end. Here Paul VI was addressing an
enduring problem. The gravity of the problems caused by avarice or greed was expressed
thirty-two years later when the international community was attempting to address and
resolve the population and development problem.23
Paul VI was prompted to such advocacy because of his personal observations of
the ordeal of the poor and the conditions of the rich nations. He alluded to his prepontifical and pontifical trips to various places - South America (1960), Africa (1962),
Palestine and India, where he had first-hand observation of the pathetic economic
situations there. He stated that such and similar observations were what prompted the
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Church to request the United Nations to intervene to help the poor.24 The difficult
economic conditions of the less-developed countries were another immediate major cause
of concern for Paul VI.
Paul VI’s reference and appeal to the UN was an indirect suggestion of the
significance of affirmative action, namely aggressive government intervention on behalf
of the desperate poor, on the international or global level, and the significance of the
principle of subsidiarity and option for the poor, even if not directly stated by Paul VI. He
was suggesting that a bigger, more powerful and capable body that could respectfully but
firmly and forcefully intervene on behalf of the poor, especially when they could not
handle their own problems, was necessary. Such a body should continue to function and
never be obsolete at any moment if world affairs are to progress.25 The significance of
such a body would be to regulate the distribution of resources and curb avarice at a global
level when necessary.
2. INEQUALITY AND INJUSTICE
According to Paul VI the inequalities and injustice consequent to technological
advancement were problems that needed to be addressed too.26 Although technology
helped to improve the situation of colonial subjects, technological advancements cause
rapid inequalities unless their use is well-checked to avoid such disparities. However,
inequalities are increasing because some nations produce more than they need while
others are constantly in need of more or produce less than they need or they are uncertain
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of meeting their aspirations of sales of their produce.27 Paul VI was addressing the
problem of what I would call development fixation in underdeveloped countries and the
opposite in the developed countries. This affirmation confirms the gravity of the growing
gap between the rich and the poor. It also confirms the inadequate support for the lessdeveloped nations and their deteriorating situation. There was an imbalance between the
steady and rapid growth in developing countries and the stagnation of underdeveloped
countries.28 While underdeveloped nations were not advancing, developed nations
continued to advance further and so to increase economic and political differences.
Inequalities were also experiences of regions dependent on agriculture and
farmers were aware of their wretched situations in comparision to the industrialists and
the prevaling inequalities among them as farmers.29 These inequalities include possession
of goods and the exercise of power. This means that while the minority lived a decent and
dignified life, the majority lived in dehumanizing conditions, where freedom is curtailed
by those who tended to control most of the resources. Paul VI was addressing the
problem of the growing gap between the minority rich and the majority poor, who were
totally incapacitated to live humane lives and to work under decent and healthy
circumstances. He described the situation as follows:
For it happens in certain regions that while a small and select number enjoys a most refined
culture, the needy meanwhile and the scattered inhabitants, “lack almost every possibility of acting
on their own initiative and responsibility, spending their lives in living and working conditions
unworthy of human beings.”30
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Paul VI was addressing the theological problem that a growing gap between rich
and poor nations inhibits God’s intention from being realized.31 He specifically referred
to the universal destiny of natural resources. Here it is noteworthy that the issue of
inequality between the rich and the poor is a global reality, even if Paul VI’s focus in
Populorum Progressio was on the problems in the less developed countries.
3. CULTURE
Conflict of cultural interests or values was another problem Paul VI identified.
The encounter between traditional cultures and industrial civilization forges conflicting
social structures and creates conflicts between adults and young people because the two
categories of people hold divergent cultural values.32 Paul VI was clear about this
problem.
Then since the traditional civilization is in conflict with recently introduced industrial civilization,
it happens without fail that social structures not corresponding to modern needs are almost
shattered. Consequently, while adults think that the life either of individuals or families is to be
centered as it were in the framework, often times narrow, of this civilization and believe that it is
not to be abandoned; the young at the same time consider it a kind of meaningless barrier which
keeps them from eagerly advancing to new ways of life in society.33

While adults cling to traditional values, youth look at them as obstacles to modern
advancement, which they consider as development. According to Paul VI this tension
needs to be eased or eradicated. People constantly deliberate whether to retain traditional
cultural institutions and values and forego progress, or to discard the culturally rich
traditions in favor of modern technology and novel cultural values. Oftentimes traditional
moral, spiritual and religious values, convictions and institutions are discarded and do not
have a place in new values and institutions. The principal problem here is the radical
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break from tradition and the intimate attachment to an inadequately comprehended
culture. According to Richard Rousseau, this is a real “breakdown of traditional customs
and attitudes.”34 This, according to Paul VI, is where development falls short of its
authentic character. This is a plausible assertion because abandoning one culture in favor
of another is absorption rather than integrated development, which is open to relevant
values. Development is not a matter of discarding old or traditional practices and taking
up new ones. Rather it is an integration of new and old valuable cultural heritage, a
continuity of the old in the new. It ought to be noted here that cultural integration is
sometimes difficult to achieve but its possibility is what Paul VI’s arguments suggest in
this case.
The difficulty of uncritical choice of cultural values was the problem that Paul VI
thought needed to be addressed. He cautioned developing nations against the attraction to
values of wealthy nations whose cultural and technical civilizations and example of hard
work and industry which produced their prosperity to a high degree.35 Though good in
itself, Paul VI contended that temporal prosperity and cultural values of wealthy nations
do not meet all human needs, especially spiritual needs. Cultures should be critically
examined and only “excellent and useful” values should be sought and developed
together with those of the “less wealthy”36 nations. Paul VI was actually advocating that
poor nations should not take up the cultures of the technologically developed and wealthy
nations and abandon their own because of an apparently better and superior nature of the
cultural values of the wealthy nations compared to that of the less-developed nations.
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Here he affirmed that development is not measured in terms of technology and industry
alone because they do not define the superiority or inferiority of a particular culture. The
significance of a culture is defined by how human it is. As long as cultures of lessdeveloped nations esteem the human person and promote human dignity, they are worthy
of retention. This is why, according to Rousseau, Paul VI warned that “developing
countries must be careful of simply accepting the values and examples of wealthy
nations.” 37
The problem of cultural conflict is sometimes aggravated by those who leave their
native countries to study in foreign countries, especially developed or industrialized
nations. Paul VI cautioned youth who study in developed countries and eventually loose
esteem for their own traditional and cultural values.38 The problem with such students is
that they often attain an excellent education in the developed nations, a knowledge that
would be beneficial for their home countries if well integrated with their own culture, but
oftentimes they overlook and disregard the invaluable cultural and spiritual values of
their own nations.39 Besides this they sometimes abandon their own countries and decide
to live in the developed nations. Here Paul VI addressed the significant issue of loss of
skilled labor by less-developed nations to the more developed ones. When people from
the former category of countries refuse to return to their patria, they contribute to the
slow progress at home but a faster progress in the more developed nations because
instead of being the brains for development and using their skills at their home countries
they add their skills and brains to what the more developed countries already have. This
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behavior of expatriate students also partly contributes to the widening gap between the
less-developed nations and the developed nations.
4. POPULATION EXPLOSION
Paul VI was concerned about demographic issues in the less-developed countries
because of inadequate resources for a decent life. He observed that rapid population
growth exceeding “available resources adds its own problems to development.”40 In his
judgment population growth was disproportionate to the supportive productivity of
developing or less- developed nations. This was threatening decent living conditions. In
such cases resources “badly needed for industrialization and capital investment”

41

are

diverted to meet the fundamental or primary needs. According to Paul VI, this does not
promote other aspects of development. This is why he says:
It is not to be denied that accelerated demographic increases too frequently add difficulties to
plans for development because the population is increased more rapidly than available resources
so that all solutions seem to end in a blind alley.42

If population growth outpaces the development or the availability of requisite
resources for humane living, it is hard to satisfy the material needs of the people.
Alternatively, human needs may not be addressed in morally desirable ways. Paul VI’s
principal concern was that population explosion was creating difficulties in the
development of the Third World countries.43 He feared that the temptation would be the
attempt by the legitimate authorities to radically or drastically limit population growth by
use of unethical or immoral methods. He wanted demographic problems to be resolved
without tampering with human dignity. This is where, according to Paul VI, explosive
40
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demographic growth becomes problematic to true human development. This problem was
also later recognized and acknowledged by John Paul II in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis as an
obstacle to development. 44
5. NATIONALISM AND RACISM
Paul VI observed that nationalism and racism are not supportive of integral
human development. According to him nationalism was often misunderstood and given a
negative connotation as expressed in its practice in some countries. It was precisely
understood to mean chauvinism, which is “blind patriotism.”45 This understanding of
nationalism differs from the positive understanding of it as patriotism or love for and
defense of one’s own country. Paul VI was concerned that nationalism as practiced at that
time tended to be a reaction to colonialism and had discriminating overtones which did
not allow for solidarity beyond one’s own country. This would not promote integral
development. Rousseau’s reading of Populorum Progressio shows that the primary
reason for the inconsonance of nationalism and racism with true development is that they
are opposed to the spirit of solidarity, and ultimately contrary to the spirit of integral
human development.46 Nationalism and racism, and let it also be affirmed in African and
similar contexts that tribalism,caste system and all sorts of favoritism, are factors that
impede integral human development. Initially, nationalism was mainly a problem of
newly independent former colonies because these newly independent states wanted to
assert themselves as separate entities, but in the course of self-assertion they were
44
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isolating themselves from other nations. According to Paul VI, just as it was before
colonial withdrawal, equality based on human dignity and solidarity remains problematic
today because of nationalism and racism.47 Here Paul VI pointed out that nationalism and
racism are enduring problems in the way of development. Nationalism is problematic and
an obstacle to integral human development because it
is divisive and stands in the way of people’s genuine advantages, but it causes the most serious
harm particularly in those areas where the needs of national economy demand on the contrary the
pooling of efforts, or of knowledge, or of financial resources to carry out the plans for economic
development and to increase and strengthen commercial and cultural ties.48

The problem with nationalism is that it is opposed to the essential conditions or
principles necessary for integral human development. These include solidarity, common
good, participation, involvement, universal charity, peace and justice. For Paul VI
nationalism and racism were similar. According to him racism is an international
phenomenon. It existed in newly independent states where there was a diversity of people
of various backgrounds. The similarity between nationalism and racism, and even
tribalism, is that they fragment human community. They are opposed to the spirit of
global solidarity and they promote limits, division, and they are detrimental to national
and international community respectively.
Where there is human diversity, tribal wrangles, separatist political affiliations
and factions also develop. Paul VI observed that racism was detrimental to justice, it
endangers civil peace and welfare, it obstructs mutual and profitable understanding, and
provokes conflicts based on prevalent injustice. All of these are serious threats to integral
human development because they are, by nature, opposed to the spirit of mutual
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integration and growth. Racism and tribalism have similar effects on human development
as nationalism. Paul VI was categorical that racism is
an obstacle to collaboration among poverty-stricken people and sows the seeds of discord and
enmity within countries as often as either individuals or families see themselves deprived of basic
rights of the rest of the citizens on account of race or color with contempt for man’s inalienable
rights.49

Paul VI did not explicitly mention tribalism as a problem, but by inference
tribalism rightly falls in the category of problems or obstacles to development because
like nationalism and racism, tribalism absolutely does not support solidarity in a wide or
universal sense. All three recognize the value of solidarity, common good, participation,
involvement, personal responsibility, charity, peace and justice but to a very limited
extent. They do not go beyond the borders of nation, race and tribe.
B. A Misconstrued Notion of Development
Paul VI decided to redefine human development because he recognized and
acknowledged a serious problem with the notion of development. He noted that what
many people and governments claimed to be development was in fact a quasidevelopment. The prevalent notion of development at that time was exclusively an
economic one. This was one of the problems that people needed to confront and find an
answer to. Paul VI was of the view hat if authentic development is not properly
understood it is still harder to achieve.
Paul VI acknowledged that development is misconstrued if viewed solely from a
material point of view, which is devoid of social and spiritual dimensions of a human
person. Consequently, he cautioned against two issues regarding development. First,
individuals and nations should not consider the growth in supply of possessions their
49
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ultimate goal, and neither is it the ultimate goal of true development. Considering the
growth in quantity of possessions as development is a mistaken notion of development.
The definition of true development is broad.50 Secondly, Paul VI acknowledged that
development has a twofold effect: positively, it contributes to the progressive growth of
the human person, and negatively, development imprisons a person if it is considered
“the highest good beyond which one is not to look.”51 The second effect of material
growth falls short of integral development because it excludes the ultimate end and
meaning of true human development. Material growth is not liberating; authentic
development has a liberating dimension.
The problem here is the temptation to think that economic growth alone is
complete development, and ultimately to make a clear distinction between true
development and inauthentic development. Paul VI incessantly and consistently disputed
the idea that economic development is the whole of development. According to him
giving priority to material possessions, while neglecting real needs of people because of
greed or avarice was not true development because it is adversely consequential to the
human person. He described the consequence as follows:
Consequently, the exclusive quest for economic possessions not only impedes man’s development
as a human being but also opposes his true greatness. For both nations and men who are infested
with the vice of avarice give clearest evidence of moral underdevelopment.52

Paul VI’s emphasis here does not deny the value of material or economic
development which constitutes only a fraction of true development. His principal concern
was human dignity. He contended that as people progress economically or materially, and
otherwise, they should also grow morally. Material or economic development should not
50
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retard or curtail moral development or overlook human dignity. Though not explicated
this way, Paul VI's contention is tantamount to stating that economic development and
moral development should have a direct proportionality, not an inverse one. This makes
sense especially when conceived in the context of Paul VI's notion of integral human
development. Authentic development is all-dimensional and does not retard the growth of
people materially and spiritually, economically and morally.
C. Causes of the Problems
Paul VI attributed misconstrued notion of development to three main factors
which he thought played a great role in creating the prevalent situations which moved
him to write Populorum Progressio. These were colonialism, neocolonialism with
subsequent imbalance of power and wealth, and imbalance in trade relations and
economic power in general, between the rich and the poor nations.53
1. THE EVIL LEGACY OF COLONIALISM
The first cause of poverty, according to Paul VI, is the negative legacy of
colonialism.54 Colonialism left enduring negative effects on the economy of many
countries that were left dependent on single export crops subject to sudden and
considerable price fluctuations.55 Although colonizing powers brought to the colonies
quality achievements through science and technology and left beneficial results of their
presence - diminished ignorance, diminished sickness, benefits of communication and
improved standard of living - in many underprivileged regions, they often perpetuated
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their own interests, power, domination and glory, and their departure left precarious
economies in the former colonies.56 Though Paul VI appreciated the work of the
colonialists, he also questioned how disinterested they were in their endeavors and
suggested that the lacuna in their endeavors was lack of authentic charity and justice.
The product of colonialism, according to Paul VI, was inadequate to face the hard
realities of modern economics. The colonialists widened levels in the world’s standard of
living, rich people enjoyed rapid growth while the poor developed slowly, and some
people produced a surplus while others produced less and were incapable of exporting.57
Paul VI observed that there was an economic, social and political power imbalance.
There was inequality in the exercise of power, a limited group of people enjoyed refined
civilization and the majority of people were poor, deprived of nearly all possibility of
personal initiative and responsibility, and lived under conditions unworthy of human
beings.58
Paul VI was opposed, though not absolutely, to capitalism or liberal trade. He
called into question the fundamental principle of economic liberalism which was
responsible for the socio-economic and political power imbalance, and requested a
moderation in free trade.59 In the context of the doctrine of the document it is plausible to
affirm here that Paul VI took such a stance because property, and subsequently profit are
not evil in themselves if they are used to promote human dignity. Promotion and priority
of property is bad only when it serves selfish ends, compounds exploitation and
disregards human dignity.
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Paul VI contended here that poverty is not merely self-made or caused by natural
factors, it is a human creation. Filochowski affirms this assertion. According to him, Paul
VI thinks “clearly it is not to be assumed that poverty and underdevelopment result from
natural causes or laziness.”60 To affirm that the poor are the cause of their poverty or to
blame for their poverty is to presume that poverty cannot be a consequence of other
people’s attitude or behavior. It is naïve to understand it that way. An integral and critical
consideration of the causes of poverty is called for here. I would suggest that people
should see beyond the context of prevalent poverty to its causes and solutions to alleviate
it. The concession that laziness is one of the factors that thwarts development is true and
ought to be added to any list of obstacles to development. Work enhances human dignity
and contributes to material human growth.
2. THE CURRENT NEO-COLONIALISM
For Paul VI, the prevalent neo-colonialism was a significant cause of
development problems.61 The problem with neo-colonialism is that it perpetuates political
pressure and economic domination aimed at acquiring wealth and maintaining political
control by/for a few. It aims at dominance which contradicts the principle of respect for
human dignity.62 According to Paul VI, nationally, neo-colonialism promotes economic
domination and internationally it encourages both economic and political domination of
poor countries by rich countries. Here Paul VI again raised the issue John XXIII had
raised in Pacem in Terris when he emphasized that “there can no longer exist a world
60
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divided into nations that rule and nations that are subject to others.”63 Paul VI was
suggesting that colonialism is obsolete. This position was based on the equality of the
dignity of people. Although Paul VI apparently thought neo-colonialism was a suspicion
and a possibility rather than a reality, he never took it for granted and he addressed
problems related to it.64 It is important to note that neo-colonialism was and still exists.
Paul VI questioned the motives behind grants and suggested that they should not be given
to subdue or curtail the freedom of the recipients; instead they should promote their
dignity.
Paul VI contended that bilateral and multilateral agreements create dependence
and bitterness. They should be replaced by systems that substitute dependence and
feelings of enhancement, left by colonialism, for systems that build a happier relationship
of friendships based on constitutional and political equality.65 If, under the cover of
financial assistance and technical aid, there is political pressure and economic motive
aimed at complete domination then there is something unjust with the arrangement. This
frustrates efforts to assist developing nations, financially and technically, and deteriorates
to an illusion because benefits accruing from such endeavors would be, at least partially,
nullified.66
3. TRADE AND POWER IMBALANCE
Paul VI noted with concern that imbalance in power led to injustice in trade
relations and contributed to the poor state of development in the Third World nations
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which were just beginning to grow or had not yet started growing.67 He challenged the
status quo of international trade relationships and underscored that these relations are
arranged to help the rich nations to become richer while poor ones become poorer.68
Development cannot be integral if trade relationships promote growth in some nations
and undermine development in others. This is one of the causes of poverty and
underdevelopment in disadvantaged nations. It is also externally determined by the
attitude of international trade partners.
Paul VI was concerned about the system of trade between rich and poor nations
because it was characterized by an unchanging course to the detriment of poor countries.
This was again partly a negative consequence of colonialism. Industrialized nations
primarily export manufactured goods which have constantly increasing prices, while
developing countries export raw materials whose prices constantly fluctuated.69 This is
why developing nations find it difficult to balance their economy or trade.Consequently,
they remain poor.
Human persons, human dignity and rights are often threatened by malfunctioning
socio-economic, religious and political systems. An understanding of true development,
healthy trade relationships, the exercise of Christian and human virtues, just political
arrangements and just social structures are also significant for the esteem and protection
of the human person and the human dignity. From these observations it is realistic to
conclude that, although Populorum Progressio dealt with issues such as authentic human
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development, materialism, a new humanism, technocracy, mutual solidarity, social
justice, universal charity, nationalism, racism, and collaboration, the underpinning
question it was addressing was that of the defense or protection of human dignity.70
In addressing problems prevalent in the global community Paul VI was making a
moral judgment about socio-economic and political relations between peoples and
nations. His ultimate concern was their effect on human dignity, the raison d’etre - the
fundamental and ultimate end or reason, of true human development.71 It would seem
right to suggest that every problem he declared immoral was because he judged it to be
consequent to an actus humanus. That is, he judged each event according to whether it
was a human act done freely and after deliberate choice preceded by knowledge. The
fundamental cause of the problems is self-concern or self-absorption of individuals and
nations. When nations or individuals make choices only in their favor they deny that
other individuals or nations are worthy of the same or similar choices. This idea points to
the question of the dignity of other individuals. It prompts the suggestion that structures
and systems are necessary for the promotion and protection of the dignity and human
rights of individuals and nations regardless of which person or nation. It also suggests
that sometimes nations and individuals are responsible to some degree at least according
to moral principles, if no impediments such as ignorance, passion, fear and coercion stand
in the way of their decisions and actions.72
III. PAUL VI’S RESPONSE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Paul VI’s approach to the problem of poverty and underdevelopment was
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deliberate. He did not approach the problem by beginning with a provision of solutions to
the problems at the international or national level without a careful and thorough analysis
of the world situation, and the causes of poverty and underdevelopment, and neither did
he start from the “. . . current conception of economic development.”73 He did just the
opposite and started with a statement of the historical concern and involvement of the
Church, an analysis of the world situation and problems, and later attempted to resolve
these problems. Donal Dorr affirms Paul VI’s deliberate approach. He thinks that Paul VI
did not use the current conception of economic development as a starting point and then
modify it. Dorr suggests that this explains why Paul VI’s Populorum Progressio
represents a notable advance on earlier Catholic social documents on the question of
human development.74
According to Paul VI, “the present situation of the world demands concerted
action based on a clear vision of all economic, social, cultural and spiritual aspects” of
human life and society.75 Here he was hinting at the importance of solidarity,
participation or involvement and respect for socio-economic and political differences. His
ultimate economic response was that rich nations should aid poor nations and
international trade should be regulated by social justice.
A. Historical Church Involvement and Contribution
Social justice has always been a concern of the Church, and the Church has often
attempted to resolve some of the social problems including problems of people struggling
73
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to come out of situations of hunger, misery, disease and ignorance.76 Paul VI affirmed
that problems are a fact in human life and the Church recurrently confronts them. They
are true, difficult and undeniable aspects of the human situation to resolve. Problems defy
changes in society. The nature of social problems changes but as problems per se they
always exist. The church is always aware of this. The Second Vatican Council
recommended the importance of the social question in all its ramifications and called for
the necessary urgent cooperation of all people.77 This was an invocation of the principle
of participation and the principle of solidarity, both of which are significant for true
human development. The historic and future role of the Church in promoting integral
development cannot, and should not be underestimated.78
Paul VI stated that historically the Church has pursued integral human
development and must continue to facilitate it both individually and in solidarity. After
the example of her founder, the Catholic Church has never ceased to promote the
development of people. For example, missionaries built infirmaries, hospitals, schools
and universities. They taught the natives to tap their resources and to benefit from the
resources, they also guarded the natives against the greed of foreigners, though at times
they acted imperfectly and contrary to Christian doctrine.79 Paul VI acknowledged that
missionaries cherished institutions of the indigenous people and developed them further.
Paul VI insisted that the Church must always be attentive to current phenomena,
reading and interpreting the signs of the times. His call and advocacy for the Church’s
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historical involvement is that it must be alert and critical, especially in situations of maldevelopment. This is a duty the Church must continue to cherish within its own ability
and jurisdictions so as to establish “on earth the kingdom of heaven”80 through presenting
a view of the human person and human affairs totally.
Currently this project is undertaken by both groups and individuals, but it
demands the concerted effort and action of all who have a clear understanding of the
different facets of political, economic, social, spiritual and cultural matters. Paul VI
mainly focused on and pointed to ecclesiastics and academics or professional people. At
this juncture he introduced the topic of authentic human development by outlining the
areas from which efforts need to be pooled together in order to bring about true human
progress. He made it clear that the political dimension is an important aspect of human
development.
B. Development in Solidarity
Here Paul VI used the word solidarity to accentuate the idea that people need one
another to be and to become, to live and to grow. For development to be true or integral,
it must occur in solidarity even if individual members of society are responsible for their
own individual development.81 This means development in solidarity demands individual
responsibility. The reason for this call is that everybody is a part of a particular society
and the community of the entire human family. Solidarity is an important principle
because people need mutual support to grow and to enhance their human dignity, to be
what they were originally intended by God. It provides opportunities for mutual exchange
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of talents and resources necessary for integral development. John S. Mbiti clearly states
the expression of solidarity in an African context which typifies solidarity. He says that
the African is convinced of the saying that “I am, because we are; since we are, therefore
I am.”82 Among the Lugbara of Uganda proverbs emphasize the importance of solidarity
for development or any achievement. The proverb: “Aluri pa (k)uu ku”, translated as “the
foot of a single person does not sound” means:
The footsteps of an individual can hardly be heard when walking. There have to be several people
walking or dancing for the sound of their feet to be heard clear and far. The inference is that the
person who is alone in society or in family cannot accomplish much; his activities have no
repercussion. Instead many people together attain far-reaching results.”83

According to Dalfovo the proverb encourages people to co-operate, to work
together to be effective in their undertaking. What is precisely encouraged by the proverb
is the spirit of solidarity toward meeting individual and community needs. This solidarity
extends from the family to people outside the family.84
Solidarity is central to integral human development. Paul VI exhorted all people
to join together to strive for the complete development of every individual and all people.
Paul VI invoked the principles of solidarity, participation, social justice, and global
involvement, peace and common good. These are principles which the Pontifical
Commission for Justice and Peace was established to promote. Paul VI further advocated
this view when he stated:
Wherefore, we earnestly exhort all men today to strive by united planning and joint action for the
full development of each individual and the common progress of all Mankind.85
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This view was forcefully re-emphasized by John Paul II about twenty years later
in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. One of Paul VI’s initial responses to the question of human
development was that development should necessarily occur in solidarity involving
dialogue leading to global plans, if human development is to be integral.86
The Church’s practical action for the cause of human development was the effort
to implement the resolution of the Second Vatican Council through the establishment of
the Pontifical Commission for Peace and Justice. The purpose of this Commission is to
conscientize the people of God about the functions entrusted to it in order to promote
human development of the poor, to foster international social justice, to aid the less
developed countries, and to facilitate their personal and independent development.87 In
1983 the German Bishops emphasized the significance of world peace by advocating
both just and sustainable promotion of development in the developing countries in order
to create the peace which Paul VI himself equated to development.88
The Church’s ceaseless call to solidarity, which is a “call to relationship with
others reflects the church’s awareness of the integral equality of dignity enjoyed by every
human being.”89 Paul VI’s concern was to foster the dignity of the human person when he
advocated development in solidarity. Development in solidarity is vital, according to him,
because “there can be no progress toward a complete human development of a person
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without the simultaneous development of all humanity in the spirit of solidarity.”90 True
development is not a solitary process. The development of an individual is related to the
development of other individuals and groups. True development involves mutual support
among individuals and groups.
Paul VI contended that true development is not just an individual affair and not
just the development of an individual. True development is mutual and demands mutual
support. According to him “the complete development of the individual must be joined
with that of the human race and must be accomplished by mutual effort.”91 This is why,
according to Paul VI, authentic development is both inclusive and exclusive. It is
inclusive because no one is outside the claim and it is exclusive because at the same time
it means the whole development of an individual. Whether development is of a whole
individual or of the whole of human kind, it calls for mutual support. It is not just a
product of an isolated individual effort but of all. This is what explains development in
solidarity, collaboration and unity, which is a development that embraces participation or
involvement. Such development, according to Paul VI, is not only relevant nationally but
internationally. Authentic human development embraces the whole of humankind,
including the past, present and future generations motivated by the spirit of mutual
collaboration, unity, good will, harmony of minds and friendship among individuals and
nations.92 The affirmation here is that in all generations true development is progressive
and dynamic, not retrogressive or static.
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The realization of integral human development necessitates duties on the part of
development agents. Authentic development is possible, according to Paul VI, on the
basis of three-faceted natural and supernatural obligations. The first aspect is the “duty of
mutual relationship, that is the duty on the part of the rich nations to give assistance to
nations still developing.”93 Paul VI was asserting that, if rich nations can assist the poor
ones, the latter can be helped to move to the development level of the former. Paul VI
advocated the importance of solidarity on international level but the same principle is
relevant for social relationships within nations, between individuals and groups or
institutions smaller than nations.
Secondly, there is “the duty of social justice which consists in improving trade
relations between the more prosperous and weaker nations.”94 Here Paul VI explicitly
advocated fair conditions for both prosperous and poor countries. He meant that the
bargaining powers of developed countries and that of less developed countries must be on
par. Both parties should be able to deal with each other without one imposing on the
other conditions that do not favor mutual exchange and progress.
Thirdly, according to Paul VI, there is
finally, the duty of charity to all men by which human relationship for all is promoted in which all
must give and receive, in which the progress of some should not impede the development of
others.95

Paul VI suggested the need to love indiscriminately because it promotes social
relationships and leads to solidarity. Authentic development demands mutual efforts,
support and charity expressed in mutual sharing. Paul VI gave precedence to charity
because according to him integral human development depends on charity. He
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emphasized genuine love, a selfless love. He introduced love as a virtue, not only
fundamental to integral human development but the greatest of virtues upon which “the
future of civilization depends.”96
Paul VI’s emphasis on solidarity, love and justice as crucial factors for true
development suggests that development is a kind of democracy achieved by a democratic
process. If it is to be called authentic development it is the development of all, by all and
for all. Development of all is integral and a development in solidarity. Development by
all is one that involves participation of all in a spirit of solidarity, and hence, democratic.
Development for all is one, which takes seriously the spirit of love, solidarity, social
justice and common good and the good of the individual as fundamental elements of
development.
Paul VI advocated a selfless human solidarity. He argued that human solidarity is
possible only when “mutual suspicions of nations and selfishness” are overcome by “a
stronger desire for collaboration and a more profound awareness of human solidarity.”97
Here Paul VI suggested a committed desire for collaboration and deep-seated
acknowledgement of the importance of human solidarity and unity in both thought and
action.
According to Paul VI selfless solidarity also demands “common plans of action”,
coordinated investments, proportionate distribution of

“means of production”, and

organized “sale of products”, and assistance to “the more needy nations” to liberate
themselves from obstacles to their progress, “and to find, without detriment to their own
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native character, the means of human and social development.”98 He advocated mutual
support on the basis of human solidarity, but he also demanded that this be altruistic.
True solidarity is expressed in selfless service, it is essentially for the sake of human
dignity.
Development ought to be the special concern of the wealthy nations. This is not
just an option for them but an obligation, and confers on them a triple duty.99 First, they
have a duty to human solidarity, which calls for aid to the poor nations. Secondly, they
have a duty to observe social justice, which demands equitable trade relationships.
Finally, they have a duty to universal charity and collaboration, which demands that the
world be made more conducive for living human life, for all peoples. Paul VI’s emphasis
on this statement suggests how much he thought that the future of the civilization of the
whole world depends on the fulfillment of these duties.
1. AID TO THE WEAK
In addressing the issue of aid to the weak Paul VI was addressing no problem
other than the question of respect for human dignity. According to him wealth per se is a
divinely ordained good and a real gift of God to people but it is, above all, an opportunity
for Christians to grow toward their ultimate destiny. Peter J. Riga suggests that, following
the Gospel injunction to faithfully serve the cause of the poor Paul VI devoted the whole
of Populorum Progressio to “one great appeal for the poor throughout the world.”
Riga further observes that according to Paul VI
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a preoccupation with material things has blinded the spirit of many men, particularly in the rich
nations. Others must realize that although material goods are absolutely necessary for human
dignity, they are not the end of human life but exist only to promote it.101

Throughout Populorum Progressio Paul VI addressed the issue of poverty that
affected human dignity. He spelled out two distinct categories of people living under
different conditions - the weak people who live in less human conditions and the rich
who live in more human conditions. According to Paul VI people who live in less human
conditions are those weighed down by material and moral poverty. They include the
materially poor and hungry, the less educated, those culturally marginalized, and those
oppressed by bad social structures created by abuse of power and wealth, exploitation of
workers and unjust business arrangements and deals.102 They are destitutes of different
sorts who need to be aided. Paul VI consistently and ceaselessly urged that such
categories of people and nations should be helped by the rich nations and peoples.103
Those who live in more human conditions are people living where there is respect
for human dignity, people are oriented to spiritual poverty, there are materially selfless
people, and there is cooperation for the common good and a will for peace. According to
Paul VI, they are people capable of aiding the disadvantaged people. This is why, in the
Gospel spirit, Paul VI made a strong appeal on behalf of the anawim, the poor, of the
world who were in dire need of the support of the wealthy, and referred to their situation
as being “scandalous and intolerable.”104 Consequently, Paul VI enjoined the world
community, especially the communities that are blessed with resources to aid the poor
nations. He bluntly suggested that the rich nations should fulfill a threefold duty - “the
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duty of human solidarity” which suggests mutual consideration and aid which the rich
nations ought to give to the less-developed nations, “the duty of social justice” which
calls for the ratification of inequitable trade relations between powerful nations and weak
nations, and “the duty of universal charity”105 which demands efforts to make a world
which is more human to all people, and all can mutually share their resources without one
group progressing at the expense of others. He stated the threefold duty in the document
as follows:
first a duty of mutual relationship, that is a duty on the part of richer nations to give assistance to
nations still developing; then the duty of social justice which consists in improving trade relations
between the more prosperous and weaker nations; finally the duty of charity to all men by which
more human relationship for all is promoted in which all must give and receive, and in which the
progress of some should not impede the development of others.106

The triple duty Paul VI suggested touches three significant factors for authentic
development. According to Peter J. Riga’s critical and challenging reading of Paul VI, the
latter’s theology at this juncture is that if people cannot discover Christ in the numerous
suffering people in the world they cannot find Christ anywhere.107 People’s response to
critical situations of need depends on how seriously they take solidarity, justice and love.
Paul VI commended aid provided by Food and Agricultural Organization, Caritas
International, and other groups, but stated that elimination of hunger and poverty is not an
adequate means to integral development. True development demands “building a world
where everybody, regardless of race, religion and nationality, lives a fully human life.”108
This is the integral development he advocated in Populorum Progressio. According to
Paul VI this kind of development calls for generosity, a spirit of sacrifice, readiness to
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give out of pocket for poor countries and from the fruits of natural resources and the
existing technology.
Paul VI further advanced this as a challenge to both individuals and nations,
especially the advanced nations who should devote part of their resources for production
to meet the needs of the less fortunate. He cautioned against a possible danger of a dual
character - spiritual and physical characters - if the poor are neglected. First, spiritually a
failure to help the needy will result in divine judgment and punishment, and secondly,
such a failure will arouse the wrath of the weak or poor people against the rich with
unpredictable consequences.109 Succinctly, Paul VI suggested that divine anger and
human violence could be consequences of neglect of the needs of the poor. In his
judgement the solution to such eminent dangers is to aid the weak or the poor, and to
promote the development of all people. The greatest threat to peace, according to Riga’s
interpretation of Paul VI, is poverty and efforts to address differences between people
through development of all people promotes peace. This explains why Paul VI eventually
considered development as the new name for peace.110
2. EQUITY IN TRADE RELATIONS
Paul VI was conscious of the need to have a balance of power,
economically and politically, nationally and internationally. According to him imbalance
of power was the negative legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism, and he was opposed
to the rule of an exaggerated liberal trade system - free trade. In liberal trade
arrangements the ground is not level for all trading partners.111 Consequently, he called
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for structural change and an economic and political balance of power. However, Paul VI
was not in an absolute opposition to liberal capitalism as Dorr rightly contends. In
paragraph 26 of Populorum Progressio Paul VI is clear, that he did not suggest a
complete elimination of liberal competition or capitalism. This is also evident in
Populorum Progressio where Paul VI only calls for a creation of equal opportunities for
trading partners.112 In other words, capitalism ought to be modified. The significant and
unstated, but underpinning, reason here is the dignity of the human person - labor - and
work that deserve recognition but are not as much recognized as profits. Paul VI was
aware like other authors, that “profit while morally legitimate requires the virtues of
generosity and magnanimity.”113 Paul VI was not teaching a new doctrine. The
foundation of this teaching goes back to the Sacred Scriptures, and was more vividly
explicated by the Fathers of the Church including Basil the Great (330-379 A.D), an
“ecclesiastical statesman, reformer of liturgy and social activist.”114 According to Samuel
Gregg he was critical of the rich because of their lack of social consciousness and insists
upon sharing as an essential obligation of social justice. His argument was that the
resources of nature are meant for all people. Social justice demands that no one be
deprived of these resources. Consequently, he advocated equal opportunities, recognition
of the dignity of labor, the human person, and the social purpose of natural resources.
The issues Paul VI addressed under this theme were: the North-South economic
relationships, long-term progress toward development, and “the international system of
trade between the rich and poor” nations, characterized by “an unchanging course to the

112

Populorum Progressio, 61, 25. Also see Dorr, Option for the Poor, 187.
Gregg, 130.
114
Gen 1: 27-29. Also see Gregg, 131.
113

145

detriment of the poor countries.”115 He also emphasized in light of the foreign aid
received by less developed countries that all aid to developing nations is meaningless and
ineffective if these nations lose much more than the aid they receive because trade
relations and arrangements are unfavorable to them. Free international trade is good and
advantageous only when the trading partners are equal.116 It is unjust if there are
disparities between trade partners. If conditions of trade partners are unequal, trade
agreements are void. Consequently, Paul VI consistently insisted that free trade between
unequal trade partners must be governed by laws of justice.117 Discussions and
negotiations are necessary for equality of opportunity. It must be added that nationalism,
racism and tribalism, which obstruct justice, have to be eliminated in economic
dealings.118 The rationale here is that norms are essential for establishing more equal and
just relations between trading partners. Consequently, Paul VI proposed international
agreements with a broad spectrum. According to him international agreements should
establish norms for regulating prices, guaranteeing specified types of production and
supporting specific industries. Such regulations promote justice in business relations
among peoples and offer positive assistance with immediate and enduring effects.
3. UNIVERSAL CHARITY
Paul VI describes the world as being sick because there is lack of concern among
people. This world sickness consists less in the unproductive monopolization of resources
of nature by a small number of people than in the lack of brotherhood and sisterhood
115

Alfred T. Hennelly, “Populorum Progressio” in The New Dictionary of Catholic Social Thought, ed.
Judith Dwyer (Collegevile, Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1994), 769. Also see Walsh and Davies, 221.
116
Dorr, Option for the Poor, 187.
117
Henriot, Catholic Social Teaching: Our Best Kept Secret, 55-56. Also see Populorum Progressio, 58,
24; 59, 25.
118
Dorr, Option for the Poor, 187.

146

among individual peoples and nations.119 There are many areas that have not been
touched by charity. These areas ought to be reached by true charity which is
indiscriminate, all- embracing, inclusive and open, even globally. This is the authentic
love Paul VI advocated as a crucial virtue for human development. Paul VI understood
charity in a broad sense, and Monika K. Hellwig’s understanding of charity helps to
clarify what Paul VI meant by universal charity because both view charity in a similar
way. According to Hellwig,
Charity is considered in Christian tradition either as the whole of authentic human communion
with God and others, or more narrowly as one of the three theological virtues. In either case it is
distinguished from a love of natural attraction, a love of needy desires, a love that simply clings to
and aligns itself with the familiar, and from such responses as the instinctive care and protection of
offspring. In contrast to all of these, charity is seen as a gift of grace empowering human beings to
transcend their nature to share in the creativity and self-gift of God. It is an enhancement of human
will to act, as it were, divinely.120

The first sense of charity is in line with Paul VI’s understanding of true charity as
a virtue necessary for integral development. Authentic charity expresses the relationship
between God and the loving agent, and between the latter and fellow human beings who
are both objects and subjects of love. This does not exclude the sense of charity presented
by Hellwig, namely charity as one of the three theological virtues, because theological
virtues, which “relate directly to God”121 have necessarily to be reflected in a person’s
relationship with others. This implies that because of the link between charity and the
divine will, authentic charity is prompted by an innate sense of human dignity because of
the divine origin of human dignity. It affirms that true charity, which is disinterested, is a
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fundamental virtue for integral human development. This was affirmed by St. Augustine,
according to Hellwig who states that:
He demonstrates that where each seeks his or her own without regard for others, there will always
be conflict, disaster, fear, and suffering. Only when the saving power of divine love transforms
human goals and desires, can human society hope for harmony and integration of all its parts.122

The above statement suggests how central the virtue of charity is in human life. It
is essential for solidarity, participation, association and common good. Charity is the
foundation on which justice and peace are founded, human community is built, and from
which protection for human dignity, and ultimately respect for human rights comes. It is
precisely for this reason that charity is central and has a social dimension, and “it affects
all human relationships and all structures of human society from the local to the
global.”123 Whether in small or large communities, charity is the propelling force for
solidarity, common good, option for the poor, unity among people and integral growth.
Paul VI specified ways of showing love and made recommendations for a
universal charity.124 First, there is the duty and obligation of hospitality to strangers, an
obligation rooted in human solidarity and Christian charity. Secondly, there should be
concern and care for the youth and students, especially those who have left their countries
in order to achieve skills that would eventually be helpful for the progress of their own
people. Thirdly, people should welcome immigrant workers who want to earn resources
for helping and updating the conditions of their families. Finally, financial and
educational assistance are crucial, and business people in developing nations should be
initiators of social progress and human advancement, helping other people to develop
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knowledge and skills that would make them responsible and productive. According to
Paul VI all these and similar efforts call for sincere dialogue both internationally and
nationally. They also demand that Christians, people of good will, government authorities
and educated people commit themselves to this cause.
C. The Invaluable Significance of Culture
Paul VI respected cultures and cultural differences, and he saw in institutions that
promoted cultures the solutions to the problem of cultural conflicts. He claimed that
besides professional organizations, institutions that promote culture played a significant
role in human development. Consequently, he argued that both rich and poor countries
have cultures that foster human life and dignity, and these cultures have been handed
down from generation to generation through arts, education and religion. Paul VI asserted
that it is a grave mistake to disregard the culture of the poor nations, in favor of that of
the rich nations, because the cultures of poor nations also “contain genuine human
values.”125 Paul VI was addressing this problem when he stated:
Developing nations, therefore, are to make the correct choice among the things held out to them;
let them criticize and reject false values by which the ideal of human life is lowered, but let them
accept the excellent and useful and strive to develop them together with their own excellent
qualities in accord with their natural abilities.126

Paul VI’s argument about the value of cultures was deliberate and succinct. If
cultures of poor nations are life enhancing they must be maintained and should not be
radically discarded. By affirming the significance of culture Paul VI recognized the
original meaning of the word culture which originated from the “latin cultura agri and
later cultura animi” which referred initially to the improvement and refinement of the
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person, mainly through education.”127 From the root of the word culture one realizes the
importance and value of each culture in the progress of its people, especially
educationally. Dorr, similarly, supports the idea that culture is important - it must be duly
respected - and he argues that the notion of “development proposed in Populorum
Progressio and understanding of international solidarity” 128 as presented in Sollicitudo
Rei Socialis offer a strong challenge to any opposition to the culture of one group of
people by another.
Paul VI raised a significant issue for the less developed nations, especially where
they indiscriminately think that development means discarding one’s own culture and
taking up a new and different one which seems appealing and progressive and yet does
not have regard for the value of the human person, dignity, rights, life and the human
community as such, but instead curtails the enhancement of authentic and genuine human
values and needs.129 Paul VI cautioned developing nations against temptations coming
from wealthier nations, lest they lose the best of their patrimony.130 The significant issue
he raised here was that culture and cultural values must be part and parcel of the process
of authentic human development. Cultures should be brought to confront one another but
be mutually enriching if they are to be part of authentic development. Development
outside concrete cultural contexts is utopian because it is out of context of the people
being promoted. It remains foreign, and it does not affect the real life of the people and
hence is not authentic development.
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Cultural imperialism was one of the issues Paul VI addressed in relation to
development. He was firm that civilizations which shaped the life, character, talents and
skills of experts should never “be considered the only one, nor must it look with disdain
on other countries.”131 Paul VI cautioned foreign experts about the danger of cultural
imperialism. He called them to a critical study and knowledge of the culture of the people
they served so that they would introduce elements of their own culture in foreign
countries only when it is appropriate and necessary, but even then ensure that they were
properly adapted to the culture of the people they served. This approach to cultural
interaction provides for reciprocal or mutual cultural enrichment. The enduring
significance of this assertion is evident in emphasis of the Rome Statement on the
importance of culture during the International Conference for Population and
Development (ICDP) as necessary for the harmonious coexistence of people.132 It was for
a similar reason that Paul VI cautioned people adapting to foreign cultures in the
following words:
Therefore those who undertake a mission of this kind must see to it that they carefully investigate
the history, the special characteristics, the store of knowledge of the country in which they live as
guests. From this will follow a contact of one culture with the other by which both will be
enriched.133

Innovation of development projects must start with a thorough study,
understanding and acceptance of people’s culture. Cultural interaction is not only
beneficial because of mutual enrichment but because it leads to mutual understanding and
knowledge, especially when the interaction involves sincere and genuine dialogue
between the principal elements of the interacting cultures. Paul VI made this clear when
131
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he stated that
When genuine dialogue between different national cultures is established as in the case between
individual men, a fraternal meeting of minds readily has its beginnings. Programs initiated for
human development to be implemented by common effort bring nations together if all the chief
government officials and the lowest artisan, are enkindled with brotherly love and ardently desire
establishment of a civilization of world solidarity. Then a dialogue will begin based on man but
not on the produce of land or products of technology.134

Paul VI suggested that a genuine cultural dialogue is a trust-building process
which leads to mutual understanding and love. This suggestion is realistic because
without mutual exchange of knowledge and trust, love is difficult if not impossible.
Mutual dialogue and understanding of cultures is significant not only for human dialogue
but also for appropriate action of the parties involved. Paul VI’s argument is logical and
simple - mutual cultural knowledge leads to mutual acceptance and love. However, in
real life mutual cultural exchange and knowledge does not always necessarily lead to
mutual acceptance and love.
Nonetheless mutual acceptance and love lead to solidarity. Solidarity becomes
meaningful with dialogue centered on the human person, not on capital because people
realize that the human person is central in the dynamics of dialogue, relationship and
solidarity. This is possible only if there is a cultural exchange, which brings to realization
the singular but universally equal human dignity of people. This is again theoretically a
plausible assertion but practically there are often difficulties brought forth by individual
dispositions of people to the real vision of the human person and the significance of
mutual cultural exchange.
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D. The Primary Significance of Education
The educational background of Paul VI as stated in Chapter One, and the
educational background of many of his family members and friends would suggest that
Paul VI would attach great importance to education. It is, therefore, no surprise that he
advocated that for development to occur, education of people is an imperative. Education
is a significant factor for integral human development and constitutes one of the
fundamentals for any attempts to develop human community. For Paul VI, “economic
growth” is founded on “social progress towards which it strives and that primary
education” which introduces literacy is the “prime objective of those planning
development.”135 Education is often insufficiently stressed as a crucial factor for human
development, yet it is actually one of the most basic factors in addition to human dignity
and rights, necessary to be grasped, acknowledged and implemented, for authentic human
development. Education is important because it creates literacy and knowledge of
phenomena and reality. It is a fundamental ingredient for human social knowledge,
integration and consolidation of personal and communal achievements. The ICPD, many
years later, underscored the importance of education for human development when it
stated that education and good health services are “prerequisites for full participation in
human societies,” 136 meaning that they facilitate personal involvement and contribution
to human development.
Education is a factor for human development because it is a significant social
process and a starting point for development. All other human achievements are preceded
by education, whatever their form may be. In Populorum Progressio, Paul VI suggested
135
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that education is “a prime objective of those planning development” besides asserting that
“economic growth is above all based on social progress toward which it strives.”137 This
assertion is plausible because any social project and progress starts with education about
its meaning, prerequisites, value and relevance, the necessities for social growth, what the
development process involves, and how it can be achieved. Paul VI demonstrated the
importance of education by emphasizing that
. . . primary education which teaches the elements of reading and writing is the prime objective of
those planning development. The lack of education is no less troublesome than lack of food, for an
illiterate is, as it were, a person suffering from starvation of the spirit; but when one knows how to
read and write, when he is prepared to perform a task or properly to carry out a function he regains
self-confidence and realizes that he can make progress along with others.138

Paul VI underscored the significance of education for integral development.
However, he emphasized the importance of the formative effect of education rather than
literacy because education contributes to development only by transforming human
persons and behaviour. Paul VI was right to state that the value of education as a
stepping-stone for social progress and economic growth is crucial but his distinction
between education and social progress is unnecessary because education is an intimate
aspect - constituent facet - of social progress. It is also more plausible to suggest that
education is a prime factor in planning and implementation of development rather than
the prime objective of planners. The prime objective of planners is development not
education.
Education is important because it has a purposeful and liberating effect. It
liberates people from ignorance, fear and incapacity for action and responsibility.
Education helps one to get involved and participate in solidarity with others. Paul VI did
137
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not directly state the liberating effect of education in Populorum Progressio but this can
be deduced from an interpretation of the text. In this case, Paul VI contended that
education is a relevant action for development and necessary for the functioning of the
principles of solidarity, common good, participation and freedom as a human right. It
makes the dynamics of these principles possible. This also suggests that it facilitates the
possibility and functioning of the virtue of charity. Even if Dorr seems to suggest that
Paul VI did not emphasize the role of education in making people responsible in society
Paul VI recognized that education helps people to take up tasks along with others.139 He
advocated for both literacy and education for responsibility. This was alluded to when he
called for students from the Third World to study in the developed nations and return to
develop their home countries.
Paul VI affirmed the importance of education in his reference to his message to
the members of the UNESCO conference held in Teheran, where the priority he gave to
education was clearer than his prior affirmations. He says:
As we stated . . . “literacy is a basic and primary factor not only for man’s social integration but
also for his personal enrichment, and for society a most excellent aid to effect growth and
development.”140

Paul VI intimated here that literacy promotes human integrity, and individual and
societal growth. He praised the initiative of public authorities and international
organizations as significant for the promotion of human progress because they equip
people to achieve development on their own. This recognition, acknowledgement and
praise suggests that Paul VI considered education to be the prerogative of all individuals
and all national and international institutions, governments and organizations in pursuit of
139
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development.
Paul VI argued that professional educational organizations are important because
they facilitate “the principal and primary way of life in the family circle.”141 Here he
conceded that educational institutions are important supplementary organs to the family
since development is also founded and dependent on the moral fiber of the family. This
shows the significance of participation of all, from individuals to the global community,
in the development process. For Paul VI the role of organizations is crucial to
development but it demands proper planning.
If these have been established to serve the convenience and interests of their members, their duty
is great in regard to their educational function which they can and must carry out. For these
organizations, since they instruct and train men, do much to imbue them with an understanding of
the common good and obligations which it imposes.142

Paul VI suggested here that educational institutions are not established for selfish
group or institutional interests but for public interests and must fulfill their duties to that
effect. Education is futile and detrimental if it does not meet its goal, namely the growth
of individuals, groups and society. Education is important, according to Paul VI, because
it helps in the instruction, training and facilitating of people’s understanding of the
common good and its demands in the development process.
Paul VI was of the view that the value and purpose of education is not limited to
just a few people. It is for the good of all people. If education is oriented to personal and
selfish goals, it is rendered useless as a starting point for integral human development. In
fact selfish education is one reason for lack of integral human development, according to
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Paul VI. Education should and ought to change people and their lives integrally and be
used integrally.
Paul VI’s affirmation about the necessity of education in the development process
is significant. Education, which many commentators on Populorum Progressio and
documents of Catholic social teaching have not explicitly stated as a crucial practice, or
loosely, a ‘principle for human development’ in the sense that it is a starting point of
development, should be emphasized and stated as such. The importance of education lies
in the fact that, if properly imparted and used, it is both a curative and preventive action
for human development. It enlightens people, makes them aware of the dangers of
poverty and its causes, and offers solutions to avoid the tragedy that follows in the wake
of poverty.
E. A Credible Notion of Human Development
Etymologically, the word development originated from the Latin word volere
which means to roll, and from the root-word veloper meaning wrap, eventually came the
old French word developer and the later or modern French developper or develop which
means unwrap, open out or to unfold possibilities of something.143 Most sources agree
that the word means to unfold possibilities of something, to open, to unwrap, and to
evolve to a higher stage in function or stature. What is evident here is that to develop or
development is not limited to a particular form of growth.
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The notion of human development up to 1960s when Paul VI wrote Populorum
Progressio was predominantly economic. Paul VI believed that the true meaning of
human development needed to be redeemed. This is evident in his deliberate choice to
use the term “development” instead of “economic growth.”144 Paul VI thought a right
notion of development was important, and he attempted to offer in Populorum Progressio
a novel and credible notion of human development. This fact is attested to by authors like
Dorr who says that Paul VI offered a “fresh approach to the understanding of
development” in the sense that it was inclusive and avoided violence.145 Most authors
affirm the view that the encyclical “maintains that development is the new name for
peace and insists on personal and social development in the context of a transcendental
humanism.”146 Development is envisioned as not being only economic and of individuals
in isolation, but as the growth of every individual who is part of the community. This was
the idea Paul VI took from Louis Joseph Lebret’s notion of true human development,
which Paul VI called integral human development. This is evident in the core statement
of Populorum Progressio:
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.147

This is the central notion of development which runs through the document and
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provides the greatest impetus in Populorum Progressio.148 This vision of development,
which encompasses all dimensions of the human person and of all people, can transform
the thoughts, attitudes and practical life of individuals, groups and human society. Paul
VI emphasized that this kind of development calls for cooperative promotion of the
common good.149
Another characteristic of the document was Paul VI’s analytical approach in
defining human development. Dorr states:
Populorum Progressio represents a remarkable advance on previous Church teaching about
human development. The advance was a conceptual one. By this I mean what is radically new is
the framework of understanding rather than specific details.150

Paul VI provided a framework for understanding but not the specifics for practical
implementation or action. This is where his notion of human development is more
theoretical than pragmatic. Paul VI’s approach to and notion of development was also
sharply different from that in the previous Catholic social teaching documents.151
Reflecting what Lebret had emphasized in his development ethics, Richard McBrien and
others affirm that Paul VI “is forceful in his insistence that development is spiritual and
cultural as well as economic” and he urges a “complete humanism” that accentuates “the
freely rounded development of the whole and of all men.”152 The difference was basically
in his definition of development because according to him authentic development is
integral, it is not just economic. Integral development is a development in solidarity, and
a development which covers all dimensions of human life, social, economic, political,
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cultural, psychological and spiritual.
Paul VI’s introduction of the term “integral” in the definition of human
development is what made a radical break from the previous definitions of development,
apart from that of Louis Joseph Lebret on which he heavily relied. This is what makes the
difference between authentic development and quasi development. Dorr aptly
summarizes Paul VI’s understanding of authentic development in Populorum Progressio:
It does not give a privileged place to the economic dimension of human development, any more
than to cultural, psychological, political, ecological, or religious dimension, rather it challenges
Christians to take full account of the non-economic elements - to recognize, for instance, that the
protection of the right to free speech may be at least as valuable a part of development as an
increase in disposable income.153

The document neither gave privilege to economic development nor took the
prevalent concept of economic development as its starting point. It outlined basic
standards for rendering social changes as authentic human development. It provided a
framework and a model of authentic human development. It emphasized the social,
political, ethical and cultural character of problems related to development, and the
legitimacy and necessity of the Church’s intervention in this field.154
As opposed to what was erroneously claimed to be development up to mid-1960s,
Paul VI described what he called ‘integral’, and sometimes referred to as ‘complete’ or
‘authentic’ human development in key paragraphs of Populorum Progressio. Many
authors, including Peter Henriot concur that a true definition of human development must
be inclusive and centered on the human person, not economics.155
Authentic development is integral, meaning it is inclusive of all dimensions of
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human life. True development provides for the progress of each individual, the whole
person and the whole human family.156 It is the holistic advancement of individuals and
community. Relying on Lebret’s work, which was intensely used for drafting Populorum
Progressio, Riga and others affirm this notion by stating that the human person must
develop spiritually, morally, socially, economically, politically and culturally, and it
should be added, psychologically and mentally.157 If some of the above aspects of human
life are not developed authentic development has not occurred.
This notion of authentic development is to some extent idealistic or utopian
because there are variable factors that affect development. For instance, talents,
geographical locations, available basic resources, mental capacities, social possibilities
and physical abilities affect the rate and level of development of individuals and nations.
What Paul VI promoted is a notion which assumes that there are no such variable factors.
This is as theoretical as what John Rawls proposes in A Theory of Justice and calls the
veil of ignorance in the original position where all parties are equal in terms of
knowledge of relevant requisite principles for justice.158 This theory presumes that
everybody has or lacks the requisite qualities and resources for the exercise of justice,
which is a difficult condition to attain in real life.
True and integral human development ought to be advocated for the sake of,
among other reasons, human dignity. According to Paul VI all people have human
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dignity, and the perfection of “human potentialities is not left to man’s good pleasure”159
because of the origin of the human person, which determines human action. True
development is, therefore, the enhancement of human dignity rather than the possession
of an abundance of material things.
Efforts and activities towards authentic development are rationally guided. It is
not a laissez faire project - absolutely freely chosen and done - because rational creatures
are obliged to direct their lives and their wills to God, who is “the first truth and highest
good.”160 Human life is destined for a higher dignity, a life in union with God and a life
which transcends human nature. This is the ultimate goal of human life and activity, and
the aim of true development. Development activity ought to be guided by this fact.
For Paul VI true and integral human development is a progressive process in
which all are involved. Using Lebret’s vision of authentic development Paul VI argued
that true development “consists in each and everyone’s passing from less human to more
human living conditions.”161 He advocated the development of the potentialities that are
within the individual, but this demands an atmosphere where there is love, friendship,
prayer and contemplation, all of which indicate that the human person is in a progressive
process.
There are indicators of less human conditions of life and more human conditions
of life. A less human condition of living is indicated by lack of “the minimum subsistence
necessary for life,” self-imposed moral deficiencies due to excessive self-love, oppression
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by social structures with consequent abuse of power or ownership, exploitation of
workers and unjust transactions.162 Conversely, more human living conditions are
characterized by the absence of destitution, possession of basic supplies for life,
successful struggle against social ills, broader knowledge, acquisition of culture,
increased esteem for human dignity, orientation to the spirit of poverty, cooperation for
the common good, the will for peace, recognition and acknowledgement of God as the
highest good, author and ultimate end of all things. For Paul VI God’s gift of faith and
unity in Christian love is also a sign of a more human condition of living.
Development is authentic if all productive activities are directed to the service of
the human person, and if they lessen inequalities, remove discrimination, free people
from the bonds of servitude and enable them to improve their conditions in the temporal
order, achieve moral development, and perfect their spiritual endowments or simply
protect the dignity of the human person as consistently taught by the subsequent
encyclical and pastoral traditions.163 These assertions show the gravity of Paul VI’s
vision of development as “liberation” and his introduction of the term in the question of
human development, though he did not use it liberally because it would fall short of
integral human development which looks “to the absolute God.”164
True development is not merely growth in the national domestic product or
technological advancement. True development consists in social progress and economic
growth, an increase in the capacity of an economy proportionate to its people, and
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equitable distribution of socio-economic and political wealth. This helps to promote more
human social situations of meaningful human life and dignity. This is what Paul VI
meant when he stated that:
When we speak of development care must be given both to social progress and economic growth.
The increase of national wealth is not sufficient for its equitable distribution; the progress of
technology is not enough to make the earth a more suitable place to live in as if it had been made
more humane. . . . The predominance of technologists, or technocracy, as it is called, if it gains the
upper hand in the next generation will be able to bring on evils . . . . Economics and technology
lack meaning if they are not turned to the goal of man whom they must serve.165

True development goes beyond meeting people’s physical or material needs to
meeting their spiritual needs. Complete and authentic humanism consists in provision for
the development of whole persons without limits to material provisions to the exclusion
of God and spiritual values.
There is no genuine humanism except that which reaches out to God as the absolute, while the
duty to which we are called is acknowledged and by which true meaning is given to human life.
By no means therefore, is man his own final measure, he only becomes what he must be if he
transcends himself.166

Full growth is realized in self-transcendence, namely in being in and with God.
True human development is not independent of God. Paul VI introduced the ultimate
meaning of human development by giving development a theological meaning besides its
material dimension. The true and ultimate realization of the human person is to be found
in God, the originator of the human person. This suggests that the climax of the process
of the unfolding of human potentialities and self-realization is in the beatific vision and
union with God. This is where socio-economic and political activities and processes
should ultimately lead people.
Paul VI advocated that development is not merely resolving prevailing problems
of people. Consequently, he stated that appeals to aid organizations, groups and persons
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for provision of funds, both privately and publicly, and gifts and loans are inadequate for
development to be called authentic just as eradication of hunger and poverty, and
combating destitution are insufficient.167 He declared that private and communal
handouts for eliminating hunger, poverty and any kind of destitution do not constitute
development. This is a sound claim because development is the unfolding of the potential
of individuals and groups. Handouts do not promote this unfolding. Instead they hamper
the spontaneous unfolding of potentials or talents. To a great extent they thwart
development because they create reluctance to work, which is a dignified activity. Paul
VI was realistic to state that donations and gifts are not development because they do not
involve any personal initiatives, involvement or participation. Important in true
development is the
establishment of a human society in which everyone, regardless of race, religion or nationality,
can live a truly human life free from bondage imposed by men and the forces of nature not
sufficiently mastered, a society in which freedom is not an empty word and where Lazarus the
poor man can sit at the same table as the rich man.168

True development is human advancement where discrimination and segregation
are absent, there is no injustice, human rights are respected, there is a radical preferential
option for the poor and charity is shown to all people. In quoting Lk.16: 19-31, Paul VI
implied that everyone who can uplift others should do so. The rich man is unnamed and
simply refers to anybody capable of elevating the needy from less human to a more
human level, even to a level better than one’s own. To emphasize the gravity of this issue
Paul VI stated that true development demands generosity, self-sacrifice and ceaseless
efforts on the part of materially blessed people and critical self-examination of all people.
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Integral development demands that every person capable of support should do something
for those who have nothing and are incapable of self-support.
Paul VI indefatigably advocated that true development embraces every body and
nation, it is multi-faceted, and depends on various factors. True development consists in
socio-economic, political, spiritual and moral progress of all people. He argued that
when we combat misery, and struggle against injustice we are providing not only for man’s
prosperity but also for his spiritual and moral development and are therefore promoting the
welfare of the whole human race.169

According to Paul VI authentic development is not accumulation of wealth for
private benefit, neither is it wealth sought for its own sake. Positively, development is
economic growth “adjusted to the welfare of the human person and in daily sustenance
provided for all the resource as it were, of fraternal charity and clear sign of the help of
Divine Providence.”170 True development involves sharing acquired resources with the
needy. This sharing of the gifts of God is rooted in love and generosity.
Populorum Progressio suggests the following conclusions regarding Paul VI’s
notion of development. First, complete development is integral in character. This means
development of the whole person because each person has dignity, right and obligation to
attain self-fulfillment. Secondly, authentic development is not a self-centered or
fragmented phenomenon - it has a social dimension. Every individual is part of a
community and civilization with its own relational history. All people are bound in
solidarity. Each person has to care for the wellbeing of others in human community,
including generations yet to come. Thirdly, authentic human development is not only
economic, it includes cultural, psychological, ecological, political and religious or
169
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spiritual dimensions of the human person and of all people. Fourthly, Populorum
Progressio offered a novel description of the term “development.” Paul VI linked and
equated development to peace. He asserted that “development is the new name for
peace”.171 This view suggests that development makes peace, and there is a mutual
exchange between development and peace. Development of all people creates a peaceful
atmosphere because each member’s dignity is respected, protected and cared for. When
an atmosphere of peace prevails it is conducive for development. The relationship
between the two is, therefore, an intimate one, and they are mutually indispensable. The
document not only linked development to charity and peace, but linked peace to justice.
Peace is the consequence of charity and justice, just as integral human development is the
consequence of charity and justice exercised in solidarity.
Paul VI looked at development in a radically different way from most
development experts. The economic, political, psycho-social and spiritual overtones in
the document underscore the fundamentals of Paul VI’s notion of integral human
development, and differentiate his vision of development from others.
F. Means and Models of Change: Violent Revolution or Passive Resistance
Paul VI suggested ways of responding to socially unjust situations. He did not
explicitly propose them, but his arguments for a response to evil in society suggest two
models of change - confrontational and consensus models of change. Each of these
models has both positive and negative consequences.
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1. MEANS OF CHANGE: FIVE PRINCIPAL SUGGESTIONS
Paul VI suggested five means of change in Populorum Progressio. These are:
world relief fund, foreign aid, limited competition, concerted effort and effective world
government.172 First, Paul VI advocated that there should be a world fund to relieve
destitute people. This was a relevant practical expression of love. It suggests the
importance of solidarity, charity, justice, option for the poor, the common good,
affirmative action and the principle of subsidiarity. He suggested that nations should
work in mutual collaboration to raise such funds. It is from out of the funds that the needs
of the poor can be met. The efforts of different people and nations should be well
coordinated so that personal interests are checked. Individual nations should also increase
their production in order to help their citizens live a dignified life and help improve the
conditions of the human race. They are entitled to use the fruits of their labor but they
should not keep their wealth exclusively for their own use.173
Secondly, he suggested massive foreign aid in the form of money, goods, skilled
labor, especially financial expertise, and agrarian reform.174 This is a questionable
suggestion in the context of the whole document because it encourages dependence and
discourages initiative and creativity. It fulfills the demands of solidarity, charity and
common good but it is against the principle of participation. It is good only at the
initiation of the development process. The suggestion supplements the theme of relief to
destitute people and concerted effort, but it needs to be implemented cautiously, because
too much foreign aid also stifles initiatives and creativity. It does not contribute to true
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development which demands involvement and participation of all people capable of
work. Paul VI himself was aware of this because he warned that development is not just
elimination of hunger and poverty or situations of destitution, as treated in the preceding
section of this chapter.175 It goes beyond that to a change of attitude toward the material
and moral empowerment of people.
Thirdly, he proposed limits of international competitive trading so as to restore
equality between the trading partners.”176 Paul VI was never totally opposed to
capitalism. He understood that as long as profits accruing from it are used for the
enhancement of human life and dignity, they served the right purpose for which resources
of nature were made. However, he called for an end to exaggerated liberal capitalism and
instead advocated moderation.
Fourthly, Paul VI suggested a concerted economic effort for the promotion of
development.177 Nations have to work together in an organized fashion in order to
promote the development of peoples. It was for such reason that Paul VI encouraged the
nations that are more blessed with resouces to help those that are less fortunate. He
advocated that this was a way of implementing the doctrine of Second Vatican
Council.178
Finally, Paul VI thought that a move towards the establishment of an effective
world authority would be instrumental for integral development.179 He encouraged and
praised the work of the UN and FAO for this reason. This was a meaningful suggestion
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for an organ regulating the international community’s socio-economic and political
activities. However, the problem is always management of large organizations or
governments, a problem which the UN experiences currently as its efforts and strength
are disputable, and sometimes defied by individual nations.
2. MODELS OF CHANGE: CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATIONAL MODELS
Paul VI opposed violence as a way of effecting change. Instead, in his
affirmations about response to social evil he implied the possibility of two models of
change – the confrontational model and consensus model of which Paul VI preferred the
consensus model.180 His choice was necessitated by the gravity of consequences of the
chosen model.
a. The Consensus Model
This is the top-down model of change where change is not initiated from the grass
roots but from the top. According to Julian Filochowski, the consensus model demands
that “changes should be brought about by those at the top - they must agree and then
mold others.”181 This approach is questionable because if the bureaucratic structure
consists of a corrupt body of people, any change initiated is corrupt and the possibility of
oppression and domination is great. The advantage of this model is that the possibility of
violent revolution is minimized.
In the consensus model, change is envisaged as coming from a willing agreement
based on reason, emotional appeal and moral pressure from the various parties involved
in the dialogue. This model presupposes that all parties have sufficient goodwill and
commitment to justice, which can move them to make concessions. It also presupposes
180
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that they are ready to sacrifice self interest to bring about harmony and promote the
welfare of all. These presuppositions do not guarantee that positive change is imminent.
Considering the requisite dispositions for initiating a consensus model of change, one is
also right to differ from Filochowski’s description that it is only a top-down model of
change. If all are well disposed it could as well be initiated from the grassroots, hence a
top-down model of change.
b. The Confrontational Model
Paul VI never intended to recommend the confrontational method, but his vision
of the urgency of the need for change suggests this kind of model which could provide
those in dire need of change an alternative model.182 This contention seems to be a
conjecture. The overall tone of Populorum Progressio suggests peaceful means of change
- not a confrontational approach. The confrontational model suggests that the principal
means of change is pressure or threat. It presupposes that those who have power and
wealth eventually yield reluctantly, but when there is pressure they cannot ignore it.183
This is a people-power model which demands more “emphasis on the political
and critical awareness that could come from education and literacy.”184 For this method
to work without serious problems, education is necessary so that people know their role
and the consequences of their behavior. This is grass roots-top movement of initiative for
change which implies that power is in the hands of the masses. It suggests a democratic
process which is ideal for true development. This would be the most effective and easiest
model of change because more people would be part of the process than if initiated by the
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bureaucracy.
The problem with this approach is that any socio-economic and political change is
still superficial because it is consequent to coercion and the change may not be genuinely
an act of responsibility. The best way to pressurize would be the education of the people
which empowers them to confront the prevalent problem. The eminent danger of the use
of this model is violent revolution, which is possible even when the community is
educated. The model is contrary to the intention of Paul VI because he warned about the
poor venting anger which would perhaps have undesirable consequences.
This approach supports Martin Luther King Jr.’s advocacy for militant nonviolence, which was intended to appeal to the conscience of the people who perpetuated
sinful structures.185 King opted for a militant nonviolent response for two reasons. First, it
was a lesser evil and, secondly, it was effective. Paul VI was warning the rich about
situations and reactions similar to what King was confronting. When poor, deprived,
marginalized and oppressed people cannot tolerate their ordeal any more, they resort to
any way to achieve results and to save them from their situation with minimum of losses.
However, a difference must be acknowledged. While King deliberately chose militant
nonviolence as a way of expressing his spirituality, Paul VI was not warning about the
danger of the poor expressing a form of spirituality.186 He was cautioning about the
danger of persistent injustice to the poor. Though Paul VI and King affirmed that evil
situations should be resolved, their approaches were similar only insofar as they appealed
to peoples’ consciences and different in that King was actively involved.
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There are different views about the value of the confrontational model. Dorr
argues that the confrontational model is sometimes necessary and inevitable for social
change. Some people think the poor and oppressed should be encouraged “to demand
their rights – and organize themselves in such a way that this demand must be heard.” 187
These views tend to suggest that Paul VI was leaning towards the idea of organized
violence but such a point of view is conspicuously absent in Populorum Progressio.
The two models of change are not necessarily beneficial for all parties involved in
the development process, and neither are they absolutely incompatible.188 The problem
with both models of change is that disadvantaged people are always at the mercy of the
rich and powerful because the development and shaping of each model depends on the
determinants of the situation. These include those who have social, economic and
political decision-making powers.
A significant question here is whether Paul VI suggested either of these models in
Populorum Progressio. The document makes no explicit suggestion of a model.
However, Paul VI implied the preferable model to be change through consensus. This
conclusion is arrived at only from the indications in the document.189 The consensus
model reflects Paul VI’s commitment to dialogue, which shows in his conviction that “a
more deeply felt need for collaboration and a heightened sense of unity will finally
triumph over misunderstandings and selfishness”.190 Though Paul VI warns the rich about
the dangers of obstinately remaining complacent, there is no clear indication that he

187

Dorr, Option for the Poor, 197.
Ibid. , 200.
189
Populorum Progressio 54, 22-23; 64, 27; 79, 32-33. Also see Dorr, Option for the Poor, 196-197.
190
Dorr, Option for the Poor, 196, 200-203. Also see Populorum Progressio, 64, 27.
188

173

favors the confrontational approach in the effort to overcome injustice, oppression and
poverty or underdevelopment in general.191
The consensus model appears better than the confrontational model because it is
less likely to breed more injustice, but it seems better to suggest that both models need to
be integrated or used simultaneously. One without the other may be inadequate or
ineffective. Both models can be engaged at the same time but their application should be
intensified according to the nature of the situation being addressed. According to Julian
Filochowski, Paul VI suggested in Populorum Progressio that education must always
precede this integration and application process.192A realistic choice of model demands a
positive education process which includes emphasis on the dangers and benefits of each
type of model, and any use of a model must be motivated by concern for human
dignity.193
Paul VI detested the idea of enforcing change or development through violent
action. Except when “basic human rights of the human person” and “serious harm to the
common good” are at extreme risk, insurrection and rebellion are morally wrong because
they “beget new injustices, inflict new inequalities and goad men to new destruction.”194
He objected to resolving injustice and social suffering through active resistance or
violence. Paul VI’s objection to violence is explained by the fact that violence contradicts
development, which he calls the new name for peace. It would be a self-defeating effort
to attempt to enforce development by promoting active force or violent resistance. To
affirm that Paul VI was justifying revolution of a violent nature as Peter Riga suggests is
191
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incorrect and detestable.195 Violence would defeat Paul VI’s statement and suggest that
the means justifies the end, which was not his position. He argued for the protection of
the human person and dignity; therefore, violence would be contradictory, and his call for
universal charity would be contradicted too. Violence is not recommended because it is
an emotional, irrational and irresponsible response to problems.
Paul VI was adamant that injustice and suffering ought to be confronted with
courage, and not be ignored. Injustices should be analyzed, people should be taught about
confronting injustice with courage and overcome them. He stated that “development
demands a bold approach to changes by which things will be thoroughly renovated.”196
Paul VI’s suggestion was relevant because passive observation of social injustices
is morally wrong. It is a sin of omission from a Christian perspective. Action ought to be
taken to preserve human dignity and to make situations of suffering noble, but only
dignified action is morally justifiable. Immediate action is needed and all people should
participate. However, those who hold special responsibility and influence “by reason of
their education, position and power” are exhorted to participate extraordinarily.197 The
significance of Paul VI’s advocacy for vigorous confrontation of injustice is explained by
the rationale that for development to occur, obstacles to it must be removed.
One may conclude that Paul VI, like Martin Luther King Jr., called for active
resistance but not a violent one – he called for a militant non-violence as described by
Hanigan.198 King did not advocate physical confrontation but stimulated consciences
towards dialogue. This constitutes an active response to unjust situations without violence
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and is morally justified. Similarly, Paul VI thought participation of all people was
important. Though Paul VI was aware that he could not enforce international order, he
was also aware that other people could be instrumental in the pursuit of this cause.
Statesmen and women, scholars, people of good will, especially Catholic Christians and
other believers can bring about change in the mentality and structures for change.199
For Paul VI a favorable response to the problem of poverty is beneficial to both
the poor and the rich. There is a threefold threat in failure to respond to needs of the poor.
Rich people jeopardize “their own highest values by yielding to greed,” they invite the
“judgment of God” upon themselves, and finally, they call upon themselves the wrath of
the poor - “a clear warning to the rich that the oppressed may take into their own hands
the challenge to bring about change through a violent action” suggesting that it is “in
everybody’s interest not to allow such a desperate and risky situation to develop.”200 Paul
VI’s concern was the risk consequent to the apathy of those who are instrumental in
creating the prevalent situation. Julian Filochowski underscores this risk when he states
of Paul VI that “he offers no further teaching on violent reaction from the oppressed. He
simply warns of the risk” and quotes Paul VI himself as saying:
Lacking the bare necessities of life, whole nations are under the thumb of others: they cannot act
on their own initiative; they cannot exercise personal responsibility; they cannot work towards a
higher degree of cultural refinement or a greater participation in social and public life. They are
sorely tempted to redress these insults to their human nature by violent means.201

It is risky to create such a situation, because a revolutionary uprising causes new
injustices, imbalances and disasters, and produces greater misery. The evil of violent
revolution must always be in view. However, this does not mean that evil in society is to
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be endured passively. What is important is that the situation has to be changed - injustices
have to be redressed and overcome. Paul VI is opposed to violent revolution as a way of
bringing about radical change because it is ineffective; change introduced in this way is
destructive and short lived.202
Paul VI was not encouraging revolution though some authors disagree with this
assertion.

In the context of the whole document and in the context of Evangelii

Nuntiandi Paul VI clearly denounced violent revolution as he stated:
We exhort you not to place your trust in violence and revolution: that is contrary to the Christian
spirit, and it can also delay instead of advancing that social uplifting to which you lawfully
aspire.203

Additionally, his advocacy for universal charity as a fundamental virtue for
integral human development defies the assertion that he was encouraging violence.
Finally, Paul VI would not have called development the new name for peace if he
encouraged violence. Paul VI even rejected the use of the term “liberation” as a synonym
for "development" for fear it would cause people to rise against unjust regimes.204 If he
considered peace as crucial to development, he would not advocate violence as a means
or model for change to achieve development.
In Populorum Progressio Paul VI carefully and skillfully advanced three
important points about violent reaction to situations of injustice.205 First, he considered
the possibility of a violent revolution, but found it is a futile way of overcoming injustice
because it tends to breed the very evils that it wants to overcome. Therefore, it is wrong
to argue that Paul VI advocated for a justified revolution. Secondly, the document
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specifies the circumstances under which a revolution could occur - flagrant and long
standing violation of human rights and great injury to the common good of the State. It is
too exaggerated to read this as Paul VI endorsing the idea of violent revolution. His
emphasis on universal love as a fundamental principle of development speaks to this
point. Finally, while acknowledging the possibility of a justifiable revolution, the Pope
very carefully refrained from stating that it would be justifiable or justified under certain
conditions. This clarifies the preceding assertions that Paul VI would not advocate violent
revolution. Even on the basis of his experience of war and the suffering it causes, as
presented in chapter one of this work, he would object to violent revolution. The fact that
he notes that there is a possibility of a justifiable revolution does not necessarily mean
that he advocated it. He was merely being speculative and foresighted.
This is a view often misrepresented as advocacy for violence. To understand it
one should not lose sight of his statement that development is the new name for peace.206
What Paul VI suggests is that violent revolution is an inevitable consequence of
omission, negligence and irresponsible behavior, a consequence of lack of development.
He argued that “excessive social, economic, and cultural inequalities among nations stir
up strife and contention and frequently imperil the peace.”207 Those who respond to such
situations with violence are culpable. But due to the negligent people who provoke
violence, their degree of culpability is diminished because they are coerced by the
prevalent situations and have to fight for their personal dignity. If the bonds of
relationship between people are close they contribute to peace-making and preservation,
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and promotion of progress.208
G. Agents of Change
Paul VI appealed to three categories of people - Catholics, Christians and people
of good will - but generally he appealed to all people who value human dignity to effect
change.209 He called for immediate participatory action in solidarity when and where
innocent lives are at stake, the burden of poverty amidst inhumane living conditions is
great, and world peace and “the very survival of civilization”210 are at stake. The
involvement of all people and nations in these issues is urgent and of grave significance.
All people should assume responsibility to make positive change wherever and whenever
necessary. Every person and all peoples are to be architects of their own destiny because
development is something people do for and by themselves.
Paul VI spelled out some categories of development agents and what is expected
of them. These are the Catholic hierachy - that has the duty of teaching - and the laity, the
entire Christian community and all people of good will.211 Re-echoing Gaudium et Spes
and anticipating Octogesima Adveniens and Evangelii Nuntiandi, Paul VI advocated that
the laity improve the temporal order by free initiative, by planning and creativity. As
much as possible they must “permeate not only men’s customs and mentality, but also the
laws and structures of the civil community with the Christian sense of life.”212 The laity
have the responsibility to change things according to Gospel teaching and moral

208

Ibid. , 73, 30; 77, 32.
Filochowski, 64-65. Also see Populorum Progressio, 15, 7; 20, 9; 65, 27; 81-87, 33-35. Dorr, Option for
Poor, 191.
210
Populorum Progressio, 80, 30.
211
Rousseau, 274-275. Also see Populorum Progressio, 81- 84, 33-34.
212
Populorum Progressio, 81, 33. Here Paul VI quotes Vatican Council II, The Decree on the Apostolate of
the Laity, Apostolicam actuositatem, n.7, 13 and 24; AAS 57 (1996), pp843, 849, and 856.
209

179

principles. “Without passively waiting for directives they have the role of infusing”213
Christian spirit in the mentality, customs, laws and structures of the communities in
which they live and they also have the duty to bring about basic indispensable requisite
reforms. The Catholic laity, especially in developed nations, should offer “their skill and
active cooperation to organizations, public or private, civil or religions, which are striving
to overcome the difficulties of developing nations,” and they have the role to disseminate
“an international morality based on justice and equity.”214 The laity should be involved in
the activities of charitable and humanitarian organizations. Their involvement in
development is an application of the principles of participation, solidarity, justice, charity
and common good.
Secondly, the Church has a role in transforming the structures of society that need
to be transformed.215 Paul VI asserted that the Church has always been involved in the
struggle to transform unjust social structures. In such situations the role of the Church is
to offer a global vision of the human person and human relationships as situations require
concerted action on a global scale. The entire Christian community is an agent of change.
All Christians have the duty to enforce change by helping people to refrain from
selfishness and resolve problems such as “egoism and arrogance, disputes and rivalries,
and ambitions and injustice” through which, according to Paul VI, the attainment of “a
more human life” where everybody is loved and assisted is possible.216 The challenge
Paul VI posits here is a reflection of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council’s
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Gaudium et Spes, Justitia in Mundo and Evangelii Nuntiandi which, recommended
reading of the signs of the times in addressing issues affecting people.
Paul VI invoked the participation of all people of good will to create meaningful
and humane living conditions through deep study and love.217 The difficulty with this
injunction is that not everybody may participate or be capable of involvement in a
development project. It takes interest, awareness of needs and commitment to the
development process to be involved. This is an obstacle to progress toward what Paul VI
calls integral human development. Consequently, the description of true development has
to be qualified as integral human development according to possibilities such as natural
capacities and resources.
According to Paul VI people of good will may be “delegates to international
organizations, government officials, journalists and publishers, educators and
teachers.”218 He further contended that in accordance with their capacities and
professions such experts are agents in resolving difficulties in the human situation and in
building a new world.
Finally, heads of state and ambassadors are significant agents of change and
development. Internationally, the role of “the rich countries and their leaders” and of
international agencies such as FAO and the UN is vital.219 Paul VI emphasized the role of
statesmen and women, journalists and the elite in wealthy states. The role of heads of
state is to create unity between their countries and other people, persuasion for
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contribution towards “the development of peoples and to preserve peace.”220 In poor
countries an important category of agents responsible for change and development are the
“experts and development workers, from the rich countries, who work in the poor
countries.”221
Paul VI affirmed that all “people of good will who are aware that peace cannot be
attained except through the development of civilization and increased resources” 222 are
also agents of human development. Paul VI appealed to the will of individuals to act in
the face of injustice and to work for development which brings about peace. For him
ambassadors to international organizations have to work for “a policy of mutual,
international cooperation, which is friendly, peace-seeking and interested to replace
hostile and senseless confrontations of force and arms” 223 among all people. This means
delegates to international organizations or institutions have the duty to make policies that
are altruistic and provide for peace and unity rather than unrest. This is how integral and
harmonious human development can be promoted. According to Paul VI the more
important agents of change are those who have power, wealth and influence. The
problem with such a suggestion is that such people contribute positively only if they have
the right attitude to human needs, otherwise they can be obstacles to development.
IV. PAUL VI’S RESPONSE TO THE OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS
A. The Right to Private Ownership of Property
Paul VI treated private ownership of property in the light of integral development.
According to him ownership must foster the good of the whole person and of every
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person.224 However, Paul VI’s understanding of private ownership of property was not
novel, but related to teachings of the Early Fathers, who had two emphatic doctrines
about private ownership of property.
First, the Early Fathers considered property as a means to what they called
autarkeia or self- sufficiency which means “property is a means to the relative end of
self-sufficiency and self-reliance which keeps one from being a perpetual burden to
others.” 225 It is a means to self- determination, self-assuarance, moral independence and
freedom to serve others. The Fathers advocated that ownership of property must be
subordinated to its use. Property is not to be owned for the sake of holding or keeping and
showing off. The real value of property is realized only when it is used, otherwise there
is no way of determining its worth. This assertion does not deny that property has
potential worth. It only means that it is difficult to determine the value of property apart
from its use.
The Fathers taught that property’s second goal was koinonia. Property is to serve
in building fellowship between those who have and those who do not have, meaning that
it is a means of communion between people, especially the rich and the poor.226 Property
is an instrument for consolidating solidarity. It ought to serve all people in need. The
Fathers were clear that property is not an end in itself. It is a means to genuine service to
human values and needs.227
Paul VI did not break radically from Leo XIII or John XXIII regarding private
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property. All three popes and the Second Vatican Council affirmed the natural right to
private property.228 However, in Populorum Progressio Paul VI treated the right to
private property in a social context. Consequently, he called for restraint in the exercise
of this right.
Paul VI’s claim about private ownership as a principle for integral human
development is based on a theology of creation, namely that “God intends the earth and
its goods for use by everyone.”229 Paul VI cited the book of Genesis: “Fill the earth and
subdue it”, and using this as a basis he argued for the right to own property with
restraint.230 He asserted that the text teaches that:
. . . all things of the world have been created for man, and that this task has been entrusted to him
to enhance their value by the resources of his intellect and by his toil to complete and perfect them
for his own use. Now if the earth has been created for the purpose of furnishing individuals either
with the necessities of a livelihood or the means for progress, it follows that each man has the right
to get from it what is necessary for him.231

Paul VI affirmed the universal destiny of natural resources. Some Ugandan
societies acknowledge this contention, namely that creation is God’s gift to all people,
not the monopoly of a few people. This is well stated in the Lugbara proverb: “Nyakuni
ba piri ma andri ni,” literally translated as “the earth is the mother of all,” and meaning
that the earth can feed everybody by its produce, like a common mother.”232 There is the
need to work, which in Catholic social teaching is the means of ownership, to guarantee
this motherhood of the earth.
Paul VI acknowledged that people are participants in creation and do so by adding
value to the original creation of God. People participate in and continue God’s creative
228

Gregg, 74. Also see Rerum Novarum, 15, 9 and Riga, 34-36.
McBrien, 1033.
230
Genesis1: 28. Also see Populorum Progressio, 22, 10.
231
Populorum Progressio, 22, 10.
232
Dalfovo, A.T. Lugbara Provers, (Rome: Comboni Missionaries, 1990), 185
229

184

activity in the world by working. This makes work blessed, dignified and noble before
God. The dignity of work, individual participation and use of natural resources are
emphasized as crucial for development.
Paul VI affirmed the right to tap resources of the earth through working on the
earth. Every person who works can claim the fruits of his/her labor as private property,
but not absolutely, because of “the destiny of the goods of creation to serve the needs of
all.”233 The universal destiny of natural resources is possible if things are ordered
according to the principles of justice and charity. Paul VI affirmed that people have the
right to what is necessary, not what is unnecessary. He stated:
All other rights, whatever they are, including property rights and the right of free trade must be
subordinated to this norm; they must not hinder it, but must rather expedite its application. It must
be considered an urgent social obligation to refer these rights to their original purpose.234

The right to private ownership ought to remain open to arising needs. The needs
of the less fortunate oblige those who are affluent, out of love and justice, to share their
resources with the needy. “The rights of all to the goods of the earth supersede not only
property rights, but also the right of free commerce.”235 The obligation to leave the claim
over property open is based on love; Paul VI also referred to the Early Fathers,
particularly St. Ambrose, who argued that the basis for sharing with the poor is the
universal destiny of natural resources.236
According to Ambrose and Augustine, the affluent do not give from their own
resources, they return what belongs to the poor. The universal destiny of resources to
meet human needs is the more compelling argument. “No one is allowed to set aside
233
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solely for his own advantage possessions which exceed his needs when others lack the
necessities of life.”237 This affirmation corroborates the relationships between the right of
private ownership, charity and the common good. It is here that Paul VI “adopts a
traditional concept of private property in this encyclical but gives it a different stress”,
particularly the emphasis on “the social function of private property.”238
According to Riga, for Paul VI “property is always a social responsibility.”239 He
agrees with Augustine according to whom “the phenomenon of property must be situated
in the context of humanity’s solidarity.”240 Paul VI affirmed that sometimes for the sake
of the common good, private property can be interfered with, especially when it affects
society negatively:
The common good therefore, at times demands the expropriation of an estate if it happens that
some estates impede the common property either on account of their vast size or because of their
small or negligible cultivation, or cause extreme poverty to the population or bring serious harm to
the country.241

In the same spirit as the Second Vatican Council, Populorum Progressio was
clear that revenues derived from natural resources should not be disposed of at the
pleasure of an individual, and excessive profits should not be used for individual benefits.
Transfer of excess profits to foreign countries is unjust because the resources of nature
are for the benefit of all people.242 This suggests that human labor is for the good of the
human community too. Human labor is good because it is participation in God’s creative
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activity, and so personal industry and creativity are significant contributions to human
development.243
Paul VI’s assertions reflected the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas, who affirmed the
right of private ownership but gave ownership a different meaning. According to him
ownership “is merely an extension of the freedom of the person - a necessary extension
for successful navigation through life”, but essentially property is for the promotion of
the common good.244 Ownership helps in the cultivation of virtue through the practice of
stewardship, generosity and work. Aquinas affirmed the value of work and regarded the
benefits accruing from labor as being for the individual as well as others, and labor was,
in a way, a custodian of natural resources.
This explains why Paul VI was, to a significant degree, opposed to exaggerated
free-market capitalism and insisted that the economy must serve the people.245 He
observed that the principal purpose of economic development is not promotion of profits,
competition is not “the supreme law of economics,” “private ownership of the means of
production” is not “an absolute right which recognizes neither limits nor concomitant
social duty” and such abusive economic mentalities ought to be rejected because
economic progress is for the good of people.246 Diez-Alegria concedes this claim of Paul
VI and succinctly states that what Paul VI “condemns on moral grounds, is private,
individualistic profit taken as an absolute itself, to which everything else must be
subordinated: the idea that maximizing return on capital is the supreme value.”247 Paul VI
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rejected the idea of liberal capitalism, though not entirely. He condemned the
maximization of profits and their selfish use. When profits are used selflessly to meet
needs of people, divine intent is respected. It was for this reason that Paul VI consistently
denounced liberal capitalism as the dominant principle for international economic
systems.248
Paul VI viewed the right to own property in relation to labor and its contribution
to development. He argued that “justice demands that we admit that not only the
organization of labor but also industrial process made a necessary contribution to
promote development.”249 The right to private ownership of property is advocated on the
basis of the traditional argument since Rerum Novarum, that property is earned through
labor. Since work dignifies and it is the causality of production, ownership of what one
has worked for is realistic. This is a motivation to work and a positive contribution to
development.
Paul VI further argued that what a nation has by virtue of divine providence and
its input in the form of labor should first be enjoyed by that nation, but no nation should
appropriate natural resources exclusively for its own use.250 Economic systems and
relationships should respect the right to private property. They ought not to turn human
beings into objects without dignity just for the sake of acquisition of property.
Consequently, Paul VI condemned the use of labor as a commodity to be sold for profits,
denounced the separation of labor and capital, and considered the exaggerated profit
motive of capitalism, which neglects human dignity, as the crux of the problem in current
248
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development programs.251 The problem with the profit motive of capitalism is that it turns
values upside down. Profit becomes the end and human persons become the means. Paul
VI denounced private ownership as an absolute right and suggested that the only absolute
principle is human dignity.252
Samuel Gregg observes that many authors have vehemently defended the right to
private property.253 Some of the reasons for this defense are: private property is a
guarantee and security for people who have worked to earn property; private property
promotes self-reliance and autonomy, it helps people to actualize virtues such as
liberality, and magnanimity; and “private ownership is actualized when persons mix their
labor with raw materials.”254 Paul VI was aware of these credible reasons, but his concern
was that this right was exaggerated and abused. Consequently, he argued for “the
common use principle” which advocates that natural resources are destined for common
use, not for unrestrained private use.255 Paul VI acknowledged that
. . . inequality of wealth is not necessarily unfair. Christianity has always affirmed that many
factors must be taken into account when thinking about what constitutes justice in the material
realm. These include factors such as need, merit, willingness to take risks and the function
performed by a person.256

Paul VI’s call for the proper exercise of the right to private property was
necessitated by the demand of integral human development, the recognition and
acknowledgment that “the goods of the earth are for all people.”257 Paul VI upheld the
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right to private property but insisted that it is superseded by the right to use the resources
of nature.
B. Two Consequential Virtues: Charity and Justice with Peace as Consequence
The relationship between charity, justice and peace is an intimate one. In Catholic
social teaching prior to and after Populorum Progressio the three are consistently linked
together. “Justice is an indispensable part of charity,” and “justice is a prerequisite for
true peace.”258 Charity, justice and peace are related not only as Christian virtues, but also
as social virtues. Peace is a consequence of love and justice, and comes after the two
virtues. Paul VI was not the first person to recognize the value of peace for the human
community and its growth. All he taught affirmed Thomas Aquinas who considered
peace a significant factor for the well being of human community.259
1. CHARITY
For Paul VI the social dimension of the human person affects all human relations.
The Church calls all people motivated by love to heed the call of those who live under
evil social, political, cultural and economic conditions.260 Paul VI invoked the virtues of
Christian charity and solidarity as basic principles of liberation and true human
development. Charity should be viewed in the context of human solidarity and be given
priority in social relationships. Consequently, Paul VI encouraged the practice of
fraternity, and charitable organizations such as Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
and Caritas Internationalis that attempt to meet the demands of charity and the material
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needs of desperate people.261 According to him such organizations are necessary and
visible expressions of charity because the depraved condition of humanity is caused more
by lack of charity than by a monopoly of the resources of nature.
Paul VI considered charity a fundamental principle for integral human
development. His assertion is justifiable because where there is universal and
indiscriminate love among individuals and nations, the possibility of integral
development is heightened. It facilitates the process of mutual support among peoples
and nations, and ultimately integral development. He affirmed extension of “a generous
welcome to others” as “a duty of human solidarity and Christian charity” in “households
and also cultural institutions of host countries.”262 This suggests that solidarity and
charity are foundational for hospitality. By recognizing their mutual bonds people love
each other. Paul VI’s concern was young people who tend to be vulnerable to situations,
ideologies and worldviews and need moral and spiritual guidance. In this case hospitality
involves not only love and accommodation, but also moral support and directing the
youth.
Paul VI advocated that “emigrant workers too must be welcomed”

263

and be

offered decent working conditions as opposed to the fact that they are often left to fate
despite their need to support their poverty-stricken family members. The dignity of
immigrant workers ought to be respected. Hospitality to aliens was emphasized as an
expression of universal charity. It was later reaffirmed as a guiding principle for the
international community. The Rome Statement of 1999 advised the members of the
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International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) to incorporate
hospitality to aliens as a vital principle for human development.264
Paul VI used the term “charity” as a specific form of Christian love, not a
philanthropic act.265 Charity is not an emotional response to circumstances but a rational,
deliberate and responsible response. He proposed that expatriate experts should be
motivated by charity in what they do in foreign countries. Regardless of personal
concerns, love must be extended to people in honor of their dignity.
Technical skill should not be valued independently of love. “If then technical skill
is necessary the signs and proofs too of genuine love must be joined with it.”266 Paul VI
affirmed that technical skill per se is not sufficiently valuable. Its value is determined by
how and why it is used to serve others and expressed in a loving way or not.267 In
emphasizing the significance of universal charity, Paul VI stated that
Programs initiated for human development to be implemented by common effort bring nations
together if all, the chief government officials and the lowest artisan, are enkindled with brotherly
love and ardently desire the establishment of a civilization of world solidarity. Then a dialogue will
begin based on man but not on the produce of the land or products of technology.268

For Paul VI love is the origin of dialogue between nations and collaborative action
because it is people-centered. Love breeds solidarity, and solidarity is the beginning of
authentic dialogue. According to Paul VI with true solidarity, dialogue centers on people,
not products or technical skills. He made the human person central in the pursuit of
development, arguing that education leads to self-embetterment, and economic and
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spiritual progress.269
Genuine love contributes to integral human development because one “who is
animated by genuine love is the one who in particular applies his mental acumen to
discourage the cause of misery and find ways to combat them and boldly overcome
them.”270 Love is what moves one to devote personal talents, intelligence, wisdom,
energy and abilities to ensure that suffering is abated and development of all is achieved.
This suggests that authentic development of the human race demands a daring love, a
charity that reaches out to others unconditionally. Paul VI suggested this when he said:
Now this striving for a more human way of life does indeed demand effort and entails
inconvenience but these very sufferings endured out of love for our brothers and for their benefit
can be most conducive to the development of the human race.271

Authentic development demands commitment to self-sacrificial charity and, a love
that is indiscriminate, unconditional and never hesitates to act. This kind of charity is a
biblical demand of discipleship and a social demand of human community.272 A loving
community can help the disadvantaged to rise to a higher standard, befitting human
beings. Though charity is supreme, it must be linked to justice because “it both motivates
and completes justice.”273 People are moved to act justly because they love and love
makes justice real and moral.
2. JUSTICE
Paul VI made the notion of justice more expansive than encyclicals before
Populorum Progressio. He extended the notion of social justice from a national level to
269
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an international one, and advocated that international social justice is essentially based on
human solidarity because human community constitutes a family.274 Fair treatment
among peoples is influenced by their relationships and the inevitable need for each other.
Paul VI recognized the significance of the regulation of economic relations between
nations so that no party would be exploited. He advocated commutative justice. He dealt
with a situation of exchange involving legal contracts, which stipulate, directly or
indirectly, the requisite conditions of the agreements or contracts entered into. This is
typical of commutative justice, a justice exercised in exchange of commodities or
services.275
Paul VI envisioned that protective agreements were necessary. Consequently, he
suggested that bilateral and multilateral agreements must be honored because of the
social relations they create on the basis of political and juridical equalities. He further
thought that these agreements need to be governed by justice which is a fruit of sincere
collaboration and respect for human rights and dignity.276 The implication of this view is
that justice must protect the human person, rights and dignity. The view is credible
because all principles for integral human development are founded on the most
fundamental principle of the human dignity. If human dignity is understood, recognized
and acknowledged, respect for human rights and the human person, solidarity, and
ultimately the exercise of justice is more easily achievable.
From Paul VI on, the requirement of justice for human development has been
consistently emphasized and supported. For example, justice was one of the principal
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developmental elements underscored during the ICPD. The Rome Statement affirmed
that justice is an important and protective component against poverty and disparities of
wealth and societal unity.277 Similarly, Paul VI had earlier argued that solidarity is easily
undermined by injustice. When nations attempt to work in collaboration and mutual
agreement, they should ensure that there are no variable trade relations, which exist
between richer and poorer countries because steady relationships provide hope and
confidence for poor nations. 278 Otherwise, their fears that aiding nations can take back
their aid any time may be aggravated.
Paul VI affirmed “the need for social justice to govern world trade.”279 Lessdeveloped countries depend on exportation of raw materials which are less valuable than
the products of developed nations, and “subject to very great and sudden price changes
and are consequently far outclassed by the increasing value of industrial products.” 280
This variation contributes to the gap between developed and underdeveloped nations. The
phenomenon incapacitates less-developed countries competing with industrialized
countries. Costs of goods from industrialized countries claim more money from the
unindustrialized countries than their income. Paul VI concluded rightly that “for this
reason nations struggling against poverty become still poorer, but those endowed with all
resources are enriched with even greater wealth.”281 Injustice in international trade
relations persists in relationships of unequal bargaining powers, capacities and
possibilities.
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According to Paul VI, international trade relations are good and just only if “the
parties involved do not differ too much in resources” and it is unjust if “very unequal
situations obtain between countries”, and it was for the same reason, according to Paul
VI, that “the fundamental principle of liberalism as the norm of commercial transaction is
called into question.”282 Paul VI did not condemn economic liberalism or capitalism,
absolutely. He simply called for moderation in the system. As long as the profits of a
capitalist serve the needs of human dignity, and are not used for needless selfish interests,
he had no problem. The aspect essentially questioned is that capitalism gives rise to
economic inequalities. Inequalities at the same time provide opportunities for free trade
because the poor cannot favorably compete with the rich. To allow people to make
economic transactions without agreements that favor both trading partners is unjust and
faulty because the more powerful can manipulate situations for selfish ends, thus
disregarding the common good.
Paul VI raised many challenging issues. First, he questioned the sense of a
claimed or supposed solidarity. When nations or individuals get into trade relationships
they express their need for each other, but true solidarity is not selfish or exploitative.
True solidarity benefits all parties involved. Where there is authentic solidarity there is
justice. Secondly, there is no justice in relationships when one party suffers or is
exploited. Thirdly, though it could happen in any economic system, liberalism is
inconsonant with justice and solidarity, or at least makes them difficult to achieve. The
terms of a just agreement may not be honored, or mutual needs are disregarded or
become selfish. Partners fail to see their need for one another and this makes the principle
282
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of economic liberalism questionable. Finally, Paul VI suggested the principle of
subsidiarity and an option for the poor to regulate economic justice. According to him,
regulation of trade relations demands an authority that intervenes when smaller groups
are unable to resolve their problems.
Paul VI argued for the exercise of justice, freedom and equity. He observed that
free competition is beneficial only to those who have stronger bargaining power. It is
unjust that the weaker or poorer parties are compelled to succumb to stronger ones
because they have no alternative. This would be an act of commutative injustice, a
violation of human freedom and immoral because it is coercion. Paul VI suggested that
there should be objective rationality in economic relations. Human reason endowed with
divine assistance should discern what needs to be done. Economic relations should be
governed by ethical principles. If not, the so-called collaborative relation or solidarity is
not authentic or relevant and integral human development is impossible.
Paul VI advocated justice on the basis of Christian understanding of the social
character of people. He asserted that justice must be based on “responsibility to others,”
restrained inviolability of private property, and “the universal destination of material
goods” or “the common use principle,” and that “completely equal standards are
necessary”
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for just economic competition or trade. Paul VI outlined conditions

necessary for justice to flourish: people need to be responsible for each other, take the
common good seriously, be selfless in the use of property and deal on even economic
grounds.
Paul VI praised the work of large industrial groups operating in foreign countries.
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He advocated and urged “industrialists, merchants, the leaders and representatives of
these large organizations” to deal with the less-developed countries disinterestedly; their
principal motive should be “social development and human progress.” 284 Justice should
govern employer-employee relations. “No one should unjustly be subjected to the
arbitrariness of others.”

285

They should help nationals to participate in shaping

development in their countries, and do this by training and involving them in the
leadership and general business of their organizations. Paul VI suggested that joint
participation of specialists and nationals of countries they serve is necessary because
different skills supplement each other and meet the needs of integral development. This
means solidarity is a necessary partner of justice because it expresses how much people
need each other and treat each other according to their genuine needs.
For Paul VI justice makes two important demands.286 First, it demands that
experts who work in nations other than their own do not dominate but serve. Paul VI
advocated just action on the part of those whose skills benefit those who lack requisite
skills for development. Secondly, justice demands that experts are free from exaggerated
patriotism - an inordinate love of their country - and unjust discrimination. Their
patriotism should not jeopardize the life, dignity and culture of the people in the nations
they serve. They should refrain from giving pre-eminence to their own culture,
knowledge and experience, and their countries of origin.
Several authors agree that in his treatise of social justice in Populorum Progressio
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Paul VI moved the focus from a national to an international level.287 Prior to the
document “justice was primarily a matter of ensuring the proper distribution of existing
wealth and resources”; the novelty of the document is that “it could be seen in terms of
the production of increased resources which would be used to overcome poverty and to
ensure that those who have little could catch up with those who have more.”288 This
means justice, like option for the poor, affirmative action and subsidiarity, consists in
improving the conditions of those who are poor and incapable. The document affirmed
the worldwide dimension of justice in human development, and the role of solidarity
between the rich and the poor.
In Populorum Progressio Paul treated the three types of justice - social justice,
commutative justice and distributive justice. Social justice is more explicit in his vision of
human solidarity and mutual relationship. The commutative dimension is clear in his
treatise on the balance in trade relations. The distributive dimension is treated in his
attempt to address the plight of nations marred with poverty, ignorance, disease and other
maladies. However, his advocacy for distributive justice should be read in light of the
right to private ownership of property and the promotion of the dignity of the human
person because the use of property also reflects justice. This suggests that general justice
as understood by Thomas Aquinas, namely as justice whose direct object is “the welfare
of entire community - the common good”, 289 and what Christine E. Gudorf calls social
justice as justice of the status quo or the social order is present in Paul VI’s vision of
justice.
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3. PEACE
At the end of Populorum Progressio Paul VI equated his overarching theme of
human development to peace. This shows how significant a condition peace is for
development. Both the Church and state should always pursue peace. Its pursuit should
be directed to the defense of human dignity - the principal focus in the struggle for peace
as Paul VI had stated in 1965 in his address to the United Nations assembly.290 Peace is
also a product of the practice of justice, and since love and justice are necessarily linked,
then peace is also a product of love. It can rightly be called the fruit or consequence of
charity and justice.
Paul VI’s doctrine of peace promoted the teaching of his predecessors. For
example, Pius XI, in Quadragesimo Anno and John XXIII, in Pacem in Terris, had
clearly affirmed that peace is an important and a unique condition to be established. It is
crucial to integral development of peoples, but delicate because it can be disrupted easily
by “excessive social, economic, and cultural inequalities among nations.”291 For Paul VI
the consequence of inequalities among nations and even individuals is often controversy
and fighting, but “peace is not simply to be reduced to the elimination of all war, as if it
consisted in a precarious balance of power.” 292 True peace is not just the absence of war.
Peace is an earned harmonious life, tranquility in relationship, consequent to unity
of mind and a deeply heart-rooted reconciliation. Justice and charity are crucial for

290

The German Bishops, A Just Peace (Bonn: Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz, 27 September
2000), 57-58.
291
Populorum Progressio 76, 31.
292
Populorum Progressio, 76, 32. Also see Rousseau, 273; Gaudium et spes, 78; and National Conference
of Catholic Bishops, The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response (Washington, D C: United
States Catholic Conference, May 3, 1983) 68, 21.

200

authentic human development but “a more perfect form of justice” 293 is a prerequisite for
peace. True peace is tranquility of heart and mind, a real transformation and an absence
of fears and concerns. A balance of socio-economic and political power is not a guarantee
for enduring peace. True peace is a consequence of satisfactory living circumstances for
all.
The French bishops argued that true peace is created by a rational influence on
people’s political wills and intentions. Peace is not forced through threats or intimidation.
Consequently, they preferred the French word dissuasion for deterrence which has the
English equivalence of dissuasion and the German word abschreckung, which is derived
from the German verb abschreken, meaning to deter, put off, plunge in cold water, all of
which give a sense of force or conditioning.294 This German term does not exactly depict
the sense of the English word dissuasion. Instead it conveys the sense of deterrence just
as the United States Bishops’ English equivalent of deterrence, which gives the sense of
intimidation and fear, even though the latter can influence people’s wills.295 The French
rendering of deterrence is preferred because it does not convey the sense of intimidation,
and it is “the deterrence of the strong by the weak.”296 This notion of deterrence is
plausible because it resonates with the original sense of peace as derived from the
Hebrew word shalom. Both OT and NT shalom had an integral meaning of general
welfare. The word meant health or peace, and a comprehensive welfare which St.
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Augustine referred to as “the tranquility of order”- meaning a true harmony with self and
environment.297
For Paul VI authentic peace is not given and taken without labor, it is earned.
Peace is something to work for ceaselessly and progressively in accordance with the
original harmony divinely instituted. Paul VI’s vision of true peace is a product of the
harmony of mind and heart, within oneself and with people in a communal environment.
For this reason peace is rightly called “a quality of relationship between persons and
nations.”298 It is a fruit of authentic love and justice. Consequently, Paul VI “argued for
economic justice as the surest way to peace.”299
This is a credible argument because people disagree and fight on the basis of
whether they are justly treated or not. Social, economic, political, religious, cultural, and
educational injustices are fundamental causes of disharmony. They directly affect human
rights and human dignity, which is the overriding principle for the integral development
of the human person and communities.
If true development is the new name for peace as Paul VI claimed, then peace is
the work not only of an individual person or a single nation, but of all.300 It involves
action in solidarity. Contributions of nations and people towards peace are significant but
they needed to be corroborated and coordinated. This is what Paul VI meant when he
said:
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Since nations are each the architects of their own development they assume a task and
responsibility of such magnitude that they will never be able to accomplish it if they live in
isolation.301

True development is not the achievement of one nation, and it is the achievement
of peace which Paul VI equated to development. The achievements of peace and
development are hard tasks in isolation. Peace and solidarity are necessarily related. For
this reason Paul VI stated that
. . . agreements between poorer nations of the same region on mutual assistance, common
programs of broader scope to help them, likewise other agreements of greater importance made to
coordinate plans of action with other nations are, so to speak, so many milestones of this road
which leads to peace while it promote progress.302

Paul VI asserted that personal or individual efforts need to be supplemented with
coordinated external efforts and support to attain true peace and true human development.
The road to true peace and development is hard, involving and demanding individuals
and nations to pool their efforts, talents and resources. Similarly, the French bishops later
affirmed in 1983 that to build peace requires courage, effort and willingness on the part
of all parties involved in the peace building process, and what needs to be understood and
attended to are the ideologies and intentions of people in conflict.303 This is a credible
affirmation because true peace can only be built when worldviews and the intentions of
conflicting parties are reconciled. Above all, the peace-building process involves critical
analysis of situations, mutual understanding and sincere dialogue.
For Paul VI there is no distinction between the fruit of peace and the event of
human development because “development is synonymous with peace,” a view
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commonly affirmed by many interpreters of Populorum Progressio.304 The credibility of
this assertion is based on the vision that when and where there is development there is
peace and when there is peace the possibility of development is eminent. This was why
Paul VI called development the new name for peace.
Henriot supplements Paul VI’s assertion by stating that there is a twofold
connection between development and peace, which flows from the text of the document.
First “a world filled with poor and oppressed people will not be a peaceful world” and,
secondly, “a world preparing for war or actually waging war will not be a world where
people move from less human to more human conditions.”305 This statement realistically
explains the equation of peace to development. Henriot suggests here that development is
the cause of true peace. If development is not authentic, peace is a dream or falsely
claimed. Secondly, war contributes nothing to the development of people.
Development and peace are necessarily mutually supportive. Peace-loving
peoples, regions and nations develop. Truly developed peoples, regions and nations are
peaceful, not only because they are developed but also because they understand that the
disruption of peace retards human progress, diminishes human dignity, and creates more
problems for society and individuals.
Paul VI’s introduction of development as a synonym for peace shows a break
from previous papal teachings regarding the relationship between social justice and the
status quo, and consequently called for a careful understanding of justice.306 Paul VI
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stated that civilization is partially manifested in charity and justice, which are antecedents
to peace. The inseparable relation between love and peace confirms the relation between
peace and solidarity. John Paul II later succinctly stated that the achievement of peace
requires “the practice of the virtues that favor togetherness and which teach us to live in
unity, so as to build unity by giving and receiving a new society and better world.”307
This summarizes the requirements of true peace, and some of the requirements of true
development.
C. Three Contextual Principles: Subsidiarity, Option for the Poor and Affirmative
Action
1. SUBSIDIARITY
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into Catholic social teaching by Pius
XI in his encyclical Quadragessimo Anno, where he stated that the principle is the
important guiding norm for the restoration of social order.308 According to Pius XI
subsidiarity is “that most weighty principle which cannot be set aside or changed, it
remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy,” and states that:
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by their own
initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an injustice and at the same time a
grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign to a greater and higher association what lesser
and subordinate organizations can do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish
help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.309

Pius XI suggested that if smaller bodies or groups or individuals can meet their
needs larger bodies like the state should not interfere. Conversely smaller bodies should
not transfer to the larger bodies like the state what they are able to do for themselves. It
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would constitute mutual injustice if smaller bodies shunned their responsibilities and
bigger bodies usurped responsibilities of smaller bodies, and vice versa. The explanation
is that the principle of participation demands that all people contribute to the common
good according to their abilities. The teaching about subsidiarity was continued by John
XXIII in Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris.310
Paul VI advocated for a mediating body to resolve conflicts when individuals or
groups are incapable of supporting themselves. In case of
conflict between acquired private rights and the primary needs of the community it pertains to the
public authorities to seek a solution to these functions with the active participation of individuals
and social groups.311

Paul VI suggested that the common good, affirmative action, participation and an
option for the poor are related to the principle of subsidiary.
When small or weak communities make efforts but cannot handle conflicts or
support themselves, then stronger or larger bodies such as public authorities should
intervene. Affirmative action is implied here because subsidiarity advocates necessary
intervention of stronger or larger bodies on behalf of the poor or the weak. It boosts the
participation or involvement of all people. Paul VI emphasized the significance of the
principle of subsidiarity.
It is the function of public authorities to establish and enjoin the objectives to be attained, the
plans to be followed and the means to achieve them; also to stimulate the energies of all involved
in this common activity. But they must be careful to associate the projects of individuals and
intermediary agencies with this kind of work. 312

According to Paul VI intervention by superior bodies must be limited - they
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should not take away what individuals and smaller groups are capable of doing. To do so
would usurp rights of these bodies to function freely and to attain self-fulfillment.
Respect between the smaller bodies and the superior ones is an imperative. The limits of
each are defined by what the small bodies are capable of doing. Encroaching on the
freedom or rights of individuals or smaller groups kills initiative and participation,
ultimately encouraging dependence. It also denies the dignity of an individual’s work and
personal dignity. However, the principle is fraught with, at least a flaw, because it is not
easy to determine what smaller bodies can or cannot do for themselves.
Paul VI thought that projects of “individuals and intermediary agencies” should
not be associated with public authorities because this leads to collectivization and
arbitrary economic management, which deprives individuals and groups of people of
their freedom and exercise of basic human rights.313 The second part of the principle of
subsidiarity is that when individuals and intermediary groups are capable, the
intervention of public authority is unnecessary. This part of the principle protects capable
individuals or intermediary bodies and limits the intervention of public authorities to
necessary moments only.
Paul VI did not explicitly use the term subsidiarity but it is apparent in his
assertion in Populorum Progressio that
This international cooperation which embraces the whole world demands institutions which
prepare the way for it, coordinate, and direct it until a new judicial order is established which all
recognize as fixed and firm.314

Paul VI was suggesting that it is necessary to have an international structure or
authority to govern activities within the international community and organizations with
313
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international orientations and overtones. He reiterated “the need of international authority
to coordinate the establishment of just political and economic spheres.”315 Such a body is
necessary when nations need support, though they should act on their own. Institutions
act as mediators or coordinators for different groups, but they should unite people and
nations, and create effective international judicial and political systems.316 In other words,
an international government or body should have effective guidelines for directing and
developing the world community.
Paul VI emphasized the importance of the United Nations Organization, which
was already established. The principle of subsidiarity was intended to restore social order
in relations between smaller groups and larger ones, to restore autonomy of groups, and
to state the right relations between associations and and the larger society.317 This was
important because integral human development depends on mutual relations and dealings
among individuals, groups, communities and nations.
2. PREFERENTIAL OPTION FOR THE POOR
As alluded to in Chapter One, Paul VI’s trips to different continents influenced his
vision of the world and shaped his writing of Populorum Progressio. Riga says that “it is
evident that the Pope’s travels put him into direct contact with the poor and that he was
shocked to see the extent of human degradation throughout the globe.”318 It is no surprise
that Paul VI’s concern for the poor was emphatic and empathetic.
The condition and dignity of the poor was the crux of the problem Paul VI
addressed in Populorum Progressio; it was inevitable that he should suggest a principle
315

Allsop, 729.
Populorum Progressio, 78, 32.
317
Quadragesimo Anno, 49, 34-35. Also see Allsop, 928.
318
Riga, 24. Here Riga refers to Populorum Progressio, 4, 2-3.
316

208

directly related to the problem. Consequently, he proposed the principle of an option for
the poor as a way of resolving these problems. The principle invokes the spirit of
sacrifice directed toward resolving the problem of poverty in society. This is a dominant
demand of Populorum Progressio.319 Option for the poor is an invitation to give priority
to care for and to protect the human dignity of disadvantaged people. This is a call to all
to act in solidarity for the empowerment of the weak in society.
Paul VI declared that “the more needy nations” should be helped to liberate
themselves from what retards their progress, “and to find, without detriment to their own
native character, the means of human and social development.”320 Here he advocated a
preferential but not exclusive action which favors the disadvantaged people. Their needs
are not specified in the document, but it can be inferred from previous doctrine that they
are socio-economic, political and spiritual because he emphasized integral human
development. For Paul VI, opting for the poor demands their liberation from obstacles to
progress, namely poverty, disease, ignorance and injustice. He cautioned that this should
not be done at the expense of their cultural values.
Paul VI urged nations to emulate the examples of nations that have replaced
military service with social service directed to the poor and needy, after the example of
Christ’s preaching.321 He suggested that money allocated for destructive military
equipment should be constructively used for promoting the dignity and meeting the needs
of people. People who are stricken by poverty and ignorance should not be ignored; those
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who possess resources have responsibility to show compassion to them.322 Prompt action
is imperative where suffering is evident.
According to Paul VI, opting for the poor is not optional for the rich. Riga
suggests that, according to Paul VI this means that for the rich it constitutes a duty, “not
an ‘act of charity’ out of their superfluity (par.44).”323 To say that it is a duty for the rich
to give to the poor needs to be well defined. If they have not met all their basic needs they
are not bound by the obligation to help the poor. This is the advocacy Paul VI made.
Those who have are obliged to give to the poor when they (the poor) are unable to
procure resources by their own strength. If they are capable but simply lazy, their lack of
resources does not constitute an obligation on the side of the rich. There is an optional
dimension of gift to the poor if circumstances surrounding the gift are critically
scrutinized. Justice would at least speak to this effect. To say that opting for the poor is
not an act of charity is contestable. It would suggest that Paul VI used the term charity
liberally while he actually used it in the strict sense of Christian charity or gift motivated
by true or selfless love which demands sacrifice. When one person gives to another that
person does so out of love.
Paul VI advocated that the Church as an institution should defend the poor. She
has the responsibility to teach and to remind the rich of their obligation to support the
weak.324 This too is not an optional responsibility for the Church and must necessarily
constitute part of her responsibilities as later advocated by Evangelii Nuntiandi and
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Justitia in Mundo. A further implication of this call is that, as a protagonist of the
principle of option for the poor, the Church must also physically do something to
alleviate the condition of the weak in society. Paul VI never overlooked the Church’s
historical involvement in the struggle for the improvement of human conditions. He
encouraged the Church’s continued involvement to support the weak in society.
3. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The term affirmative action was not part of the vocabulary of Paul VI’s teaching,
neither was it explicitly coined and used that time or earlier, but his teaching in
Populorum Progressio speaks to that effect because it addressed the need for deliberate
action to address the helpless condition of the disadvantaged people of society. The term
is used here to mean assertive government intervention on behalf of the weak and
disadvantaged people. This is not different from affirmative action which is a “legislated,
judicial and administrative mechanism” used for addressing problems caused by social
structures so as to offer hope for minorities to participate, contribute and improve their
conditions.325 Affirmative action captures the thought of Paul VI about integral human
development because it is “a program to diminish the present effects of past
discrimination and to prevent its future occurrence.”326 Similarly, Paul VI was addressing
the problem and the causes of differences in socio-economic and political status of
people.
Paul VI contended that individual initiatives and competitions are not a guarantee
for successful development because they can exacerbate the problem of the widening gap
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between the rich and the poor. Instead of improving living situations “the resources and
power of the rich become even greater and the distress of the needy increased and the
enslavement of the oppressed aggravated.”327 In case of two conflicting parties, a third
party is inevitably necessary to resolve the conflicts. Here government intervention
becomes necessary.
Paul VI addressed questions of social justice, common good, option for the poor
and human dignity. These are problems that individuals may not be able to handle on
their own. It was for this reason that he advocated some sort of world authority and
approved the organization of the United Nations, as a force to help when smaller
communities are incapable of handling their development needs. This is why he stated
that “programs therefore are necessary to encourage, stimulate, coordinate, supplement
and supply the deficiencies of the activity of individuals and intermediary agencies.”328
The affirmation here is that a government should rectify situations of disadvantaged
people.
An unjustifiable discrimination or arbitrary differentiation on the basis of race,
sex, tribe or age contradicts integral human development just as it is counter to
affirmative action because it renders its victims alien, forgotten, dispensable and
insignificant objects in decision-making as well as the allocation of resources.329 This is a
problem Paul VI addressed in Populorum Progressio, and why he emphasized the
importance of related principles such as solidarity, common good, option for the poor and
subsidiarity and affirmative action. Although Paul VI never used the term ‘affirmative
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action’ he applied it in his teaching in Populorum Progressio.
D. Two Significant Social Principles: Common Good and Solidarity
1. COMMON GOOD
Paul VI advocated that the common good is crucial to human development and it
imposes obligation on all people.330 The common good is a reflection of the social
character of human persons. The notion of the common good is closely related to
Aristotlean anthropology and the Thomistic vision of the goal of law. Thomas Massaro
spells out this assertion in the statement that
Aristotle’s anthropology begins with the claim that the human person is by nature a social animal,
a being of the polis. Every person is a part of the polis and the end of the polis is the common
good. The purpose of law, therefore, is to govern the relation of a person to his or her true good, or
genuine happiness. Aquinas borrows this notion when in his “Treatise on Law” he asserts that
“everyone is ordained to the common good.”331

The idea of common good is at once relational, moral and legal. It is relational
because human persons are naturally social beings, they have the affinity to relate with
one another and must be protected by the political community. It is also relational
because the common good is “the end of the social whole.”332 It is moral because it
provides some norm for ordering people’s life; “it implies and requires recognition of the
fundamental rights of persons.”333 It is legal because the common good is sometimes
promoted through enforcement of laws or norms directed to create conditions for people
to live gratifying or self-fulfilling lives.
It is because of its social nature that the common good is related to social justice,
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solidarity, human rights such as the right to private ownership of property, option for the
poor, affirmative action, peace, participation and other virtues, conditions and principles
for integral development. In this regard, other than human dignity, the common good is
the most inclusive of the principles for integral human development. This is suggested by
Jacque Maritain’s observation which aptly describes it.
Thus, that which constitutes the common good of the political society is not only: the collection of
public commodities and services – roads, ports, schools, etc, which the organization of common
life presupposes; a sound fiscal condition of the state and its military power; the body of just laws,
good customs and wise institutions, which provide the nation with its structure; the heritage of its
great historical remembrances, its symbols and its glories, its living traditions and cultural
treasures.The common good includes all of these and something much more besides – something
more profound, more concrete and more human. For it includes also, above all, the whole sum
itself of these; a sum which is quite different from a simple collection of juxtaposed units. . . . It
includes the sum of sociological integration of all civic conscience, political virtues and sense of
right and liberty, of all the activity, material prosperity and spiritual riches, of unconsciously
operative hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, justice, friendship, happiness, virtue and heroism
in the individual lives of its members. For these things all are, in a certain measure, communicable
and so revert to each member, helping him to perfect his life and liberty of person. They all
constitute the good human life of the multitude.334

Maritain advocates a consolidation and integration of conditions that contribute to
human growth and perfection. All of these are some of the “values which combine
overlapping and sometimes competing concerns for both individuals and communities”
and make the common good “an umbrella term for describing patterns of human agency
which allow for the protection of such values.”335As a condition for integral growth the
common good is defined as “the sum total of conditions of social living, whereby persons
are enabled more fully and readily to achieve their own perfection.”336 The common good
is not just the sum total of individual interests or goods. It is a condition or circumstance
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that allows total growth of people of the community in question. Jacques Maritain
succinctly states this:
The common good of the city is neither the mere collection of private goods, nor the proper good
of a whole which, . . . relates the parts to itself alone and sacrifices them to itself. It is the good
human life of the multitude, of a multitude of persons; it is their communion in good living. It is
therefore common to both the whole and the parts into which it flows back and which, in turn,
must benefit from it.337

According to Paul VI, at times for the sake of the common good, ownership of
property can be interfered with especially when it affects the wider human society
negatively. He encouraged people’s cooperation for the common good because it
facilitates people’s lives.338 Paul VI linked private ownership of property to the common
good and the original divine intention about natural resources. Revenues derived from
natural resources should not be disposed of at the pleasure of an individual, nor should
excessive profits be used for one’s benefit only. The resources of nature are for the
benefit of all people. Through such assertions Paul VI implied that resources of nature
must be used for creating possibilities for people to realize their self-perfection. They are
good only for human participation in God’s creative activity through personal industry
and creativity which are significant contributions to human development.
Paul VI stated that the common good is related to the right of ownership. The
explanation for this assertion is that the life and dignity of people, and the common good
itself are jeopardized if the wealthy and powerful withhold resources meant for the good
of all.339 This explains why, according to Paul VI, the common good is the public good
and a necessity for a decent life. His notion of the common good was close to that of John
XXIII in Mater et Magistra where he says of the common good: “This embraces the sum
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total of those conditions of living, whereby men are enabled more fully and more readily
to achieve their own perfection.”340 This means the common good is an aggregate of
requisite conditions for individuals to realize their self-fulfillment to the most perfect
possible degree. Natural resources constitute part of the conditions necessary for a decent
human life. According to Paul VI natural resources must be used for the promotion of
human community, and if they are not the community can claim them.341 For this reason
Paul VI argued that
The common good, therefore, at times demands the expropriation of an estate if it happens that
some estates impede the common prosperity either on account of their vast size, or because their
small or negligible cultivation, or cause extreme poverty to the population or bring serious harm to
the country.342

The common good compels an individual to abdicate personal rights of ownership
for the sake of community. This is especially necessary if what an individual owns
obstructs development of community or does not contribute to the growth of society. The
attainment of the common good involves dynamic exchange between an individual and
community or among members of the community.
From the foregoing arguments it is right to concur with Jacques Maritain that the
common good goes beyond the individual and beyond community. He says that “the
common good of the city implies an intrinsic ordination to something which transcends
it.”343 The common good is a condition that is not a monopoly of an individual, neither is
it a monopoly of community but it is promoted by both and it promotes both. The
common good goes beyond individuals constituting community yet it is achieved in and
by the individuals constituting community.
340
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2. SOLIDARITY
Paul VI emphasized universal human solidarity for integral human development
as he stressed the necessity of universal charity. It was because of the significance of
solidarity that his emphasis on “universal human solidarity and fraternity” 344dominated
Populorum Progressio more than any of the previous encyclicals. However, Paul VI was
not the first person to raise the significance of solidarity in human life. His advocacy for
solidarity in Populorum Progressio is in line with Thomas Aquinas, John Chrysostom,
Pius XI, John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council fathers, especially in Gaudium et
Spes, that emphasized the necessity of solidarity for human life.345 Paul VI advanced the
teaching on solidarity by emphasizing its importance for true human development.
Solidarity is the guiding principle for integral human development, according to
Paul VI.346 Paul VI also thought that one must first understand the human person to
understand human solidarity. The human person, according to him, must be defined in
relation to other humans because the person is a social being and belongs to society, and
family in particular, which defines a person initially. Paul VI was of the view that people
should also define themselves independently. Citing the social structure in the developing
nations he advocated that “ancient social institutions, however characteristic of
developing regions are still necessary for a time, but their excessive force must gradually
be diminished.”347 However, he never disregarded the family ties that define initial
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human identity. Families forge unity and mutual assistance, leading to acquisition of
wisdom and harmony in personal rights, which “with other social requirements
constitutes the foundation of society.”348
The origin of solidarity is in the family because solidarity within the family is
what is extended beyond it. Solidarity leads to harmony and a better understanding of the
human person, rights and relationships both within and outside the family. This
affirmation facilitates the understanding and appreciation of the equality of human
dignity. Consequently, the universal value of the human person and human rights can be
recognized. This recognition promotes mutual acceptance, respect, unity and enhanced
solidarity. Equality of human dignity is the basis for the claim that solidarity should be
infinite both temporally and spatially.349
Solidarity is fundamental for Paul VI because without solidarity progress towards
development is deceptive. There must be a “simultaneous development of all humanity in
the spirit of solidarity.”350 Solidarity is not only to be exercised among individuals. It
should also be expressed locally, nationally and internationally. For this reason developed
nations and peoples have a duty to help less fortunate nations.351 The principle of
solidarity is a compelling reason for rich countries to help the poor ones. People need one
another to be and to become better. Consequently, developed nations have the obligation
to support the less-developed nations.
More-developed and less-developed nations need to live in solidarity, but this
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demands a spirit of dialogue. For Paul VI dialogue creates understanding and a smooth
working relationship among nations. It is a burning necessity because it provides wellarticulated conditions for functioning, and it encourages and facilitates mutual support.
Loans can be more properly used, their repayment is less problematic, capital is loaned
without ulterior motives, and poor nations receiving loans can maintain their
independence and integrity and avoid interference from the aiding and developed nations.
This ensures that there is no mutual violation socially, economically or politically. Paul
VI advocated solidarity with freedom when he stated that
Since sovereign states are involved, it is their exclusive right to conduct their own affairs, to
determine their policy, and to choose the form of government they prefer. This, then, is
indispensable that nations collaborate with each other without constraint and with equal dignity,
that they at the same time work at creating a civil society truly worthy of man.352

For Paul VI collaborative action is important and should be performed
ceaselessly. He stated that “this common task without doubt demands constant, prompt,
concerted action.”353 Action in solidarity ought to keep pace with needs and all efforts to
meet needs should be pooled together. It is ceaseless in the sense that even when external
assistance has long stopped, solidarity between the collaborating nations should
continue.354
Paul VI thought that solidarity is the fruit of joint national and international
efforts of government officials and the grassroot-individuals. This demands participation,
a spirit of understanding, collaboration, love for the common good and an attitude of
selflessness which are crucial for integral human development.355 Consequently, he
advocated that “individuals, social groups, and whole nations” should devote all their
352
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“wisdom enthusiasm and charity” to help the disadvantaged to progress.356 This suggests
that the fruit of solidarity animated by charity is the preferential option for the poor, care
for the common good and affirmative action. It indicates the significance of solidarity for
integral human development, and evinces that it is related to option for the poor, the
common good and affirmative action.
According to Paul VI human solidarity is possible only when “mutual suspicions
of nations and selfishness” are overcome by “a stronger desire for collaboration and a
more profound awareness of human solidarity.”357 This demands “common plans of
action”, coordinated investments, proportionate distribution of means of production,
organized sale of products, and it requires that “the more needy nations” should be helped
to liberate themselves from what retards their progress, and “find without detriment to
their own native character, the means of human and social development.”358
The vision of solidarity presented by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio was
expanded and re-emphasized by John Paul II in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. The latter called
solidarity a virtue with eight requisite conditions. Solidarity demands interdependence,
trust, collaboration, an enduring commitment to serve common good, a spirit of selfsacrifice, transformation of interpersonal relationships to a point where the wealthy take
responsibility for the weak, participation by the weak and mutual respect of interests.359
According to him, solidarity demands that there be no domination, oppression or
exploitation of one nation by another; and nations must resist hegemony and
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imperialism.360
John Paul II asserted that solidarity demands and leads to radical change in
society because it empowers people “to oppose diametrically the desire for profit and the
thirst for power, and the sinful structures arising out of choice of profit and power” 361 at
any cost. It calls people to live responsibly in harmony with their environment. He
cautioned about ignoring solidarity. Individuals and nations that exploit others instead of
respecting them may grow rich, but they are not truly developed because they ignore the
crucial moral dimension of human development in solidarity with others.362
The principle of solidarity demands collaboration, participation and responsibility
for others. It fits well in the treatise of integral human development. Paul VI thought that
solidarity should yield efficacious results, as later re-emphasized by John Paul II.
Consequently, solidarity dominated the teaching of Populorum Progressio.363 The
importance of solidarity for integral human development lies in the fact that it facilitates
selfless joint movement toward growth.
E. Necessary Conditions: Association and Participation
Association and participation are akin to the principle of solidarity, according to
Paul VI, although documents issued after Populorum Progressio are more emphatic
about their positions as prerequisites for integral human development than he suggested
in the encyclical. Nonetheless, Populorum Progressio never neglected the significance
of association and participation in integral human development.
360

Dorr, “Solidarity and Integral Human Development” in The Logic of Solidarity: Commentaries on John
Paul II’s Encyclical On Social Concern , 148-149.
361
Ibid. , 150. Also see John Paul II. Sollicitudo Rei Sociallis: On the Social Concerns (Boston: Pauline
Books and Media, 1987), 26, 42-45; 34, 61-63; 38, 69-72.
362
Ibid., 151. Also see Sollicitudo Rei Sociallis, 9.9.
363
Riga, 29. Also see Populorum Progressio, 1, 1-2; 6,3-4; 15,7-8; 17, 8; 20, 9; 22, 10; 27-28, 12-13; 34,
15; 39, 17; 42, 18; 47, 20; 65, 27-28; 79, 32-33; 86, 35.

221

1. ASSOCIATION
Solidarity is the reason for association and it embraces participation, which
promotes it. People associate to build organizations because they need to uphold,
preserve, protect and promote each others’ dignity. Paul VI was clear about this in his
encouragement of organizations such as UN and FAO. However, he was discriminate in
his choice and suggestion of associations. Social actions that rest on the philosophy of
materialism and atheism are detestable from a Christian point of view, especially, if they
have “no regard either for the religious outlook directing life to its eternal and final goal,
or for freedom, or for human dignity”364 because social organizations are established to
serve people and to liberate them from desperate circumstances of life. Any association
that falls short of this goal does not contribute to true human development. Social
organizations and associations have as their objective the promotion of the human person
and human dignity. Integral human development is possible “through dialogue and
cooperation with others.”365
Paul VI reiterated his support of associations by recognizing and acknowledging
charitable organizations such as FAO, Caritas Internationalis and other groups operating
everywhere to help meet the needs of desperate people.366 These and similar
organizations are to be emulated because they promote people.
2. PARTICIPATION/INVOLVEMENT
The emphasis on participation as a principle for integral development was not
Paul VI’s own idea. He was promoting the doctrine of Quadragesimo Anno of Pius XI
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who advocated that “humanization of production demands the participation of all
involved.”367 Paul VI encouraged participation by advocating that every person and all
peoples are entitled to be shapers of their own destiny.368 He made this appeal in many
parts of Populorum Progressio. According to a significant number of authors including
Dorr, participation is one of the document’s most important contributions because
“development is something people have to do for themselves.”369
Circumstances demand that individuals change their lives and the society in
which they live. The significance of participation is in promotion of authenthic
development is evidenced in self-fulfillment people experience when they do things for
themselves and their community. They realize their worth, the significance of their
initiative and creativity. What people realize is an unfolding of their talents, which is
development.
For Paul VI, human persons created imago Dei, are called to cooperate with God
in creation, and to perpetuate the creative activity to perfection. This is possible because
of the intellectual power and sensitivity with which God has endowed people. Anyone
who engages in work cooperates with God and participates in God’s work of creation and
“leaves imprint of himself upon them while at the same time refining his persistency,
skill and power to think.”370 This suggests that work is also a means to participate and to
be united.
Participation in solidarity or unity demands mutual respect for human rights and
collaboration. In other words, where there is true solidarity and unity there is freedom
367
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too. According to Paul VI world unity “must allow all peoples . . . to be the architects of
their own fortune.”371 Unity and solidarity are significant for complete development but
they should not diminish personal involvement. Instead they ought to promote
participation. People need not entrust their future entirely in the hands of other people.
Paul VI urged that international relations, interpreted broadly, should consider seriously
that regard and friendship; they should “be expressed in assistance with mutual respect
and collaboration” with “individual nations accepting with full conviction their obligation
and duty to promote the improvement of all.”372 This assertion is significant because it
points out that participation is not only a duty, it is also a right.373
Participation is also seen in the work of expatriate experts involved in developing
countries. Their presence in these nations should be one of helping and collaborating with
the people to bring about development.374 Paul VI advocated the value of participation of
the people who need to develop. He also suggested that a facilitating leadership is
necessary for the involvement of the people. This means participation demands which
stimulates people’s thoughts and activity.
Participation is important for authentic development because it is the
responsibility of the entire human race to heal and prevent miseries due to disease,
poverty, ignorance and other social moral evils. Everyone must be devoted with “firm
determination to combat underdevelopment to the extent of his strength and
resources.”375 Such a demand to participate whole-heartedly calls for a selfless attitude
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that goes beyond an individual and extends to the needy. It also demands maximum
participation according to one’s capacity.
Participation is demonstrated in joint action to enforce change. According to Paul
VI immediate participatory action of all people, capable of contributing in solidarity, is
called for in situations and moments where innocent lives are at stake, the burden of
poverty amidst inhumane living conditions is great, and world peace and “the very
survival of civilization”376 are all at stake. In other words, the involvement of all people
and nations in such moments is an urgent need and of grave significance. All people
should assume the responsibility to make positive change. Paul VI was also attentive and
focused on the importance of the value and role of the lowest artisan. True development
calls for recognition, acknowledgement and involvement of, even, the least as long as
they have the abilities to perform, and are capable of contributing to the enhancement of
human life, person, rights and dignity.
V. CONCLUSION
The treatise in this chapter leads to the following conclusions: First, Paul VI’s
vision of development in Populorum Progressio is paradigmatic in the sense that he
provides an archetype notion of development which reduces other notions of
development to just a portion of what he called integral human development. Though
Paul VI’s conception of development appears paradoxical because it seems challenging
and practical, and at the same time idealistic or practically difficult, meaningless,
contradictory, and sometimes utopian, it has truth and presents an enduring challenge of
Catholic doctrine on human development. This is evinced in the fact that all Catholic
376
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social doctrine before Populorum Progressio gravitated toward the document and those
after it emanated from the document or re-echoed it. The theme running through all of
them is concern for the human person, which constitutes the center of all development
and development problems.
Secondly, Populorum Progressio is pragmatic because it treated issues that still
affect people. Paul VI placed the social issue, particularly, that of human development, in
a global context, offered an interpretation of the causes of unrest, and presented charity
and justice as the sources of true peace and development. Paul VI rejected the basic laws
of capitalism, especially its laissez faire principles for liberal pursuit of ownership of
property, its profit-oriented tendency, its inclination to absolute reliance on free trade in
the world economy. However, he was not opposed to the entire practice of capitalism.
According to him, if profit promotes human dignity it is in accordance with divine
design.
Thirdly, Paul VI emphasized justice, the right of the poor nations to aid from the
wealthier nations, and argued that in situations of extreme need the poor have the right to
claim the property of the rich. They may also be justified to use non-violent pressure or
force to seek solutions to their problems. Precisely, it emphasized social justice and the
social dimension of property.
Fourthly, in Populorum Progressio Paul VI offered a vision of development
which takes place on an individual level as well as communal level, an integral human
development. This notion of development includes all dimensions of human life, namely
the economic, cultural, political, social, psychological, educational and spiritual aspects
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of life. It is based on the recognition of supreme values of human dignity and the destiny
of the person and the acceptance of faith, which opens individuals to union with God.
Fifthly, Populorum Progressio underscored the importance of development,
which Paul VI equated to and called the new name for peace, one of the principal
prerequisites for development. The document suggests that requisite principles for
integral human development are of diverse nature but all of them are interrelated. None
of them is dispensable for authentic human development because each plays a unique role
and contributes to the support of other principles, and ultimately integral human
development. Their basic relationship is founded on the principle of human dignity. All
the principles, virtues and requisite conditions govern and direct human activity to the
protection and care for the dignity of the human person.
Finally, human dignity per se is the indisputably contending principle and reason
for the existence of other principles, conditions and virtues. This point will be
emphasized in the next chapter which will explain the centrality of the human person,
human dignity and human rights. The chapter will advocate the significance of a relevant
anthropology, and explore the relationship between different development principles,
virtues and requisite conditions
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CHAPTER THREE
POPULORUM PROGRESSIO AND AN ANTHROPOLOGY FOR INTEGRAL
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
I.INTRODUCTION
The principal concern of this chapter is to show that a relevant anthropology is
necessary for integral human development, which Paul VI suggested in Populorum
Progressio, because true development is the enhancement of all people through respect
for the human person, human dignity, and human rights. Chapter Two treated Paul VI’s
doctrine in Populorum Progressio, the meaning of integral human development, and the
problems and causes of lack of integral human development. It revealed Paul VI’s
concern for both the individual and community, which are significant terms in both
Chapter Two and this chapter. They are the reasons for Paul VI’s introduction of the term
integral human development in redefining development. The chapter also outlined Paul
VI’s suggestions for attaining integral development. He attempted to resolve peoplerelated or people-centered problems. The problems not only affected people, they were
also caused by people, and the suggestions to resolve them were virtues, conditions, and
principles related to people. This suggests that the problems originated from conflicting
anthropologies.
Paul VI’s major concern was the human person but his goal was not a treatise of
theological, philosophical and social anthropology. This chapter focuses on the notion of
the human person, human rights and human dignity, all of which are necessary for
authentic human development. It treats an anthropology for Populorum Progressio.
Critical readers of Paul VI question the adequacy of the application of Christian or
theological anthropology in Populorum Progressio. Robert Royal, for example, notes that
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If there was a step backward, it was not his adherence to Catholic principles, but his failure to
bring the church’s views of the human person fully to bear on the current developmentalist
orthodoxies. This failure resulted in contradictory messages in his text.1

Royal suggests that Paul VI needed to critically apply Catholic or Christian
anthropology to facilitate the question of integral human development and the application
of principles, virtues and conditions necessary for it in the current contexts. It was not
Paul VI’s intention to do an anthropological treatise as such. However, Royal’s
observation shows a failure in the application of Christian anthropology in Populorum
Progressio. This chapter attempts to construct an anthropology relevant for integral
human development, but Paul VI should be credited for his vision of the human person in
terms of development, because throughout Populorum Progressio he made references to
anthropological notions such as person, dignity and rights. This chapter will attempt to
emphasize these anthropological elements and show their significance in the application
of the doctrine of Populorum Progressio.
It is necessary to treat and understand the human person, dignity and rights
because of the pluralistic nature of human community, both locally and globally. Above
all it is an imperative to construct a relevant anthropology because “the ultimate
determining factor” and litmus test or measure of true development “is the human
person.”2 An anthropology is necessary in the study of Populorum Progressio because
the document addressed problems affecting human dignity and involved people of
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diverse socio-cultural, economic and political backgrounds. There are racial, tribal, ethnic
and class differences, yet all people have equal dignity. This is the central critique Paul
VI suggested in Populorum Progressio. In light of this statement it is realistic to concur
with John Mary K. Kabyanga that
. . . the problem of the theology of development as a starting point is no longer merely that of the
split between the body versus the soul, the temporal versus the spiritual and the kingdom versus
eschatology. The problem is man himself.3

The problem here is anthropological. Kabyanga argues that true development
starts with a right understanding of the human person. It is from the understanding of the
human person that the temporal and spiritual, the kingdom and eschatology can be
integrated well. This is a credible vision because, theologically, ultimate integral human
development is realized at the end times when all people are united with God and with
each other. This assertion suggests why Kabyanga advocates people’s individual and
collective striving. Chapter Three is significant because it attempts to explain the human
person; it shows whether the concept of the human person is the same for all people, and
how different visions of the human person can be explained and reconciled.
The chapter is divided into six main parts. The first part deals with contending
notions of the human person. It treats the development of the African communitarian
notion and the Euro-American notion of the human person. The second part deals with
the notion of human dignity, its meaning and origin, the universality and equality of
human dignity, and the significance of the universality and equality of human dignity.
The third section treats human rights from the liberal and communitarian points of view,
and attempts to establish the universality of human rights. The fourth part is an
3
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anthropology for Populorum Progressio. It attempts to demonstrate how Paul VI viewed
the human person, human dignity and human rights. The fifth section is an attempt to
reconcile liberal and communitarian notions. It shows difficulties in reconciliation of
these notions and how the difficulties can be overcome. The last part attempts to establish
an ultimate principle for integral human development and how it is a link between other
principles for integral human development.
II. CONTENDING NOTIONS OF THE HUMAN PERSON
The two contending notions of the human person are the individualist or liberal
notion and the communitarian notion. David Bohr states that people’s search for selfunderstanding is “the basic quest for life, and the question Who am I?, has been
intensified due to “cultural pluralism.”4 This question suggests why it is necessary to
understand the human person from different perspectives, and to attempt to judge
whether it is right to prefer only one vision of the human person.
Cultures affect people’s thought patterns and their vision of reality. Consequently,
cultural differences explain differences in the vision of the human person. From a
Catholic, and generally a Christian believers’ point of view, “the human person is central,
the clearest reflection of God among us.”5 The Scriptures ground an understanding of the
human person. Catholic social doctrine suggests that “the book of Genesis provides us
with certain foundations for Christian anthropology” such as the “inalienable dignity of
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the human person” 6, the principle of imago Dei, human freedom and the social nature of
human person and the meaning of human activity in the world.
A. Development of the Notion of the Human Person
The notion of the human person developed over time. Classically, Boethius (ca
480 - ca 524) defined the human person as rationalis naturae individua substantia,
meaning that the human person is “an individual substance of rational nature.”7 The
principal elements of this definition of the human person are rationality and individuality.
The human person is an individual with the ability to think or reason. This defines the
human person inadequately because the human person is defined independently of other
people and the prevalent environment. It denies the notion that the human person is a
social being. However, rationality distinguishes the human person from other creatures
but identifies one person with other people and “only humans are honored with the term
person.”8 No other individual being is called person, except what has naturally been
endowed with rationality.
Later, the human person was defined on the basis of “relationship,
incommunicability, self-consciousness, freedom, duties, inalienable rights, and dignity.”9
The notion of human person is so lofty that it cannot be easily captured but there are
certain traits specific to a human being. The human person is an individual but also a
social being, aware of his/her existence and activities as an individual. A human person is
endowed with the ability to choose, to make inevitably obliging claims on other human
6
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persons, to act responsibly and to be accountable for his/her actions. The human person
has worth which other human individuals have, but which other creatures do not have.
This notion of the human person is more balanced than the preceding one because it
includes individuality and communality.
Like Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure considered a person as “a distinct substance
possessing dignity.”10 This notion of person emphasizes individuality and dignity. This
dignity of a person provides gravity for the claim that the human person, human dignity
and human rights are at the center of integral human development. Later, Immanuel Kant
(1724 -1804) viewed the human person as “an absolute that may never be used as a
means but must always be respected as a moral end-in-itself.”11 The Kantian vision of the
human person, like the biblical notion, places the human person at the peak of creation. It
reflects the singular identity of the human person. The human person is never a ‘thing’.
After God, in rank, the human person is the master of creatures other than human beings,
can make responsible use of them for his/her own good, but cannot be equated to the
things (s)he uses to meet his/her needs. The rest of creation is a means to help the human
person realize fulfillment. The Kantian notion of the human person suggests a vision of
the human person who is more an absolute individual than a social being. Jacques
Maritain developed Kant's vision of the human person in relation to or based on the
Aristotelian and Thomistic visions. Maritain stressed the idea of the individuality of
human person in relation to personality but distinguished the two. According to him
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Outside of the mind, only individual realities exist. Only they are capable of exercising the act of
existing. Individuality is opposed to the state of universality which things have in mind. It
designates the concrete state of unity and indivision, required by existence, in virtue of which
every actually existing or possibly existing nature can posit itself in existence as distinct from
12
other beings.

Maritain emphasizes that the human person is a distinct individual. Individuality
is the principle which explains the identity or distinction of a person from the rest of the
community. However, this is not a sufficient definition of the human person according to
Maritain. He thinks that “personality is the subsistence of the spiritual soul
communicated to the human composite” and it “signifies interiority to self” and yet “of
its essence requires a dialogue in which souls really communicate, especially to God, “the
absolute source of sufficiency.”

13

In defining individuality and personality Maritain

asserts that individuality is a reality of the human person to be asserted and respected as
such, but human affinity to relate or communicate, especially as an expression of his/her
spiritual and personal nature may not be ignored without denying the human person a
truly human characteristic of being communal or social. He affirms that individuality and
personality are distinct from each other but inseparable when predicated of the human
person: “our whole being is an individual by reason of what is in us which derives from
matter, and a person by reason of that in us which derives from Spirit.”14 Personality
pertains to the spiritual reality and the concrete individual pertains to material reality.
The contemporary definition of the human person has relational overtones, even if
it takes the individuality of a person seriously. This is probably because at one moment
there was an overemphasis on the individuality of persons and liberal expression of
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freedom and claims for personal rights. The contemporary theological notion of the
human person resonates with the philosophical assertion that “every human person is
distinct from every other, yet at the same time all are truly human.”15 In both Theology
and Philosophy the individual and social dimensions of the person are significant for
understanding the human person. They provide an integrated and balanced vision of the
human person. Gerald O'Collins and Edward G. Farrugia note that
Today, to overcome the notion of persons as autonomous selves, some stress the way persons are
always persons-in-relationship, constituted through relations with other persons and the
environment.16

The contemporary notion of the human person is a summation of notions of the
human person developed over time. It is relational, not only to fellow human beings but
also to the rest of creation. It tends to combine the individualist or liberal and the social or
communitarian visions of the human person in order to give a better notion of the human
person. Paul VI's vision of the human person in Populorum Progressio is suggestively in
the category of the contemporary notion. This is, at least, implicit in his advocacy for
integral human development. The contemporary notion of the human person is preferable
because it takes seriously the individuality and the social nature of the human person.
The human person may be defined from different points of view by different
people, depending on what emphasis they prefer or think is fundamental for the definition
of the human person. Louise Marcil-Lacoste is aware of this and observes five
perspectives from which a person could be defined. First, logically, “a person is an entity
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distinct from a mere thing.”17 The dignity of a person is what makes distinction between a
person and other creatures. Theologically, this claim is explained in terms of the principle
of imago Dei. The dignity of the human person is directly endowed by God in whose
image and likeness the human person is created. Since the human person is created in the
image and likeness of God the human person has an “inherent dignity that must not be
violated.”18
Secondly, from a moral point of view people are entitled to special treatment on
account of their inherent and inviolable dignity as beings created in the image of God.
This means, in Kant’s famous phrase, that persons are “ends-in-themselves and sources
of value in their own right.”19 The dignity of the human person is again the ground for
such claims. The unique treatment of a person differentiates the person from things and
limits the relationship between the person and God who is an end, the absolute being. The
relationship of the human person to God is one of creature to creator.
As God’s image the human person lives constitutively in relation to God. This means every
dimension of his existence and finitude, his creaturely needs and his mortality.20

The relationship between the human person and God is one of dependence where
the human person owes existence and functionality to God. Human activity is due to God,
the ultimate principle of activity.
Thirdly, from a legal point of view, “a person is a being who has legal rights and
duties. In this context, one would insist that persons alone are responsible and that
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rationality is a precondition for responsible action.”21 Here the qualifications of a person
are stated. A person is one who can make claims on other people and is at the same time
responsible in relating to others because of the endowment with reason. A person has
duties or obligations toward other people because of this endowment with reason.
Fourthly, from a metaphysical point of view “persons ought to be defined
primarily by reference to self- consciousness.”22 Persons are aware of themselves as
existing individual entities. This does not suffice to define a person because relationship
with others and environment is also crucial. Metaphysically, there is relationship to
oneself and this constitutes the individuality and the totality of the human individual in a
social relationship. The individuality of a person is a significant element of the definition
of a human person. It is also important to note that “the relationship of a human person to
his own self” is not “a conscious relationship of the intellect to itself, but is a total unity
of human life embracing body and soul.”23 This means the human person exists as an
individual entity, a totality, distinct from other things but there is a relational dimension
of the individual because of the spiritual dimension of the human person. The identity
and distinction of an individual from others involves the totality of a person as a
conscious individual agent who is aware of this consciousness. Here there is also an
emphasis on the rational aspect of the human person.
Finally, since the human person has a unique role in relation to the rest of
creation, the “definition of the concept of person is based on the concept of role.”24 The
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human person has “a God-given mission to preside (Gen. 1:26) over all created things.”25
The human person is also related to these creatures in terms of responsibility. The human
person is the crown of God’s creation, commissioned and entrusted with a task “to serve
his Creator in the representative function of establishing God’s peaceful sovereignty over
Creation.”26 This alone does not suffice to define the human person adequately. The
dominion of the human person over creation must be a responsible one. This means the
human person is a steward and a co-operator27 with God in the enhancement of creation.
Since a human person is viewed differently, depending on the point of view from
which the human person is defined, the claim that “such variations in meaning are
important sources of ambiguities when talking of persons”

28

is compelling and

intriguing. Therefore, if the concept of the human person varies, integral human
development is problematic because human dignity and human rights are not conceived
in a uniform way.
Attributes often associated with the human person are spirit, soul, image of God,
human dignity, body, intelligence, ability to love, and moral responsibility.29 Here, it is
significant to note that human dignity is founded on these attributes of the human person,
and for the same reason the human person has inherent and inviolable dignity. Paul VI’s
Populorum Progressio advocates that a totality of these attributes should be protected and
25
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enhanced. Consequently, a right vision of these attributes is necessary for integral human
development.
The human person, as the image of God, is a relational being in four ways: human
relation to God, other human beings, self and creation. As Thomas D. Williams suggests,
according to his reading of Augustine, “the human person is, therefore, an intermediate
end in himself and also a being for God, his ultimate end,” meaning that the human
person is
. . . a true and inviolable end in himself and must be treated as an end; on the other hand; one
person cannot constitute the final end for another, or for himself, since man is made to find his
total fulfillment in union with God.30

This assertion suggests that the human person is ultimately subject only to God.
Other human beings may not, therefore, do as they please with fellow human beings
because they are all (intermediate, not ultimate) ends in themselves. God is the ultimate
reference for defining the human person, even when the human person is defined in
relation to other human beings. Consequently, the Catholic Church has consistently and
emphatically stated that
The human person may never be thought of only as an absolute individual being built up by
himself, as if his characteristic traits depended on no one else but himself. Nor can the person be
thought of as a mere cell of an organism that is inclined at most to grant it recognition in its
functional role within the overall system. Reductionist conceptions of the full truth of men and
women have already been the object of the Church’s social concern many times . . . .31

The unity and totality of the individual person are significant. That “man was
created by God in unity of body and soul” 32 is the consistent teaching in the Catholic
Church. The notion of the unity of the human person is significant for Paul VI’s advocacy
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for integral human development which is not only the development of all people but also
the development of the whole individual. Here the anthropology implicit in Paul VI’s
teaching in Populorum Progressio is affirmed to be relevant for integral human
development. According to “Aristotelian - Thomistic ontology, the human person, unlike
non-personal existents, is a totality in which the fullness of creaturely reality is present in
a unique manner.”33 The human person is a climax and summary of divine creation. In a
way, the contention is that creation subsists in the human person. However, the
superiority and distinctiveness of the human person over the rest of creatures is what is
stated in this claim. It is also important to note that while the human person is not like
other creatures - not a thing - persons are still both objects and subjects because they can
initiate action directed to other beings and actions can also be directed to them. Thomas
D. Williams has clarified this by asserting that persons are “rational subjects of action”
but also “rational objects of action.”34 The assertion is plausible because human beings
can rationally initiate activity and also rationally direct activity towards other human
persons or receive rationally initiated activity from other human beings. I think this is
partially why human persons are responsible for what they do and how moral culpability
may be judged.
The human person is social and this fulfills God’s plan of love, which is
theologically, based on “the mystery of God as a Trinitarian love.”35 The relationship
between the three persons, a relation of love, is the ultimate fulfillment and reflection of
the social nature of the human person. No relationship goes beyond this in perfection.
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Every loving human relation is a reflection of the Trinitarian love to some degree. This
element of interpersonal relationship is a significant aspect of the definition of human
person because it grounds human rights, which are mutual claims.
Relationship to other human beings, namely shared humanity and the fact of two
genders, suggests the universality of human personhood, human dignity and human
rights. The vertical relationality of human existence with God is extended in the
horizontal relation with other human beings. Here there is a relationship of “the
dependence of the human person on a human ‘thou.’ ”36

According to Eberhard

Schockenhoff this horizontal relationship of dependence is captured by Gen. 1:27 where
both male and female are created in God’s image. This is where the equality of
personhood must be sought. This is further affirmed in Gen. 2:8-14 which shows only
humans are equal and other animals do not meet the standard of personhood and both
genders are complimentary though different. That “they complement each other’s shared
humanity in a comprehensive manner which includes mutual understanding and
dialogue”37 is, according to Eberhard, a significant and realistic statement. It spells out
that man and woman are distinct only in gender but not in human personhood. This
distinction or differentiation of gender does not affect equality of human personhood.
This assertion facilitates the understanding of the equality of the dignity of the human
person.
The vision of the human person has varied over time, and from one person to
another. Noticeable in historical development of the notion of the human person are two
outstanding positions. First, the human person is defined as an individual entity distinct
36
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from and independent of other human persons or an individual in relation to other people.
The definitions emphasized the individual dimension of the human person or the social
dimension of the human person. Secondly, the human person is defined in terms of
rationality as opposed to the rest of creation. It is in the light of such visions that the
distinction between the communitarian notion of the human person and the individualist
notion should be viewed.
B. The Communitarian View of Person
The communitarian defines a human person in a social context, not in isolation
from other persons and the rest of creation. A typical communitarian vision of the human
person is what Placide Tempels offers in his study of the Bantu of the present Democratic
Republic of Congo, which Bujo correctly suggests is applicable even to “modern Black
Africa.”38 Tempels describes the human person as a personal living force who
participates in the force and being of God, the supreme, complete and perfect force; and
the human person is “the dominant force among all created visible forces.”39 However,
the emphasis in the communitarian vision of the human person is on community rather
than the individual, although this does not mean that the individual is negligible. The
individual has a personal conscience and is responsible or accountable for his/her actions
which is primarily based in the heart according to most African societies and ethical
thought.40 Much of the communitarian vision of the human person is summarized in what
David Fergusson states:
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The communitarian . . . is more impressed by the essentially social nature of the human being.
Then self is formed by its roles, attachments, and relationships with other people, institutions,
communities, and traditions. Concepts of what is right and how society should be organized
always presuppose some vision of the common good.41

The human person is an individual affected by the actual context of life. The
individual lives in and interacts with the environment. The individual is partly externally
determined, not absolutely self-determined. As Stanley M. Harrison states, “persons are
irreducibly social beings, where this is taken to mean that being-with others is necessary
in order to be a person.”42 Harrison’s assertion is correct because people’s personalities or
characters are molded by and in the community in which they live and with which they
interact. This explains why a right vision of the human person is that the human person is
social, has an individual identity, and yet is in a growth process which is a consequence
of interaction with other people and the environment in which the person lives. This idea
is also expressed by the African scholar, John S. Mbiti, whose view is consonant with
that of Harrison. He states that according to an African “the individual can only say: ‘I
am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’.”43 The significance of the
community for an individual and the individual for the community is also underscored in
this statement. This is appropriately equated by Uzukwu to Martin Luther King Jr.’s
statement in one of his speeches for advocacy for equality of people and human rights.
41
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According to Uzukwu, the idea of relatedness underlies or is consonant with with Martin
Luther King Jr.’s dream speech for a free non-racial America in 1961 when the latter
stated: “Strangely, enough, I can never be what I ought to be until you are what you
ought to be. You can never be what you ought to be until I am what I ought to be.”44
A person is a creature made in the image and likeness of God, and endowed with
freedom of thought and action, responsibility to respond and enter into dialogic
relationship with God, the absolute "I".45 The human person has the ability to think freely
and responsibly, take initiative to communicate and relate with others. The climax of this
communication and relationship is the one with God. This thrusts into the communitarian
vision of the human person that the human person, whether extravert or introvert, is
actually relational. Joseph Fichtner agrees with this vision. According to him it is only
when a person transcends whatever is selfish and enters into fellowship with God that the
person is complete and fulfilled. The climax of the communitarian element of the human
person is expressed in the communion with the divine community. In fact the human
person is considered the image of God because (s)he becomes person through
. . . relationship to the whole of the world, through openness and accountability to the world, to its
end, and to the Thou in community. This is in fact a relationship with God and this proposal stands
in contrast to definitions of person that focus primarily on conscious spiritual individuality.46

The emphasis in the quotation again is on the social nature of the human person.
Human personality develops and is shaped by the environment through the interaction of
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the person with others or the environment and the interaction with the Creator. This
vision of the human person is opposed to the individualist vision, which emphasizes the
individuality, freedom and autonomy of the human person. The communitarian theology
of the human person, therefore, consistently views a person as
. . . a being in solidarity with the cosmos and with God. Corporeally he gathers up the world
within himself but spiritually he transcends it, raises it to the level of his own existence, and in
turn is open and accessible to his creator.47

The human person is viewed here as a being shaped in and by society but (s)he is
an individual who exists as a distinct entity and even transcends society in as far as (s)he
relates to God. Therefore, the human person is not only social by nature, but also a sacred
being because of the relationship with God. This communitarian view of the human
person is reaffirmed by Philip Hefner whose understanding of Tillich suggests that
. . . being a person is constituted both by a cognitive process of perceiving and understanding
oneself in one's world, and also by a moral process of responding in relationship to the world.
Formally, then, the person is defined in relationship.48

Communitarians define the human person relationally, not independently or as an
isolated individual. Even in the contemporary African context a person is defined in
terms of clan or blood relationship as well as relationship beyond blood or clan because,
as Alexis Kagame suggests, according to Bujo, “fellowship based on blood extends to
include non-blood relationship.”49 This means relationship is also just based on the fact of
being human. The life of an individual is affected by others, and (s)he affects the lives of
others too. This assertion supports the commonly accepted Aristotelian view that the
human person is a political animal and social being. It suggests why communitarians
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think that “we realize our dignity and rights in relations with others in community.”50 The
human person ought always to be defined relationally. This is a valid foundation for
mutual respect for human rights and human dignity. The communitarian vision of the
human person is fundamentally based on the idea that “individuals actualize their full
potential through the virtually unlimited enhancements that community life offers . . .
persons can develop most successfully by drawing on the talents and accomplishments of
others.”51 According to Andrew N. Woznicki the
. . . feeling of deep esteem for each and every human person is the corner stone of building any
community life of all men, which Cardinal Wojtyla described as participation in terms of a relation
of man to man.52

Human community is founded on every human being. The respect for the dignity
of every person is the foundation for a social or community life, and acknowledgment of
a participatory or shared dignity. Unless universality of human dignity is acknowledged
community life is not possible or authentic.
C. The Individualist/Liberal View of the Human Person
The liberal notion of the human person seems diametrically opposed to the
communitarian notion. It begins with the idea of self-consciousness or subjectivity as a
fundamental basis of humanity. The human person is depicted as being aware of his/her
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existence as a person. Ray S. Anderson expresses the foundation of the liberal notion of
the human person in the following words:
I experience my own humanity as a subjective reality. I am a center of feelings, reactions, hopes,
fears, opinions, motivations, and desires. Other persons exist for me. That is, they are within range
of my own perception of reality, either as other subjects whose feelings, motivations and desires
interest or threaten me, or as objects along with other phenomena in the objective world.53

This vision of the human person is centered on the individual and defies
relationship with other individuals. At its social best other human persons affect one’s life
positively to a minimum possible degree. Otherwise, they affect the individual
negatively. This, however still suggests that other people are not absolutely excluded
from an individual’s life although the vision does not seem to acknowledge the basic
relationship between persons. It shows an individual as an absolutely independent and
distinct entity from other people. The underlying principle emphasized in this notion of
the human person is the principle of individuation and unrestrained freedom and use of
reason.
However, some scholars think that the liberal notion of the human person does not
necessarily neglect the communal elements in the human person though its emphasis is
on the individual. This raises the question whether it is necessary to categorize the vision
of the human person into the communitarian vision and the individualist vision. In
response to such a question Andrew N. Woznicki argues that
In view of the mutual relation between men, participation in humanity is based on mutual primacy
of “I” in regard to each other, as being regarded as person, constituting ties which are always
secondary to the personal one. In other words, the mutual participation of “I” in the other person is
by the same token indicative of the primacy of personal subjects over the community.54
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While it is right to acknowledge that the difference in the understanding of the
human person by both communitarians and individualists is a question of the emphasis on
one dimension of human person to the neglect of the other, it should also be
acknowledged that the individual always comes before community. This is the argument
Woznicki attempts to raise when he refers to the “I” as the primary element of
relationship between people. The mutual relation of people is the interaction of the
various “I”s and these various “I”s are constituents of the community. The individual
should not get lost in the community; instead the individual should be emphasized so that
a community makes sense and the human person can be called a social being.
In terms of human rights the inevitable tendency is to view the human person as a
liberal bearer of rights. As Fergusson states, “liberalism asserts the right of each person to
free and equal treatment” 55 and views human rights as entitlements of individuals. This is
a Kantian vision of the human person supported by scholars like Karol Wojtyla (John
Paul II), who was strongly of the view that the human person is a being endowed with
dignity which is “an excellence that calls for special regard” ; a person is “a thinking and
willing subject, capable of making decisions,” a subject not to be subordinated by other
subjects, “never to be used merely as a means to an end for another person” and by
natural right a person “deserves to be treated as an end-in-himself”56 According to
Thomas D. Williams, Wojtyla thinks that the person must remain inviolate by fellow
human beings and even God the Creator.57
Though credible from a practical point of view, this idea is subject to challenge
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because of the social nature of the human person and the significance of interdependence
in human life. Even from the very fact of differences in people’s talents and abilities such
an argument falls short of practical needs. The principles of participation, solidarity,
association or involvement, common good and subsidiarity would be rendered useless if
the social aspect of the human person was ignored because these principles recognize and
affirm the significance of using one’s talents for the good of others. From this point of
view the human person can still be considered also a means for other people to thrive.
However, what is clarified and ought to be noted here is that human dignity may not be
tampered with in such a process, an assertion Kant affirmed by stating that “we should
not only ever use each other partially as means.”58 Human dignity is an-end-in-itself and
so the human person may not be treated merely and only as a means. This is the
categorical imperative of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals that suggestively offers a
significant argument for the respect of the individual, human rights and human dignity.
The foregoing study shows two contending notions of the human person and two
extreme emphases in the notion of the human person. The first emphasis is on the social
dimension of the human person, which represents the communitarian vision of person.
The second emphasis is on the individual dimension of the human person, which depicts
the vision of the liberals or individualists. In both cases the opposite dimension is not
excluded absolutely. Consequently, the following conclusions are in order: First, the
social and individual dimensions of the human person are both significant in a total
definition of a human person. Secondly, each of the notions of the human person suggests
the possibility or potential for reconciling the communitarian and liberal visions of the
58
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human person and human rights. Thirdly, there is also a paradoxical dimension of the
definition of the human person as Thomas Massaro says:
Maritain holds out a paradox for investigation: humans are beings of inestimable and inviolable
value, transcending any temporal or political order, yet they find themselves and realize their
dignity only by participating in (and in so doing, subordinating themselves to) the community. The
human person simultaneously transcends and is subordinate to the common good.59

Here the paradox is that the human person is both a social being and an
autonomous individual who acts freely, a person is communal and individual. One is an
individual by reserving sovereignty to self, and social because the human person remains
open to other people and open to God, interacts with God and “reserves ultimate
sovereignty to God alone.”60 Maritain views the human person as having both immanent
and transcendent dimensions but the aspirations for transcendence are immanent. These
two opposite traits inhere in the same person. This suggests some uniting element in the
human person in the vision of the communitarian and the liberal. This connecting element
also explains why some liberals have rightly conceded that “the self cannot be understood
apart from the social roles and attachments. Any fulfilled life is one in which the self is
committed to goods that are essentially social.”61 The ultimate suggestion of the
preceding arguments is that radical separation of the communitarian and individualist
notions of the human person is unnecessary. As Linda Zagrzebski suggests, it suffices to
view a person as a rational individual substance, self-conscious or aware of his/her
existence as an entity with a capacity to act deliberately and responsibly to attain an end,
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and may do so not only for his/her own sake but also for the sake of others.62
III. HUMAN DIGNITY
A. Meaning and Origin
The meaning and origin of human dignity can be viewed both philosophically and
theologically. The operative notion of human dignity depends on who defines it. The
notion of human dignity articulated here rejects an understanding of dignity that
disregards the qualities of universality, durability and invariability. This means human
dignity is lasting and does not change according to circumstances. A notion of human
dignity which excludes the idea of associating human dignity with only certain capacities
and conditions of life is more preferable than its opposite because human dignity never
depends on the individual person’s characteristics and circumstances of living. Patrick
Verspieren observes that a concept of dignity defined in terms of capacities and
conditions of life denotes that human dignity is “the capacity to decide and act for
oneself, what may be called autonomy and independence, and the quality of the image of
oneself that one offers to others.” 63 A definition of human dignity that considers dignity
as autonomy and a liberal expression of personal freedom as opposed to the classical
vision of freedom as “the inalienable value of the person” 64 demanding respect because
of the enduring character of human dignity regardless of prevailing temporal or social
circumstances, is out of question.
According to Williams, Aquinas considered the origin of human dignity to be
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“personhood” defined in terms of the rational character of the human person, and he
defined human dignity as “the distinguishing characteristic of personhood.”65
Bonaventure concurred with Aquinas in his definition of human dignity. In the definition
of both Aquinas and Bonaventure human dignity marks the difference between a human
person and other creatures. This definition of human dignity also establishes the intimate
link between human personhood, human dignity and human rights. The trio are
inseparable and necessary for defining each other. The human person comes first but
there is concurrence or simultaneity in their occurrence.
“One classic definition of the enlightenment philosophy is that dignity is that
which has no price, which cannot be bought or sold,” a definition derived from Kant’s
vision of “the human being as an end in itself and a prohibition against total
instrumentalization which follows from that.”66 Kant clarified the definition of dignity by
distinguishing between price and dignity which he called “innern werth, an intrinsic
value.”67 Kant affirmed that dignity was different from price because price measures the
value of a thing and equates it to another thing of the same value but human dignity
cannot be equated to the value of any other thing. This invaluable worth inheres in all
people. The notion suggests the singular and invaluable character of human dignity as a
necessary principle for real development because it does not exclude anybody from
possession of dignity. Human dignity is a transcendental human quality. Kant attributed
65
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the foundation of the dignity of human nature to “autonomy”, a view which is disputed
because autonomy, value and moral norms are founded in God, not just human nature,
even if it participates in divine nature.68 It seems right to concur with those who dispute
Kant’s view that the origin of the dignity of the human person is merely autonomy
because freedom or autonomy does not ultimately originate from an individual.
Individual freedom or autonomy is a participation in divine nature and confined within
divine freedom which is ultimate.
While Philosophy does not state that human dignity originates from a definite
being other than human person and nature, Theology explicitly affirms that human
dignity has its foundation in God. Human dignity originates from without the human
person. It is a gift and a participation in the nature of a greater being than the human
person.
Theological foundations of human dignity and rights include creation in the image of God (Gen.1:
26-27), the Trinitarian concept of God, redemption by Jesus Christ, and the call to a transcendent
destiny.69

This idea is succinctly stated by Gaudium et Spes which affirms that “an
outstanding cause of human dignity lies in man’s call to communion with God. From the
very circumstance of his origin, man is already invited to converse with God.”70 This
conversation leads a person into a communion with God. This is an essential statement
about human dignity and human rights. All other explanations of human dignity and
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human rights revolve around this idea. The grounding of the notion of human dignity on
the idea of creation in the image of God is, however, often questioned from a secular
point of view. It is considered a religious view of human dignity in the same way human
rights are some times branded. According to Michael J. Perry, people argue that the
notion of human dignity and human rights are religious because “there is . . . no
intelligible . . . secular version of the conviction that every human being is sacred. The
only intelligible versions are religious.”71 Such objections are refutable, according to
Regina Ammicht-Quinn, on the basis of the assertion that
On the human level the dictum about human beings as the image of God has two shades:
representation and affinity. . . . representation means that human beings are not alone. They are
wholly themselves, but not just themselves. If one looks at them they are transparent to another
reality. Affinity means that human beings are not alone. They are wholly themselves, but not just
themselves. If they look at themselves, at the same time they see the other.72

As individual entities, human beings are representations of God. As complete
individuals they tend towards union with God, and reflect God and fellow human beings.
This observation seems to concur with Perry’s view that the concept of human rights,
based on human dignity which is an attribute of human personality or human beings, is
“inescapably religious”73 because it is an idea that reconciles beliefs about interpersonal
relationships and how people are bound to each other and to the Ultimate Reality or God.
This is theologically correct. The question here is who defines or interprets human rights
and human dignity, and from what perspective the person is doing this – a believer or a
non believer. There is, therefore, a religious notion of human dignity and there is also a
secular notion. The notion is not necessarily religious but the notion is just better
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articulated in religious or theological terms. Nonetheless, this does not make a difference
in human dignity as such because it does not depend on religion or any other
circumstances and status. To claim it makes a difference in itself is to deny the
universality of human dignity. It would seem that Perry has stated that the notion is
inescapably religious because any notion of human dignity other than the religious notion
is already contained in the religious notion.
Human dignity is worthiness, not value, but it is the basis of value and what
makes human beings different from things and animals, although human dignity and
human worth are rather recent vocabulary of the 20th century.74 Human persons have
something that resembles God. It is for this reason that the idea that “God created us in
His image . . . is the basis of human dignity.”75 Theological anthropology often advances
three basic reasons for the claim that human persons are created in God’s image. First,
they are rational. Secondly, they are created free and have ability to make choices.
Thirdly, they are capable of interpersonal relationships. This last characteristic captures
the idea of human persons created in the image of God because God is a community of
relationships between Father, Son and the Holy Spirit which David Bohr calls “a Trinity
of personal relationships or Tri-Unity.”76 This Trinitarian element of the definition and
origin of human dignity is also significant for understanding the human person and
human rights as being relational too. It ought to be reflected in the treatise of the human
person, human dignity and human rights.
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Machan Tibor defines human dignity in terms of the capacity for moral
responsibility for actions rationally evaluated, and consciously and freely chosen.
Human dignity is the capacity of individuals to be morally responsible. Moral responsibility, in
turn arises because human beings are capable of free choice and rational thought, rational
consciousness and the ability to make choices make an individual a moral agent since his
decisions can be made in accordance with a rational standard in which some actions are right
while others are wrong. 77

Freedom and the ability to choose constitute significant defining elements of
human dignity. Since rationality and freedom are traits of the human person, it is
reasonable to say that human dignity is an individual’s moral capacity to act responsibly.
It is also the ability to make choices which accounts for human responsibility for
deliberate behavior. Consequently, it is right to say that when people’s ability to choose is
impeded, their human dignity is denied because human dignity is a moral capacity for
responsible action.
From a social point of view human dignity is also based on self-respect and the
respect for others. This idea is well expressed in the traditional religion of the Lugbara.
The word ru or ruta, which means respect or honor or fear, explains some unique quality
in every human person, and it is the reason for respecting or honoring every person.78
This means there is something shared or mutual about human dignity and human persons.
A further reason for such a respect consists in what John Paul II often referred to as a
sincere feeling and great esteem for the human person as stated by Macan Tibor.
The most vital social condition for any person is the honoring of his or her dignity. If someone’s
dignity is destroyed, all other benefits that person reaps from others amount to very little and
certainly serve as no compensation. Trading one‘s dignity is akin to selling one’s soul; it takes
away one’s essential identity as the human being one is.79
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The honor and respect for human dignity is a foundation for understanding human
rights. Its significance is in the idea that human dignity is the core of the being of the
human person and accounts for becoming the human person. The human person is
defined by human dignity, on which human rights are based. The very attributes which
define human dignity, namely intellect or rationality, freedom, and the capacity for
responsible action or choice, and the capacity for interpersonal relationship are the
reasons for people to claim certain rights.
In human dignity there is singularity and universality. The feeling of the presence
of human dignity in other people is something unique in the human person and in all
people. Ammchidt-Quinn, citing John Baptist Metz, suggests that “radical vulnerability is
a negative formulation of dignity”, necessary for understanding human dignity meaning
that the “human dignity is unassailable.”80 Human dignity cannot be tampered with
without an opposing reaction in response. This claim is credible because human dignity is
the most sensitive element of the human person in the sense that it is easily tampered with
by others and yet nobody wants it to be tampered with. This is probably an argument that
defies the claim that the notion of human dignity is essentially or “inescapably religious”
because every human being is sacred, as Michael Perry suggests.81 Human dignity is the
reason for the claim of the inviolability of human integrity. It is the worth that every
person has which demands
. . . that the human being must not be treated as a mere means to some other end (such as, for
example, the state), but must be regarded as an end in himself. His self-fulfillment is an
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indispensable goal of human life, and the society is backward, unjust, even evil, that does not
promote it.82

This vision of the importance of human dignity clearly shows that an institution,
religious or civic, that does not respect and promote human dignity ought not to claim to
be developed. The view also affirms the recognition of the universality of human dignity
which will be treated in depth in the next section. The same view was, at least indirectly,
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights where the drafters of the
document never linked human rights to religion and never thought that one had to adhere
to a particular religion in order to accept the existence of human rights.83 The
International Theological Commission, using Kantian categories of thought, emphasized
the gravity of the recognition and respect for human dignity in the following words:
. . . man appears not as an object and instrument to be used but as an intermediate end in himself,
whose welfare both personal and ultimately as a being for God must be our aim. Man enjoys a
spiritual, soul, reason, freedom, conscience, responsibility, an active role in society.84

The constitutive elements of human dignity were stated by the commission as
important. These elements make the human person valuable and different from other
beings. It was for this reason that the commission advocated that “all personal
relationships between people must be conducted in such a way that this fundamental
human dignity be given full honor, and the needs of self be fulfilled to the best of our
ability.”85 The commission suggested that the virtues of justice and love are crucial for
the enhancement of human dignity. Likewise, Paul VI advocated in his theory of integral
human development that this dignity should be enhanced in all people. The basic reason
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in both cases is that human dignity is equal in all because all are created in the divine
image and likeness. The equality and common origin of human dignity from God also
explains why the dignity of each person is realized in community, should be recognized
by the community or other individuals, and is protected by the community or other
individual persons. This shows the social and the universal dimensions of human dignity.
It is for this reason that Catholic social doctrine emphasizes “community as a necessary
locus” 86 for the awareness and promotion of human dignity.
Three concluding statements prompted by the above treatise are: First, the origin
of the idea of human dignity is the idea that all people are created in the image and
likeness of God, or at least a being that human persons recognize and acknowledge to be
greater than every human person. Secondly, because of their common origin all people
share in divine qualities such as rational faculty, and the ability to make free decisions or
choices though to a limited extent as compared to their creator. Thirdly, secularists
consider these assertions to be religious. Consequently, human dignity is variously
defined but the ideas principally expressed are tantamount to calling human dignity a
connatural value, inherent value, inborn worth or “an innate worth.”87 It is an
immeasurable value, an invaluable worth, in monetary or equivalent terms. It is also an
invariable worth under every circumstance of time and place. It is an ontological value.
The idea is not necessarily religious because even those who are not religious recognize
human dignity.
B. Universality and Equality of Human Dignity
The main issue treated here is whether human dignity is spatially and temporally
86
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universal and equal in all people of all. The focus of the arguments will be the assertion
that everybody has human dignity regardless of disabilities.88 The explanation of the
universality and equality of human dignity is traced to the origin of human dignity.
Each person is created as an imago Dei; collectively we are deemed by our Creator to be good.
Even the power of sin, original or actual, in no way cancels this bestowal of dignity. Our status as
children of God sets humans apart from the rest of the created order . . . . 89

Human dignity is the participation of all rational beings endowed with the ability
for free choice, in the intelligence of God or divine qualities. The arguments advanced by
Thomas D. Williams about the universality and equality of human dignity are
compelling. He argues from the very nature of the human person, which according to
him, is the same in all people. It is in this nature that human dignity should be located.
Consequently, he states that
If this dignity inheres in man’s nature as a free and intelligent being, it can be predicated equally
of all members of the human race. In order to be universal, personal dignity could not be a
function of intelligence, abilities, accomplishments, moral worth, or baptism, for these factors vary
from person to person. It must rather be a function of the human being simply by virtue of his
humanity, of his personhood, a natural quality that cannot be acquired or lost. The very expression
“human dignity” implies that dignity resides in human nature itself and thus ensures a fundamental
ontological equality among all people.90

The universality and equality of human dignity, according to Williams, is its
inherence in human nature. Human dignity is beyond human ability or creativity. It
defeats conditions created by individual human persons and communities. The vision of
the universality and equality of dignity of all people has not only been the idea of the
Catholic Church or any other religious group. The inherence, inviolability, universality
and equality of dignity and rights “of all members of the human family” were affirmed by
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“the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations on 10
December 1948.”91 The assertion is also reechoed in the assertion of John Paul II who
contended that “the dignity of the human person is a transcendent value, always
recognized as such by those who sincerely search for the truth.”92 The general consensus
is that all human beings have dignity. Human dignity is beyond any human conditions or
making because it does not derive from the will of the human person. The preceding
arguments support the assertion that the universality and equality of human dignity is
explained by the idea that
. . . every person is created by God, loved and saved in Jesus Christ and fulfills himself by creating
a network of multiple relationships of love, justice and solidarity with other persons while he goes
about his various activities in the world.93

That all people were created by God and in the image and likeness of God
explains why human dignity is universal and equal. However, this claim can be contested
on the basis that it is only a religious claim and may not be held as such by non-believers.
Nonetheless, the problem is whether non-believers can adequately account for the origin
of human dignity, which transcends individual persons and embraces all people. If the
common origin of dignity is denied, then universality may have to be denied and the very
idea of human dignity or humanity makes no sense at all. Hence, human dignity and its
universality should be affirmed.
That the dignity of the human person is inviolable and “the whole of the Church’s
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social doctrine”

94

develops from this assertion or principle is generally an accepted

assertion because the social doctrine is all about the promotion of the human person. The
idea of the universality and equality of dignity applies to all human sexes or genders. The
two human sexes,
“Male” and “Female” differentiate two individuals of equal dignity, which does not however
reflect a static equality, because the specificity of the female is different from the specificity of the
male, and this difference in equality is enriching and indispensable for the harmony of life in
society. . . . 95

The firm assertion of the Catholic social doctrine is that man and woman are
complementary physically, sociologically and ontologically. This complementarity does
not, however, mean that either of the two has greater dignity. The meaning of human
dignity and human person would change if there was any differentiation in the dignity of
men and women.
Man and woman have the same dignity and are of equal value, not only because they are both, in
their differences, created in the image of God, but even more profoundly because the dynamic of
reciprocity that gives life to the “we” in the human couple, is an image of God.96

Significant to note is that equality of dignity is not affected by differentiation in
sex or gender, stature, socio-economic or political standing. What is stated here is that
human beings complement each other in many different ways because they are social.
The idea that both men and women are social also demonstrates individual inadequacy
and the need for others on account of their talents and abilities or capacities. This
affirmation does not disqualify the assertion that all people are created in the image and
likeness of God. Difference in dignity are only in what Williams calls moral dignity but
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not what he calls ontological dignity. This means the root of the offence against the
equality of human dignity is sin, in both its “personal and social” 97 dimensions because
division, which also explains claimed differences in human dignity, has both personal and
social aspects. Any sin is an abuse of freedom with the consequences of alienation from
God, alienation from others and alienation from self as the Pontifical Commission for
Justice and Peace advocates. According to the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace
the affirmation of the equality of the dignity of human persons is also theologically
founded on the idea that God loves and cares for everybody and “shows no partiality.”98
According to Thomas D. Williams scholars like Fortin disapprove of the idea of
the universality of human dignity on the grounds that it is approved only in a limited way
by Christian anthropology.99 Williams argues that Fortin can be refuted on the basis of
the distinction between “ontological dignity, common to all human beings by reason of
their nature, and a moral dignity, which reflects the consistency with which a person lives
according to moral truth”, meaning that while “moral dignity can be acquired and also
forfeited, ontological dignity remains constant, since the rational nature on which it rests
endures independent of moral choices.”100 Williams’ argument is based on the nature of
the human person which is a quality shared by all human beings. On this basis the
universality of human dignity can be affirmed, whether by Christian anthropology or any
category of people who take human nature seriously. According to the argument of
Williams the actual universality of human dignity is explained in the ontological
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dimension of dignity, not the moral dimension. The argument of Williams is more
credible than that of Fortin. To argue that the universality of human dignity is approved
only in a limited way by Christian anthropology is to deny the very idea of the
universality of human dignity. Secondly, it would suggest that the idea of human dignity
is necessarily religious or Christian, which is not true. The fact that human dignity is not
necessarily a religious notion suggests the affirmation of the universality of human
dignity.
Williams plausibly argues that ontological dignity is a quality per se while moral
dignity is a quality attached to an action, not independent of any action. In other words,
human dignity is not contingent or dependent on any factor.101 The credibility of this
argument is affirmed by the idea that if human dignity were contingent on prevalent
circumstances, one would only sensibly talk of degrees of human dignity or human
dignity varying from person to person. It would make less sense to talk of human dignity
generally. Instead it would even be better to talk of human dignities. Consequently, it is
plausible to state that since moral dignity is just a quality attached to an action, it defies
the idea of universality. Universality of human dignity can only be predicated of the
ontological dignity.
Since human dignity is inherent in the human nature the affirmation of the
universality of human dignity is credible. Hence, Williams’ distinction between
ontological dignity and moral dignity is intelligible and plausible. It facilitates the
distinction of a contingent dignity and a universal, invaluable, inviolable and durable or
enduring dignity, which is typically a human dignity. Further reflection on the source of
101
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morality Williams suggests points to a transcendent and universal source, which is an
ontological source. Consequently, one can conceive an ontological dignity, which is
universal. The universality of human dignity ultimately implies an ontological human
dignity, of which what Williams calls moral dignity is part because the ultimate source of
morality is God who is the Ultimate Being and also the source of human dignity.
C. Importance of the Vision of Universality and Equality of Human Dignity
Paul VI’s principal concern in Populorum Progressio was the integral
development of peoples. The vision of universality and equality of human dignity is
important for Paul VI’s vision of integral human development for a number of reasons.
First, the “conditions of equality and parity are prerequisites for the authentic progress of
the international community.”102 If all are to develop or be helped to develop, they must
be seen as having equal worth because they are creatures of God and in the likeness of
God. This way they can be treated in the same way or at least with the same
consideration. The recognition of human dignity and human rights which are based on
human dignity is necessary for the integral promotion of the progress of peoples.103
Recognition of the dignity of all people is an impetus for a struggle for the promotion of
all peoples. The gravity of this assertion can be seen in light of Karol Wojtyla's statement
that humanness is “concretized in every man just as much as it is in myself” and this
humanness “unites human beings.”104 When people recognize in others what they know
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they have and treasure they can be moved to act selflessly. This offers possibilities for
integral human development.
Secondly, the awareness and recognition of the universality and equality of the
dignity of every person helps “safeguard and promote human dignity only if it is done as
a community, by the whole community.”105 This suggests that the awareness and
recognition of human dignity is everybody’s responsibility if integral human
development is to be achieved. This recognition can be promoted through the
applications of Paul VI’s integral human development principles of solidarity,
association, common good and participation. Since all people are created in the image
and likeness of God, and participate in some way in divine dignity, human dignity can be
affirmed as equal in every person. Promotion of freedom, justice and peace in the world
and in any society demands the recognition of the inherent worth, also expressed in
human rights, of every human being.106
Thirdly, the human person is defined by attributes such as body, soul, spirit,
intelligence, conscience, freedom and sense of responsibility. All these attributes
contribute to the foundation of human dignity. Since these attributes are under normal
circumstances shared by all people, “all human beings, since they are God’s creation and
endowed with the same fundamental characteristics deserve the highest consideration.”107
It should also be added that the universality of human dignity demands that all people be
responsible. That all human beings have dignity is the principal thesis in human dignity
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talk. The emphasis of the International Theological Commission is that there is no
exception in treating people respectfully because all share the same attributes originating
from the same source. This assertion reaffirms that human dignity is an objective reality.
For these reasons it seems right to concur with Williams that
. . . to say that persons are to be treated in a certain way, then, is not an expression of a
philanthropic sentiment to which others may or may not subscribe, it is a statement about the true
nature of things. Human dignity is a quality which demands a certain response from us.108

Fourthly, the respect for human dignity, which facilitates the development of all,
demands an application of “the principle of reciprocity” or Jesus’ golden rule “Do to
others what you would like done to you . . . be merciful as your heavenly father is
merciful.”109 This principle of reciprocity is founded on the notion that the human dignity
is a shared quality or value and should always be recognized as such. As Michael Perry
suggests, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was proclaimed by the
United Nations suggests this universality in its recognition, in the preamble of the
document, of “ ‘the inherent dignity…of all members of the human family and of the
dignity and worth of the human person’ ”110 thus recognizing and acknowledging the
universality of human dignity. The affirmation suggests that human beings should treat
each other in a dignified manner.
Finally, the universality of human dignity brings to our awareness that human
dignity is an ontological reality inherent in human nature. As an ontological reality it is
not contingent on any person or factor. Nobody can give another person human dignity.
Human dignity is (it exists) in human beings. Although it can be abused, violated and
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denied, it cannot be taken away. It ought to be protected, defended and promoted or
enhanced.
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INDIVIDUALIST AND COMMUNITARIAN NOTIONS
A number of observations are necessary before delving into the question of
human rights. First, the concept of human rights is polyvalent and it developed over time.
Most human rights studies trace the origin of human rights to the Ancient Greek
foundation of Stoicism at the time of Zeno who initially suggested the universality of
rights on the basis of the universal law of nature.111 Secondly, this section is a treatise of
two, supposedly, different and hardly reconcilable, concepts of human rights - the EuroAmerican individualist and the African communitarian concepts of rights. The goal of
this section is to examine the two concepts of human rights, and to attempt to establish
the universality of human rights. Some definitions of human rights will be interjected to
help support the positions of the two philosophies of human rights. It suffices here to note
that
Human rights address situations where power is being exercised in such a manner as to control
human beings by manipulation or coercion so that they are unable to affirm their dignity and
humanity fully.112

This means human rights are immunities or protections against forces that
interfere with the exercise of human freedom, and consequently abuse of human dignity.
It suggests that the claims of one person are limited by claims of other people.
Thirdly, it is significant to note, as the magisterial teaching presents, that human
“dignity forms the basis of rights.”113 Hence, a correct notion of human rights depends on
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the right understanding of human dignity. The preceding section is therefore crucial to
this section. Finally, I will attempt a synthesized definition of human rights using ideas of
other authors, which, I consider to be inclusive of both Euro-American individualist and
African communitarian notions of human rights, especially with consideration of the
reconciling Roman Catholic notion of rights.
Michael Perry’s vision of human rights points to two major perspectives on
human rights - the individualist and communitarian notions. He states that the idea of
human rights suggests that “each and every person is sacred - each and every human
being is inviolable; has an inherent dignity and worth; is an end in himself; or the like.”114
This aspect of the idea of human rights emphasizes the individuality of a person as a
distinct entity. The vision gravitates to the liberal notion of the human person and human
rights. The second part of the idea of human rights is that
. . . because every human being has inherent dignity, certain choices should be made and other
choices should be rejected; in particular certain things ought not to be done to any human being
and certain other things ought to be done for every human being.115

This dimension of the idea of human rights points directly to the relational
character of rights, and so it has communitarian overtones because claims one makes on
other people are reciprocally applicable. There is mutual obligation in claiming and
exercising rights. Rights are related to individuals as well as community.
A. Individualist Notion of Rights: The Euro-American Model
The Western liberal concept of human rights, like any other vision of rights, is a
consequence of political, social and economic power or authority. Contextually, Donnelly
thinks that the Western concept of human rights is characterized by “a perpetual and . . .
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obsessive concern with individual dignity, personal autonomy and property.”116 Human
rights are viewed as protections or immunities from external aggressions against
individual freedom. This contention suggests that
. . . the liberal tradition interprets a right as an immunity from coercion; a right in this sense is
understood as a circle of protection within which the person is guaranteed a sphere of freedom
from intervention by the state or other organized forces in the society.117

This seems to be the reason why Western philosophical anthropology views
individuals or persons as dominantly motivated by self-interest when making claims upon
others or for themselves.118 However, it would seem that, according to Donnelley, the
individual character of human rights is reasonable in the absence of alternative protection
of the dignity of the individual person. If an individual’s dignity, which defines or
determines freedom, is to be protected and the individual is incapable of doing this, some
other external and capable force has to protect it. This very concern gravitates toward the
possibility of thinking that the dichotomy between an individualist and a communitarian
view of the human person is unnecessary in the human rights dialogue because their
mutual complementarity is suggested here. An individual’s claim to be protected as a
being that has dignity is inevitably valid and necessary because human dignity is the
basic human principle. Society has a duty to support and protect the individual. This
means the individual also needs society. To be society individuals should also exist
because society is constituted by individuals.
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The Western concept of human rights was much impacted by Lockean thought.119
Bryan J. Hehir states that according to John Locke the concept of human rights has
nothing to do with the notion of shared responsibilities; “the person enters civil society
with rights but not bound by social responsibilities” and the individual is presented as
being a “self-sufficient” entity in need of society because “protection of life, liberty and
property is too arduous outside some kind of social setting”, meaning that “a person is
social by necessity.”120 This suggests that according to Locke people are merely
conditioned to be social because they, individually, are incapacitated to meet some of
their needs. Even here one can still notice that the individual cannot, absolutely, stand
independently of society. Whether it is out of necessity or not, individuals need society or
community because society is built on the basis of values commonly shared by its
members. Two of the commonly-shared qualities are natural equality of dignity and
freedom. These are the foundations or reasons for the unity of all people, they are not
qualities of differentiation.
The USA Virginia Bill of Rights had Lockean tones in some aspects. The June,
1776 document had the following to say in its first clause:
. . . all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which,
when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity: namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property and pursuing and obtaining happiness.121

Four important observations are significant at this point. First, the main emphasis
of the above statement is that individuals precede society and determine it. This is an area
of fundamental difference between Western individualist and African communitarian
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concepts of a human person in relation to society, because the notion of human rights is
comprehended in terms of the individual in the Western context while it is centered on
community in the African communitarian view. Generally it is observed that “liberalism
asserts the right of each person to free and equal treatment.”122 For the African
communitarian the individual and the community are inseparable. It is true that the
individual and community are in mutual need but in the order of phenomenon there is a
flaw because the individual is not given precedence over community. However, this does
not mean that African communitarianism entertains unequal treatment. Consequently,
like the individualist vision the freedom or individuality of a person is still significant.
Secondly, the foundation of natural equality is not specified in the document. Rights are
only said to be inherent. The source of inherence is unstated in the clause. If it is on the
ground that human nature is the same, the sameness of this nature has yet to be accounted
for. However, in the mind of the founding fathers expressed in various ways - the
American motto, In God We Trust, the pledge of allegiance and the National anthem this clause does not exclude the idea that the equality of nature is grounded in God. This
fact is also evident in the July 1776 Declaration of American Independence. Thirdly,
although the clause is refined in the Declaration of American Independence of July, 1776
which states that “all are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights . . . .”123 both statements still manifest the individual and liberal
character of human rights in the Euro-American concept. Finally, such a view of rights
tends to create a dichotomy between the individual and the society or community – the
Western view and the African one.
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According to David Hollenbach,
In the neo-scholastic documents it is ‘reason’ which gives persons the power to make history, to
understand their social relationnships, to be self-determining and to be obedient to God’s law
without loss of personhood and freedom. 124

Reason commands human action and life. It explains the demand for
responsibility for one’s actions. This is why it defines the human person, and specifically,
human dignity. Reason impacted the Western concept of human rights in the sense that it
helped define rights as responsible freedom. If freedom is a natural quality of all people,
then rights may not be considered absolute prerogatives of an individual or few
individuals. In the Western context because every person is by nature free, everybody has
rights. The corollary implication is that it suggests that one person’s rights are restrained
by another person’s rights. This is why in every context rights have always to be
interpreted as mutual claims. In this sense there are never absolute rights in any context.
According to Bujo this idea is similarly deepened by Kant’s emphasis on the autonomy of
a person on the basis of the faculty of rationality or the general law (the categorical
imperative), making autonomy the chief characteristic of the Western concept of human
rights.125 Bujo suggested that this autonomy was not just a laissez faire freedom but
autonomy for self-realization. This autonomy again belongs to everybody, but in relation
to the autonomy of other people.
The preceding contentions suggest that the emphasis on the autonomy of the
individual or personal freedom is, historically, a constant contention in the Western
tradition of human rights. Hollenbach’s claim that the Western concept of human rights
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emphasizes the right of the individual and, consequently, his assertion that all rights are
commonly founded on “the freedom of the individual person”126 is a testimony to this
contention. The emphasis of freedom as foundation for rights supports individual liberty
but in relation to the liberty of other individuals or groups because all people are naturally
endowed with freedom. On account of this fact the social dimension of the individual’s
life is not secondary, as it seems in practical life. Benezet Bujo’s view is not different
either. He suggests that in the Western school of thought based on Kant’s Metaphysics of
Morals, there is one original right, and quoting Kant, Bujo says:
Freedom (independence of another person’s constraining arbitrariness) is the sole, original right, to
which every human being is entitled on the basis of humanity itself, as long as this freedom can
exist together with every other freedom in accordance with a general law.127

Even if freedom is the sole original right, it seems right to infer from this
quotation that freedom, and consequently human rights, are not absolute. Rights call for
duties or obligations - rights and duties or obligationa are correlative. One person’s
freedom is limited by other people’s freedom, implied in the general law or the
categorical imperative, which proposes that other people have similar freedoms or rights.
A laissez faire interpretation of freedom, hence, is irrelevant. This suggests that, just like
human dignity, an adequate concept of human rights gravitates around a commonlyshared element in human persons.
Bujo contends that according to the Euro-American vision of rights
. . . at the core is the concept of the the dignity of the individual: being human justifies the claim to
certain rights. The emphasis falls upon the individual, not upon society; the single person should
be respected as such and not on account of ‘the relationship to others.’128
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The autonomous respect of an individual is based on the dignity of the individual,
which is universal at the same time. Human dignity and human rights are, in turn, based
on and defined in terms of natural freedom. This view promotes Hollenbach’s assertion
that human rights are “ramifications and extrapolations of individual freedom” - human
rights are consequences and expressions, projections and expansions of human freedom hence rooted in the fundamental rights to liberty as H. L.A. Harts affirms.129 He further
advances that people capable of choice have the right of liberty or freedom from coercion
or restraint, and they have the liberty to do any action that is never coercing or restraining
or injurious to any other person.130
Harts’ vision of rights, according to Hollenbach, is that rights are negative in the
sense that they are defenses of liberty. This seems an extremely liberal notion of rights.
However, the second part of Harts’ definition points to an element of rationality and
responsibility, implied in the ability to choose. A right is freedom to do what is morally
right and necessary but it should not obligate others nor may it thwart the liberty of others
by restraining them. Its expression should not hurt any other human person. This Western
vision suggests why Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff think that many people have
rightly argued that “the very concept of liberal democracy implies restraint” - in other
words “the ethic of the citizen in a liberal democracy incorporates its restriction because
the concept of liberal democracy implies this restriction.”131 Such an understanding of
human rights does not seem to give an absolute character to human rights. It is within
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limits of charity, justice, peace, common good, subsidiarity, solidarity, option for the
poor, and respect for human dignity. If rights are absolute, for example, the right to
private ownership of property, then we must also deny the social nature of human person
because it would mean the human person is independent or does not need other persons
for whatsoever reason. As long as there is no absolute freedom, there are no absolute
rights for one’s rights are restricted by another person’s rights.
The emphasis on the individual is valid, but it ought to be affirmed with emphasis
on community. If humanness and human dignity are shared by all, a conscious individual
always fights to promote and protect the duo. This protection, however, is the
responsibility of the individual and community or society. It is the duty of both the
individual and society because society facilitates individual efforts and the individual
contributes to the efforts of the community. Consequently, society or communituy and
the individual cannot determine or facilitate human rights independently of each other.
Although Bujo does not deny that there are communitarian elements in the EuroAmerican liberal notion of human rights, he says: “. . . they are always concerned with
the individual’s self-realization.”132 This may not be read negatively only. It positively
affirms individual freedom. However, to some degree, this is where the Western
individualist concept of rights and the African communitarian concept conflict with each
other. The problem here is that of mutual exaggeration of individuality or communality at
the expense of the other and of an individual’s relation to community or vice versa. The
conflict of rights remains unresolved if such emphasis is not moderated.
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Western philosophy of human rights manifests that rights emanate from the needs
and the good of the individual. They are based on the command of reason and human
freedom, and they are legally determined through mutual agreements. Rights are liberal
exercises of freedom. They are freedom from external “interference of the exercise of
one’s rights.”133 In this sense rights are negative or “they are immunities from
interference by others.”134 This suggests that rights always have communal orientation.
This is evident, especially where an individual’s claims conflict with or obstruct the
rights of another individual.135 Since one person’s rights are limited by the rights of
another person or other people, rights are not absolute at all. This notion of rights does
not deviate from the Roman Catholic vision. A testimony to this assertion is that
In the nineteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church clearly rejected the liberal concept of
human rights on the grounds that the individual was being elevated to such a position that social
cohesion and the common good were being undermined.136

A liberal notion of rights would be characterized by absoluteness but the idea of
absolute rights has been refuted in the western world too. The basic reason for this
refutation is the mutual relationship between people. Mary Ann Glendon affirms that an
absolute human right is an illusion, and a harmful vision of rights. When one claims an
absolute or mandatory right one hurts other people too. Such claims are irrational and do
not deserve the name human rights. Glendon’s claim suggests that
When we assert our rights to life, liberty, and property, we are expressing the reasonable hope that
such things can be made more secure by law and politics. When we assert the rights in an absolute
form however we are expressing infinite and impossible desires - to be completely free, to possess
things totally, to be masters of our fate and captain of our souls. 137

133

Hehir, 8.
Hollenbach, 14.
135
Bujo, 149.
136
Falconer, 903.
137
Mary Ann Glendon, “ ‘Absolute’ Rights: Property and Privacy” in The Essential Communitarian
Reader, Ed. Amitai Etzioni (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 113
134

277

The argument of Glendon has gravity and serious implications. It draws attention
to the idea that we are limited and our rights are limited. It suggests that to claim absolute
rights is to initiate a conflict of rights. The exercise of rights demands mutual respect and
some compromise. The significance of the argument lies in the thought that rights are
protections or immunities and claims demanding responsible action from the side of both
the right bearer and those upon whom claims are laid or from whom the respect of rights
is demanded. To deny this, according to Glendon, is to shun one’s responsibilities and
“the implication is that no one else is affected by the exercise of the individual right in
question.” 138 This is not possible because rights are exercised in social contexts and have
social implications too. It is important to note, as Hollenbach suggests in relation to social
justice, that in the Western context, “human rights have a social as well as individual
foundation.”139 People make individual claims and do so with the awareness that there are
other individuals who constitute society and make similar claims.
B. Communitarian Notion of Rights: The African and the Third World Model
The foundation of the African concept of human rights is the African
understanding of the human individual. As stated earlier, according to John S. Mbiti, an
African thinks that “the individual can only say: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are,
therefore I am.’”140 This African saying emphasizes the value of the individual within the
community, not an individual dissociated from community. The importance of
community is emphasized not only in a secondary sense but also in a primary sense
without disregarding the individual. Both community and the individual are placed on
138
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par. This idea is suggested by Mbiti’s affirmation that “the individual does not and cannot
exist alone except corporately.”141 For Mbiti, and many who interpret him, the individual
constitutes just a portion of the entire community because “only in terms of other people
does the individual become conscious of his own being, his duties, his privileges and
responsibilities toward himself and towards other people.”142 The African individual and
community are complementary and actually mutually inclusive.
However, this notion of the individual does not exclude individual identity. This
means individual identity is not lost in the community. While the individual is identified
with community, he/she is at the same time distinct from it. This is what Placide Tempels
affirms of a person when he asserts that
The Bantu cannot be a lone being. It is not a good enough synonym for that to say that he is a
social being. No; he feels and knows himself to be a vital force, at this very time to be in intimate
and personal relationship with other forces acting above him and below him in the hierarchy of
forces. He knows himself to be a vital force, even now influencing some forces and being
influenced by others.143

The individuality and independence or freedom of a person is evident, according
to Tempels, but the conscious individual person is also aware of the influence, on him or
her, of other people and the environment in which one lives. Some African authors
support this contention. For example, Deusdedit R.K. Nkurunziza is in line with Tempels
and thinks that man is an active constituent part of society involved in the promotion of
the well-being of other members of society.144 The individual is not lost in society. In a
response to the question: “Does individuality get lost in the African communitarian view
of a person?” Bujo explicitly says that “the statement that in Africa the community alone
141
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matters and not the individual is hardly right.”145 He argues that the individual is singular,
inexchangeable and responsibly related to the community by solidarity while at the same
time retaining his/her identity. The argument that the individual does not get lost in the
community in the African communitarian view of person is consistent. It is also
supported by the fact that in the African context each person is responsible for his/her
actions and punishments are administered according to responsibility for actions.
The second factor that individuates the African person is name. Authors like
Tempels and Bujo argue to this effect. Temples argues that besides the physical
appearance of an individual, the name is an outstanding factor of individuation, “the
name is not just a simple external courtesy, it is the very reality of the individual”
because “the name expresses the individual character of the being.”146 According to Bujo
the concept of names is what typically points toward the difference between the Western
and African notions of an individual. He argues that in African context
There are no family names, in the Western sense, which are transmitted from father to son. Every
child has its own name, depending on the circumstances of birth. The name of the individual
characterizes him/her as a historical being, in its uniqueness.147

Bujo’s contention suggests that there is an individuation of the human person in
African society. A person is different from the community. Bujo’s contention also
amounts to the idea that there is something communitarian in the Western world,
expressed here in terms of names, because if one name is passed from parents to children,
there must be something that binds their lineage too. The issue at stake is that the
communitarian element in the Western world is emphasized in the concept of names but
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not as much in their concept of rights of the individual in relation to society. This is the
paradox of theory and practice which is outside the scope of this work but requires
further investigation.
The foregoing paragraphs suggest the following conclusions as affirmed by
Uzukwu and Bujo: First, in African social and theological anthropology, individual
freedom is recognized as such; an individual remains free within society. According to
Uzukwu E. Elochukwu
The autonomy and right of the individual subject are enjoyed in relationship in communion.
Indeed the “freedom” of the individual is “for” the construction of a better community. . . . It is not
148
principally understood in terms of “freedom from” an oppressive society.

The positive element in Uzukwu’s assertion is that freedom is considered as a
virtue in the sense that it is a disposition of the human person to do good for
herself/himself and for others. The common good is in view in the exercise of freedom.
This suggests that African societies advocate responsible freedom.
Secondly, the African concept of human rights is based on the African
understanding of the individual in the context of society. This is because relationship is
“not simply a way of living in which the subject must realize itself” but “it is the essential
element of personhood. One is human because of others, with others, and for others.”149
This is what earns the African notion of human rights the description communitarian
concept of rights. The African sees individuals’ rights in a relation of mutual interaction.
They can at most be mandated or confirmed in a community context. Therefore, it is
appropriate to describe the African notion of human rights as the African social concept
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of human rights. This assertion is explained by the authentic communitarian vision that
rights are never absolute individual claims. This vision supports the assertion that in a
communitarian vision of the human person “the conception of what is right and how
society should be organized always presuppose some vision of the common good. In this
respect, the good presupposes the right.”150 This suggests that the common good makes
the individual impose claims on others but it also obliges the person claiming rights to
accept similar or the same claims from others for their own good.
Thirdly, human rights are founded in the community without disregarding the
individual, although the emphasis seems to be more on community than the individual
interests or claims. Bujo affirms this view by claiming that “human rights here do not
emanate from the individual but are extended from community to the individual.”151
Bujo’s argument is grounded on the idea that in the African context “only within the
lineage, that is the kinship, can one be a human being,” without forgetting human dignity
and right, because “to be human is something that has to be learned right from childhood
together with others.”152 This assertion suggests why the African notion of human rights
seems not to allow deviation, heroism and the individual’s overwhelming influence on
society.153 The problem with such a vision of rights is the limitation of individual
freedom. It is the crux of the African understanding of human rights and a point where it
seems to deviate radically from the Western notion of human rights.
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C. The Universality and Equality of Rights
The primary concern of this section is to attempt to show that human rights are
universal and relative. It is generally acknowledged that human rights are claims persons
have on other people on account of being human. This acknowledgment shows the
mutual character of rights and points to the idea of the universality of human rights and it
suggests that human rights are not absolute.
The universality of human rights is affirmed on the basis of the common origin,
nature and dignity of people. The affirmation of the universality of human dignity also
suggests the universality of human rights. The basic argument for the universality of
human rights is that God created people in his image and likeness as is explicit in Genesis
1:27-28. Many scholars hold this position. Joseph Massaro expresses the idea as follows:
. . . every human being is a person; that is, his nature is endowed with intelligence and free will.
Indeed, precisely because he is a person he has rights and obligations flowing directly and
simultaneously from his very nature. And as these rights and obligations are universal and
inviolable, so they cannot in any way be surrendered.154

On the basis that people have the same nature originating from the same source,
every human being has rights prompted by this universal nature, and these rights are the
same every - where. This argument does not, however, suggest that people have the same
rights everywhere but it suggests that certain rights (human rights) are commonly shared
and so are universal. The assertion also suggests that rights are sometimes relatively
absolute as long as they are founded on human nature. For instance, the right to life of an
innocent person is always to be respected, everywhere and by all people. I would like to
suggest here that the right to life is a relative-absolute right. As long as one maintains
innocence the right to life is absolute but in the event that innocence ceases the right to
154
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life ceases to be absolute - it becomes a relative right. The quality of inviolability or
inalienability of human dignity makes the right to life relatively absolute. Thompson
speaks to this point by affirming that human rights are claims made on the basis of human
nature and so are equal, universal and cannot be taken away from people or be
surrendered by people.
. . . human rights are rights that one has simply because one is human. Such rights are held equally
by all humans, and they are inalienable. Human rights are rooted, then, in a theory of human
nature.155

The idea of the equality and universality of human rights is, however,
controversial. People like McIntyre reject the idea of the universality of human rights,
and even the idea of human rights per se. Such contention or denial suggests a vision of
rights as a laissez faire exercise of human freedom. Williams states that according to
McIntyre
To speak of “rights of man” is to speak of a presumably universal phenomenon. Yet whereas
needs and wants are universally experienced and thus universally intelligible, rights claims
presuppose social and ethical structures that are not universal.156

The principal claim of McIntyre seems to be that human rights depend on local
social structures and institutions. It is true that some rights depend on established local
social institutions and structures. Some civil rights, for instance, fall into this category. A
distinction ought to be made between human rights and civil rights. Civil rights are
entitlements of a person by virtue of being a citizen. These would vary because of
differences in institutional and legal structures, and not necessarily be universal. Human
rights are claims people have on other people by virtue of being human. These are rooted
in human nature and so are universal. The denial of universality of human rights is a
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denial of the universality of human nature. This does not, however, exclude the existence
of universal human rights, for example, the innocent person’s right to life. Whether by
religious people or unbelievers, civilized or uncivilized people, the right to life and other
related rights such as the right to food and decent living are often treasured.
The universality of human rights was affirmed by John XXIII because human
dignity is universal and all people are created by God in the divine image, and they
deserve the reverence that is due to God because “human nature” is a partial reflection of
“divine nature.”157 This assertion grounds the universality of rights because human rights
are based on human dignity, which originates from God. If human dignity and human
nature and their universality are affirmed, the same affirmation should be granted to the
possibility of the affirmation of at least some human rights. Conversely, the denial of the
reality and universality of human nature, dignity and rights should be predicated of
human nature, human dignity and human rights.
The study of human rights in this section is typified by Williams’ vision of rights.
Williams outlines characteristics of human rights as follows: First, “a right is something
one has” in the sense that it is the power to make claims on others, meaning that it is
distinct from its bearer but “within his ownership or jurisdiction . . . . ”158 Secondly, a
right is “a transitive term: always a right to something.”159 This means a right is a claim
to do or to have something or a demand for protection against something or action.
Thirdly, a right is not a tangible thing, it is “a moral power or capacity or in more
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classical language, a faculty”160, and as such it is a stable quality to do or to claim or have
something. Fourthly, Williams suggests that as a moral quality a right is important
because it determines the quality or type of claims one lays upon others. In other words,
rights are not needless burdens laid upon other people or unrealistic demands from others.
The importance of this understanding of rights is evident in the pragmatic characteristics
of human rights. Finally, human rights “describe a reciprocal relationship,” meaning that
“an assertion of right is other-directed and therefore passes from the sphere of personal
morality to the juridical sphere.”161 Any claim on others invokes the reciprocal
acceptance of the same claim from others. It invokes corresponding duties, obligations
and responsibilities on the part of the rights’ claimant. This shows how rights are
necessary for ordering people’s relationships in society.
V. THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POPULORUM PROGRESSIO
The principal concern of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio was the human
person, particularly the development of the human person. This too is the central concern
of the Catholic social doctrines. Since the promotion and the good of the human person is
the center of attention in both cases, it is relevant to suggest that a Christian anthropology
is necessary for the promotion of the human person, and in particular for Paul VI’s
advocacy for integral human development. Paul VI never explicitly defined the human
person or undertook a categorical anthropological study for this purpose. However, in
many ways he mentioned, implied, and dealt with traits that define the human person.
The intention of this section is to explicate areas of the anthropology of Populorum
Progressio necessary for integral human development.
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A. The Human Person
Paul VI touched upon issues like human freedom and the creation of the human
person in the divine image. The freedom of a human person, which can also be properly
called a right, is what partly determines a person as an individual. It also constitutes a
defining element of the dignity of a person in terms of valuing the nature of the human
individual as free and divinely endowed. Paul VI made the important assertion that:
. . . man is a man only in so far as being the master of his own actions and the judge of their
importance, he himself is the architect of his progress and this must be in keeping with his nature
which the Creator gave him and the possibilities and demands of which he freely assumes. 162

Autonomy or freedom, the ability to judge and to act responsibly defines the
human person. Paul VI did not veer from the views of other theological anthropologists
who define the human person in terms of intellect and responsibility. A responsible action
is first an intellectual activity because it involves judgment. Neither was Paul VI different
from Kant who emphasized autonomy as a defining characteristic of a human being. He
was in line with traditional Catholic creation theology founded on Gen.1: 26-28, which
grants the human person dominion over the rest of creation.
The free nature of the human person facilitates people’s ability to interact with
their environment, particularly fellow human beings. Consequently the human person is,
in part, defined in terms of other humans because the person is a social being and belongs
to society and family, which defines an individual. Paul VI advocated that persons should
be defined and define themselves individually because an exclusively social definition of
the human person, typical of “ancient social institutions” of the “developing regions” 163,
impairs the basic human rights. He mentioned the individual’s right to marry and to
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procreate. Paul VI suggested that the individual person should be recognized as a distinct
entity, and always as such even if he/she lives in and is a part of society. He cited social
structures such as the institution of the family in the developing nations as an example.164
Such rights as to form family should be protected. Paul VI advocated that old social and
institutional definitions and arrangements are necessary only temporarily.
According to Paul VI “excessive force” from ancient social institutions in
developing regions “must gradually be diminished.”165 Though Paul VI was not explicit,
his contention suggests that he was opposed to an exaggerated community ethos which
would cause the individual to disappear or be a negligible component of human society.
He advocated that the exercise of individual freedom must be permitted. This means that
the identity of the individual must be intact, yet the individual should be seen as part of
the human family, dependent on it for personal fulfillment. He advocated for family ties
that define initial human identity and forge unity, mutual assistance leading to acquisition
of wisdom and harmony in personal rights. However, he further argued that social family
values are instrumental for humane living. Family is fundamental and the first enriching
school, and together “with other social requirements constitutes the foundation of
society.”166 True solidarity starts in the family. This implies that solidarity based on
family relations has positive effects. It leads to harmony and a better understanding of the
human person, rights and relationships, and builds a solid community. This assertion is
realistic for four reasons. First, it suggests that human dignity is universal and equal in all
people. Secondly, as a consequence of the assertion, the human person and human rights
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can be recognized as having universal value. Thirdly, it facilitates unity and mutual
respect for human dignity and human rights. Finally, it suggests a typically
communitarian element of the notion of the human person, dignity and rights.
The above discussions also suggest the following conclusions: First, Paul VI's
vision of the human person incorporates both the communitarian and liberal notions of
the human person. This assertion is confirmed by his vision of human rights, especially
the right to private ownership of property. He affirmed that the individual has the right to
own private property, but this is not an absolute right in the face of ardent need. When
there are people or individuals in dire need, one should relinquish the right to private
ownership in order to save or promote the right to life. The individual’s right to private
ownership of property is subordinate to the demands of the common good or the needs of
the community or its members, especially in moments of ardent need. Secondly, Paul VI
defined the human person as an individual endowed with qualities such as intellect and
freedom or autonomy, which are exercised within the context of fellow humans and the
rest of creation. Finally, like other philosophical and theological anthropologists, he
asserted that a human person is not a thing, and is different from the rest of creation,
which is meant to serve human needs.
B. Human Dignity in Populorum Progressio
The persisting principal concern of Catholic social teaching is the human person
and the promotion of the dignity of the person.167 Similarly, the epicenter of the teaching
of Populorum Progressio is the dignity of the human person, based on the fundamental
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principle of imago Dei, meaning that all people are created in the image of God. Imago
Dei is the principle on which human dignity and human rights, and all other principles of
humane living and relationship are grounded. It is also the principle of universality and
equality. All human beings are made in God’s image. They have a value different from
that of other creatures by virtue of their unique relationship with God, and they cooperate
with God and participate in God’s governing and creative activity in the world.168
Paul VI did not categorically state that human dignity is the foundational principle
for authentic development but it was the reason for his advocacy for integral human
development. He was motivated to take a stance for integral human development because
there is “an integral equality of dignity enjoyed by every human being.”169 However, Paul
VI presumed that the centrality of human dignity and human rights were already
acknowledged as such and emphasized enough. His approach to the issue of integral
human development suggests that the dignity and rights of the human person were
already understood by all as basic for human development. Consequently, he tended to
weaken the stance that human dignity is fundamental because all human beings are
created in the image of God and participate in divine qualities and dignity. This principle
runs throughout the entire Catholic social teaching because it is the reason for the
institution of the Church.170
The Church has a duty to defend and protect this dignity and is always concerned
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about the dignity of all people who constitute society. The evidence of the centrality of
human dignity in modern Catholic social teaching is Gaudium et Spes, which provides
the core of the thesis, that human dignity is the foundational principle for true
development. According to Peter Henriot, the document confirms this in its statement that
“the human person is the source, the center and the purpose of all socio-economic life.”171
All development efforts are motivated by this fact, and they are directed to the human
person. When they fall short they are not efforts towards authentic development.
Human dignity and human rights are at the center of the human person, and this is
why human dignity is the overriding principle for integral human development.172 All
development initiatives should attempt to address the problem of degradation and abuse
of the human person, human dignity and human rights. It should be stated here that
human dignity is also central to the question of integral human development because it is
an invariable principle. It is immutable not just because it is equal in all people by virtue
of being imago Dei, but also because it does not depend on any variable factors such as
economic status, political status, social status, religion or age.173 Human dignity is not
determined or defined by any of these variable factors. The whole of paragraph six of
Populorum Progressio is devoted to the question of the dignity of the human person,
which should be recognized in endeavors towards development.174
Like many other proponents of the central position of the human person and
dignity in development issues, for Paul VI human aspiration must first try to protect
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human dignity.175 This is why people seek and do what they advocate. The quest for food,
cure for diseases, the search for employment, personal responsibility, security and
protection from oppression, desire for education, private ownership, socio-economic
progress worthy of humans and enhancement of human values, and freedom from any
threat to human dignity; all of these contribute to protection or defense or enhancement of
human dignity. They are genuine human aspirations, which people desire to achieve by
their own power through the available resources. The problem is that many people live in
conditions that frustrate these natural, human and genuine desires.176 In Populorum
Progressio, Paul VI expressed his deepest concerns for human dignity, and demonstrated
the invaluable character of human dignity.
When newly independent or less-developed nations overcome frustrating
conditions and gain their legitimate human enhancement, they can become part of the
international struggle for true human development. Here Paul VI emphasized human
dignity, the human person and human rights. They are strongly invoked and advocated as
reasons for every effort favorable to development.
Since human dignity is at the center of the human person, it is unjust to deprive a
person of any opportunities that enhance human dignity. Human dignity is enhanced by
work because work is dignified. Work has dignity because it is a divine design, mandated
by God’s command to our first parents to fill the earth and subdue it. The Pontifical
Commission for Justice and Peace affirms that “even though these words do not refer
directly and explicitly to work, beyond doubt they indicate it as activity for man to carry
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out in the world.”177 Work is a duty of all who are capable of work. When people capable
of work are deprived of this duty or shun this duty, their dignity is depraved/corrupted,
and this is an injustice. Often times this injustice is detestable because it affects the very
being of people.
Paul VI was aware of the invaluable significance of human dignity when he said:
For when entire populations, deprived of necessities of life, are so subjected to the domination of
others that they are denied any self initiated activity, responsibility, attainment of higher culture,
and participation in social and public life, men are easily tempted to remove by force the injustice
done to human dignity.178

When the core dimension of a person is attacked, there is the inevitable reaction
in self-assertion by fighting back in self-defense. Here Paul VI addressed the question of
the significance of people’s self-determination expressed in self-fulfillment. Individual
and social self-determination and assertion or private and public self-determination and
assertion of a person is an indication of the need to protect and enhance human dignity.
One way of asserting oneself is work. Paul VI meant that human dignity is enhanced by
human involvement and participation in work. He was also suggesting, like other
theological anthropologists, that the human person should also be defined in terms of
responsibility expressed through dominion over the rest of creation other than human
persons and God. Denying a person such an opportunity means tampering with a very
basic principle and reason for efforts toward human development. Human dignity which
is (exists) because the human person is created imago Dei is attacked. This assertion is
credible because if the human person is created in God’s image and does not contribute to
and participate in work (s)he does not cooperate with God in God’s creative activities.
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This deprivation is an injustice because the human person is emptied of the core of
human existence, and human dignity is devoid of its meaning and credibility. It is
because of such offenses against human dignity that forceful uprisings are often
inevitable.
Paul VI was concerned that the population explosion could adversely affect
human dignity because
. . . accelerated demographic increases too frequently add difficulties to plan for development
because population is increased more rapidly than available resources so that all solutions seem to
end in a blind alley.179

If population growth outpaces the development of available resources, it is either
too hard to meet the material needs of people, or their needs may be addressed
inadequately. This militates against human dignity and its consequence is the temptation
to attempt to address the shortage of material supply by drastically limiting population
growth using methods that disregard human dignity and the value of the human person.
This would mean the possibility of violation of human dignity and human rights. It
explains why, according to Paul VI, wild demographic growth is problematic to authentic
development.
Social actions that rest on the philosophy of materialism and atheism are
detestable from a Christian point of view especially if they have “no regard either for the
religious outlook directing life to its eternal and final goal, or for freedom, or for human
dignity.”180 The sole reason behind Paul VI’s assertion is that social organizations are
established to serve people and to liberate them from desperate circumstances of life.
Social organizations should work for the enhancement of the human person and dignity.
179
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The purpose of natural resources is also the enhancement of the human person
and human dignity. Individually, nations must work to improve their production both
quantitatively and qualitatively “to give the life of all their citizens truly human dignity
and give assistance to the common development of the human race.”181 Paul VI
advocated that national products must meet the needs of both the nationals and nonnationals whose life and dignity need to be promoted. Private ownership must give way
and be rendered powerless when there is excess after meeting the needs of the nationals.
National private ownership of property including technology and expertise is not an
absolute right, according to Paul VI. Consequently, he suggested that affluent countries
should train teachers, engineers, technicians and scholars to serve the less-developed
people with their knowledge and skill.182 Paul VI linked ownership of private property,
including professional skills and talents, to human dignity. The right to private ownership
of property is forfeited in the face of need, precisely, for the sake of promoting or
protecting human dignity.
According to Paul VI the work of experts who move to countries other than their
own should enhance human dignity. This suggests that the work of both expatriate and
domestic experts should help change human conditions and improve the quality of life of
people. Their work should preserve, promote and protect human dignity. This too is the
reason for the practice of charity and hospitality. It seems right to accept Henriot’s thesis
that “integral human development requires respect for all human rights and is itself a
human right” 183 because development is a natural aspiration of all and so it constitutes a
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right. The logic of this assertion is that human rights are based on the dignity of the
human person, and this aspiration is directed toward the promotion of human dignity.
Human person, human dignity and human rights are the enduring principles for
authentic human development. These are the consistent and recurrent principles of
Catholic social teaching. Human dignity in particular is central to any teaching related to
authentic human development. International conferences including the International
Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) of 1994 have given priority to
people over markets, and emphasized equality of people’s rights.184
C. Human Rights in Populorum Progressio
Human dignity and human rights are intimately related because human rights are
based on human dignity; they are affirmations of the existence and recognition of human
dignity. It must be added that human rights are also protections for human dignity.185 The
assertion here is that there is a mutual exchange between human rights and human
dignity. Human dignity is recognized and respected if human freedom and selfdetermination are inviolate.
Populorum Progressio did not treat human rights in depth the way its predecessor
document, Pacem in Terris, did, but Paul VI did not overlook human rights. In fact his
treatise on human dignity, the common good, subsidiarity, participation, association and
justice are a treatise of human rights. However, his treatise on human rights was more
focused and emphatic on the right to ownership of property. In treating this right there are
actually two contending rights, the right to free access to use resources of nature and the
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individual’s right to own property.
According to Peter Riga, in the thought of Paul VI the right to ownership of
property is subordinated to the right of the usage of the fruits of one’s talents and the
protection of health, suggesting that conservation of life comes before the right of
property.186 Paul VI does not object to the right to own property. He objected to the
absolute claim for the right and emphasized the limited nature of the right to use
property; and the obligation to share with those who lack the means of livelihood because
the resources of nature are destined for the good of all people. Paul VI’s affirmation of
the universal destiny of natural resources, with his predecessors, sets limits to the right of
private ownership of property and the exclusive use of property.187 He consistently
emphasized that the right of ownership of property was limited by other virtues,
conditions and principles necessary for human growth, including the principle of the
common good.188
Apart from property rights Paul VI affirmed other rights such as the right to free
trade, the right to life and the right to have a family, but he subordinated all to the
universal destiny of goods of nature. Consequently, with regard to ownership of property
he insisted that “the absolute right of private property is a grave aberration.”189 Absolute
ownership violates the real meaning of the the right to private ownership of private
property. Paul VI treated the right to life, the right of families, “the rightful freedom of
married people”, and “the most inalienable rights of matrimony and procreation” which
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Paul VI thought if taken away means the destruction of human dignity.190 Paul VI did not
elaborate these affirmations enough but his reference to procreation draws attention to the
divine plan and the means through which human persons manifest the image of God and
also promote human life and society. In stating that parents have the right to determine
the number of children they wish to have, he advocated that parents’ human rights go
with responsibility to the community and their children. Therefore, exercise of rights
should be in a responsible fashion because they have corresponding duties and they
should promote human dignity and the human person.191
Paul VI advocated the right to development of the less developed peoples, and the
right to development of all peoples as the theme of the encyclical suggests.192 This view
reflects not only Paul VI’s mind. It was also what the drafters of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights stated and referred to as “full development on the part of
individual.”193 The evidence that this was what he advocated is to be understood in the
light of the entirety of Populorum Progressio. The whole document focused on the issue
of true or complete human development. In terms of rights, its gravity is on the question
of the right of everybody and all people to develop.
Riga’s reading of Paul VI, which I think is correct, suggests that the right to
development is globally to be promoted through international relationships.194 The
explanation for this affirmation is the social nature of the human person and practical life
which demands interaction with others. This affirmation calls for international
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collaboration, associations, and participation in human development. It also demands
world unity and government which promotes “the rights and dignity of the human
person”195, a body Paul VI strongly suggests and evinces in his support for the United
Nations.
Paul VI’s advocacy for development of the peoples sums up his treatise on human
rights. The right to property is the most extensively treated individual human right in
Populorum Progressio. However, the issues he addressed in the whole document are
rights-related because he addressed threats to human dignity, which is the foundation for
human rights. For instance, there is no doubt that when he addressed the injustices of the
time he was at the same time suggesting that those who were being treated unjustly had a
right to fair treatment.
At the beginning of this chapter I made an allusion to Robert Royal’s claim that
Paul VI failed to articulate true development in light of the church’s views of the human
person.196 In fairness to Populorum Progressio, it is questionable whether a critique of
failure of application of Christian anthropology is well-grounded because Populorum
Progressio dealt with concerns about people. Paul VI never devoted a section of the
encyclical to an anthropology necessary for understanding integral human development.
He was not making an anthropological treatise per se. However, his treatise of
development was in light of the Christian understanding of the human person. His
principal concern was the development of peoples and the reasons for lack of integral
development of peoples, and the requisite principles, virtues and conditions for integral
human development, although an explicit anthropology would have facilitated his
195
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articulation of the question of development. However, anthropology features in his
espousing of the requisite principles, virtues and conditions for integral human
development as outlined in the document.
VI. RECONCILIATION OF NOTIONS: THE NEED FOR AN INCLUSIVE VISION
A. Impediments to Reconciliation of the Concepts
A number of factors stand in the way of reconciliation between Western
individualist concepts of the human person, human dignity and human rights, and African
communitarian notions. This section outlines some conspicuous obstacles to the process
of dialogue between liberal and communitarian anthropologies.
In the first place, dialogue is facilitated by language because it is a real
communication medium and exercise. One of the difficulties in the dialogue between
liberal Western anthropology and communitarian Third-world anthropology, particularly
regarding the notion of human rights, is the language for communication. According to
Asmarom Legesse, the main problem is that “different societies formulate their
conception of human rights in diverse cultural idioms.”197 Practically, this makes the
articulation of the concept of rights problematic. The need to develop a better and
inclusive language is real. This need is suggested by the shared human nature. Human
beings are “by nature dialogical creatures.”198 Persons have the ability for mutual
exchange of views, and because of this ability they can arrive at a consensus. The
medium of this mutual exchange is speech. Speech itself is “essentially other oriented.”199
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It facilitates this mutual exchange of views through language. A mutually intelligible
language for articulating the notion of human rights is necessary.
Secondly, there is the problem of a distinct individual as opposed to other
individuals or society/community. In this line communitarian critics of liberalism think
that the latter needs community only for self-security.200 Uzukwu succinctly states this
idea:
While the African social definition of a person displays the human person as subsistent
relationship - in other words, the person as fundamentally “being with” and “belonging to”Western philosophy lays emphasis on the absolute originality and concreteness of the human
person, a “being-for-itself”. . . . However, Western systems wish to guard against the dissolution
of the person in relationship. The “I” is already constituted before it ever chooses to be related.
The autonomy and the incommunicability of the “I” are fundamental. 201

Uzukwu is addressing the question of a radical separation between the individual and
community. The problem here is the one of the notion of the human person. He suggests
that it is the problem of resolving the “I-you”, “I-they” and “We-they” relationships and
differences. If this is true it is a real problem in the attempt to reconcile the individualist
West and the communitarian African visions of rights, person and human dignity. It is
also a problem manifested in co-operative action, especially in pluralistic contexts. In
light of Uzukwu’s assertion about the Western vision of a person as not emphatically
related to others it would be questionable how rights could exist in the West if rights are
claims persons have on other people. This in itself is enough to suggest that the individual
is not really exclusively autonomous. One would even wonder how organizations or
associations, that are characteristic of the west as opposed to the communitarian Africa,
could exist without people relating to and defining themselves in relation to other people.
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However, Uzukwu recognizes the interaction between the individual and community in
the Western context. This idea is suggested by his assertion that right from medieval
times, Western philosophy - phenomenology and existentialism - recognized the
importance of relationship for self-realization of the individual.202 The issue raised by
Uzukwu is only the issue of emphasis on community and the individual independently of
each other.
Josef Fuchs acknowledges this difficulty. According to him
the ‘I’ and the Others are personal individuals and not simply identical, with the exception of
personal dignity in which we are all equal. But the human concreteness in which personal dignity
is incarnate is not the same in different human beings, even if the dignity itself is the same for all:
this concrete difference is the source of difficulty.203

The assertion that individuals are different should be acknowledged. It impacts
their existential relations and claims on one another. Similarly, Mark G. Kuzewski is of
the idea that “the main problem is liberalism’s voluntaristic notion of a person.”204 Such a
notion of person creates a plurality of nationalities, personalities and interests with a
consequent rift between one individual and another or other groups of individuals. To
argue for a commonly-shared concept of human dignity and human rights on such basis is
problematic. Consequently, a common denominator for understanding rights and human
person is called for here. A foundation that unites, modifies and facilitates relations
between individuals is needed.
The third problem, closely related to the second, is the one of the concept of the
self. Liberal individualism and communitarianism look at the self differently. Walzer’s
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contention suggests this. According to him, communitarian critics of liberalism think that
Liberalism . . . is founded on the idea of a presocial self, a solitary and sometimes heroic
individual confronting society, who is fully formed before the confrontation begins . . . . The
critics are commonly said to believe in a radically socialized self that can never ‘confront’ society
because it is from the beginning, entangled in society, itself the embodiment of social values.205

The assertion here is that for liberals the individual comes before society or
community because society is constituted by individuals while communitarians contest
such assertion. The issue here is whether the self is predetermined, or at least shaped by
society or developed in community. The appropriate response is an affirmation of the
latter - the individual is shaped or influenced by the community, although the community
is affected by the life of the individual. The liberal tradition of the human person and
rights recognizes this but emphasizes that the individual comes before society, which is
right, while the communitarian vision tends to emphasize community more than the
individual. This suggests why Western individualist notions of human person and human
rights and African communitarian concepts are contending notions though not mutually
exclusive.
The fourth impediment to reconciliation of Western and African concepts of
human rights is the difference in the conception of the notion of human freedom. Bujo
claims that according to Kant
freedom is the sole, original right, to which every human being is entitled on the basis of humanity
itself, as long as freedom can exist together with every other freedom in accordance with a general
law.206

Freedom is part of Kant’s categorical imperative that ought to be respected. This
seems to be why in the Western context freedom is often conceived as “freedom from
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interference of the exercise of one’s rights”207or freedom from oppressive systems. It is
freedom as liberation. On the other hand, in the African conception, freedom is viewed as
freedom for promoting community. The major difference and problem is the West’s
laissez faire notion of freedom as opposed to the conservative African notion of freedom
which is limited by society.
The last significant problem in the dialogue between notions of person and rights
is that of degrees of values so that “when forced to choose between basic values, societies
rank them differently.”208 This problem is present in the ways the Western world and
Africans or the third world in general look at the individual and community, value them;
and outline the nature of the human person and human rights. The difference in visions is
also manifest in what the two traditions want to protect, what their needs are and the
circumstances in which individuals and communities find themselves, economically,
socially and politically. A few problematic enduring questions are inevitable here: Is
there any culture that can claim superiority for its values? On what grounds can such
claims be made? Finally, are hierarchies of values important in the dialogue about human
person, human dignity and human rights?209 These questions invoke further elucidation
about the place and significance of hierarchy of values in anthropology. They will not be
investigated here but they stimulate further reflections on the issue of human person,
human dignity and human rights.
From the foregoing discussion there are three areas of differences between the
Euro-American vision and the African communitarian visions of person and rights. First,
207
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there is difference in the starting point of the notion of rights or the human person. While
the Western notion starts with individual freedom, the African communitarian notion
starts with the community. Secondly, there is difference in emphasis on the individual
and community. While the Western liberal vision emphasizes the individual more than
the community, the African communitarian notion emphasizes the community more than
the individual. Thirdly, there is difference in limitation of the individual or community.
While in the Western context the individual tends to limit community, in the African
communitarian view the community tends to limit the individual. These issues and
similar problems further raise the question as to whether the notions of the human person,
human dignity; and human rights from the Euro-American and African communitarian
points of view can be reconciled. The next section of this work tries to show how and
how far some of these difficulties can be resolved. It attempts to show the mutually
inclusive aspects of Western-liberal and African-communitarian concepts. The mediating
factor is the Roman Catholic understanding of the human person and human rights.
B. Reconciling Notions: The Roman Catholic Tradition
Even if there are some differences between the liberal and communitarian
anthropologies, they can be reconciled. Their reconciliation is a necessary factor for the
attainment of integral human development. In the attempt to resolve the conflicts between
the Euro-American liberal notion and the African communitarian anthropological
concepts Roman Catholic tradition is necessary for mediation. A number of observations
are, however, necessary at the outset.
First, the Roman Catholic Church acknowledges that human dignity and human
rights exist and they initially originate from God. Secondly, the Church looks at herself as
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a community of the people of God consisting of individual persons. These two statements
suggest the conviction in the Roman Catholic tradition about the import of both the
individual and community. From the Roman Catholic point of view, the possibility of the
reconciliation of the Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of
rights lies in the proper understanding of the individual, the community, their origins and
mutual interaction. Other arguments revolve around this conviction. Thirdly, the attempt
to reconcile the two notions of rights is based on the consistent modern Roman Catholic
tradition often “dominated by one basic theme - an unshakeable affirmation and vigorous
defense of the dignity and rights of the human person.”210 David Hollenbach’s remarks
about the Catholic tradition are significant for acknowledging its mediating role,
especially in Catholic human rights tradition. He states that
Catholic rights theory is far removed from individualist or libertarian social philosophy. The
theory presented in the encyclicals is “personalist”, not individualist, and it recognizes that persons
are essentially social and institution building beings.211

This statement supports the social and political thoughts of Aristotle, later
developed by Aquinas, one of the principal architects of Catholic theology based on
philosophical principles or categories. According to Aquinas the socio-political
orientation of a person is natural but it does not exclude the individuality of a person. The
Roman Catholic tradition precisely emphasizes both the individual and society. The
moral injunction provided by the personalist vision of the human person is close to, if not
like, the Kantian categorical imperative forbidding the use of the human person as a
means to an end, but it has also the “positive content (Thou shalt love!),” not only the
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“negative content, (Thou shalt not use).”212 It differs from other theories of human rights
by its balanced emphasis on both the individual and the social dimension of the human
person and its introduction of human dignity, originating from God, into the human rights
arguments.
The two visions of human rights can be reconciled. The attempt to reconcile the
liberal and communitarian concepts of rights is treated under five sub-themes: human
dignity based on the principle of imago Dei, which is the greatest concern of the Catholic
documents, the question of the individual versus community, the concept of freedom, the
problem of language, and the diversity of values.
1. HUMAN DIGNITY: THE FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION
Human dignity is the most important principle in the Roman Catholic human
rights arguments. Its importance lies in the assertion that
human dignity is not a concept which derives its meaning from a particular class or genus of
human action. It has a reality in all situations, independent of the kinds of actions and relations
which give them structures.213

The dignity of the human person has a transcendent origin, it is an ontological
reality. This assertion has been the consistent emphasis of the Roman Catholic
magisterial doctrine since Leo XIII’s encyclical, Rerum Novarum (1891). Besides
affirming the equality of human dignity in all people, the basic and enduring statement of
Leo XIII is that “man precedes the State,” suggesting that “the worth of human beings . . .
is the standard by which political and legal institutions are to be evaluated.”214 The
priority of the individual and human dignity is stated here. This is not, however, an
absolute contention that emphasizes only the individual. Leo XIII also invaluably united
212
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the two crucial dimensions of the human person - the individual and social dimensions in his formulation of rights and duties. According to Williams, three elements of the
document account for this fact: human dignity, social interaction and social institutions
which Leo XIII proposed. This suggests that any claim and exercise of rights is not
detached from concrete situations and other individuals or groups. Catholic social thought
preceding Populorum Progressio was based on the affirmation of human dignity and the
social nature of the human person. Paul VI was aware of this and suggested this
affirmation in his treatise of the right to private ownership of property.
In his encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, Pius XI also emphasized the dignity of the
human person as the foundation of human rights. Hollenbach says that
all of Pius XI’s claims about respect for persons’ claims to material, bodily, and even
psychological necessities are ultimately founded on a characteristic of the person which transcends
any and all of these needs.215

Rights are claims dependent on and defined in terms of human dignity. They are
not arbitrary claims. They are claims commonly shared by all on the basis of a human
characteristic that transcends needs, interests and desires. The assertion suggests that
human dignity - the transcendent characteristic of persons - comes even before claims
(rights), needs, desires and interests. There is no authentic human right without human
dignity. Human dignity necessarily precedes human rights, and the demand for
satisfaction of human needs, interests, claims and desires. This affirmation explains the
call for respect for human rights, human dignity and the human person. Robert Audi and
Nicholas Wolterstorff concur with the affirmation, and state the respect for persons is a
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central notion in ethics and also for citizenship.216 This suggests that according to the duo
liberal democracy emphasizes the importance of mutual respect in ethics and human
relations.
To acknowledge that human dignity deserves respect demands that it should not
be arbitrarily abused for selfish interests because it is an honorable quality shared by all.
Both Western individualist and African communitarian rights advocates need to
incorporate this idea in order to reach a consensus about the notion of human rights,
because it creates a possibility of uniting the individual and community. Human dignity is
an absolutum and a conditio sine qua non for determining human rights. Without human
dignity there are no human rights even if human rights in turn protect human dignity. To
reconcile the Western and the African notions of human rights, a common denominator,
which at the same time is the ultimate foundation for articulating the concept is
necessary. Without such a foundation any human rights concept is arbitrary and the two
trends of thought cannot be united because they each argue from different foundational
determinants of human rights. For individualism and communitarianism to be reconciled,
the notion of human dignity should be accurately articuated and grasped.
Robert A. Evan’s contention that human dignity needs to be seen as a quality
bestowed on all by God, “something that people have, rather than something they earn or
are granted by family, society or government”217 is crucial for reconciliation between the
individualist vision of rights and the communitarian vision. Human rights are not
determined by individuals, community, social structures or institutions. They are
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determined by God through human dignity which is an ontological reality. It is only when
any concept of human rights takes seriously the transcendent dimension and origin of the
human person that a common notion of human rights is possible. This is what the
Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts need to incorporate as the
basis of their explication of the notion of the human person, human dignity and human
rights in order to arrive at a consensus view of human rights.
2. PRUDENCE IN THE PRIORITY OF INDIVIDUAL OR COMMUNITY
The main issue addressed in this section is the relation of the individual to
community. It is partly the problem of the Sitz-im leben of the development of the human
person or personhood. Although human dignity is, at least in Roman Catholic tradition,
the ultimate foundation of rights, the understanding of the individual in relation to
community is crucial for the right understanding of human rights. Therefore, the issues
are particularity and universality, unity and plurality.
Pius XI’s encyclical, Quadragesimo Anno, emphasized the transcendental origin
of the dignity of the human person in relation to community.218 Although the document is
more concerned with issues of social justice, it touches the question of human rights. This
is evident in its basic contention that “liberalistic individualism which subordinates
society to the selfish use of the individual” should be avoided because the individual is in
“organic union with society,” and by mutual collaboration “the attainment of earthly
happiness is placed within the reach of all.”219 The individual is recognized but not
independently of community because the two are tied together by a mutual relationship.
Leo XIII’s emphasis on the primacy of human dignity is reaffirmed and the role of
218
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institutions in mediating and shaping human rights is stated by Pius XI too.220 Similarly,
from a communitarian point of view, Bujo asserts that in the African context
Although the individual is embedded in the community, he or she is a unique and inexchangeable
being, who has irreplaceable tasks within a community. The individual has to act in solidarity with
the lineage, while retaining his/her identity as well as showing the responsibility entrusted to him
or her.221

According to Bujo, individuality does not get lost, it is not subordinated to
community. This is a point emphasized by John Paul II in the entirety of Sollicitudo Rei
Socialis, where the individual and community are on par, and viewed as necessarily
related. Prior to this John Paul II, then Karol Wojtyla, emphasized that when a person is
viewed in the context of community, humanness should be seriously considered because
it unites people, it is shared by all people, and "it puts into the forefront man's relation
and subordination to a given community."222 The individual is a distinct portion of
community.
In his attempt to resolve the issue of the relation of the individual to society, Pius
XII emphasized social morality using the notion of “responsible citizenship.”223 The term
‘responsible citizenship’ is significant in the reconciliation of the Western individualist
and African communitarian concepts of human rights because it suggests a notion of
rights which combines both notions. It shows mutual concern of individuals as well as
that of an individual and community. A responsible citizen is not eccentric. In other
words, a responsible citizen does not deviate from community but is an individual
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conscious about duty toward self and toward others.224
John XXIII’s emphasis, in Mater et Magistra, on the dual context of human
dignity and rights is important. In the document he stresses that interdependence is vital
because “human dignity can only exist within a consciously developed context of human
interdependence.”225 This means persons need to understand that they are dependent on
each other and there is something worthy in other people. Unless this conception exists, it
is difficult to recognize the dignity of other people. This is a reality present in the African
notion of the human person, but not much deepened by the Western notion of the human
person. Western anthropology of rights, therefore, needs to seriously consider that “it is
in the belief in human interrelatedness, human reciprocity, that the key for solving the
problem of human rights is to be found.”226 It is when people recognize equality of
dignity and mutual responsibility, that the possibility of global human rights becomes
real. This assertion calls for a mutual relationship in which there is not an overemphasis
of distinctions. Instead the distinctions of I and You or They; and the We and They, melt
into a We relationship and human identity. This suggests that people need to understand
that they are dependent on each other, and there is no need for tribalism or parochialism.
This manifests a recognition of the universality of human dignity, and equality of rights
of all without losing sight of the distinct individual.
The notion of interdependence reflects the biblical teaching on the equality of
persons, which is vital in the conception of equality of human dignity. This equality of
dignity is based on the fact that all are created in the image of God. This is a fact extant in
224
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the sacred scriptures (Cfr. Gen. 1: 26-27). Both the Old Testament and the New
Testament emphasize the equality of the dignity of the human person. This biblical view
of human dignity is distinct from Western and African communitarian concepts of rights,
which can be inferred from the contention of Montgomery, who asserts that the
. . . biblical approach to human dignity cannot he identified with the barren extremes either of
eighteenth century western liberal philosophy or Marxist-Socialist collectivisms.227

The biblical vision of human dignity can be utilized for reconciling the liberal and
communitarian visions of human rights because it stands in between the two. What the
liberal notion and the communitarian notion of rights need is emphasis on human dignity
as the foundation of human rights. Once this foundation is incorporated into both, their
reconciliation is less problematic because at this point they have a common and
transcendent ground for articulating the notion of human rights and the human person.
The Roman Catholic principle of the common good can also contribute to the
dialogue between the liberal and communitarian human rights concepts because it places
rights in both a social and an individual context. As Hollenbach states Mater et Magistra
defines the common good as “the sum total of those conditions of social living, whereby
men are enabled more fully and more readily to achieve their own perfection.”228 This
principle is vital for resolving the conflict between the individualist and communitarian
notions of human rights because it joins the good of each person to the good of all, the
good of community. It shows that Catholic tradition rejects extremes of individualism
and communitarianism, but incorporates elements of both to build a tradition of its own.
The principle combines both elements because the promotion of the common good calls
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for the promotion of the rights and the good of every individual member of the
community. It considers both the individual and community important. The Western
individualist who emphasizes freedom, concreteness and autonomy of the individual, and
the African communitarian, who stresses the communal character of persons, can feel
comfortable with the principle of common good, even if not absolutely, because the
elements of the two notions are included in this principle. The principle is, therefore,
necessary in the attempt to resolve the conflicts between the individualist and
communitarian notions because it provides checks and balances in the course of
articulating the notion of human rights. As Hollenbach suggests, society is necessary for
founding, supporting, conditioning and limiting human rights.229 Society checks extremes
of individualism and at the same time protects its individual members. Both the society
and the individual need one another for a balanced self-conception.
The dual emphasis of the value of community and the individual is further noticed
in two other Roman Catholic documents - Pacem in Terris and Gaudium et Spes. First,
according to Hollenbach, Pacem in Terris underscores the importance of both social and
communal rights and acknowledges rights stressed by both the liberal democratic
tradition and socialism as crucial in the human rights talk. The principal norm for
acknowledgement of rights emphasized in both traditions is human dignity. Such rights,
as listed by Hollenbach, include: life-related rights, rights concerning adequate standard
of living, moral and cultural values, religious activity, family life, economic life,
assembly and association, freedom of movement, and political rights.230 These rights are
all claims relevant in both liberal democratic and socialist settings on the basis of the
229
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universality of human dignity. The two concepts of rights - the individualist concept and
the communitarian concept - fall under either of these trends or ideologies. They can be
reconciled by applying John XXIII’s vision of human rights strongly established on
human dignity.
Secondly, the Vatican Council II’s Gaudium et Spes, advocates that “if persons in
society possess a transcendental worth, then the structures of social organization are
confronted with claims to serve and protect personal dignity.”231 That the dignity of every
human individual is important is stated here. Community ought to protect the individual
dignity and rights. This is an idea that features in both the Western and African contexts
of human rights, though with a difference in degree of emphasis. In the Western context,
unlike in the African context, “relationship is not constitutive of the being of humans, . . .
it is fundamental to human existence.”232 This is where one of the fundamental
differences between the Western individualist and the African communitarian notions of
person and rights lies. However, similarity is evident because social relationship is still
fundamental for human existence.233 Here one notices that the difference between the
Western and the African notion of the human person, the self and human rights, gets
more blurred - a signal for the possibility of reconciliation of the two, though the notion
of the human person as a social entity seems to be more conspicuous in the African
concept of person than in the Western vision. The document unites the Western and the
African notions of person by its recognition of the value of “social interdependence and
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the essential social nature of the human person.”234 The communal dimension of persons,
which also features in both Western and African contexts, is affirmed though the African
communitarian vision tends to emphasize the communal dimension more than the
Western individualist vision which is more concerned about individual rights than about
society. This conciliar view of the human person points to the possibility of reconciling
the two trends of human rights arguments because the document presents human persons
as being in a dialogical relationship. The notion of rights derived from both individual
and social understandings of the human person projects human rights as being in constant
conversation.
One of the fundamental and reconciling concepts in the Roman Catholic human
rights tradition is the one of solidarity introduced into the rights talk by John Paul II in
his encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. The document affirms the value of solidarity in the
following terms:
Solidarity helps us to see the ‘other’- whether a person, people or nation - not just as some kind of
instrument with a work capacity and physical strength to be exploited at low cost and then to be
discarded when no longer useful, but as our ‘neighbor’, a ‘helper’ (Cfr. Gen.2: 8-20), to be a
sharer, on a par with ourselves, in the banquet of life to which all are invited by God.235

Solidarity is closely related to the principle of common good. Its import in the
human rights dialogue is its emphasis on the individual’s commitment to community.
Like the notion of interdependence, it stresses the fact that people need each other to be
and to become better. This point is well taken by the African notion of the human person
because “the value of life consists in solidarity and participation of the individual entities
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in the totality of the whole reality.”236 The main issue is that solidarity constitutes the
essential trait of Africans. The Sitz-im Leben of a fully developed person is community
and communal relations because community is for meeting the needs of the individual as
well as the entire society. This is why human need, and it should be added, human dignity
or right is “the basic criterion of behavior.”237 Solidarity, hence, defines the self in terms
of society or other selves and vice versa. If this definition of the self and community is
acknowledged, reconciliation of the individualist and the communitarian notions of rights
can be visualized because there is no more clear distinction between the individual person
and the community since they define, or are defined, in terms of each other.
Finally, the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity is vital for the reconciliation
of Western and the African concepts of human rights because it facilitates the dialogue in
human rights. Verbatim, the principle is stated as:
Subsidiarity is a fundamental principle of social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one
should not withdraw from individuals what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and
industry. So, too, it is an injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance of right
order to transfer from the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be found and provided
by the lesser and subordinate bodies. In as much as every social activity should, by its very nature,
prove a help to the members of the body social, it should never destroy or absorb them.238

The principle of subsidiarity advocates that the independent decisions and actions
of the individual and the intervention of community are legitimate when it is reasonable
and necessary for both the individual and society. The individual is recognized as much
as the community on account of natural competence to decide and to act. In other words,
society’s interference with the individual’s right to decide or act for the good or
promotion of his/her dignity is a violation of rights. And the society’s refusal to intervene
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to save an individual from a violence against his/her rights, when the individual is
incompetent, is itself a violence against the dignity of the individual. Conversely, the
individual’s refusal to act for the protection or promotion of his/her rights or dignity,
when capable, is a self-inflicted violation of dignity and rights, contrary to the spirit of
solidarity and common good. The individual’s refusal of community intervention, when
he/she is incapable, is another self-inflicted violation of rights and dignity.
From the foregoing analysis, the principle of subsidiarity seems to suggest an
incorporation of both individual and communal exercise of rights. But it does so within
limits of reason, necessity and competence. It permits both individual and communal
exercise of rights provided that the consequences do not violate the individual’s rights
and duties, and the rights and duties of others in community. This is where the liberal
human rights advocate recognizes that rights are not absolute claims and the
communitarian rights advocate should not suppress the individual’s exercise of rights
unnecessarily. The solution to the problem of limits of the exercise of rights seems to be
extant in the Roman Catholic principle of subsidiarity.
With regard to the individual’s relationship with society, in the context of human
rights, the following points are crucial: An appropriate understanding of the human
person is necessary to resolve the conflict between the two human rights concepts. The
human person needs to be understood as “an individual with intellect and will: the
capacities of insight and judgment, choice and decision, an individual able to inquire and
to choose.”239 Persons should be conceived both as subjects and objects of experience and
“the moral subject can be, in a way, a plurality of persons or selves within a single
239

Michael Novak, Free Persons and the Common Good (New York: Madison Books, 1989), 134.

318

individual human being.”240
Considering the two conceptions of the human person jointly, it is noticeable that
both subjective and objective dimensions of a human person are stated. This is what
explains the interior tensions in an individual in a process of deliberation, choice and selfaffirmation or determination. It suggests that one person ‘co-exists with many persons’
within him/herself; there is in each person a community, if not of persons, of views or
opinions. If this can happen within an individual, there is also a possibility for it to
happen with an individual in relation to an outside community, even if the opposite is
also true. This shows that the individual and the community are inseparable, at least at
certain moments and so the individualist notion of rights and the communitarian notion
can be reconciled.
In an attempt to bring consensus between the individual and the community with
regard to rights, Kuczewski aptly suggests that “the self regains contents via knowledge
and participation in the community of which he/she is a member.”241 There is a mutual
exchange between the individual and the community. As far as there is such exchange,
the individualist concept of rights and the communitarian notion of rights are not
radically separated. There is a possibility of the reconciliation of the two on the basis of
this mutual exchange. Proposing a radical interdependence between the individual and
society, Kuczewski reaffirms this in the following words:
We need to define the self as essentially related to community. The community must be a
constitutive of the individual’s identity. . . . This makes possible, a positive notion of rights. The
communitarian is able to embrace a value of rights as basic guarantees that enable the individual to
discover his or her values and higher preferences.242
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The social element of the human person is again stated here. From this assertion it
is right to agree with Walzer that “the liberal ideology of separatism cannot take
personhood and bondedness away from us. What it does take away is the sense of
personhood and bondedness.”243 This means that personhood is not exclusively an
individual reality because it is developed and achieved in community. It is personhood
that unites individuals. The individual and community are inseparable. What separates
the individual and community is the loss of sight of this fact. In relation to rights, the
contention is that rights cannot be absolutely individual claims regardless of community.
This assertion is augmented by the contemporary Roman Catholic notion of the common
good, which includes both the individual and the community. The individual and the
community have a mutual obligation of promoting the good and rights of one another
because an “individual stands in an ultimate relation to the community and vice versa.”244
In other words, there is a moment of coincidence of both the individual and the
community or their interests. This is why, in rights claims, both individual or personal
good and the common good have to be valued equally. This way neither individual rights
nor the claims of community are given priority. Instead both are placed at the same level.
Consequently, the problems of individual or communal absolutism and the one of
overemphasis of only one dimension of the human person and rights disappear.
It seems plausible to conclude, as Uzukwu advocates, that an unbalanced view of
the human person is problematic only when priority is given either to the individual or
the community alone because overemphasis on either of them makes the survival of the
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other problematic.245 The point here is that overemphasis of one means the death of the
other. There is, hence, a need for balanced emphasis on both the individual and the
community. The solution to reconcile the Western and the African notions of the human
person and human rights is to strike a balance of emphasis. Jacques Maritain suggests a
solution, but it is plausible to concur with Thomas D. Williams who says:
Maritain holds out a paradox for investigation: humans are beings of inestimable and inviolable
value, transcending any temporal or political order, yet they find themselves and realize their
dignity only by participating in (and, in so doing, subordinating themselves to) community. The
human person simultaneously transcends and is subordinate to the common good.246

This affirmation stands out as paradox because of the mutual dependence of both
the individual and the community while at the same time subordinating the former to the
latter. Indeed such a solution is a paradox because it suggests the importance of both the
individual and the community. As a solution to the problem it shows how important both
the individual and community are in suggesting a notion for the human person, human
dignity and human rights. This could be considered one of the core arguments for the
universality of human rights and dignity. Massaro argues and suggests that Maritain’s
solution to the conflicting vision of human person and human rights is the human
person’s “immanent aspiration for transcendence”, and subsequently
Maritain insists on the ultimate inadequacy of any social, political or economic system which fails
to acknowledge the spiritual nature of persons, possessing as they do aspirations which surpass
their temporal needs.247

The insistence of Maritain is credible because of the dual dimension of the human
person - the material and the spiritual dimensions. The spiritual tends to the communal
while the material tends to individuation. The two dimensions, therefore, do not need to
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be radically separated as if they are absolutely independent of one another and do not
exist in the same person.
3. A RIGHT CONCEPT OF HUMAN FREEDOM
A proper notion of human freedom is necessary for a credible understanding of
human rights. At least from a Christian perspective, rights and duties are correlative
notions rooted in the social nature of persons. This implies that freedom as a right is
exercised in the context of society and should be defined in a social context. Rights
cannot be liberally exercised because “the deepest meaning of freedom is ‘freedom for’
engagement with others in society.”248 This is a point also stated by John XXIII who,
according to Hollenbach, contends that rights are not “a jumble of ad hoc claims.”249
They are mutual claims. This affirmation is plausible because if human rights are not
defined in terms of mutual human relationships there would be an endless list of rights.
Hollenbach advocates that Dignitatis Humanae provides a solution for the
problem of the foundation of rights, their mutual relationship and institutionalization. It is
concerned with interaction and relationship of persons. The assertion is realistic on the
basis of his affirmation that the concern of the arguments in the document is
. . . for the person and his or her freedom to act in society. The state may not substitute itself for
the responsible citizen. It may regulate, which is to say it may order, human interaction. For
Dignitatis Humanae, as for Pius XII, order is an ordering of freedom. Only thus is it possible to
understand the common root of both personal and social rights and to see their essential
interrelationship with each other.250

This document offers advocacy for freedom in social context. Its assertion is not
an advocacy for liberal freedom because the exercise of freedom is limited by society.
The document suggests a responsible exercise of freedom. The exercise of freedom, and
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ultimately all rights, should be within the limits of social good and demands. John Paul II
combines both views by affirming, in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, that human freedom and
respect are related to solidarity on both individual and communal levels.251 Freedom with
mutual respect is, in other words, important for solidarity.
A reconciliation of the African communitarian notion of freedom with the Roman
Catholic understanding is not a problem because the African notion is not libertarian, it
emphasizes freedom as “freedom for construction of a better community.”252 Bujo
affirms this view, in the African context, by stating a view consistently emphasized by
the Roman Catholic social doctrine as necessary for understanding human dignity and
rights. He says:
Freedom has always to keep in mind the communitarian dimension and can only be developed
within the community. Without communitarian relationship there is no identity for the African
person. Only together with others can one become a human person and achieve individual
freedom, which again should be exercised in a communitarian manner.253

A careful reading of this statement, suggests that it is rather hard for the
individualist rights notion to be reconciled with the communitarian notion and the Roman
Catholic vision. However, the problem could be resolved because both notions express
that there is individual human freedom. The main problem is how freedom is exercised
and the context of its exercise. The possibility of reconciliation of the two views of
freedom lies in the acceptance of the view that no absolute rights exist - a point noted in
the African communitarian context and less emphasized in the Western vision of
freedom. I think this is the aspect of freedom most difficult to reconcile in the two visions
of freedom and human rights.
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According to Robert Evans, “human dignity”, and I suggest not human freedom,
“is the Foundation for nurturing and protecting human rights”254 because human freedom
is just an expression, or an outgrowth, of human dignity. The self-determination of an
individual can only be authentic and dignified if it does not neglect the dignity of other
persons. Any claim for absolute self-determination is excessive. It oversteps the limits of
freedom and denies that there are actually and often conflicts of rights. Freedom needs to
be conceived as a relational reality because it is limited by the freedoms of other
individuals or community. In other words, as a right, freedom is a prima facie right. To
reconcile the liberal and the communitarian concepts of rights a balance of emphasis of
individual freedom and the freedom of others ought to be maintained. These observations
make credible Bujo’s assertion that:
Because of one’s humanity and independently of “personal conditions, political constellations and
historical circumstances,” everyone shall claim human rights, whereby one’s self-determination,
that is freedom, should be “compatible” with that of all others. Freedom which is understood in
this way could be called the only yardstick of human rights. At the same time, it is apparent that
freedom, which is shown in autonomy, does not support arbitrariness, but stresses to the highest
degree reasonable and responsible self-determination. This confirms human dignity which belongs
to each and everyone in an equal manner.255

The importance of this statement lies in one issue Bujo raises. He raises the issue
of lack of responsible individual claims in the liberal Euro-American concept of human
rights. His contention is that any claim by an individual without regard for others
contradicts the authentic meaning and demands of human rights. Rights are exercised
with the consciousness that other people also have rights and rights claimants have
obligations to fulfill towards others and themselves.
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4. COMMON LANGUAGE AS A SOLUTION
The Western individualist and the African communitarian notions of rights need
an inclusive language to articulate the notion of rights and, consequently, to eliminate
some of the prevalent conflicts between them. The two trends of human rights advocacy
have been influenced by the cultural contexts of the people. This in turn has affected their
way of thinking. The basic reason for the need for an inclusive language is that the two
trends of thought use different types of language to describe human rights. Michael
Novak observes that
two types of languages are associated with liberal individualism and communitarianism.
Liberalism’s language is the one of rights and freedom while that of communitarianism is of learnt
virtues and common good.256

These two distinct types of language create a dichotomy of vision between liberal
individualism and communitarianism. An inclusive language is needed in the formulation
of a concensus concept of human rights. This means the languages of individualism and
communalism should be modified rather than claim precedence. They should both
constitute elements of the notion of human rights.
It seems inevitable to conclude from the above arguments that the problem of
rights language can ultimately be resolved by the use of the Roman Catholic traditional
language of human dignity - transcendent worth shared by all - solidarity, common good,
subsidiarity, interdependence, transcendent and equally shared values, dual dimension of
the human person, individual and social constitution and determination of the self, and
mutual responsibility. The language of I-you, I-they or we-they ought to be replaced by
we. This last terminology is crucial because it neither excludes the individual as opposed
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to other individuals nor community or society as opposed to the individual.
5. A SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
An uncritical study of the Western individualist and the African communitarian
concepts of human rights would suggest that the two visions cannot be reconciled. A
critical analysis suggests that reconciliation of the two notions is possible. The difficulty
in reconciling them lies, first in the absence of emphasis on a common foundation - the
dignity or the inherent worth of the human person. Secondly, besides the problems of
language, understanding the constitution and determination of the self, the concept of
human freedom and the diversity of values, the problem lies in over-emphasis on only
one aspect of the human person, discrepant language, and vision of the foundation of
human rights. The two concepts of human rights, independently considered, emphasize
different but vital domains of the human person, and ultimately, human rights. These
emphases seem a dichotomy in such philosophies of human rights. Such a dichotomy
impairs the right vision of human rights. The solution for reconciling the two visions lies
in placing the Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of human
rights on par. An analysis of the two philosophies of human rights and their constituent
elements suggests a possibility for reconciliation of the two.
The Western individualist and the African communitarian concepts of human
rights are distinct but not absolutely contradictory because community is not totally
independent of the individual and vice versa. This possibility is suggested by the Roman
Catholic human rights tradition, especially as expressed in the doctrines of human dignity
or the human person as an imago Dei, the common good, responsible freedom,
subsidiarity, solidarity and interdependence. The Roman Catholic tradition of human
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rights has consistently avoided extremes of the individualist and the communitarian
understanding of rights by introducing the notion of human dignity, derived from a
common transcendent source - God - as the foundation of its arguments about human
rights. By steadily maintaining that the dignity of an individual is not detached from
occasions of encounter with other individuals in society or community, Roman Catholic
tradition suggests a unitary nature of human rights and the possibility of reconciliation of
the two concepts. The inclusive element of the two dimensions of the human person
seems to be more manifest in the African concept of human rights than in the Western
notion. Consequently, it seems easier for the African concept of human rights to fit the
Roman Catholic tradition than the Western concept. However, traces of the communal
aspect of the human person are present in the liberal concept of rights. The difference is
the degree of emphasis.
A sound concept of human rights integrates crucial concepts such as human
dignity, individual, community, liberty and equality. This assertion suggests that the
individual and the community should not be mutually exclusive. It is plausible to
conclude a treatise on the theme of reconciliation of Western and African concepts of
human rights with an inclusive definition of human rights. Relying on various definitions
of the human person, human dignity and human rights, the following definition seems
reconciliatory:
Human rights are mutually responsible, moral and just political, civil, economic, social and
cultural claims or entitlements, immunities or protections and powers of either an individual or
other individuals who constitute society, exercised for the sake of the individual and society on the
basis of their equal transcendent worth which may not be violated by any other individual or group
of individuals.257
257

This is my suggested definition of human rights arrived at on the basis of my readings about the human
person, human dignity and human rights. The definition shows that human rights are not absolute. In other
words, human rights are prima facie because they may be overridden at certain times and under certain
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From this definition and the preceding discussion, the following observations are
noteworthy for the reconciliation of the Western and the African concepts of human
rights. First, the individualist view of human rights fits well in categories of rights such as
legal or civil and contractual rights. Secondly, rights are neither egoistic nor suppressive,
neither considering the individual’s selfish interest only nor the community’s
conditioning and suppressing of individual identity only. Rather they are just claims of
individuals or the community that do not harm any individual or the community. Finally,
in terms of entitlement, rights are not a guarantee of authority for individual claims
regardless of community and vice versa. Instead, they are claims or immunities of an
individual and community in dialogue. This dialogue is founded on the transcendental
worth, the dignity of the human person, which is the common characteristic of all people.
Therefore, human dignity and the mutual relationship between the individual and the
society are vital for reconciling Western and African concepts of human rights. Although
possibilities of reconciliation are apparent, an absolute reconciliation is utopian. It is not a
guarantee because of differences in the foundations of arguments, dispositions to
reconciliation, thought patterns and contextual experiences. An inclusive vision of the
human person and human rights is grounded on the assertion that all people have equal
dignity. The assertion is founded on the idea that all people have the same origin and they
are imago Dei. The principle of imago Dei, from which the social dimension of a person
is derived, forms the basis for the reconciliation of the notions of human person and
human rights because

circumstances. However, they may not and should not be selfish claims. They should protect and provide
for the good of people.
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Personality, that spiritual side of man tends by nature to communion, in virtue of its value and
dignity and of its needs. The knowledge and love, the freedom and responsibility, that enrich and
enable the personality require relationship with other persons because personality is identical with
a creative spirit that wants to communicate whatever treasures it has. Likewise personality stands
in need of dialogue with others because of its deficiencies derived not so much from itself as of its
material individuality.258

An individual should be recognized as such, but because the individual person
shares something with other persons, one remains open to incorporate others in one’s life.
Human dignity is not an absolute personal claim; it is universal. Human rights cannot and
may never be absolute personal claims because they require similar responses or
obligations. There is something mutual and obligatory because human dignity prevails in
each case which calls for respect because of human dignity. Anderson's view of the
individual and community is significant for understanding this assertion. He says:
The determination of humanity in general as being with others does not dissolve individual beings
into corporate being, but results in a determination of humanity in its singularity as well as its
plurality. This singularity, however, is expressed as reciprocity of being of one with the other and
also, to an extent for the other.259

The individual should be recognized as a unique being, but is part of a community
and exists in community. This contention calls for acknowledgment of uniqueness in
plurality without destroying the social element or dimension of the human person.
Human person, human dignity and human rights should be viewed in the contexts of both
the individual and the community. No context should be given precedence or be more
emphasized than the other. This claim is supported by Mary Ann Glendon’s vision and
argument about rights. She says:
The exaggerated absoluteness of our American rights dialect is all the more remarkable when we
consider how little relation it bears to reality. There is a striking discrepancy . . . between our
tendency to state rights in a stark unlimited fashion and the common sense restrictions that have to
be placed on one person’s rights when they collide with those of another person.260
258
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The argument is that it is unrealistic to claim absolute individual rights. This is a
strong argument because rights are relational and as such they have both individual and
communal dimensions, none of which is to be neglected in the exercise or recognition of
rights - claims, duties and responsibilities.
There is, however, some paradox in understanding the human person and rights in
both Western-individualist and the African-communitarian contexts in relation to the
question of integral human development. Sometimes in the so-called individualistic
societies, such as in the Western world, a better degree of integral development is
attained while societies that are acknowledged as communitarian, for example African
societies, tend not to flourish integrally or cooperatively. This paradox may be resolved
through acknowledgement and esteem for the human person, and the universality of
human dignity and human rights.
C. The Importance of Reconciliation of Notions
An understanding of the human person, human dignity and rights is vital because
it is related to all people. Consequently, the principal focus of this section is the human
person, human dignity and human rights that tend to be variously conceived. An
understanding of the human person and human dignity are crucial because it is through
this understanding that human dignity can be viewed as an inalienable (God-given)
element which forms the foundation of human rights.261 This also helps people to rethink
their vision of persons, their dignity and rights, and eventually try to work for authentic
human development. They would, for example, rethink their conception of human
development and their action plans for human development. The issue of human
261
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development would not be just a matter of semantic activity, but a process of
transforming people’s thinking and practical life.
Divergent views of the human person make application of principles for integral
human development difficult because principles may be applied in a relative manner,
depending on which vision of human person, human dignity and human rights is
emphasized. For instance, a principle like that of common good may be considered of
less gravity if human person, human dignity and human rights are individualistically
viewed. Just as various principles are insufficient, independent of each other, there is a
need to reconcile the notions of human person, human dignity and human rights because
they are also defined by each other. Such reconciliation is necessary for integral human
development since it provides for integration of visions.
The communitarian views a person to be social, human dignity as shared because
of its common origin, and human rights as mutual claims and entitlements. Human rights
necessitate fulfillment of obligations and responsibilities or duties, and freedom is a
‘freedom from’, leading to a ‘freedom for’ responsible behavior or action. The
individualist views a person as an independent or distinct entity, human dignity is not
necessarily shared but individuals have their dignity, and human rights are claims to
protect the individual. Rights are more commonly considered as ‘freedom from’ binding
conditions leading to ‘personal or individual gratification’ without ‘freedom for’
obligation towards others. If there are such divergent visions of human rights integral
human development is difficult to achieve.
There is need to balance the vision of human persons, human dignity and human
rights. Any claim of ‘absolute rights’ has the negative consequences of “tending to down-

331

grade rights into mere expressions of unbounded desires and wants.” 262 Such claims arise
if there is exaggerated emphasis on the individual dimension of the human person and
freedom. The consequence is the tendency to make rights absolute as if the person
claiming rights does not affect or relate with other individuals. If both individuals and
community are seriously considered in the question of rights, there is mutual
responsibility or duty. It is here that the elements of care for others and mutual respect are
expressed. Consequently, love, justice, peace, care for the common good, application of
the principles of subsidiarity, solidarity, participation and association are possible. These
principles, virtues and conditions provide fertile ground for integral development to
flourish. For instance, local, national and global integral development can be achieved.
Exaggerated political tensions, economic differences, nationalism which breeds hatred
for non-nationals, tribalism, racism or ethnicity can be tempered. It is possible to achieve
these for at least two reasons. First, a single vision of the human person facilitates a
uniform vision of human dignity, human rights and people-related problems. Secondly, it
facilitates the vision of human rights and duties or responsibilities. It makes easy the
application of the golden rule or mutual relation and action - do unto others what you
want done to you - in terms of human rights.
VII. THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE: ITS RELATION TO OTHER DEVELOPMENT FACTORS
A. Human Dignity: The Ultimate Principle for Integral Human Development
The ultimate principle for integral human development is human dignity. Any
social teaching starting with any of the principles as most fundamental, for instance the
common good, as Todd David Whitmore advocates, is questionable because it falls short
262
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of the assertion that human dignity is the ultimate principle.263 Human dignity is the
ultimate principle because it defines the human person and it is the foundation for human
rights. Since Catholic social doctrine has the human person as its ultimate goal, principles
related to the human person are foundational. All other virtues, principles; and conditions
required by integral human development and emphasized in Catholic social teaching are
related to each other through human dignity.
In order to be fair to Whitmore, there is no doubt that the common good is a
necessary condition for the human person, human dignity and human rights to thrive, but
it is not what is pursued as an end. The common good is a means or stepping stone to
protect or promote human dignity. The right and ultimate starting point of any morally
sound social reflection and teaching and integral promotion of people is human dignity.
Any Catholic social doctrine is ultimately addressing human issues, and specifically
issues that affect the dignity of the human person. This is the indispensable principle,
contrary to Whitmore’s suggestion of the common good. Any talk about the common
good is ultimately directed to the dignity of the human person.
It is true that both common good and human dignity are transcendent principles in
the sense that they are not exclusive qualities of an individual. However, only human
dignity is the most basic or fundamental principle. This argument is better understood
from the idea that any attempt to develop or to address a social issue is an attempt to
solve problems which affect human dignity. The principle of common good creates
conditions for the success of the attempts to resolve the problems.
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Whitmore’s order of priority calls for a rearrangement which first takes human
dignity more seriously and provides the common good for the enhancement of a dignity
which already exists. If Whitmore’s argument for starting with the common good is “the
empirical observation that all persons are social,”264 which is affirmed by many authors,
he also should note that social nature of people is partly explained by what they
fundamentally share. The fundamental trait which human persons share is human dignity.
There is, at least, no ground to affirm that the common good is a quality or an experience
of every person. Human dignity remains the basic principle around which other principles
are built, either to protect it or to enhance it. It is for this reason that Milburn Thompson
argues that the dignity of the human person, realized in community, is the foundation of
Catholic social teaching and its theory of human rights. 265
The common good is a significant principle for integral human development
because it is profound in depth and breadth. It includes many other virtues, principles and
conditions which Maritain emphasizes as necessary for human thriving.266 The common
good is a comprehensive notion which appears to subordinate human dignity. It is a
necessary condition for the human person, human dignity and human rights to thrive but
it is not what is pursued in social contexts as an end. Instead it constitutes a means, a
stepping-stone, to an end, which is the promotion or enhancement of the human person,
human rights and human dignity. It is called for because human dignity demands it. This
does not contradict the assertion that common good is a relevant starting point to reflect
on human dignity. In fact the latter affirms the importance of the universality of human
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dignity. To affirm the common good is to affirm the universality of human dignity.
Two visions of human dignity suggest themselves as interesting here, and
probably account for differences in the vision of the human person. But one vision is
critical for acknowledging the universality of human dignity. These are the vision of
human dignity as ontological dignity, which is the dignity common to all human beings
by reason of their nature, and human dignity as moral dignity which is the reflection of
the “consistency with which a person lives according to moral truth.” 267 The ontological
dignity is a requirement for moral dignity because the origin of morality is God, the
ontological and the absolute being or being itself. The ontological dignity is the ground
for the intelligibility of moral dignity. From the perspective of believers the ultimate
principle is called imago Dei principle - namely, the human person created in the image
and likeness of God, the absolute being from whom human dignity or inherent worth
emanates. This idea is emphatic in the thoughts of Maritain, according to whom
the deepest layer of the human person’s dignity consists in its property of resembling God - not in
a general way after the manner of all creatures, but in a proper way. It is the image of God.268

The affirmation of the principle of imago Dei consistently points to the idea of the
universality of human dignity and its ultimate and ontological character. The principle,
therefore, weakens the moral dignity theory because moral dignity suggests a difference
between the dignity of one person and another. It denies the universality of human
dignity and suggests that human dignity is variable or dependent on variable factors.
Consequently, it defies the idea of the ultimate character of human dignity as the ultimate
principle for integral human development. It is for this reason that ontological dignity,

267
268

Williams, 156.
Maritain, 42.

335

which expresses the ultimate nature of human dignity is preferable to moral dignity as it
constitutes what may hesitantly be called human dignity.
B. The Relationship Between Human Dignity and Other Development Factors
The ultimate and uniting principle of integral human development is human
dignity because all other principles of Catholic social teaching protect or promote human
dignity, and are based on human dignity. Theological anthropology suggests that human
dignity is the ultimate expression of the divine quality, which is the ultimate principle in
the human person. Consequently, the interrelationship among the principles for integral
human development is also based on human dignity.
Succinctly, the relationship between the principles of human development may be
stated as follows: All the virtues, principles and conditions for integral human
development, namely charity, human person and human rights, participation, subsidiarity,
common good, justice, peace, preferential option for the poor, affirmative action,
solidarity and association are related to each other through human dignity. However,
charity or love also plays a vital role in the establishment of this relationship because it
“constitutes the fundamental content of what is ‘due’ to human dignity” and “it also
mediates between dignity and particular human rights.”269 Human dignity calls for love
or charity. Love or charity is expressed in the different facets of the principles for integral
development of peoples as proposed by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio.
Love, peace and justice are virtues necessary for integral human development.
One significant observation about their relationship to the common good is that they
manifest the moral dimension of what is properly called the common good. The
269
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significance of their relation is that the common good is based on “justice and moral
goodness.”270
Human rights are based on human dignity and they promote or protect human
dignity. The recognition of human rights is indicative of the recognition of human
dignity. Charity is a manifestation of the recognition of human dignity. The purpose of
justice is respect and promotion of human dignity and human rights. Justice is a sign of
respect and recognition of human dignity. It is at the same time founded on human
dignity and it also protects and promotes human rights.
Peace is pursued for the sake of human dignity. It is related to justice because
justice provides the foundation for peace. Peace is also related to love because it is the
fruit of true love or charity. It is related to solidarity, common good, and participation
because its attainment demands joint action of people.
The principle of subsidiarity, which advocates that bigger bodies should allow
smaller bodies or individuals to do for themselves what they are capable of, is a
recognition and promotion of the self-worth of individuals and smaller collectivities
because it allows them to work according to their abilities. Human person, human dignity
and human rights are also related to the principle of subsidiarity through the exercise of
human rights. Rights first suggest the existence of an individual even though rights are
relational. This also suggests that the individual always comes prior to the family or
society, and so the individual should be given precedence over any kind of collectivity.
Human constitution in the divine image and their destiny to eternal life “is the origin of
those primordial rights which political society must respect, and which it may not injure
270
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when it requires the service of its members.”271 Respect for the human person, human
dignity and human rights is suggested in the principle of subsidiarity but the individual
who is given precedence over a collectivity is also defined against the backdrop of
community or collectivity. This links the human person, human rights and human dignity
to solidarity and common good, and ultimately to subsidiarity.
Preferential option for the poor is emphasized or called for in order to protect or
promote the dignity of the poor. It is, therefore, recognition of the dignity of the
disadvantaged. Similarly, affirmative action or aggressive government intervention on
behalf of those discriminated against or disadvantaged falls into this category. Any such
intervention is for the protection or promotion of the dignity of such vulnerable people.
The principle of the common good is related to the human person, human dignity
and human rights. Common good implies that there is some shared quality among people,
and a person is a reflection of the entire community. Such a reflection or mirroring
depends on the exercise of respect for human persons, human dignity and human rights.
The common good partially consists in respect for and the promotion of human rights and
human dignity. Human dignity and human rights contribute to the common good because
human rights protect human dignity and they are founded on human dignity. They
mutually help each other and create part of the conditions demanded by common good as
necessary for human flourishing.
The principle of common good is also related to solidarity, association and
participation because all of these suggest that human dignity is recognized. Solidarity
suggests that there is inner worth in every person, and this is why people need one
271
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another to be and to become. Common good is demanded for the promotion and
protection of human dignity. Association is possible on the basis of recognition of the
value or worth of the other. Participation by all is also based on the understanding that
other people have something to offer. They should be given a chance to contribute
because they have inherent worth.
From the above observations, it is proper to make the following assertions: First,
it is important to emphasize the relationship among the different virtues, principles and
conditions for integral human development because they are dependent on each other
directly or indirectly, and thus complementary. To consider the significance of the
principles absolutely individually is to deny what Paul VI advocated and called integral
human development. Secondly, the application and functioning of each principle is
facilitated by and directed to the same purpose or goal, the protection and enhancement
of human dignity. This constitutes a reason for the assertion that human dignity is the
ultimate principle and link between all the principles. Each of the principles is based on
and directed to human dignity. All other principles, conditions and virtues necessary for
integral human development are related to each other, and should be treated as part and
parcel of one another. Thirdly, to argue that the various principles for integral human
development are independent of one another is to fragment and destroy the integrity of
the human person, human dignity, human rights and integral human development. Since
all the principles, virtues and conditions are based on and directed to human dignity, they
are related to each other through human dignity. Therefore, it is realistic to affirm that
none of the principles, virtues and conditions for integral human development is
dispensable.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The litmus test for authentic human development is how much the life, the
dignity, and rights of the human person are esteemed, cared for and protected, both
individually and collectively. This test depends on a proper understanding of the human
person, human dignity, human rights and true human development. From the
investigations in this chapter a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, there are
diverse anthropologies both secular and religious. Consequently, though difficult, there is
need for an anthropological consensus if the integral human development advocated by
Paul VI and the subsequent Catholic social doctrine is to be achieved. If there is no
unitary vision of the human person, integral human development remains utopian. Paul
VI did not provide this vision explicitly. He presumed it was already in place, but his
advocacy in Populorum Progressio suggests that there is one true way of conceiving the
human person.
Secondly, the human person is often viewed from both the liberal Euro-American
point of view and the conservative or traditional African communitarian point of view, a
representative of the vision of the less-developed nations. These visions affect not only
the vision of human rights and human dignity, but also the vision of human development.
There is, therefore, a need to seek a reconciliatory vision of the human person - a
universal notion based on the origin and nature of the human person - in order to
guarantee a possibility for integral development of people and individuals. Such a vision
should embrace the private, individual and the social or public dimension of the human
person, and the material and spiritual dimensions. The human person should be viewed as
a two-dimensional reality - as an individual entity and as a social entity. This requires

340

acknowledgment of the mutual subordination of the individual and society, which Jaques
Maritain refers to as “reciprocal subordination and mutual implication.”272
Thirdly, acknowledgment of the universality of human dignity is crucial to the
possibility of integral human development. This acknowledgment calls for a
reconciliatory notion of human dignity, which may best be described as an ontological
dignity because this description is inclusive and captures the transcendent aspect of
human worth. On the basis of the ontological character and the universality of human
dignity, integral human development may alternatively be defined as the promotion of the
human dignity of all people or the universal promotion of human dignity.
Fourthly, just as it is the case with human dignity, human rights should be
acknowledged as reciprocal claims and entitlements with reciprocal or mutual
obligations. A reconciliatory notion of human rights is also necessary for integral human
development. If such an understanding or notion of rights is lacking, the consequences
are conflicts of rights and the practical impossibility of integral human development.
Human rights have universal dimensions but not all human rights are absolute.273 If rights
are viewed as being absolute they remain subjective claims lacking a binding or
compelling force.
Fifthly, in the context of general Christian anthropology and the anthropology in
the Catholic doctrine, Populorum Progressio is less explicit in its anthropology, but its
teaching suggests an anthropology which is consonant with the rest of Christian
anthropology, especially the Roman Catholic anthropology. Paul VI's anthropology could
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not be more explicit than what Populorum Progressio suggests because his treatise was
not fundamentally anthropological. However, his concern was anthropological because
he treated the development of the human person.
Sixthly, there are obstacles in reconciling the different visions of the human
person, human dignity and human rights. These difficulties can be overcome and need to
be overcome, if integral human development is to be attained. The human person, human
dignity and human rights should be defined in terms of their origin, freedom and intellect.
Human persons are ends in themselves, not just means to an end. However, it is necessary
to observe that people are intermediate ends in relation to God because God is the only
absolute end and only God can make absolute claims.
Seventhly, the question of the universality of the notion of the human person,
human dignity and some human rights is significant for integral human development
because such a vision offers the possibility for the recognition of every person. Paul VI
never got directly into the question of the universality of the notion of the human person
in Populorum Progressio. However, his advocacy for integral human development
suggests that he understood the universal nature and dignity of the human person. Human
dignity is precisely why he advocated integral development. There should, therefore, be
universal validity to the notion of the human person, human dignity and basic human
rights. Human dignity, without exception, should be conceived universally as a valid
claim. The distinction between ontological dignity and moral dignity facilitates the
understanding of the universality of human dignity fully expressed in the ontological
dignity.
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Eighthly, it is necessary to acknowledge that there is a relationship between the
different principles for integral human development. No principle for integral human
development is independent. This relationship needs to be established, stated and
explained so that the application of one principle of integral human development is done
according to how it is related to other development principles.
Finally, it seems appropriate to suggest that the solution for reconciling the
different notions of the human person, human dignity and human rights is a holistic
anthropology. This conclusion suggests an anthropology which establishes both the
individual and social dimensions of the human person, and how they relate and operate
within the same person. It is on account of a holistic vision of the human person that there
is a possibility of integral human development. This is what Paul VI suggested as
fundamental for integral human development.
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CHAPTER FOUR
INTEGRAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN POPULORUM PROGRESSIO:
CHALLENGING UGANDA’S DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS
I. INTRODUCTION
This chapter investigates the extent of the challenges of the doctrine of Pope Paul
VI’s encyclical Populorum Progressio to Uganda’s development claims, especially since
its independence from British colonial rule on October 9, 1962. Until very recently the
World Bank and other western organizations, the protagonists in the attempts to help
African and other less developed countries to develop, often include Uganda among their
development promotion success stories, especially since 1986.1 Whether the claims
originate from Uganda or from outside Uganda they stand to be challenged by the
doctrine of Populorum Progressio and some current observations about Uganda. A recent
African survey of Uganda’s development claims contradicts and questions such claims.
Economically, Uganda is currently “classified as one of the 26 poorest countries in the
world where more than half of the households live below the poverty line.”2 According to
“the African Development Report 2005, compiled by the African Development Bank,”
Uganda is rated as “eleventh from the bottom among African countries with less than
$300 per capita.”3
The chapter attempts to establish how much the development principles, virtues
and conditions stated in Populorum Progressio have been integrated into Uganda’s
1
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development endeavors. It attempts to demonstrate successes and failures of development
in Uganda. In line with some of Paul VI’s contentions in Populorum Progressio
Josephine Bweyale strongly suggests that development in Uganda
has been deterred in all dimensions of life. Even morals have degenerated drastically, cherished
cultural values have been suppressed under the guise of modernity. One wonders whether
development means immorality and loss of one's identity.4

The above statement of Bweyale, the preceding claims and the subsequent
statements about development help one to make a provisional claim about Uganda at the
beginning of this chapter. Uganda’s development claims, since its independence in 1962,
are in many ways below the standards set by Populorum Progressio, which advocates
integral human development.
The loci of the arguments and contentions in this chapter are human life, the
human person, human dignity and human rights as consistently implied or explicitly
stated and emphasized in the three preceding chapters. These are the critical principles
around which human development revolves. All other principles of integral human
development Paul VI advocated in Populorum Progressio are grounded in and linked to
these fundamental principles.5 They shall be and should always be emphasized and
acknowledged.
Denis Goulet, a development ethicist, contends that “development is an
ambiguous term used both descriptively and normatively to depict a present condition or
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to project a desired alternative.”6 When the term development is applied to Uganda and
yields magnanimous conclusions about the development level in the country, those who
draw such conclusions have not cared about the idea that there is ambiguity in the notion
of development. This is why it is realistic to acknowledge what Goulet states as an often
mistaken notion of development.
Development is equated to aggregate economic growth, the creativity of modern institutions and
the spread of consumer aspirations and professional ambitions. In the most fundamental sense,
however, none of these is development; at best they may be social changes capable of facilitating
genuine development.7

Authentic development is not just a socio-economic and political change. Diverse
notions of true human development and the human person were advocated in history
because of uncritical considerations. It seems right to construe that “most economic or
political paradigms of development define it as a process of structural change in which
external forces shape and transform people’s lives.”8 This claim about development is
supported by the assertion that “during the early 1960s there were competing notions of
development . . . .”9 However, the question to be investigated in this chapter is partly
whether development is from without or from within a person, community (society) or a
nation.
Several authors, institutions and governments have differences of opinion
regarding the notion of human development, the requisite principles and their challenges
to, and practicability in the diverse human situations. A majority of these claims are
6
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based on limited reflections, examination and interpretations of the notion of
development and the human person. They have not adequately expressed and emphasized
the most fundamental elements for authentic human development - the human person,
human dignity and human rights. This factor ultimately makes the achievement of true
human development difficult. These assertions also suggest why integral human
development is not readily possible and cannot be practically achieved in most, if not all,
countries including Uganda.
The meaning of development has been misconstrued by many people in Uganda,
in the same way Paul VI suggested in Populorum Progressio as presented in Chapter
Three. Mahmood Mamdani suggests that there is misunderstanding of human
development in Uganda. He states:
It used to be that the analysis of a politics of underdeveloped countries was informed solely by the
dualism of the traditional and the modern . . . . The traditional was retrogressive, the modern was
progressive.10

Mamdani’s statement reflects the way development is conceived by the majority
of Ugandans. In contemporary Uganda development is also conceived differently among
the various ethnic groups as Twaddle and Hansen suggest by acknowledging that there
are “conflicting models of development which continue to influence Museveni’s
Uganda.”11
It is critical to note that the “starting point and term of reference” of the Fathers of
the Second Vatican Council “was the kind of economic development to which
governments all over the world were committed,” and because they were discontented
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with the notion of development at that time they “set out to correct and expand this
conception, to produce a more integral and balanced conception of human
development.”12 Paul VI’s doctrine of integral human development in Populorum
Progressio continued the spirit of the Second Vatican Council, and suggests a persistent
challenge to a failure of authentic development in Uganda and other countries.
Therefore, the fundamental thesis in this chapter is that the development claims in
Uganda, though not excluding other nations, fall short of authentic human development
because the notion of integral human development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum
Progressio presents pertinent challenges to the status quo in contemporary Uganda. Paul
VI’s vision of human development includes all dimensions of a person and all people.
This is evident in his core statement and challenge in Populorum Progressio.
The development of which we are speaking does not extend solely to economic growth. To be
genuine, growth must be integral, it must clearly provide for the progress of each individual and of
the whole man. In this regard an eminent specialist in the field has rightly and forcefully said: “we
do not approve of separating the economic from the human or of considering development apart
from the civilization to which it belongs. In our opinion great value is to be placed on man, each
man, each group of men and human society as a whole.13

Paul VI was convinced that, if this vision of development is seriously taken and
applied, it could transform people’s thoughts and attitudes, and eventually their practical
life situations. The transformation advocated by Paul VI is holistic. Such a vision and
transformation is particularly necessary in the Ugandan context.
The chapter is divided into three main parts. Part one treats the statement of the
problem in a general way, and in fact it is a precis of the Ugandan situation. Part two is a
12
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study of the situation of Uganda in the light of the development principles, virtues and
factors or conditions in Populorum Progressio, as treated in Chapter Two and Chapter
Three. Part three offers some recommendations for Uganda’s development.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT: A PRECIS OF THE UGANDA CONTEXT
The problematic situation in Uganda is at once realized when one traces the origin
of the name of the country. “The name of Uganda was derived from the ancient kingdom
of Buganda.”14 When the British wanted to name their protectorate which included
Buganda and other ethnic or tribal groups the Baganda wanted the country to be called
Buganda. The British refused because the dominance of Buganda was already causing
tension. Moreover, Buganda was Britain’s favored ethnic group of what would later be
called Uganda. To make it a neutral name and avoid further tension, the letter ‘B’ was
simply omitted, hence the name ‘Uganda’ emerged as the name of the British protectorate
and has remained the name of the nation to date.
Uganda became independent on October 9, 1962. Justus Mugaju suggests that at
that time it was relatively developed compared to other third world countries in the
world, but “shortly after independence, the country degenerated into tyranny, chaos,
violence, war, economic collapse and moral degeneration.”15 He states that in most of the
period from 1971-1986 there was widespread lawlessness although lawlessness pre-dates
1971. About a million people lost their lives, many were imprisoned, and some others
went into exile. This was hardly a period of human development in Uganda. It is
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necessary to note that the development referred to here is integral or authentic
development which, Alice Tuyizere, like Paul VI, has suggested “is people centred and
guided by values of peace, justice, equality and genuine participation in a democratic
way.”16 It is correct, however, to say that the critical statement regarding the situation in
Uganda is that, to a significant extent, true or integral human development has not been
evident in Uganda since its independence. This claim is supported by the following
observation by Adrian K. Ddungu which shows the recurrent situation in Uganda since
independence.
The endemic obstacles to integral development in Uganda are very well known, namely:
ignorance, disease, poverty, exploitation, instability, political manipulation, greed, selfishness
among those who control power and money, gross injustices and corruption in most sectors of
society, and the absence of a clear and correct people and life-centred vision of development.17

The national disparity of development in Uganda may also be explained by the
people’s division along “religious, regional and ethnic lines, and the colonialists’
politico-administrative way of doing things,”18 which emphasized these divisions and
made them the basis of their administration. Hence, there is need for unity in the country
and care for the common good of the people of Uganda. The dual principal elements of
Uganda’s national anthem and national motto, namely: For God and My Country and
United Free for Liberty together we will always stand, are constant reminders to the
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people about the need of their efforts towards this unity and common good.19 Integral
human development is possible in a country if there is national unity. Unfortunately,
disunity is one of the issues Ugandans have to wrestle with in order to advance together
as citizens of a nation. Since its independence, and even prior to that, tribal or regional
allegiances militated against any nationwide nationalist movement in Uganda. The people
could not come together as a consolidated or united front. There is no doubt that “deep
north-south divisions”20 have characterized the history of post-independence Uganda.
This is reminiscent in the persistent disunity in the country today. This element of
disunity which recurs in the relationships among Ugandans to date pre-dates Uganda’s
independence. Paul Gifford says of pre-independence Uganda that
in the run up to independence, the rise of any properly nationalist movement was hindered because
the Baganda, seeking a separate state, refused to countenance any proposal which treated Buganda
as an integral part of greater Uganda.21

There is a tribalism or there are tribalisms, as some would suggest, which tend to
impede national unity and, consequently, integral human development.22 The tribal
constitution of the country compounds the difficulties in applying the principles Paul VI
offered in Populorum Progressio. In treating the question of integral human development
in Uganda one deals with a heterogeneous context - “the three main groups of Eastern
Africa - Bantu, Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic - all meet in Uganda.”23 Other than this,
19
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“political parties tend to divide the people along ethnic, religious and such other nonpolitical lines resulting in unnecessary conflict,”24 a reason for which the NRM
government denied multi-party politics for Ugandans for twenty years. Such a denial
could be considered a genuine political reason because it helped to temper the political
situation in Uganda but it is opposed to democracy and freedom of association and
infringes on the human, civil, social and political rights of Ugandans.
The Commission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, on the request of the Uganda government, emphasized the gravity of the
ethnic division in the country by asserting that there is still evident division that runs
across Uganda between the Bantu-speaking people, who are mostly in the south and
central lake region of the country, the Nilo-Hamitic speaking people to the north-east of
the country, and the Nilotic-speaking people of the north, and the Sudanic-speaking
people west of the river Nile in the north of the country besides the Hamitic-related
pastoral class, the Bahima, in the western part of the country. Uganda consists of 24-34 or
more ethnic groups within these major divisions.25 It seems correct to suggest that
religion or Christianity in particular and the claims of Uganda’s so called broad-based
government have not overcome this effect of ethnic diversity.
The pluralistic context of Uganda is suggested by the diversity of cultures
exemplified in the different languages spoken all over the country and the diverse vision
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of human, social, political and economic relations and trends of thought. “There are
diverse cultural groups speaking more than thirty-three languages”26although other
authors give lower figures. The issue of language is outstanding and needs a careful and
critical consideration.27 A real mutual understanding is necessary because of the ethnic
diversity in the country. Besides the people of African descent there are people of Indian
and European descent. Although the latter two groups constitute a small percentage of the
population, they are economically and politically more influential and powerful than the
indigenous people and a significant force to reckon with.28
Kabwegyere suggests such a pluralistic social constitution by acknowledging that
there is “diversity in terms of social scale and social organization.”29 At the advent of
colonialism some of the groups were socially, economically and politically powerful
while others were not, and the social organizational structures varied in magnitude - some
were organized on a small scale while others were organized on a large scale. The
advantaged positions were further strengthened by the Colonial administration and
continued to the post-independence period. They are partly responsible for the conflicts
that started soon after independence.30 They were, principally, tensions between
superiority and inferiority. These tensions and other diversities suggest difficulties of
achievement of integral human development, a real challenge to Uganda today.
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Another problem is uneven development in and among individuals, contrary to
the consistent teaching of Populorum Progressio in the global context.31 This disparity in
Uganda’s development is the effect of overemphasis on the diversity in the country.
Consequent to the political, ethnic, religious and language diversity, there is conspicuous
tribalism, ethnic animosities, persistent political division, segregation, discrimination, and
factionalism.32 There have been and there are, for instance, still “post-independence and
political factions” like “pro-Baganda” and “anti-Baganda” 33 factions. At this point it is
important to reflect on the observation of Ali Mazrui, a renowned East African scholar.
He thinks that
ethnic pluralism, in much of Africa, tends to be among the most politically sensitive of all the
social issues. The risk of violence between tribes is at the centre of Africa’s twin-crises of identity
and integration.34

Mazrui is contending that division is imminent and unity is hard to achieve
because of ethnic differences and tensions. This is a problem to be addressed if African
nations, including Uganda, which have such characteristic tribal or ethnic diversity, are to
achieve integral development. The cattle-rustling by the Karamojong and the frequent
conflict between them and their neighbors, a problem that demands some solution, is a
testimony to this fact.35 The problem here is one of cultural differences which require
mutual education, understanding and acceptance of cultures, especially those aspects of
31
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culture which are enhancing to the human person and human dignity and promote human
development.
Considering the fact that even neighboring ethnic groups are in frequent
disagreement and tension, the issue remains serious for both the church and state to
resolve. Caution is needed here because the Karamojong, for example, may have to be
approached and treated according to their background, without imposing certain values
on them. For instance, a political system which centralizes activities is contrary to their
socio-political set up which is acephalous and even “the very word chief does not exist:
because among them nobody can impose on others his or her will.”36 Other than
corruption, injustice, ignorance and illiteracy, exploitation of the poor and the weak is
another problem, which compounds the social distinction of the elite. 37 Also featuring
clearly in Uganda are problems such as: poverty, unemployment, prejudice and social
stratification, dependence syndrome, an ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor,
recurrent wars and political instability.38 In 1994 Uganda was unable to meet 50% of its
debt service obligations because of its inadequate foreign currency earnings.39 It was
“among the world’s five poorest countries” in 1991 and in “1998 when Uganda sent
troops into DRC”40 (Democratic Republic of Congo) the economy was much affected.
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There has also been a considerable violation of human dignity and rights which
are central to Paul VI’s thoughts on human development. Uganda’s additional crucial
historical problems are: a bad education system, cultural superiority and inferiority; and
socio-economic and political confrontations and “mutual suspicions.”41 Corruption,
which is one of the aspects of NRM’s target in the ten-point program which aimed at
elimination of corruption is also a great force to reckon with and major factor yet to be
overcome in Uganda today.42 Contrary to NRM government’s initial plans to overcome
corruption, George B.N. Ayittey offers evidences of Uganda’s escalating corruption.
Acording to him the corruption in Uganda permeates all levels of Ugandan society, and
the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) recently reported that
Uganda has been ranked among the most corrupt countries of the world . . . 80 percent of business
in Uganda pays a bribe before accessing a service. . . . In the year 2000, transparency International
ranked Uganda as the third most corrupt country in the world. . . .43

While the police, judiciary and the health department are rated most corrupt
inmstitutions in the country, the World Bank Mission sent to investigate Uganda in 1998
pointed accusing fingers to President Museveni’s brother, Salim Saleh, the then Vice
President Specioza Wandira Kazibwe and, even President Museveni himself
collaborating with the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi to plunder the resources of the
DRC.44 The simplest conclusion here is that it is not a development to move from the
goal of fighting corruption to being part of the efforts for the promotion of corruption –
an evident self-defeating (contradictory) development plan or prophecy.
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Anthony J. Regan, like many authors, states that “Uganda is divided along
overlapping complex religious, ethnic, regional and economic lines.”45 Divisions and
conflicts are sometimes consequences of multiculturalism or ethnic diversity. In
themselves multiculturalism and ethnicity are not bad, as Gregory Baum contends as he
addresses a similar problem in a Canadian context.46 Neither does Paul VI condemn
cultural diversity in Populorum Progressio. He actually encouraged the promotion of
culture and respect for other cultures. However, the contentions of Paul VI and Baum
also call for a critical reflection about the problematic aspects of multiculturalism or
ethnicity, at least from a Christian perspective. Dominant groups in a diverse community
may not overlook people of the same community with different cultural, racial and ethnic
backgrounds because they all have dignity before God who created all of them. Baum
suggests this point in his critical and crucial statement, a statement still more crucial for
Uganda, a nation characterized by “religious, ethnic, regional and economic”47diversity:
Since God has created humanity made up of different peoples and different traditions, it is
intolerable that the dominant group in a country should despise the less successful groups and
make some people feel badly about their ethnic or racial background. To expose children to a
climate in which they are made ashamed of their own heritage is a grave social sin.48

Baum’s vision is socio-culturally and psychologically important for authentic
integral human development. Families, institutions and ethnic groups contribute, socially,
culturally and psychologically, towards integral human development. It is the
responsibility of all these social groups to impart to their members, that “every human
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person is distinct from every other, yet at the same time all are truly human.”49 This
responsibility depends on good and proper personality development, which is the duty of
the government, the religious institutions, families, ethnic communities and educators.
The individual human person is ultimately decisive, but this is impacted by the primary
educators and formators. Reichmann confirms this view by his affirmation that
. . . one’s racial, cultural and educational backgrounds function as a significant influence on the
kinds of decisions one will make, but they do not determine these decisions, nor is their influence
ultimately decisive.50

One of the greatest challenges to Uganda’s development claims is Peter Henriot’s
assertion that “integral human development anywhere requires integral development
everywhere.”51 This contention suggests that what Paul VI affirms in Populorum
Progressio is that a true development is not fragmented. Dorr’s reading of Populorum
Progressio rightly shows that “Paul VI provides a basis for integrating personal
development with community development and reconciling national development with
global development.”52 According to Paul VI integral human development is both
individual and communal.
Nationally, integral development calls for national participation besides other
requisite factors. Such participation is possible when there is a common medium of
communication. Unfortunately in Uganda there is the problem of language differences
because at least thirty-three languages are spoken. On March 31, 1967, because of
cultural and language diversity, Apollo Milton Obote, the then President of Uganda,
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adopted the position of the British and reiterated that English shall be the national or
official language used for education, politics and economics.53 This was an attempt to
solve the problem of language but another problem has been created, namely the problem
of a majority not knowing the national and official language of the country. This means
participation of the majority is curtailed because the official language favors the minority.
Political participation since Uganda’s independence has always been the privilege of
powerful minorities.54 This is explained by the fact that change of government has always
come through coups. A slight change developed in the 1990s when people started
electing representatives to parliament and government offices. However, whether
everybody who participated in these elections understood what it is all about is still
questionable.
Uganda’s political history shows that the country never had a smooth transition of
governments. From the time of Benedict Kiwanuka to the time of President Yoweri
Kaguta Museveni in 1986 there were successive coups.55 Each time change of
government occurred by force of arms. It has mostly been a traumatic history as some
people describe it.56 When Prime Minister Milton Obote took over power from Kabaka
Edward Mutesa, the King and President or Head of State at independence, by force of
arms in 1966, he abolished the four kingdoms - Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Buganda forcing Buganda which had an apparent federal status to come directly under the control
of the central government of Uganda. He abrogated the 1962 constitution, introduced a
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new constitution in 1967, and in 1969 he banned “all opposition parties.”57 Obote’s
popularity continued to sink among the different institutions and categories of people in
Uganda.58 One coup after another continued to occur in Uganda from then on.59
In 1971 Milton Obote was overthrown by Idi Amin Dada who expelled all Asians
from Uganda in 1972.60 He attempted to invade Tanzania and annex part of its territory in
and around Kagera to Uganda, and he was in turn overthrown by a coalition of Tanzanian
forces and Ugandan exiles who formed themselves into the Uganda National Liberation
Army in 1979.61 A provisional government was established under the Military
commission headed by Paul Mwanga who was assisted by Yoweri Museveni. Yusufu
Lule and Godfrey Binaisa were leaders shortly: each one was overthrown, eventually, to
pave way for Milton Obote to return to power when rigged elections were held in 1980,
and Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) party under the presidency of Milton Obote, was
declared the winner. He soon was overthrown by the army under the leadership of Tito
Okello-Lutwa in 1985.62
While Tito Okello-Lutwa attempted negotiation with the opposition forces, the
most significant of which was National Resistance Army/National Resistance Movement
(NRA/NRM), the latter refused, but pretended to be in favor of the negotiations then
taking place in Nairobi, Kenya.63 As talks continued the NRA was making its way to
Kampala, the capital city, to capture power, and they did so under Yoweri Kaguta
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Museveni in 1986 when they captured Kampala and dissolved the Military Council.64
The NRM established what it called a broad-based government with
representatives of all groups; elections were held in 1989 to the Constituent Assembly,
dominated by Museveni’s supporters, to write a constitution, which was published in
1993 and promulgated in 1995, and the constitution allowed only no-party democracy.65
This was actually a one-party system of government, and that one party was NRM.
Technically, all other parties were banned and there was no multi-party democracy for at
least 20 years. There has been political unrest and instability, with its brutality, in the
north and northeastern part of Uganda during these twenty years, and it is likely to
persist.66
The political system used in Uganda since independence shows similar patterns
with just slightly modified differences. There has been consistent failure of democratic
governance, a dictatorship of one kind or another, and expression of self-interest. This
claim can be substantiated by the ardent request and plea of the Catholic Bishops of
Uganda in their appeal to the members of parliament when they say: “the ‘self-seeking
politics’ that has characterized Uganda’s politics for several years since independence
should be shunned.”67 This is not just a statement defying the past. It is also addressing
the currently prevailing situation in the politics of Uganda.
Prior to independence, the economy of Uganda was flourishing but not controlled
by the natives in much the same way the political system was not in their control. It was a
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situation where much of the economic destiny of Ugandan nationals was not in their own
hands. There was simply no economic and political participation of the indigenous people
or it was minimal. Paul Gifford has properly stated this case.
Within the Protectorate, Indians - normally called ‘Asians’ and originally brought in to build the
East African railway - were encouraged and assisted to engage in business and trade; Africans
received no such assistance. Asians were given a place on the Legislative Council, something
denied to Africans until after the Second World War when Britain had accepted that
decolonization was inevitable.68

From the point of view of education in Uganda, for a long time too much
emphasis has been laid on academic education instead of practical training. Much of the
education people have received is not related to practical or actual daily life situations
and needs, although recently emphasis is being made on the significance of vocational
institutions and the study of practical Sciences.69 This more theoretical and less practical
system of education has been a persisting pattern since colonial times.
In conclusion, the principal factors impeding or causing development difficulties
in Uganda are: cultural diversity, social-economic and political variations, religious views
and general disunity. All of these may be explained in terms of limited anthropology.
These factors have often made it difficult to implement or apply the necessary virtues,
conditions and principles for integral human development. The lack of application of
these virtues, conditions and principles primarily presents pertinent challenges to the
Church, the state, and to individual citizens and groups of people living in Uganda,
although the challenges go beyond this limit.
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III. CHALLENGING UGANDA’S DEVELOPMENT CLAIMS: THE CHOICE BETWEEN
CONFRONTATION AND MUTUAL RESPECT
The overarching challenge of Paul VI’s teaching in Populorum Progressio to the
socio-economic, religious and political context of Uganda, according to Benedict XVI,
was “the scandal of underdevelopment as an outrage against humanity,”70 and the very
concept of authentic development, which he articulated in the document. The principal
and durable challenge is the respect for human dignity. True development is the moral
growth of the human person and all possible dimensions of growth for each and
everybody – a concept whose practical manifestations are lacking in Uganda, even
spiritually, but also socially, politically, economically and culturally due to
marginalization of some sectors of the population.71 The fundamental challenge is,
therefore, the respect for the human person, human dignity and human rights expressed in
the complete growth of an individual and all people. This challenge is manifest in the
different facets of human life. Addressing Uganda’s development problems Adrian K.
Ddungu reaffirms Paul VI’s idea of development.
Integral development is opposed to dichotomized development. The former aims at enabling all
men and women to be inspired, directed and assisted in developing, as fully as possible, in various
dimensions of life: educational-physical, socio-personal, moral-cultural, economic-political,
spiritual-religious. Integral development should appropriately take into account the fact that a
human being is made up of body, soul and mind. To develop integrally, people need to plan for all
their material and spiritual needs in an holistic manner, without undue imbalances.72

Ddungu’s contention is clearly the reiteration of the doctrine, especially the
definition of true development in Populorum Progressio. He suggests that both Church
and State leaders should serve people without dichotomizing their lives - without
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separating the spiritual and the material dimensions of the human person. This is one of
the general challenges of the document. However, the document challenges the Ugandan
context in the various facets of the life of the nation as explained below.
A. The Anthropological Challenge: The Challenge of Mutual Respect
The main challenge here is to respect and protect people’s dignity. In dealing with
the anthropological challenges we deal with the most crucial elements of the question of
human development. Human development is directly related to the human person who
has dignity, free will, rationality, rights and eternal destiny.73 The gravity of the
anthropological challenge ought to be seen in the light of peace, the fact that the
anthropological challenge underlies all other development principles, virtues and
conditions suggested by Paul VI, and finally the situation in which people of Uganda as
citizens of the secular society and members of the Church live. In relation to issues
affecting the people of Uganda the Executive of the Association of Major Superiors of
Religious Institutes in Uganda (AMSRIU) made the following challenging statement
about the situation of the Internally Displaced People (IDP) in the war-torn northern
Uganda and northeastern Uganda:
This appalling situation in the camps is a crime against humanity! It is a big challenge to each and
all of us. We have to do all that is possible to bring it to an end.74

The challenge in this case is not only the need to recognize the human person,
human dignity and human rights but also to respect them. The human person, the respect
for human rights, and ultimately human dignity with which every person is gifted by
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God, whatever background the person comes from, should be acknowledged and
respected. These areas constitute the challenge of mutual respect which Populorum
Progressio consistently suggests, and which was emphasized in Chapter Three of this
work. Similarly, in a global context, Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest that
it is significant to have an appropriate anthropology in order to have the possibility of an
integral human development.
One hopes for the advent of an era in which an authentic world community can be created in
which the dignity of each one and the fundamental rights of all are recognized and in which every
nation understands that it cannot think of its own welfare without interesting itself in the welfare
of all nations.75

Human dignity and human rights are the consistently challenging anthropological
principles for integral human development. Mutual respect for them is tantamount to
mutual human development. In the Uganda context we are dealing with what the 1995
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda also clearly acknowledges as being beyond the
control of any person when it affirmed that “fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual are inherent and not granted by the state.”76 While the constitution aptly
affirms the fundamental character of the human person, rights and dignity, the challenge
to the government is to help people to protect and enhance these elements.
One specific challenge, among others, to the Uganda government and to the
Church is the 2000 Kanungu tragedy77 where people of a religious sect, the Movement
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for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (MRTCG), burnt to death and the
government issued arrest warrants for the culprits; but after more than four years, or more
now, no arrest has been made.78 The local governments in the areas where the movement
had establishments were not negligent or careless about the people, their rights and
dignity. Indeed they attempted to make arrests of the propagators of this religion on
discovering that they were promoting dangerous ideas but the arrests were condemned by
higher government officials.79 This is one of the significant anthropological challenges to
the citizens, and above all the government of Uganda, which has the duty to protect the
citizens from being harmed. A government that cares about its citizens should have
prevented such a tragedy by enforcing laws through national security agents. It should
have pursued this case and informed citizens of the findings. Both the Catholic church
and the Protestant church made vain attempts to thwart the growth of the religious
movement.80 Their efforts needed to be supplemented by the government. This is where a
healthy Church-state relationship is invaluable to resolve issues affecting people’s dignity
and rights.
The constitution of Uganda suggests that the Ugandans are equal in some regard
and should recognize each other as such. Vincent Okot Oburu also speaks to this effect in
an attempt to explain the role of the Church in promoting national unity in Uganda. Unity
can only be attained if there is mutual recognition among the citizens of Uganda.
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Many Ugandans have not fully recognized people from other tribal or ethnic groups, as being
fellow citizens, with equal rights and duties: in the social, political and economic life of the
country.81

The above statement is consonant with what Ali A. Mazrui construes as a crucial
challenge to Africans and others, including African intellectuals. It is what he calls selfcontempt which must be conquered prior to recognition of this invaluable human dignity.
The African can begin to recognize human dignity in a fellow African if (s)he can
recognize and appreciate her/his own dignity and culture with the values that it contains
and reach out for a self-accepting attitude. Mazrui emphasized this issue of mutual
respect for human dignity and culture in the following words:
This in turn requires the growing toleration of some of the least respected, in western terms, of
those aspects of indigenous culture. If an African intellectual can begin to concede dignity to the
physical nakedness of the Karimojong men, or to the use of red ochre on the skin of the Masai, or
invocation of supernatural forces to help determine election, the African intellectual is on his way
to transcending his own cultural self-contempt.82

The ordinary African and African intellectuals ought to acknowledge that all
people have dignity and overcome degradation of their own cultures. Respect for human
dignity and culture are at the center of Mazrui’s advocacy. The Karamojong,83 who are
pastoralists, are some of the sectors of Ugandan population that have not developed
much. They are very much like their Kenyan and Tanzanian counter parts, the Masai,
who are also pastoralists and some of the least developed groups in Kenya and Tanzania.
Mazrui actually construes that this fact about these people and their culture does not
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constitute them into people with less dignity than the so called developed ethnic groups.
The greatest challenge here is to respect culture and recognize human dignity, human
rights and the person of every Ugandan and of people beyond Uganda.
Another principal anthropological challenge is to recognize a “common
understanding of man and woman, and of their dignity, human rights and needs, and their
final destiny.”84 The anthropological dimension of the human problem, therefore,
concerns the way human persons view a human being. This is the central challenge in
every human relationship. When the human person is misunderstood and there is no
consensus in the definition of the human person, conflicts are inevitable, and integral
human development is at stake. It was essentially the question of slavery which violates
the essential aspects of the human person, which caused the troublesome split and civil
war in one of the world’s greatest nations - USA - for about a decade beginning in
1860.85 This further shows the gravity of the anthropological challenge.
The violation of human dignity is a universal problem, and Uganda is not an
exception. In the Uganda context this problem is aggravated by the diversity of ethnicity
in the country. The different ethnic groups have their own philosophies and world vision,
and in particular unique visions of the human person. This accounts for the variation of
social and political relations among the ethnic groups in Uganda.
The most dominant ethnic group in Uganda is the Bantu group who constitute
over fifty percent of Uganda’s population.86 Although there are different names of Bantu
tribes, this ethnic group covers the area in the whole of southern Uganda, parts of eastern
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Uganda, and western Uganda. They constitute a group that has a distinct cosmological
and anthropological vision though similar in many ways to the ethnic communities that
occupy the north-western, northern, north-eastern and some eastern parts of Uganda
because there is some shared vision of the human person.87 However, there are variations
in the vision of the human person in the context of the entire human family. In light of
this fact one of the challenges of Populorum Progressio to the Uganda context is the
vision of the human person. To illustrate this point in the context of Uganda it is relevant
to consider two examples, the Bantu vision of the human person, and that of the Lugbara
of West Nile, which are not extremely different from the vision of other ethnic groups in
Uganda and African ethnic communities.
Placide Tempels studied the Bantu, not those in Uganda but the Baluba of the
Belgian Congo (Current Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC) in Central Africa, who
are akin to the Bantu of Uganda. According to him the study was exclusively from the
Bantu philosophy of life, not from a western point of view. He asserts that among the
Bantu a person, muntu, is a full, lofty and vitalistic force or personal force, part of
creation, in relation with family, clan brethren, descendants, patrimony of his/her land,
creation and God but above created material or visible beings, and a causative agent that
exercises vital influence.88 This description of the human person shows the relational and
social character of the human person. According to Tempels the Bantu think that this
personhood grows or increases with acquisition of material goods and diminishes with
loss of possessions.89 The reason is that the person is a vital force and this force depends
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on what the person owns, contrary to the strong notion that human dignity is invariable
under all circumstances. This notion of the human person is, therefore, questionable; it
contradicts Christian anthropology which upholds the view that human dignity is not
contingent upon any temporal circumstances or factors.
The muntu is an individual being distinct from other people. The marks of
distinction are the native name of the person which expresses the “very reality of the
individual” and the “visible appearance”90 of the person. These traits of a person are
shared by other ethnic groups. However, these definitions of the human person were,
initially, limited to each ethnic group as Benezet Bujo suggests, and I would like to agree
with Bujo that there has been a development in the vision of the human person in most
African contexts. 91 This suggests that the extension of the term person beyond blood or
tribal relationship with the same connotation was a later vision of the human person
which was probably influenced by Christianity and western philosophy.
Often those who belong to ethnic communities other than one’s own are
considered foreigners and at most not considered as human as those in one’s ethnic circle.
Consequently, they may be treated differently from those who belong to one’s ethnicity.
This is the probable explanation for strife, discrimination or segregation in African
communities including that of Uganda. For example, the traditional Lugbara of
northwestern Uganda categorized some people as juru or anyi’ba, foreigners, which
means one who does not fit exactly in the immediate definition of people related to
oneself by blood, though considered ba or person worthy of respect but not exactly the
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same as the immediate people.92 This suggests that the human person is defined
according to the degree of the relationship of the person being defined and according to
the one defining the human person.
Many ethnic groups in Uganda, and elsewhere, view the human person in a
similar way, meaning that they view the human person in limited contexts. These ways of
conceiving the human person contribute to the preferential treatment of people and
constitute problems in understanding and achieving integral human development. The
definition of the human person according to ethnicity or relationship contributes to a
fragmented vision of the human person. The various visions are limited to the ethnic
groups. Historically, this can be explained by limited world-views that people had
because the world basically consisted of their immediate environment. Their world-views
never went far beyond their ethnic groups. This is why persons tend to be those
belonging to one’s ethnic community.93 Consequently, all others are either less-persons
or non-persons. They may be treated fully humanely or less humanely. This is a problem
and challenge to national solidarity, the common good, unity and integral development. It
is an aspect of the human problem to be addressed, especially by government, religious
leaders and educational institutions in the country.
One of the principal concerns of colonial states, including Uganda, emerging from
the colonial era was “nation building” and “national integration” but once this was
achieved the problem after independence was “the elite/mass gap.”94 Kabwegyere rightly
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affirms Binder’s contention that the key issue for national integration in developing
nations is “the relationship between a modernizing elite and a traditional mass; the point
being that there exists a gap which must be bridged if countries are to be integrated. To
him national integration requires that the gap be closed.”95
Uganda has been a victim of this kind of elite-traditional mass gap since
independence and continues to be subject to such a situation. There is a gap between the
elite who constitute the minority and the majority of the population that is not formally
educated or not educated at all. This gap has continued to create tension between the
traditional vision of life and the modern vision, which is often considered a foreign vision
or life-style. Consequently, the notion of human development is affected too. It is also
here that there is a failure, in the Ugandan context, of the right notion of human
development in the light of Populorum Progressio which advocates the promotion of
cultures and different cultural values emphasized in chapter two of this work. The
principal argument for this assertion is that every culture has some value and no culture
may claim total superiority over other cultures. Each ethnic group and culture should be
considered in its own context and right.
The cultural issue calls for discretion. Some aspects of two cultures may not be
able to blend well while other aspects may be able to blend well, but no culture should be
branded and dismissed as absolutely irrelevant, as advocated by Paul VI.96 The crucial
social challenge here is the possibility of integration of different cultures, which demands
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a critical study.97 This is a process that facilitates the growth of solidarity in the country,
and ultimately solidarity with cultures outside the country. An adaptation of cultures is
insufficient to build social bonds between people because it may not facilitate a unitary
vision of the human person, human dignity and human rights. In light of the teaching of
Populorum Progressio Uganda’s plural cultures, tribal or ethnic diversityare real
challenges to integral growth.98 The document never mentioned tribalism as a bad
practice but in the global context it considered racism and exaggerated nationalism as
opposed to integral development. However, by interpretation and inference, tribalism
which displays the negative elements of exclusivity and discrimination, characteristic of
racism and nationalism, belongs to the latter categories. As Kabwegyere rightly suggests,
it is an “enemy to national integration.”99 In Uganda it is perhaps this fact which accounts
for the extant difficulties in social interaction, inappropriate mutual ethnic visions and
discrimination in economic and political activities, except where there are personally
vested interests.
One of the major challenges in the political field is the role of government to
protect the citizens, to promote all the people of the nation and protect or promote their
rights and dignity. Promotion of justice and peace, and the implementation of affirmative
action and preferential option for the poor all contribute positively to human
development. They are significant indicators that the anthropological challenges to
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human development are being addressed. A political system that does not provide for
such possibilities and the care of people is called into question because it neglects human
needs and thwarts development. This has been and still is a challenge to all governments
of Uganda since its independence in 1962.100 There is discrimination on the basis of
tribes or ethnic communities whenever a new government takes over, of course often by
force of arms meaning that there were/are often regional, economic, religious and
political marginalization or discrimination, and human rights abuses.101
Currently in the northern part of Uganda the socio-economic and political
atmosphere is not supportive to the respect for human persons. This is evident, not only
in the twenty-year old ongoing war in the region but also in the fact that many people are
living in dehumanizing conditions created by the dual fighting factions.102 The challenges
to be addressed here are to help both sides to understand and accept the values and
dignity of human life and the consequential significance of peace. The process calls for
cooperation from both the indigenous people and those supporting the course of peace. If
no change is made it is either because the indigenous people are not developed enough to
understand the value of their dignity as persons, or they are intentionally suppressed. In
either case it is also the duty of the state and the Church to perform, though the Church is
doing the best according to her capacity. The two institutions need to ceaselessly address
issues like arbitrary arrests, detentions without court trials, and obstruction of justice.
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Another critical anthropological challenge to religious institutions, the
government, and cultural and social sectors such as education, is to explain and help
people understand the human person, human dignity and human rights. It is the challenge
to educate people about these basic values or principles. The mutual relationships
between people regardless of religion, ethnic or racial origin and political affiliations
needs to be understood if people are to respect one another. Education about the human
person and human dignity ought to be a continuous pastoral imperative for religious
institutions as much as it should be a priority in socio-cultural, educational and political
institutions.
In the field of religion a number of issues also require attention. Religion or the
Church has a duty, like the state, to protect and promote the human person, human rights
and human dignity. There is no doubt that the Church in Uganda has consistently and
frequently taken this responsibility very seriously. This is evident, especially in the case
of the Catholic Church, in the 18 pastoral letters that the Catholic bishops of Uganda have
written since independence, beginning with Shaping Our National Destiny which was
issued on the occasion of Ugandan independence from the British, October 9, 1962, to
Towards a Democratic and Peaceful Uganda Based on the Common Good published in
November 2005.103 For example, one of their most extensive pastoral letters, namely
With A New Heart and A New Spirit, which was issued in 1986 at a very critical time in
the history of Uganda, devoted “nearly a whole chapter on the need for respecting human
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rights”104 and on the whole covers many human issues which are critical, even, to Uganda
of today. They present enduring challenges to the political system in Uganda, and have
been the reason for some of the improvements in Uganda's economic and political
systems in the past few years. However, one serious question to ask, and a retrospective
challenge to the Uganda Catholic hierarchy, is why there was a lapse in their address of
national social issues from the time of the pastoral letter Shaping Our National Destiny,
published in 1962, to 1979 when Reshaping Our Nation was written.105 This was a lapse
of seventeen years of not addressing Uganda’s intense socio-economic and political
problems, during very stormy years in the history of Uganda.
Religious institutions also stand to be challenged where there is no respect for
human life. Killing or fighting is sometimes encouraged by some religious leaders.
Outstanding examples are the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments
of God (MRTCG), a break-away religious sect which, on March 17, 2000 and earlier,
killed at least 893 people in the name of an apocalyptic vision that was to be realized
imminently.106 This and armies like Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) of Alice
Lakwena and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Joseph Kony that claim to fight for
the moral, political and economic rehabilitation of the people in the name of the Lord are
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serious challenges to religious institutions.107 They show that to some extent religion is a
failure. They question how effective religion is in the life of our people.
There are different religious denominations, and it is not infrequent to notice
religious discrimination. In fact, just before independence Ugandans were already divided
along religious lines because the main political parties were formed along the lines of
religious denominations.108 The questions to grapple with are two. Either the teaching of
the church or different religious denominations has bounced against people who call
themselves believers or Christians, but actually they are not, or the teaching has been
inadequate, especially about human dignity, its universality and equality. This failure is
seen not only when different religious denominations encounter each other. It is also
evident in politics and general social interaction involving the same people who are
believers. The anthropological challenge is tied to the challenges of solidarity, justice and
the common good, and to all other development principles, virtues and conditions or
factors. In a context like Uganda they should always be addressed simultaneously.
One of the greatest challenges to the church in Uganda is to help people express
God’s love for all people. This love for people is partly expressed through the church’s
active participation in fighting unjust social structures, economic organizations and
political systems that humiliate people and subject them to misery. This is a constituent
dimension of the church’s true mission and what makes the church relevant to
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humankind.109 This perspective suggests that one of the significant challenges to religious
institutions, the government and individuals, especially Christians, is to remain relevant
to people by protecting their fundamental rights and helping them to meet their needs.
B. Universal and National Charity: The Challenge of Authentic Love
At the outset it is important to note that, similar to human dignity, the issue of
charity or love is a crucial one and ties together all other development principles Paul VI
advocated in Populorum Progressio. What ties charity and human dignity together is the
fact that they are directly related to the human person. Although both justice and charity
are compelling virtues, charity must always come first because every person is “the
object of charity.”110 Benedict XVI re-emphasized the centrality of love, asserting that in
a global context and interdependent world, economic, social or political projects cannot
substitute “that gift of self to another through which charity is expressed.”111 In other
words, the sincere gift of oneself and one’s talents is the climax of the expression of love.
The testimony to this is God’s sacrificial self-gift in the person of Jesus Christ. A brief
treatise of the theme of charity anticipates the fact that the treatise on virtues, conditions
and other principles for integral development touches the question of charity.
Universal charity is a love “without discrimination of tribe, religion and
nation.”112 This claim is consonant with the theological summary of Paul VI's advocacy
for integral human development. Integral human development should be manifested in
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physical and public love. This is possible if individuals are receptive to all people of
different backgrounds, regardless of mutual or personal knowledge and evenness of
development in the country. The challenge to Uganda is the observable continued
segregation and discrimination, initiated by its successive leaders, with consequent
irregularity in development and social interaction.113 In a context such as Uganda the
challenge of love is compounded by what David M. McCarthy suggests as true love.
According to him "love requires that we will what is good."114 Love is not only an
emotional feeling, it is a duty and expressed in a rational or deliberate good action. In the
context of Uganda its principal challenge is that people deliberately act to stop
segeragation and discrimination. This, in other words, should be the good they will - love
should have what McCarthy calls the "critical elements of willing and the good."115
McCarthy suggests that it is the rational and deliberate character which makes
love an authentic human act and thus gives it its moral dimension. True love ought to be
viewed against the backdrop of "both doing good and having good reason for what we
should do."116 This contention suggests that much as it is difficult to define love, true love
can be seen expressed in genuine action that is gratifying to both the agent of love and the
object of love. The challenge for Ugandans is to grasp this fact and appreciate it in order
to show national and universal charity.
One of the greatest challenges of the call to universal charity is the questioning of
people’s apathy. This challenge is directed in a special way to Catholics, and other
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Christians, because they constitute the majority of Uganda’s population and contributed
much to the formulation of the motto of the country – “For God and My Country”.117
Showing love in the most critical or difficult moments is indicative of the authenticity of
love. Patriotic citizens stand by their agonizing fellow citizens in times of trouble. The
political situation in northern and northeastern Uganda reveals the contrary. Parts of the
country have quietly watched these affected regions suffer for many years. In a bid to
break this silence John Baptist Odama had this to say:
I want to remind the indifferent world that the people of Northern and North-Eastern Uganda,
Acholi, Langi, Teso, Karamojong, Lugbara, Madi, Alur, and many others subjected to such
atrocities are part of Uganda and the whole humanity who should enjoy equal rights, responsibility
and dignity. 118

The named peoples constitute a segment of the country whose people are of
Nilotic and Nilo-Hamitic origin, distinct from the rest of the Ugandans, most of whom
are Bantu speaking people. Even if the statement of Odama were not broadly interpreted,
it is still tantamount to the assertion that there is lack of national charity. This challenge is
still more compelling to Catholics who, denominationally, constitute the majority of the
population of Uganda – 40 to 50 percent of the population.119 The challenge is prompted
by the apathy manifest in the silent observation of many who do not care about what
some parts of the country are suffering. This claim is supported by the observation of Ian
Legget:
There is remarkably little national concern about the atrocities that are being perpetrated against
the people of the north, and an apparent lack of understanding among southern Ugandans about
the sheer scale of the humanitarian and economic crisis that has evolved.120
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This statement shows the gravity of the situation in northern Uganda, a portion of
one nation. The challenge of the statement is again compounded by the reality of the
“predominantly Christian character or constitution of Uganda’s population.”121 Uganda is
a nation that boasts of being at least 86% Christian (48% Catholic and 38% Protestant)
and a religious or a God-loving nation expressed in Uganda’s motto: “For God and My
Country.”122 Where is the love of God and concern and care for fellow children of God in
this case? Uganda is a nation that proclaims, partly, in its national anthem:
. . . united free for liberty, together we’ll always stand. Oh Uganda the land of freedom, our love
and labour we give, and with neighbours all, at our country’s call, in peace and friendship we’ll
live.123

The national anthem rightly expresses, in resonance with Christian anthropology,
de facto the end of true love as "sharing our lives" with others and our "fulfillment in the
love of God."124 Just considering the fact that citizens of Uganda are spread from north to
south and from east to west of the country, an attitude of indifferrence as stated (above)
by Legget is one of the greatest challenges to the government and the religious leaders of
Uganda, and to every Ugandan, in the context of the true end of love. It ought to be
overcome. In light of the stated end of love, the motto and the national anthem have no
meaning or they are just decorations and words to be proud of but not lived in real life.
The Catholic church in particular has tried to be an instrument of love in many
different ways, though it needs to do more. For instance, the efforts of the Uganda
Catholic bishops to establish the Centenary Rural Development Bank (CERUDEB). This
is one of the best serving, if not actually the best serving local bank in the country. It
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serves people without discrimination in terms of employment and economic sevices,
expressed in its motto: “Unite, Love and Serve.”125 This is a symbolic and traditional
Catholic expression of universal love besides what the Catholic church practices in other
services such as schools, orphanages, hospitals or health care services and other areas.
Political representation should be a testimony of true and national or universal
love in the country, but this again is a failure. True love shows itself in many ways but
the challenges of true or universal love are seen in the results when there is universal
love:
social life will be peaceful, mutual help will be given more freely, dialogue and consequent mutual
understanding will pave way to friendship, to a real culture of heart and civilization of love. Such
love, it is abundantly clear, cannot be confined to attraction towards others, nor simply to good
feeling. These may be only the beginning of the process towards real love. Real love is above all a
decision of the will controlled by reason.126

The real challenge of love to anyone is to build a civilization or a culture of love.
This is something not forced upon a person or groups of people. It is a deliberate action
consequent to a reflection and a realization of the value of people and the obligation to
love them. Such a love is indiscriminate, goes beyond any borders, shows in mutual
recognition and peace.
The challenge of charity or love is the invitation to love indiscriminately, meaning
that love be extended even to one’s enemies as Jesus Christ taught.127 In addressing the
problem of socio-economic and political instability in northern Uganda, John Baptist
Odama had this to say to the people of the region about the mission of the Church:
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Every Christian faithful and every God-fearing person knows that our faith is a mission we are to
accomplish. This mission for us is strictly peaceful, loving and respectful of the dignity in human
persons of all walks of life.128

The reason for this advocacy is simply the imperative nature of the Christian
mission because of the centrality and universality of human dignity. Universal love is,
therefore, called for because of universality and equality of human dignity. Besides this
“love is the badge for all Christians” and its “social expression”129 is solidarity. Teaching
or preaching and practicing charity is one of the principal functions of religion. There is
no doubt that church or religious leaders often like to do acts of charity.130 In fact the
practical expression of charity in the church is evident in the social services that the
church renders through education, hospitals, orphanages, baby care homes, homes for the
elderly and the blind. However, one other challenge to the church in preaching and living
charity is that it should always take into account the socio-economic and political
situations in which people live. It is good to preach universal love but it is also significant
to let the masses know their rights and the injustices that are perpetrated by other people
against them; if the church preaches love without considering different circumstances,
she can also prepare ground for injustice, abuse of human rights and human dignity.131
The attempts the Uganda Catholic Bishops’ Conference made to resolve the crisis in
Kabale Catholic diocese symbolized their collegial spirit and love for each other and the
church in Uganda.132 The efforts of the bishops towards resolving the problem also shows
that they were determined to thwart the cause of injustice resulting from abuse of human
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rights and human dignity. They would not have acted immediately to resolve the issues if
this were not the case.
C. Universal Destiny of Natural Resources: The Challenge of Private Ownership
The study in chapter two treated the basis on which Paul VI argued about
ownership of property. It spelled out that his teaching was founded on the creation
theology. God created the earth and its resources for the good of all people, and this
mandate was given to the first people when God told them to “be fruitful, multiply, fill
the earth and subdue it.”133 The articulation of the principle of ownership of property as
indicated in the chapter suggested that ownership takes into consideration the work of the
property owner and the needs of those who gravely lack the basic resources for their
livelihood. This understanding of ownership is based on the interpretation and meaning
of the quotation from the book of Genesis. Concisely, the text suggests that the mandate
or command to conquer the earth through work is a fulfillment of a divine precept, and
even though people earn property by their labor they should not forget that they are only
God’s ambassadors and custodians – they are stewards of divine property originally
intended for the benefit of all.134
When property owners have met their basic needs and have extra resources, the
universal destiny of the resources of nature demands that they help those who do not have
resources to meet their basic needs out of the surplus. Much as the owner of the goods or
natural resources has the right to own these goods by virtue of having worked for them,
(s)he has at the same time a duty to meet other people’s needs after meeting her/his own
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because these resources are meant for the good of all people according to divine design.
However, if the person lacking the basic goods neecessary for living is capable and has
possibilities for acquiring them, but is negligent or simply lazy, the application of the
principle should be made with care and caution. Such persons could be denied such
support except when in danger or under threat to their life. Merely supporting the needy
without critical consideration of their abilities and possibilities available to them would
also contradict participation, solidarity and the common good to which everybody should
contribute.
The principle of ownership of property challenges every citizen to live in a spirit
of universal charity, solidarity, and preferential option for the poor. One of the issues
raised by this principle is how socio-economic and material resources of a nation are used
or shared among the citizens. Some critical observers have suggested that
if the religious, political, and ethnic divisions which have proved to be so destructive in Uganda
are to be reduced and replaced with a stronger sense of nationhood and national identity, the role
of economic and social developments as a means of minimizing differences rather than
accentuating them will be critical.135

The principle touches the issue of human equality and socio-economic justice. It
challenges the church, government and the people of Uganda about the poverty of certain
people and parts of the country, and the widely-growing gap between the rich and the
poor. The claimed economic growth of Uganda does not mean that all Ugandans are
beneficiaries of the currently prevailing policies and resources. It is noticeable that “there
has been growth in inequality, and an increasingly common feeling that some people and
some parts are doing very nicely, while others are being left behind.”136 An example for
citation is the comparison between Karamoja or any other place in the north and north135
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east and Kampala in the south or any other lake region area such as Mbarara in the West
of the country.137
Any visitor to Uganda who has the opportunity to go to the north, as well as to spend time in
Kampala and the fertile crescent around Lake Victoria, would be struck by the remarkable contrast
between the two. Kampala and the towns of the south and west are thriving. Business is good, and
the signs of growth and wealth are evident all around: in the houses being built, the goods
available in the shops and markets, and the number of vehicles on the roads. Kampala is one of the
safest and most pleasant cities in Africa. Travel north for four to five hours to the town of Gulu,
however, and the landscape changes completely. Gulu has experienced growth in the last ten
years, but it is an expansion of cheap investments and hurried construction, signs of flight from an
unsafe and increasingly abandoned countryside.138

The quotation above evinces the disparity of socio-economic and political
development in Uganda. Gulu is referred to here because it is one of the outstanding areas
affected, similar situations prevail elsewhere in the country. All of these support the
claim that there is no integral development in Uganda.
The problem of private ownership of property in Uganda dates back to the early
1950s when cooperative unions and other business organizations were established but
they were dominated by the rich farmers “who controlled the committees and thus the use
of surplus funds”139 and grossly mismanaged corporate resources. They denied poor
people the right to use resources of nature. This behavior contradicts the limited nature of
the right to own private property as espoused in chapter two.
One of the principal challenges of the right to ownership of property is to ignore
the fact that ownership of land is an ownership of the source of human livelihood. The
problem of ownership of land was aggravated by the 1975 Land Reform Decree, which
created opportunities that undermined customary ownership of land, especially in
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northern and northeastern Uganda, which was formerly considered Crown Land in the
colonial times and later called Public Land after independence.140 The consequences of
this decree were undesirable and resented by those who are educated about the value of
land because the “customary land tenure system has been seriously eroded by the middle
class gaining advantage over the ‘ordinary people’.”141 The system opened the way for
the rich who can afford to buy land from the poor and to do so at will. Such a system not
only disfavors the poor and illiterate populace, it is unjust or immoral because it deprives
them of their source of living.
The Land decree is disadvantageous because it opened way for the use of the land
“in northern and northeastern Uganda to capitalist relations of production,”142 as
suggested by Amaza Ori Ondoga. Ondoga suggests that people in these regions, and
other regions of Uganda confronted with similar situations, were denied the right to own
land; they were unjustly treated and discriminated against by the prevailing laws. Similar
discrimination is also observable in the unjust traditional system of land ownership where
women who are “childless, widowed, disabled, separated/divorced, or with only girl
chidren often have little or no recourse to land since they cannot even rely on men for
access to land.”143 The fact that there is no preference for them as poor people in need of
the support of government and because they are human beings means a denial of their
dignity and rights. This deprivation and injustice to women is also expressed in the
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practice that even if a woman and the husband jointly acquired land, the woman cannot
claim ownership because the land titles are registered in the name of the husband.144
The above system of the ownership of land recurs to date. It has compounded the
problems of poor people when the rich continue to purchase the land of the poor,
depriving them of ownership of their livelihood. As Aili Mari Tripp states, “land is the
most important resource in Uganda because much of the population depends on it for
their livelihood.”145 Moreover, many of those who sell their land are not aware that they
are depriving themselves and their future generation of a precious ownership and life, or
they are unable to anticipate the grave and eminent danger into which they are heading.
Such “commodification of land”146 poses a grave threat to the poor people who own
nothing but their plots of land. People, therefore, need to be educated about the value of
land, and this is a challenge to be confronted by the government, religious institutions and
the educational institutions in the country.
The economic system was unjust because economic activities were controlled by
Asians until 1972 when Idi Amin expelled them from Uganda, and some of them were
unjustly deprived of their citizenship and their property.147 The Asians had earned what
they were deprived of through their own hard work. The indigenous people had the right
and duty to meet their economic needs. The Asians were deprived of resources they had
earned by working for them. It was a vicious circle of injustice – a deprivation of either
party of the right to own property. The Asians should not have been forcefully deprived
144
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of their property but they also needed to realize and acknowledge that the indigenous
people required necessities for survival, and had the right to participate in their own
development.
One test for true development of a nation is the number of beggars in the nation
and their distribution according to regions or the number of poor people and their
distribution according to the regions of the country. The 86% of the population of
Uganda which live in the countryside constitute the majority of the population and they
are actually the poor of the nation.148 Those who own businesses, especially in the urban
areas, are called to question whether their businesses are exclusively for themselves or
also for the benefit of their needy neighbors, who might be haunting the rich deeply in
their consciences. Kampala has more beggars today than ever before, yet Uganda is said
to be developing faster than ever before. Such claims are not tenable because one of the
litmus tests for the development of a nation is the number and care for the poor people in
that nation.
The challenge of ownership in a political context is how government uses the
resources of the country. It can also be seen in how widely spread economic development
is in the country. Though partly the legacy of pre-colonial economic differences and the
colonial reinforcement, while the southern, southeastern and western parts of Uganda are
developed and have good socio-economic infrastructure, the north, northwestern and the
northeast are not.149 This disparity makes the use of government grants or foreign aid to
Uganda questionable in terms of its distribution for developing the country. The proper
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use of resources is demanded by just social and economic order and it is required by the
sense of responsibility expected of anybody in public service because (s)he is
“accountable not only to the nation but also to God, and God will be the final judge.”150
The challenge of integral development to the government of Uganda and the nation’s
economic planners is that the ownership of the wealth of the nation means provision of
better opportunities and solutions to problems confronting the poorest regions of Uganda.
Matthew Habiger has rightly pointed out that ownership is important for the
stability and confidence or security of society: “it is inherent in the nature of men and
women that they have some claim to material goods for a sense of security for themselves
and for all their dependents.”151 The principle of ownership of private property also calls
to question the ownership of property in both Christian institutions and other religious
institutions. Many times conflicts between religious leaders and members of the groups
arise over resources and their distribution. The challenge to religious institutions in this
regard is about sharing or use of personal property and donations given to members,
community leaders, priests, religious, bishops and pastoral agents or whoever is entrusted
with such responsibility. Such a state of affairs further challenges one to reflect on why
churches split and why there are many independent churches, radical or fundamentalist
religious sects even within Christian institutions. The problems are sometimes doctrinal
or ideological, but they are also related to ownership of property.152 There are sometimes
squabbles about the wealth or property of religious institutions. The examples Gifford
gives of the crises in the churches in Uganda suffice as adequate testimonies to this
150
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assertion, though there are other examples besides these.153 It is the problem of ownership
or access to property, and the question goes beyond this to the self-concern of
individuals. The temptation to high standards of living is one of the factors that forces
religious people to “live above their means.”154 It contributes or leads to dishonesty and
corruption, not only in religious institutions but above all in civil or political institutions.
One of the challenges of the right to own property is, therefore, the challenge to shun
undue self-concern, and hence a challenge to think of the common good. This is a great
challenge because people always want a mutual determination of allocation of resources.
At the same time each person aspires to receive a share and members of the institutions
also question whether government is the owner and the one in charge or the people,
whether the superior of the religious community or his/her delegate or members of the
religious institution are the owners and custodians.
D. Subsidiarity: The Challenge to Promote Initiatives
As stated in chapter two, the principle of subsidiarity is crucial for social order. It
is a principle Paul VI considered necessary for resolving conflicts of rights between
individuals and communities.155 It is necessary in both secular and religious institutions.
The challenge of the principle of subsidiarity is threefold: the issue of the priority of
government versus the priority of intermediate groups or institutions, the priority of
intermediate groups or institutions versus that of families, and the priority of families
versus individual family members. The main issue in each case is who does what and
when. The principle of subsidiarity demands that smaller groups or individuals should do
153

Ibid. , 123 and 125.
Luke Mbefo Nnamdi, The True African: Impulses for Self-Affirmation, (Onitsa, Nigeria: Spiritan
Publication, 2001), 138.
155
Populorum Progressio, 33, 14.
154

391

for themselves what they are capable of without the interference of the bigger bodies; and
when they are not capable the bigger bodies should intervene, which means smaller
groups or individuals should not expect larger bodies to do for them what they are
capable of doing for themselves.156 Families and small groups are challenged that they
can only be helped when they are incapable of fruitfully helping themselves in carrying
out their missions. “Even the United Nations” and other aiding organizations should be
helpful and function according to the principle of subsidiarity and promote “the
autonomy of single states”157 and the states respect the principle of solidarity and
subsidiarity.
The main problems here are government or state control of development projects
and services, which people could otherwise manage on their own. For instance, if people
or regions are able to provide or raise funds for building power stations they should be
allowed to do so. Secondly, there are certain things towards which people could
contribute but some people simply do not cooperate. Such attitudes also exist where
people expect to be given things or expect that things should be done for them. To give is
often the expectation of people from the state or government, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), the Church or religious institutions or individuals people imagine
are rich, while they would be able to do some of the things themselves using personal or
local resources. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni’s call for participation in poverty
eradication is crucial to any development endeavors: “But Government does not work
alone. Poverty-eradication is the business of all the citizens of Uganda. We all contribute.
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. . .”158
The political development of the different regions of a country depends on the
ability of the local regions or government intervention when the regions are
incapacitated. This means that a proper application of the principle of subsidiarity is
crucial. In the political arena, a similar attitude as in the socio-economic fields is one of
the main problems affecting other aspects of development in some parts of Uganda. For
instance, the promotion of political efficiency depends on creation of a conducive
situation in the country or the particular region. Peace is one of the relevant factors and a
typical example of a factor whose promotion demands coopertion. Its promotion depends
on all people besides the government.159 Government may contribute but the support of
the indigenous people who know the mentality and the culture of the region is equally
necessary. In addressing such a situation in northern Uganda, the bishops of the affected
areas had this to say:
Above all the Acholi themselves, each and every one of them, must help and join the efforts for a
peaceful solution of all the violence and insurgency. We ask all citizens of Uganda to share our
difficulties and understand us.160

The bishops suggest that there is sometimes some regional and individual
indolence where many people are expected to contribute towards a given course such as
peace making. The main challenge is that sometimes people expect government to make
peace. At other times government expects the local people to provide conditions
necessary for peace. The problem is that both the local people and government are
equally in dilemma. There is a fine line between the role of government and that of the
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local people or agents of peace. Consequently, the expectation of peace is uncertain
because there is no clear definition of who does what.161 The local people look toward the
state or government to solve all the local political problems and vice versa. This is a
difficulty in the application of the principle. It is one aspect of the challenge of
subsidiarity in the political context and it needs to be clarified.
Another political challenge in the application of the principle of subsidiarity is the
situation where there is a possibility of conflict between church and state regarding
development projects. While history has shown that the church and state have cooperated
in helping to meet the needs of the citizens who are also members of the religious
institutions as President Yoweri K. Museveni stated: “We in government commend
serious development efforts, and we will do all that is possible to assist the church in such
endeavours,”162 the possibilities of conflicts of interest cannot be ruled out completely
because there is no fine definition of limits of responsibility. Secondly, such conflicts
often arise when there are personal interests or ulterior motives involving particular
projects. However, the principle is favorable for advancement because it clearly stipulates
that what smaller groups can do for themselves should not be taken over by larger
bodies.163 For instance, if a religious institution is able to manage a particular project for
its people, who constitute part of the nation, the state or government should not thwart its
efforts. It is helping the state and relieving it of some of its responsibilities to care for the
161
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people, though this is also a responsibility of the church. The church cares for both the
spiritual and material needs of the people, and it has done this consistently in the past,
and even to date.164 It is for this and similar reasons that Museveni’s contention is
significant and should be taken seriously by any political leader. Moreover such efforts
contribute to solidarity and the common good of the nation.
In the religious field people have sometimes failed to handle local religious
problems effectively. The principal reason is also the difficulty in drawing the line
between the roles of individuals, local religious institutions and national or regional
authorities. The second difficulty is autonomy, which is often given to the individual
local religious authorities. The limit of their authority is not clear and it is difficult to
explicitly know whose responsibility begins where. Two examples of this challenge can
be cited here.
The first example of the difficulty or challenge in the application of the principle
of subsidiarity was apparent in the crisis in the Catholic diocese of Kabale in western
Uganda in the 1990s when the diocese was split into two major factions – those who were
pro-bishop Barnabas Halem’Imana, the then ordinary of the diocese, and those who were
opposed to him.165 The dispute in Kabale Catholic diocese was about the management of
the resources of the diocese and the relationship of the bishop to priests of the diocese
and of some of the priests (Rwandese Tusi and Hutu) to the Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF) – apparently it was an ethnic dispute and the bishop’s relation to the security
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forces of Uganda.166 The application of the principle of subsidiarity was an apparent
failure. The bishop of the diocese, the priests, religious and pastoral agents could not
resolve the division and strife among themselves and the people in the diocese. Neither
could other people in the diocese resolve the problem. The alternative option was the
Uganda Catholic Bishops Conference but they could not resolve the problem
immediately and radically because, according to Catholic Church law (Canon Law),
though the ordinary of a diocese is in collegiality with other bishops,167 he is still
autonomous as the ordinary of that diocese.168 Consequently, the crisis dragged on for a
substantial period of time.
Rome did not intervene to handle the crisis directly or personally. It expected the
people of the diocese together with the ordinary, or the Catholic Episcopal Conference of
Uganda, to resolve the crisis. It was not until a commission of inquiry consisting of
canonists from among the Uganda bishops and one priest-canonist was sent to look into
the issue, make a report to the bishops’ conference; and “in mid 1994 the report was
completed and outlined four options. It was considered at a plenary meeting of the
Catholic bishops, and Halem’Imana himself chose the option that he resign.”169 This
technically shows that he was not dismissed by the episcopal conference or his opponents
or the bishops’ conference.
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One thing again to be observed here is the difficulty or challenge of drawing a
clear line between the intervention of the superior body and the freedom of the smaller
body. The lines remain fine and unclear. This is often the difficulty in applying the
principle of subsidiarity. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest that the
Church’s central administrative authority
should avoid presenting itself as a suffocating central organization which takes everything on
itself, controls everything and gives directives to every part of the world, to the detriment of what
the local and synodal authorities can decide for themselves.170

Since there is a fine line between authorities in as far as the application of the
principle of subsidiarity is concerned the contention of the duo should be taken with a lot
of caution too. While people should or can be left to do for themselves what they are
capable of, it is sometimes not easy to know who is capable of doing what. Conversely, it
is not always easy to determine when a superior body should intervene to help a smaller
group or if it should not. The greatest challenge of the principle of subsidiarity is the
difficulty of its application because of the fine lines between the ability of smaller bodies
and that of larger bodies.
The second example is the Church of Uganda (COU) crisis, which happened in
the Diocese of Busoga, beginning on August 20, 1992, when the dean of the Cathedral
resigned on several grounds including corruption and irresponsible leadership.171 The
community was also split into two – those who supported bishop Bamwoze, the then
bishop, and those who wanted him out of office. Just as in the case of the Catholic
diocese of Kabale, Bishop Bamwoze could not resolve the crisis, and neither could the
Church of Uganda community in the diocese do it. They appealed to the Archbishop,
170
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Yonah Okoth, who found it hard to resolve the issue because he was himself subjected to
violence in the same way bishop Bamwoze was.172 There was no way of resolving the
conflict except to try to employ some extra-ecclesial organs or agents. Consequently,
government or state organs and agents were involved to curb the problem.173 In the
context of the nation the principle worked but not within the limited context of the
administrative structure of the Church of Uganda. The bid to involve state organs or
agents was indicative of the difficulty of the application of the principle of subsidiarity
within COU as an institution.
Another challenge of this principle in the religious field is economic. There is
often, as Yoweri K. Museveni remarked in 1989, three years after coming to presidency,
the tendency of expectation of help from elsewhere as if Uganda does not have resources
that could be tapped for its development.174 This is a real problem with religious
institutions.This problem is also real with the government of Uganda which depends on
“the international community for 55 percent of its bugget.”175 Many national, regional
and local seminaries and individual dioceses have for years expected to be helped by the
churches or religious institutions in the developed world. This is the seemingly enduring
dependence syndrome. It considerably challenges the plans, initiatives and efforts of the
churches or religious institutions in Uganda in over one hundred and twenty years of
Christianity in Uganda. The Catholic church’s expectation of funds from Propaganda
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and other organizations or associations for several decades suggests needs that

are more than just the support for crucial things. The need is apparently for daily and
annual financial support. Such needs suggest rather an extremely loose interpretation of
subsidiarity, universal charity and the right of ownership of property, which leads to a sitdown-and-wait attitude. It also undermines the principle of participation or involvement.
This challenge is critical because it invites all to further reflect about living within one’s
own means. It is sometimes the wish to live beyond one’s personal means that makes
people behave unethically in order to achieve what they want. This is the case, especially
when the expected aid is not forthcoming as it initially was.
E. Common Good: The Challenge of the Requisite Conditions for Development
The principle of common good challenges us to acknowledge the social character
of human beings. It is closely related to social justice, solidarity, option for the poor and
affirmative action, not withstanding the fact that it is also intimately connected to
universal love and human dignity. As the sum total of conditions necessary for fostering
the well-being of every member of community, it challenges every person to contribute in
various ways to creating this situation.177 Common Good challenges everybody that
development is not possible without other principles, virtues and conditions required by
integral human development. In every context, including that of Uganda, it challenges all
to embrace universal love, social justice, peace, subsidiarity, preferential option for the
poor, association, participation and education.
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The challenge of the common good in the social and economic context is well
expressed in the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda but it needs to be actualized
in the socio-economic life of the people. The constitution aptly suggests that the citizens
of Uganda should be patriotic and loyal, “engage in gainful work for the family and the
common good, contribute to the national development and the well-being of the
community. . . .”178 As the supreme law of a country it is fitting that the constitution
incorporates the idea of the common good because as law the constitution is meant to
foster the good of the people. It creates an orderly situation and gives people a sense of
direction. That law is for the good of people is an idea consistently asserted by
outstanding legal students including Thomas Aquinas.179 The stipulation of the 1995
constitution is, therefore, a positive theoretical contribution that needs to be actualized.
The actual positive contribution is real if corruption, discrimination and marginalization
of some people or regions of Uganda are eradicated. Although these are serious
challenges, as Lisa Cahill Sowle suggests, despite human weaknesses one can entertain
hopes that "the common good can become a reality and not merely a utopian illusion
because humans have an innate capacity to build a just society"180 although not without
commitment and serious efforts. Secondly, people are rational and have the ability to
know the requirements of common good or social life, and to establish "certain important
values from their moral and social experience."181 However, the challenge here is the one
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of the proper use of intellectual capacities. The intellectual capacity has sometimes been
deliberately and wrongly used. This misuse is the problem to guard against.
Another challenge of the principle of the common good is that “in a society of
persons, the common good is for each individual an end which (s)he must serve and to
which one must subordinate one’s particular life or interest.”182 Any service for the cause
of the common good demands that people of the community are considerate or less selfconcerned. It means each person renders service for other people. This is a great
challenge because the human tendency is often first to try to satisfy the ego. On the basis
of such demands of the common good, one of the challenges of the common good
presented by the Catholic bishops of Uganda is that “politicians and political parties
should desist from sacrificing the common good for selfish ends.”183 This is a critical
challenge because it touches the idea that if Ugandans are only self-concerned, they
cannot attain the common good. Common good is achieved when people know that they
need each other to survive, grow and develop. The Uganda bishops aptly emphasized this
need of unity and solidarity in the following words:
unity in diversity should be among important ingredients of pluralistic political dispensation that
Uganda has embraced. With unity as a starting point and the pursuit of the common good for all
citizens of Uganda as a fundamental political principle, we can be assured of a peaceful political
transition and greater future prosperity as a country.184

The principle of the common good presents a special challenge to the government
which has a unique role. According to Ddungu “the state exists for promoting the
common good of its citizens and other residents.”185 This means the role of the state is to
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create conditions that help all people and groups to fully develop themselves. Such
conditions include all kinds of justice - commutative, social, distributive and legal peace, efficient public service, good will, education, unity, truth, responsibility, the spirit
of sharing and love.186
The principle of the common good is, therefore, a common challenge to all people
of Uganda. Politically, the challenge of the principle of common good to Ugandans may
be viewed in the light of what the Bishops’ conference stated recently:
All of us should unite in solidarity adhering to the values and principles of the common good.
Political diversity should be rooted in this common good around which all party programmes
should revolve.187

Common good demands solidarity of the people or their unity in action despite
the ethnic differences in Uganda. The statement of Uganda Catholic bishops is significant
when interpreted in relation to the significance of the colors of the Uganda flag. The
Uganda flag has three colors – black, yellow and red, in this order. Black is the color of
the skin of the people and shows that Uganda is a black African nation; yellow stands for
the abundance of sunshine which Uganda enjoys as an equatorial country because of its
location, 4 degrees north and 2 degrees south of the equator; and red stands for oneness
or brotherhood/sisterhood in blood.
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All three colors symbolize what the people of

Uganda commonly share. Besides the colors of the Uganda flag there is one similar
symbol of unity - the motto of Uganda: For God and My Country.189 The motto suggests
a selfless commitment to the cause of Uganda. All these symbols strongly suggest and
point to the common good of the nation.
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The challenge of the principle of the common good is that it imposes on people believers and citizens alike - the responsibility to care for others. The principle imposes
on people an ethical or moral responsibility they must fulfill as their conscience directs
them. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest to this effect that “the ethical
category of responsibility obliges me not to bury talents I have received but to multiply
them for the advantage of all.”190 The challenging obligation is to use one’s talents for the
benefit or good of the community. In this spirit the church has made great contributions
to the common good of Uganda through its spiritual and social services to the people of
the nation. Ddungu has carefully observed and affirmed this in the following words:
In fulfilling its mission, the church here in Uganda, as elsewhere, has from the very beginning
been laying emphasis upon assisting in providing the following services: education and health
care, assistance to the needy and the disadvantaged, integral evangelization, which makes people
holistic in their thinking and acting; promotion of the means of social communication for
educating people’s consciences and attitudes; and improvement of food production, water, shelter,
environment, family and community life for all. The church has provided personnel and structures
for the realization of most of the above services.191

If there are any institutions in Uganda that give priority to the common good, it is
the religious institutions that are ranked among the first, especially the Christian
churches. The Catholic church and the Protestant churches have consistently shown
concern for the common good and done what it requires, from the time of the first
Christian missionaries up until today. If they are to be commended for their work this is
one of the areas where they should be complemented. If the Churches have done so much
to contribute to the common good, others are also capable of doing the same. However,
the final challenge I would like to adopt from Cahill is what she describes as "James
Hanigan's diagnosis of 'the human problem', namely as 'not that we do not know what we
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should do, but that we do not want to know and do not want to do it'."192 It is not that
nobody knows the right things to do and how to do them. The problem and challenge is
simply human obstinancy or negligence – people deliberately refuse to know and do the
right things. This is the reality of the immoral or sinful dimension of human character.
F. Justice and Equality: The Challenge of Equality and Fairness in Social Diversity
Justice is one of the most challenging principles for integral human development.
It is called for by the human need to co-exist, it requires and at the same time leads to
human co-existence which is often complicated by individual interests. As Reinhold
Niebuhr suggests, the difficuty of human co-existence is a perennial one and human
society will always have to deal with the question of justice necessary for “the
preservation and fulfillment of human love.”193 In treating the question of justice in this
section our concern is about people who suffer injustice, but it should be noted that in
reality the main concern is about the attitude of those who do injustice. The best
explanation or supportive assertion in this case is what the Nichomachean ethics which
resonates with the Christian view suggests. Namely, it is worse to do injustice than to
suffer injustice because the latter does not involve vice and so it is not blameworthy
while the former involves some form or degree of vice and is blameworthy.194
Paul VI was clear in his expansion of the notion of justice, from being a national
social justice to international social justice, that the virtue is based on the principle of
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human solidarity.195 As some of the preceding sections of this work espoused, Uganda is
a nation that has a pluralistic ethnic constitution. The virtue of justice is both a significant
value and a challenge in such a context, at least on the basis of understanding justice as
fairness or giving each person his or her due, though what is due to each person is often
difficult to determine. Justice and its pursuit is, nonetheless, a moral imperative to both
religious institutions and the civil society.196 The moral obligation that at once confronts
the church leadership, the Christian community, the Uganda government, the citizens,
believers and leaders, in relation to justice, is the recognition of and respect for the equal
dignity and freedom of all people. This idea is also clearly stipulated in the Ugandan
constitution and stands as a serious challenge to all. The constitution states that “all
persons are equal before and under the law in all spheres of political, economic, social
and cultural life and in every other respect . . . .”197 The real challenge is that it is not
enough to verbalize the equality of people while in real life there are critical differences
in treatment of peoples or regions, as has been the case in the history of Uganda and still
persists. A typical example here is that since the establishment of British protectorate
West Nile
was used as a labour reserve, gazetted as a ‘closed area’ from which outsiders were excluded and
systematically underdeveloped in favour of the cash-crop agriculture of southern Uganda.198

This is a problem that also affected some parts of Uganda as indicated in some of
the subsequent paragraphs of this sub-section. This differential treatment recurs in West
Nile to date, and the evidence is what Mark Leopold has stated. Namely, that “the

195

Populorum Progressio, 2, 5; 44, 48.
Norman G. Kurland, “Economic Justice in the Age of Robot” in Curing World Poverty: The New Role
of Property. Ed. John H. Miller (Social Justice Review: Saint Louis, Missouri, 1994), 62.
197
Government of Uganda, 20.
198
Mark Leopold, 12.
196

405

economic, social and political marginality of Arua has persisted.”199
From socio-economic and political points of view the issue articulated here is,
therefore, that of the recognition of the rights of people, the equality of their dignity and
treating them according to these rights and needs in a fair manner. Justice can only be
achieved if people understand and accept that they have mutual rights and obligations.
The demands of justice may be imposed by religious or civil law. This means that justice
sometimes demands some form of coercion as Reinhold Niebuhr also suggests.200 This
view was also upheld by Martin Luther King, Jr., according to Deotis J. Roberts who
observes that
King believed in a strong and aggressive leadership by government authorities to sponsor civil
rights and social justice. However when government is on the side of injustice, King believed
Christians had the responsibility to apply moral pressure to compel unwilling authorities to yield
to the mandates of justice. Government has a responsibility to help control antisocial and immoral
behavior through the process of law. . . . For King the state is fulfilling the divine purpose for its
existence when it reflects love and justice, when it creates and preserves the well-being of humans
intended by God in Christ. This, in King’s judgement, would be a community where integration
has replaced segregation where economic justice has eliminated poverty, where a just order has
supplanted violence and chaos. On the other hand, a state is evil and sinful when it formulates and
sponsors policies that are divisive, unjust and violent.201

Here the state is portrayed to be potentially both good and evil, which is right
especially from a Christisn perspective in light of the history of secular states. Religion
should be its corrective counterpart. However, King suggests a non-violent pressure.
According to me, it seems good to argue that King also advocates that from a Christian
point of view a true act of justice does not demand physical coercion because it is
motivated by love. Justice demands that mutual responsibility and obligation are
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recognized and accepted as such by all.
Viewing justice in reference to the salaries of the public or civil servants, justice
remains a significant challenge to Uganda. The challenge is compounded by the legal or
constitutional claim that
Under “the rule of law,” every citizen has the right to receive a just return for his labour: whether
manual or mental. In conducting economic, and cultural affairs of the state, every government
must realize that the rights of the individual, include provision for just and favorable conditions of
work, fair and adequate renumeration [sic] which can ensure the worker and his family a standard
of living worthy of human dignity. It is the duty of the government to take all possible action to
promote the economic and social welfare of the people and of the nation as a whole.202

Such issues have not been raised for nothing. Neither are they new, even in
modern Uganda. Although Levis Mugumya claims that teachers’ salaries are in
accordance to the service they render, there is a poor salary scale for teachers in
particular.203 For example, currently Primary school teachers are paid, monthly, UShs
150,000/= (an equivalent of US $ 82.00), Secondary (High) School teachers receive,
monthly, UShs 200,000/= (an equivalent of US $ 110.00).204 This salary scale suggests
that the average annual income of a secondary school teacher is about UShs 2,400,000/=
(US $ 1,320.00). On average, excluding children in the primary schools, a family takes
care of the education of 3 children in secondary schools with an estimated term average
expenditure of UShs 120,000/= for tuition, UShs 25,000/= for stationery and 30,000/= for
pocket money and transportation, in a rural area. This means a year’s expenses on the
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three secondary school students amounts to a total of UShs 1,575,000/= (US $ 875.00),
leaving a balance of UShs 825,000/= (US $ 458.33) for the rest of the family needs, viz.
feeding, health care, school supplies of children in primary schools, clothing, etc, for a
whole year.
The annual estimates suggest that these salaries cannot sustain the teachers and
their families for a month. Though government has attempted to raise the salary of
teachers by UShs 20,000/= (an equivalent of US$ 11.00) after their peaceful
demonstration in 2005, the teachers still clamor that the salary increase is “still below the
average cost of living.”205 The challenge to the government is to ensure that these
teachers, and all employees, are paid a living wage – not “a killing wage as it is often
called in Uganda”206 because the meager salaries are incapable of sustaining employees
and their families or dependents. The Uganda National Teachers Union (UNATU) study
in April 2005 made interesting revelations. Precisely, it
showed that 71% of teachers spend their very meager salaries on feeding and educating their
children; . . . 69% of Uganda’s teachers do not do any other job to supplement their abysmal
incomes. The teachers “survive on debts and handouts. They live as beggars . . . .”207

It is unjust to treat civil servants the way these teachers are treated, just because
they have no alternative opportunities for their livelihood and that of their families. The
gravity of the injustice to the teachers is aggravated by the fact that money is drained by
the defense ministry, sometimes encouraged from without, there are ghost soldiers and
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ghost teachers or people are paid when actually not teaching or even out of the country.208
The real challenge is to pay workers a just wage. Here a just wage is understood to be
. . . the way of responding to the economic rights of every person which lay claim to adequate
food, clothing, shelter, education, working conditions, health care, retirement protection - all that
is needed for the full and integral development of the human person.209

The just wage is what provides for the barely comfortable life of the workers,
their families and dependents. In other words, as Frank D. Almade suggests, it helps the
employee to meet just the basic necessities of life. It is the minimum pay and “equal pay
for equal work done.”210
While the evil of injustice is perpetrated against Uganda’s civil servants, the level
of corruption is also growing. The statement of AMSRIU is a testimony here:
“Corruption continues to be rampant and it is ineffectively challenged.”211 Economic and
social justice demands that the resources of a nation are used for the benefit of all and
especially the needy or less fortunate citizens. Unfortunately, as Ronald Kassimir states,
Ugandans have transformed “in popular parlance their national motto from ‘For God and
My Country’ to ‘For God and My Stomach.’ ”212 The expression typically depicts the
politics and mentality of corruption and self-concern. In light of this assertion the
inevitable challenge for the Uganda government, the citizens, rich regions and, civil or
public servants is to undo the colonial legacy of the uneven distribution of the country’s
resources.213 While the central region, especially around the capital of Kampala, and the
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Lake region have reasonable infrastructure and economic standing, and a few other parts
are wealthy, other areas are not.214 Even the so-called wealthy regions have beggars, and
the majority of the country lives in dire poverty. The challenge here is that many of the
poor are unaware and not concerned about the differences between their conditions and
that of the well-to- do. They need more and real education, a further challenge to a
sincere government and civil or public servants, and religious institutions.
Labor for large estates or plantations of tea, coffee and sugar are obtained from
the poor regions of the nation, a routine which was arranged during the colonial times.
For instance, those from Kigezi and Ankole, in western Uganda, and West Nile, Acholi,
Teso and other northerners were considered strong and courageous, hence, good fighters
and thus good candidates for the military and any hard labor.215 These regions have been
and are some of the poorest regions of Uganda. Consequently, in the subsequent years the
recruitment and employment at Kakira and Lugazi sugar estates was provided by the
western, northern and northeastern regions of Uganda. Such were, and are still, some of
the factors that contribute to “ethnic animosities and prejudices, which eventually became
stereotypes of the ‘developed’ south and the ‘backward’ north,”216 which suggest or are a
testimony to the regional imbalances in the country. Vali Jamal is of the same view when
he affirms that there is “the North-South divide”217 in terms of income distribution or
economic differences.
The unaware and unsuspecting people thought, and some still think that going
down country Uganda is getting to heaven. To date some of the civil servants or
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government agents, who should be at least slightly enlightened, in some of these regions
encourage the youth to get recruited for these kinds of work, either out of ignorance or
because the agents and the youth are bribed. Uganda is historically known for
government intimidation of and bribes to politicians to silence them and any religious
leaders who raise sensitive political issues.218 It is not a surprise that the responsible
people are bribed to contribute to such unfair treatments of certain sectors of the country.
This constitutes an actual injustice.
This practice of labor recruitment occurs mainly in specific political regions of
Uganda while there are capable people in the regions where the estates are located and
they need money too, as the general poverty situation in Uganda suggests, and they too
could work in these estates.219 Two conclusions are inevitable. First, the poor regions are
discriminated against and targeted for use as instruments of development in some regions
of the nation without being remunerated adequately. This is social and economic
injustice. Secondly, every able citizen is expected to contribute to the progress of the
nation as demanded by solidarity, justice, common good, and participation but surely not
at the expense of the respect for human dignity. No citizen ought to be subjected to such
unfair treatment.
In any unjust political and economic system or process people are often
disgruntled and sometimes fight each other. Injustice has caused the decline of many
nations and regimes or governments. Justice is, hence, a crucial virtue for government,
public servants, and every citizen. Where it is lacking there is no peace. Reinhold
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Neibuhr speaks to this point in his assertion that in addressing injustices in society
“violence can therefore not be ruled out on a priori grounds.”220 He suggests, as Paul VI
did in Populorum Progressio, that violence is not desirable but it is an inevitable
consequence regardless of the rightness or the morality of the purpose to be achieved.
Otherwise, where there is justice, there is peace and stability.
In the context of Uganda, Okot observes that “instability, insecurity, war and
various other forms of violence that have been suffered in this country have largely been
consequences of economic imbalances.”221 The imbalances reflect the degree of injustice
in Uganda. These imbalances suggest that governments in the past did not create
conditions to promote development of the nation. While it is necessary to acknowledge
that there are differences in circumstances and abilities of the people, it is also good to
accept that certain conditions can be corrected and they should be corrected or improved
for the sake of the growth of the people. This is a challenge to both the former and the
current government of Uganda.
Three types of justice that challenge the Ugandan context must be delineated
because all of them are part and parcel of the question of justice as a virtue necessary for
human growth. First is commutative justice which requires that when people make private
contracts or agreements, they should keep the contracts and there must be equality
between the goods and the services or work offered and the reward given for them.222
This type of justice presents a challenge to business people, who cheat with weighing
scales and the quantity of work done by employees and the remuneration paid to them for
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the work done. It puts into question the deceptive advertisements through any
communication medium.
The second type of justice is distributive justice which demands that public goods
of a country “such as its natural resources, be used to satisfy the basic needs of all the
people, especially the under-privileged[sic], the poor and the powerless.”223 Distributive
justice is a challenge to the government of Uganda in relation to lack of hydro-electricity
in the West Nile region, Karamoja and any region in that country that is not supplied with
hydro-electricity despite exporting electricity to Rwanda or other neighboring nations.
Finally, there is legal justice which “demands that all citizens contribute
according to their ability to the promotion of the welfare of society: by supporting public
institutions, which serve the common good of all the citizens.”224 This aspect of justice
again challenges the rich regions of Uganda such as Kampala or the central region, and
the lake region in general, to respond to the needs of the poor regions which receive less
of the resources of Uganda, including electricity already referred to above.
Heroism is one of the challenges of the virtue of justice to the religious
institutions and leaders in addressing the issue of injustice in both civil and religious
communities. The challenge for anyone addressing questions of injustice is to accept to
be heroic and exercise the virtue of courage, even when the cause being pursued is
unpopular to the government or civil society, and their sympathizers. A challenging
example suggested here is the difficult time during the reign of Idi Amin as president of
Uganda. While his reign was marked by lots of injustices, persecutions, and confiscation
of the property of Asians and their expulsion, including those who were Ugandan
223
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citizens, no church authority dared to confront him or government organs to demand
justice.225 One of the main challenges of that time, and during similar moments in our
time, is that of accepting the consequence of the fulfillment of one’s prophetic mission or
to be a Christian hero.
According to Gifford only the Makerere University students of that time dared to
protest the expulsion of the Asian-Ugandan citizens and the confiscation of their property
when they marched into the city.226 They proved to be more prophetic and heroic than the
religious leadership in the country at that time - a country dominantly Christian. This was
a real challenge and a failure of the religious leadership or the Christian churches’
prophetic leadership and mission at a time when it was most needed. They constitute the
majority of the population and needed to pool their efforts together early enough to
address issues.227 Whether it was fear or prudence, the challenge was the one of the
choice between love and hatred, justice and injustice, between mutual respect and
confrontation. This, unfortunately, is a frequently neglected responsibility. Peter
Kanyandago alludes to such assertion when he affirms that
We have to acknowledge, especially, we the church leaders, that in the past, sometimes, we have
feared to expose and endanger ourselves individually, or as an ecclesial community and
institution, that we have been too prudent.228

However, one has to acknowledge that it was the church, especially the Christian
churches, which remained the only formidable and unbroken institution providing
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support and strength, and the best place of refuge for the populace at the difficult times
during the reign of Idi Amin and later, even to date.229
The problem of the need to address the issue of injustice affects not only the civil
society, but also religious institutions. This assertion is suggested by the fact that the
church is not only a divine institution, it is also a human institution – it is both holy and
sinful. However, this is not a justification to excuse or exempt the church from being
affected by the problem of injustice.The church has also treated this issue of just pay in
parts of several of her social teachings and documents.230 On account of this assertion the
question that the church needs to address is also whether in practice she offers just or
living wage for her employees or not. Peter Kanyandago suggests that to this question, in
the context of Uganda, the dominant answer is no because the majority of church
employees are paid meager salaries.231 They are often expected to render service as their
Christian contribution. The fact is, however, that they and their families or communities
need material resources to live. This fact is often minimized or neglected. The greatest
challenge in this regard is that if the church or religious institutions are not just, “our
action and call” to people “for a more just world”, our function as religious leaders and
institutions, “will not be credible.”232 In other words, the mission and ministry of the
church or religious institutions become obsolete.
Another challenge of the virtue of justice to religious institutions in relation to the
commitment to be examples of justice for the civil society or other people and institutions
is that of re-examining our life style. Above all it important to note that “every just social
229
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order can be judged according to the service it provides for the people who live under
it.”233 This challenge confronts the civil society as well as religious institutions. In
relation to such a situation Peter Kanyandago strongly charges:
if we are honest with ourselves, we will recognize: that there is concentration of wealth to
particular areas of the church, mainly in clerical circles. Justice calls for an equitable sharing of the
goods of the world. Failure to share and distribute the wealth of the world is to disregard the will
of the Creator. It is also an offence to the poor, which can provoke reactions of frustration and
violence, which can hamper the church’s mission, as happened during the French revolution.234

Religious leaders and institutions are challenged here to reflect on their attitude
toward possession of natural resources, their attachment to these goods and their
application of the principle of ownership of natural resources. This is a critical challenge
because the religious, not just religious by profession of the vow of poverty, but all
members and leaders of religious groups or institutions, are the very teachers or
advocates of these principles. This challenge also invokes the application of the
principles of preferential option for the poor, affirmative action, common good and
solidarity.
The challenge of justice or its opposite, injustice, is equally critical to religious
institutions, governments, various groups and individuals because the question of justice
or injustice involves lawlessness, greed and unfairness or their opposites. The
Nicomachean ethics which, in my judgement, is in line with Christian ethics says it all
about justice in relation to law and fairness: “. . . what is just will be both what is lawful
and what is fair, and what is unjust will be both what is lawless and what is unfair.”235The
real challenge here is to be just and to act lawfully.
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G. Preferential Option for the Poor: The Choice between Priority and Self-interest
The question of the preferential option for the poor is and has always been one of
the principal concerns of the Church. The Church in Uganda has also been the champion
and protagonist of the teaching and application of the principle.236 The 2006 Lenten
message showed the gravity of the option for the poor. After frequent references to
Populorum Progressio in his 2006 Lenten message, Benedict XVI alluded to the
statement of Blessed Teresa of Calcutta, that “the worst poverty is not to know Christ.”237
His message shows the significance of the option for the poor especially when he states
that to care for the poor is to live the Christian message because Christ identified himself
with the poor; liberating the poor means Christ is recognized in them.
As treated in chapter two, option for the poor is a principle that Paul VI would not
have overlooked because, in Populorum Progressio, he was addressing the problem of
the poor peoples of the world. It was the issue of the degradation of human life and
dignity.238 The principle is necessary for a poor country, purportedly said to be
developing, like Uganda. In Uganda there are economic disparities.239 These disparities
demand or call for the Uganda government, the Church and organizations capable of
providing assistance to apply this principle of positive discrimination in favor of the most
disadvantaged people of Uganda.
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Yoweri K. Museveni acknowledges this fact and states that “the poorest part of
the country, the North, has made much slower progress than other areas, mainly because
of insecurity.”240 The poverty due to insecurity in northern Uganda is a challenge to stop
fighting but it is also a challenge to ceaselessly help war-ravaged, and consequently poor
regions in parts of northern and western Uganda that have been affected by “chronic
insecurity, resulting in social dislocation and economic underdevelopment.”241
Despite their critical financial situation the economically poor often shoulder
more financial burdens than affluent people. They pay for the basic needs of life more
expensively than the rich. The majority of the rich live in urban areas and the poor live in
the rural areas or in the countryside. Over 66% of Ugandans live below the poverty line,
“on less than US $ 15.00 per month”.242 While cultural practices and individuals
contribute to such a pathetic situation, the situation demands that government allocate
more development funds to help the poor address their needs. It calls for the government
and the Church to educate people and to create enduring systems that can create
conditions for the poor to improve their lives. The government attempted to address the
problem through its Poverty Eradication Plan, introduced in mid-1990s after an
agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was “designed to wipe out
poverty within 20 years;”243but the conditions of the majority of the people remain poor.
The results of the Poverty Eradication Plan are hardly noticeable on a general
observation of the situation in Uganda. In the urban areas, where there is more money in
circulation and there are more possibilities for employment, basic needs are less
240
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expensive than in the rural areas where there is less money; and there are no lucrative
businesses and employment opportunities. Vali Jamal’s testimony about the situation, at
least up to 1998, supports this contention. He states that “around 35 per cent of the rural
population and 16 percent of the urban population are now shown to be in poverty” but
because “the rural areas comprise over 88 percent of the total population, poverty is very
much a rural phenomenon in Uganda, with over 90 percent of the total poverty.”244
The rich are often in serious pursuit to purchase the land of the poor, which is
their livelihood. They try to do so at give-away prices. There is a challenge here because
rich people, who could improve the situation of the poor, neglect the poor, forfeit their
responsibility to help the poor, contrary to Paul VI’s exhortation in Populorum
Progressio.245 The neglect of the poor is not only an injustice. It also shows that the rich
are motivated by self-interest and do not recognize the dignity of the poor.
Politically, governments have not come up with feasible projects to help promote
poor citizens. Even if Uganda’s poverty reduction strategy has well outlined plans for the
reduction of poverty in the country as indicated by the 2000/2001 development report, the
results are far from reaching the desired goal.246 The weak and the poor are consistently
neglected or marginalized. They are not listened to politically. Yet they are the people
whose votes are often sought by politicians. They seem to exist as citizens only when
elections are close and during elections. They are often promised heaven on earth before
and at the time of elections. Once elections are over politicians do not deliver on their
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promises. Their votes are solicited with money which is not even suffieient for a decent
meal. This is not what the poor would opt for if they had bargaining powers. Neither is it
an option that promotes their life, dignity and rights. Instead of giving precedence to the
needs of the poor over the rich, the rich give precedence to themselves over the poor.247
The problem here is that of distortion of the order of priority of values. Even if “poverty
eradication is the central objective of the Government of Uganda”248 and it were
achieved, Uganda would still be far from being called truly developed if the poor are not
part of human development. I would like to appropriate the suggestion of Anna Mary
Kayonga to help us understand and improve the condition of the poor. She suggests that
to help the poor we need to
enter into solidarity with the poor in concrete ways: by sharing their lives, sorrows, joys, hopes,
and fears. . . . Solidarity with the poor also means that we must break complicity with those who
oppress the poor, and that we must oppose the causes of evil. This calls for the transformation of
the unjust structures, which institutionalize destitution.249

The poor are often the victims of corruption by government and civil leaders and
individuals who are self-concerned. While external aid and loans are solicited for them
and in their name, they almost never benefit from the foreign aid. All they receive
depends on the political giants. This is precisely why the forgiveness of debts of Uganda,
which was forgiven 67% of its debts in 1995, makes no sense for a country where there is
rampant discrimination, injustice and corruption.250 Uganda claims that corruption is now
minimized, but actually proportionately it has been aggravated. The 2003 World
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Development Report shows that 39% of the total number of the known and reported
bribes were paid.251 Since the corruption is prevalent in Uganda, forgiving its debts
aggravates corruption. It encourages more corruption on the part of those who administer
the funds, and adds to the marginalization, exclusion and misery of the poor. It promotes
an option for the rich, not an option for the poor. This is where the request of African
bishops during the African Synod, and the later advocacy of John Paul II in preparation
for the jubilee year, that debts of poor countries should be forgiven seems rather
ridiculous and may be accepted reservedly.252 As pastors their request makes sense
because it shows their concern for the needy and poor. The forgiven debts are intended to
relieve governments so that they may help unfortunate citizens. The concern of the
bishops and the pontiff is the dignity of the human person. It was this kind of concern that
attracted the African bishops to propagate the idea of an “uncompromising solidarity with
the poor and to make their cry known.”253 However, in reality those who are forgiven are
the corrupt officials who are beneficiaries of loans and grants that the government
receives. They make forgiveness of debts problematic and perhaps even immoral,
especially if those who forgive the debts are aware of the prevalence of corruption.
Uganda is a religious country and dominantly a Christian one - 48% Catholic and
38% Protestant, though some authors suggest that Catholics constitute 49.6% and
Protestants are 26.2% of the population of Uganda.254 Religious institutions have been the
chief protagonists of the principle of the preferential option for the poor. The poor have
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often been a priority of religious institutions because they understand that they are one of
the reasons the Church was instituted. The Christian Churches are perhaps the more
leading religious institutions in this regard since the colonial times. They built and
continue to build schools, colleges, formation houses, hospitals, orphanages and other
development institutions that meet the needs of the poor.255 They are the ones that speak
more strongly on behalf of the poor, and try to educate the poor to come out of their
situations. Adrian K. Ddungu affirms this assertion when he states that
The church in this country is committed to community development, with special emphasis upon
women, youth, and rural people’s development; and upon uplifting of the condition of the poor
and the oppressed.256

The initiatives of the church in making a preferential option for the poor are
definitely a noble cause. Ddungu’s statement is true but it is also questionable whether all
churches or religious institutions, used here as a generic term for believers, are committed
to this cause. Secondly, option for the poor may also have negative consequences and
present extra challenges. This suggests why, recognizing and citing Laurenti C. Magesa’s
very significant view, Kanyandago alludes to the possible danger of helping the poor, as
“aggravating their dependence.”257 He specifically states that according to Magesa “true
generosity liberates unto freedom, enabling individuals and peoples to take charge of
their own life.”258 In other words, any help rendered to the poor should improve their
condition but at the same time help them to be self-reliant. The danger of perpetual
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donation or assistance is that it can lead to perpetual dependence. This is counter
productive to authentic development.
After independence in 1963, the state took over the management and the policies
of schools, and a majority of schools became public or government aided schools.259 It
was too expensive for poor people to educate their children because they could not afford
the costs of education, previously much subsidized by the church. The quality of
formation also declined and continues to decline. In 1997 Universal Primary Education
(UPE) was introduced in Uganda to help the poor attain at least a primary education but
this meant “only four children per household benefit”260 would be given free education
though in practice UPE remained open. This was a positive implementation of prior plans
for the future development of Uganda, but its implementation was not ready for 1997 or
the implementation was either poorly planned or unplanned. Consequently, the standard
of education has worsened and UPE cannot be considered a favorable option for the poor.
Education is a crucial factor in development. It is for this reason that some people send
their children to schools where they can receive relevant, well-founded and profitable
education, even if that means paying very expensively for it.
The study in this section shows that the “poverty in Uganda is a development
problem” and it calls for a “development strategy involving all sections of the
population.”261 This is a critical challenge to the government of Uganda, religious
institutions and, especially the planners of development strategies in the country.
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H. Affirmative Action: The Challenge of Genuine Government Intervention
One of the priorities for any good government is to address the past injustices of
discrimination and marginalization. This priority is significant because if not addressed
violence or disharmony may creep into society. In Uganda different categories of people women, disabled people and minorities for instance - have suffered and many of them
still suffer injustices. The government of Uganda (NRM government, in particular) has
tried to address some of these issues.262 The challenge which confronts the nation and the
church or religious institutions persistently is that women need to be included and
promoted more than ever before. As Mary Mugenyi states
Developing Uganda takes men and women. Gender should therefore be on the agenda of
development dialogue more so in Uganda where women constitute a 53 percent majority of the
population; they contribute 80 percent of agricultural labour and 90 percent of domestic labour and
are almost exclusively responsible for the health and nutrition of their families and
communities.263

There is no doubt that in the field of education there has been promotion of
women. Government has done so by providing opportunity for female students to go on
to higher institutions of learning with poorer academic grades than male students. The
problem with this effort in the positive discrimination or affirmative action is that “if
access is not open to all at the lower levels, then affirmative action of affording females
to enter higher institutions of learning” will not achieve its goal of “eliminating equality
and injustice.”264 The academic requirement for admission to higher institutions of
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learning is less for female students than for the male students in terms of their academic
performances. This arrangement merely perpetuates the vicious cirle of discrimination
and injustice. It has helped promote female students who often perform poorly in subjects
like mathematics and the physical sciences. The number of women admitted to higher
institutions has grown since the inception of this program. However, the problem the
program could create is that of encouraging female students to be lazy. They may become
reluctant to fully apply themselves in studies. Positively, the plan helps male students to
work hard in order to perform extremely well so as to be admitted to the higher
institutions of learning. The arrangement still contributes to a difference between female
students and the competing male students in terms of how much they learn or accomplish
in their education.
Uganda’s education system has also been discriminating on the basis of subjects
taught in schools. Some subjects are traditionally considered too hard for female students
and so become mainly the prerogative of male students, and other subjects are considered
fitting for female students only. For instance, mathematics, carpentry, construction and
experimental sciences in general are still considered male subjects while home
economics, needle work and tailoring are considered women subjects.265 This
discrimination has not been adequately addressed. In addition to this this difficulty,
certain cultural values and practices need to be examined, evaluated and remodeled or
abandoned altogether to help improve women’s situation in relation to men. This
suggests that there are still many obstacles to be overcome if women’s level of
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development is to match that of men.266
Paul VI’s proposal of the significance of the principle of affirmative action
emphasized the importance of bodies or organizations like the United Nations (UN) as
presented in chapter two. However, the implementation of the principle is not without
challenges as Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest.
. . . the United nations still does not have the power to impose its will, nor does it have a legally
authorized and authoritative representative. The time has not yet arrived to courageously propose
such a world authority because up till now the narrow concept of the sovereignty of the Nation
State still holds.267

This state of affairs does not help a nation like Uganda, which has problems it is
unable to resolve by itself. A typical example of this is the twenty-year-old war which has
ceaselessly continued in northern and north-eastern Uganda. Another challenge besides
the apparent weakness of the UN currently is that should it happen that the organization
becomes legally authorized and has an authoritative representation, there would be an
absolute power or body that would impose its ideologies on people regardless of cultural
differences in the world. The UN decisions in this case, would override the positive
elements of cultures which, Populorum Progressio suggests as indicated in Chapter Two,
are necessary values and constituent elements for human development. If a feasible
world-body or authority that moderates global life and activity is to be established, it
must be by “virtue of free consent” and promote the “spirit of liberty and of coresponsibility.”268 This consensus is not easy to achieve, whether globally or nationally,
because of differences of tribe, race, ethnicity and ideologies.
Politically, in the history of Uganda from independence up to 1980s, women,
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disabled people and youth less actively participated in Uganda’s politics. However, since
the NRM government took over the administration of Uganda, women, the disabled
people and youth have been given opportunities for political participation. They are all
represented in the parliament. The integration of women into political positions with men
is one of the greatest positive achievements of the NRM government in the field of
affirmative action.269 In Uganda’s political history the first woman Vice President,
Wandira Kazibwe, was appointed in the period of NRM, and the number of women
ministers and members of parliament and, in general, women’s involvement in political
affairs increased during this time.270 This is a positive innovation by the NRM
government – it was not just an affirmative action, it was also an option for the poor.
The innovation is a positive attempt at the promotion of women and enforcement
of affirmative action. However, in the context of true development based on the dignity
of the human person, at least a problem remains unresolved. While women are definitely
recognized to have the same dignity as men, there is a social discrimination which
penalizes men or places some artificial barrier in the way of men who qualify for certain
jobs or educational levels but are left out because of such affirmative action policy.
Although the implementation of the principle of affirmative action is the
responsibility of the government, religious institutions can contribute to the
implementation of the principle by way of suggestions to the government to formulate
and effect practicable affirmative action policies. The rationale here is that the Christian
churches have often strongly spoken and acted on behalf of women and marginalized
269
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people based on the equality of human dignity. This is, however, questionable regarding
Islam, which differs in its tradition about women from the Christian denominations.
Religious institutions need to contribute toward implementation of affirmative action
because it is the responsibility of religious institutions to act as a conscience to the nation
by reminding government of the existence of situations that need to be aggressively
addressed by the state, and in particular “religious leaders should be concerned about the
overall needs of the people they lead.”271 If the Church, its members and organizations do
not fight to change the evil conditions under which humankind lives, “it will become
identified with injustice and persecution.”272 When the church or religious institutions
and communities identify with injustice and persecution they are obsolete and
questionable.
I. Solidarity: The Challenge of Non-fragmented or Segmented Solidarity
Solidarity is a necessary and “an urgent moral imperative”273 and a challenge to
humanity created by God out of God’s love for all people. One of the critical challenges
of the principle of solidarity is the challenge to transcend self, family, tribe or ethnicity,
race and nationality. In view of this perennial problem the idea that human beings are
social, they have an affinity to unity and they are co-responsible for one another has been
persistently emphasized.274 The gravity of the challenge of the principle of solidarity is
founded on love and the universality of the principle of human dignity, much emphasized
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in Chapter three, which is shared by all people, and human affinity to unity and coresponsibility. To many people this is an unquestionable assertion. Human dignity is the
concern of the Association of the Major Superiors of Religious Institutes in Uganda
(AMSRIU) when reflecting on the situation in Uganda. They allude to people being
wounded because their dignity has been affected, and they affirm that these wounds
“presently hinder us from forming a family where, each in spite of our tribal, religious
and political differences recognizes the other as a brother and a sister to love and
respect.”275 Similarly, Denis Goulet also contends that
All agree that beyond differences of race, nationality, culture, or social organization a common
“human-ness” is present. This factual unity of a shared humanity is the first ontological basis for
solidarity among humans.276

Solidarity is an outstanding challenge to Uganda. One of the programs intended
for Uganda’s development since 1986 or earlier is the consolidation of national unity and
elimination of all forms of sectarianism as advocated in one of NRM’s ten point
programs for Uganda.277 The program suggests the significance of the principle of
solidarity. However, the practical application of the principle remains questionable in
Uganda. In spite of the historical fact that one of the significant paragraphs in the national
anthem of Uganda is “United free for Liberty together we will always stand,”278 a critical
observation reveals flaws in how Ugandans actually live this significant verse of their
national anthem. This verse of the anthem initially suggests unity, thus solidarity among
the people of the nation as expressed in the phrase “together we’ll always stand.” A
further challenge of the principle of solidarity in light of this verse is that every Ugandan
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needs not only be tolerant to others but needs a true spirit of unity. Every Ugandan who
seriously craves solidarity should adopt and apply the suggestion of Bernard Haring and
Valentino Salvoldi that “every search for unity between human beings implies first of all
that this unity be accomplished within self. . . .”279 Unity with others or love for others is
a consequence of integrity within oneself and love for oneself, and subsequently within a
small group or community. This is an interior challenge to love all and to be in solidarity
people. It is not an advocacy for selfishness or self-concern. The contention suggests that
self-acceptance and self-love are positive steps towards acceptance of others.
In the Ugandan social and economic context there is some kind of solidarity but it
is a fragmented or segmented solidarity. Solidarity in Uganda, like in African and other
contexts beyond Uganda and Africa, is in most cases fragmented because it is often based
on ethnic or similar backgrounds.280 Even within people of the same ethnic groups there
are often micro-groups based on classes or social, economic and political status. An
example to illustrate this fact is the statement of the Catholic bishops of Gulu
Archdiocese, Nebbi, Arua and Lira as they addressed the problem of the war in northern
Uganda. They state:
The Acholi are divided among themselves: there are the fighters, their supporters, their
sympathizers, the profiteers of this situation and the peace loving people (90%). Moreover there
are the Acholi soldiers in the UPDF who fight Acholi fighters (LRA) and they themselves join
other societies who in different ways oppress civilians in Acholi territory.281

This disunity within the same ethnic community could be predicated of other
ethnic groups in Uganda and beyond. In such cases the kind of solidarity expressed may
be called segmented or stratified solidarity, which is unchristian and opposed to what
279

Haring and Salvoldi, 17.
Ayittey, Africa in Chaos, 60.
281
Catholic Bishops of Gulu Archdiocese, Nebbi, Arua and Lira, 39.
280

430

Paul VI advocated in Populorum Progressio, and which was re-emphasized by John Paul
II in Solicitudo Rei Socialis. In Uganda fragmented solidarity has been exacerbated by a
lack of a common or mutually intelligible language. This is an added challenge to
Uganda.
Solidarity has also been negatively impacted by differences in economic
development. Long before the current standing problems of lack of solidarity in many
ways the commission from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
observed in 1960 that
. . . in order to cement unity of the country and to maintain stability, the Government cannot afford to
neglect the economic and social developments of certain areas where the yields to investment in purely
economic terms, may not be the highest available. The Government has also to avoid neglect of certain
fields of investment such as the law and order services, where economic returns tend to be unduly
discounted merely because they cannot be measured.282

Questions about enforcement of justice and absence of discrimination, tribalism
or regionalism are directly cited here by the commission set by the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. If some regions or people of the country are not
discriminated against and justice is allowed to take its course, the possibility of peace and
unity is high, but if justice is at stake, peace, unity and, consequently, solidarity are also
at stake. This is in the spirit of Populorum Progressio that affirms these principles,
conditions and virtues as being crucial for integral development. What the commission
advocated was integral development in the regional dimension of Uganda. Consequently,
the commission further suggested that
. . . a balance must be struck between positive measures to develop the economy as rapidly as
possible and measures to conserve the conditions essential to such development, the chief of
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which are the unity of the country and the maintenance of law and order and good relations with
neighbouring countries.283

Rapid economic development ought to go with the possibility and development of
the means to sustain it. The principle of the common good is also partially invoked here
as necessary for economic and social growth. Secondly, solidarity which is necessary for
economic growth goes beyond the solidarity of the nation. Uganda’s challenge is to show
this solidarity with its neighbors, instead of fighting with them as has been the case with
Tanzania and Kenya at Idi Amin’s time, and Rwanda, Sudan and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) during the reign of Museveni’s NRM government.284
The notion of solidarity is neither necessarily Christian nor exclusively sociopolitical. Solidarity is also an expression of responsible attitude and action extended
towards others, but it has a more theological or Christian overtones than socio-political
one because God is the Christian ethical foundation of the principle of solidarity.285 God
is the creator of all people, and all people are created imago Dei. Consequently, because
God is also a family or a solidarity of three persons, the ultimate source of solidarity is
God. This ought to be recognized. However, in a pluralistic socio-political context like
the one of Uganda the real challenge of the principle of solidarity is what the 1995
constitution of the Republic of Uganda expressly states: “Every effort shall be made to
integrate all the peoples of Uganda while at the same time recognizing the existence of
their ethnic, religious, ideological, political and cultural diversity.”286 The constitution
rightly advocates that there should be unity in diversity. The constitution’s teaching in
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this regard is in line with the Catholic social tradition and Paul VI’s teaching on the
respect for culture, and the dignity of all. The critical national challenge is the one to
implement what Populorum Progressio and the constitution of Uganda stipulate.
In Uganda the political arena is one of the areas where the principle of solidarity
is much violated. National political solidarity is, at its best, an apparent failure in Uganda.
This is manifest in the political history of the country. For example, the West Nile region
has been in a marginal position - at the periphery - since the inception of colonial
administration in the region and continues to be so.287 The different ethnic groups have
struggled and fought for political power, and one political party has often stood in strong
opposition to the others. The existence of political factions since independence are not
unfamiliar to the majority of Ugandans.
One of solidarity’s greatest challenges to religious institutions is that “religion has
frequently contributed to making . . . conflicts ‘holy’ ”288 thus justifying divisions, as
Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi contend. Uganda is a religious, and especially a
“Christian Country”289 – about 48% Catholic and 38% Protestant. The Muslims constitute
about 8-10 % of the population. The contention of Haring and Salvoldi has proved to be
true in the religious history of Uganda. At the initiation of Christianity in Uganda, there
were conflicts between these religious denominations.290 Even if open religious wars
occurred between Christians and Muslims, and even between Catholics and Protestants in
the 19th century (1880s) there has been a fairly good balance and harmonious co287
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existence and relations between the different religious denominations. However, this has
not been without flaws in the subsequent years. Around the year 1976 there was
“Muslim-Christian violence in Ankole,”291 the home place of President Yoweri Kaguta
Museveni, in western Uganda.
There is often stronger solidarity according to religious affiliations than
interdenominational solidarity. This is an issue president Yoweri K. Museveni has often
cited and emphasized as negative since 1986 when he came to power, probably because
of his 1976 personal experience of the Muslim-Christian conflicts in Ankole. He sees
religious differentiations as one of the divisive factors in the country, an idea that
challenges all Ugandan believers about the true meaning of religion. Museveni’s view is
not different from the above concession of Bernard Haring and Valentio Salvoldi.
Religion needs to be conceived, principally, as a reunion with God and fellow human
beings. The word religion is derived from the Latin word religare, to reunite what was
once united with God but has since been disunited.292 Religion should and must be an
instrument of justice, unity, reconciliation and, consequently, solidarity. The critical
challenge at this juncture is for Ugandans, especially Catholics and Protestants, to
reconsider the Christian and moral character of solidarity and desist from using the
historical idea that colonialists sowed seeds for Catholic and Protestant conflicts and
disunity as scape-goat.293 Ugandans now have a moral responsibility and obligation to
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correct the mistakes of the past of which they are aware.
However, ecumenical efforts have made possible the establishment of joint
Christian activities. One clear example of positive interdenominational solidarity is
Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC).294 The UJCC which was founded in 1964
consists mainly of Catholic, COU and Orthodox representatives.295 It needs to be
expanded to include other Christian religious groups which are not part of the Council.
This kind of association and solidarity has not been readily possible with the Muslims
because of some significant differences in religious doctrine and practice, and structural
organization. These phenomena show yet another aspect of the failure of solidarity
among the religious denominations in Uganda.
There were, however, times in Uganda’s religious and political history when all
the three major religious denominations – Catholics, Protestants and Muslims – have
worked together. A typical example, according to Paul Gifford, was when, during Idi
Amin’s presidency, the situation in the country was at its worst and the leaders of the
three religious denominations, especially the COU Archbishop Luwum and Emmanuel
Cardinal Nsubuga convened a meeting and invited all the bishops and senior Muslim
leaders to meet and share their concerns with Idi Amin.296 This is an evidence of a joint
heroic and prophetic action of leaders of different denominations in a spirit of mutual
support and solidarity, although according to Paul Gifford the death of the Protestant
archbishop, Luwum, as a consequence of a joint prophetic and heroic action of the
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religious leaders dulled the Catholic-Anglican relation because the latter thought the
former were not sincerely ready to confront the government squarely.
Mazrui observes that in most African countries including Uganda, which he cites
as an example, Muslims have been ready to accept Christians democratically elected to
be heads of states but Christian countries have been less ready to accept a Muslim who is
democratically elected to head Christian countries.297 Perhaps this is an area that needs a
critical study. General Idi Amin Dada, a Muslim, though not democratically elected
served for eight years as the head of state of Uganda that is predominantly - about 86% Christian. However, here there is need to consider the fact that he came to power through
a military coup and ruled with brutality and an iron hand.298 This was the reason he was
able to hold power for so many years.
The issue raised by Mazrui should be critically studied, weighed and considered.
Though it is not the intention of this study to go deep into that, the issue is intriguing to
Ugandan Christians. Are they being discriminatory against the Muslims or is it because
the Muslims have not provided capable leadership for Uganda or the Muslims themselves
are discriminatory? The precise answer is the Christian constitution of the population of
Uganda and the, historically, different religious ideologies reflected in the political
leadership of Uganda. There is certainly a significant difference in the vision of
Christians and Muslims. Consequently, there is not much religious and political solidarity
between Christians and Muslims.
Ugandan Catholics seem to have a greater sense and degree of unity and national
solidarity than the Anglicans and the Muslims. However, this sense of solidarity has not
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always been consistent in the Catholic Church as pointed out by Paul Gifford. 299 Gifford
correctly states that when Martin Luluga was appointed an Auxiliary Bishop of the
diocese of Gulu, he was welcome. Later as the Ordinary of the diocese he was held in
suscipicion and resented; Bishop Emmanuel Wamala received a cool reception from the
Baganda of Kampala Archdiocese in 1988 when he was appointed the Archbishop of
Kampala because he was a Muganda from the diocese of Masaka. However, despite such
phenomena there is Catholic solidarity. There are four Catholic national major seminaries
in different regions of Uganda, and Namugongo, the Uganda martyrs basilica and
national shrine, is a national centre for pilgrimage for all Catholics in Uganda and
beyond.300
Within the internal ordering of the mainstream churches or religions in Uganda Catholics, Protestants and Muslims - there have been, to this day, elements of tension and
division too. These show a failure of solidarity in the different religious denominations.
Muslims, including those in Uganda, are often characterized by fighting and divisive
behavior, even among themselves.301 In the 1990s Catholics and Anglicans were no
exceptions to similar conflicts and divisions. A Catholic example is the diocese of Kabale
in Western Uganda, where the community was divided into two factions - those who
were pro-bishop Barnabas Halem ‘Imana and those who did not support him.302 The
episode was based on ethnic and political differences, and allegations of some corruption.
The consequence was that “the entire diocese became polarized and, when all Church
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groups ceased to exist, effectively collapsed.”303 In 1992 a similar event occurred in the
COU (Church of Uganda), in the diocese of Busoga. The Christian community was also
split into those who were pro - bishop Bamwoze, the then bishop of the diocese, and the
anti - Bamwoze because it was alleged that he was dysfuntional or irrelevant, and had
practically forfeited his role and position as bishop and pastor by not fulfilling his duties,
and so another bishop should be elected.304
Despite these episodes, there are elements of solidarity among the religious
institutions in Uganda, especially in the Catholic and the Anglican churches. A clear
example of the expression of solidarity is the fact that there are a good number of bishops
in Uganda, both Catholic and Anglican, who serve among people who are of ethnic
backgrounds other than their own. In the Catholic Church the following dioceses have
bishops from outside their ethnic backgrounds: Nebbi, Gulu, Lira, Kotido, Moroto,
Kasese and Jinja. This is nearly half of the number of Catholic dioceses in Uganda. In the
Anglican Church the outstanding example is the Archbishop of Kampala, Joseph Orombi,
who is an Alur from Nebbi in northwestern Uganda but is serving among the Baganda in
the south of the country, although also in a national capacity as an archbishop.
From the foregoing treatise on solidarity the following conclusions can be made:
First, true solidarity is all-embracing and it demands mutual openness. This can be a
spontaneous process based on the virtue of universal charity and recognition of the
universality of human dignity. Secondly, where spontaneous and inclusive solidarity is
not forthcoming, especially in the political context, some form of coercion may be
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necessary as the situation in Kabale Diocese and Busoga diocese.305 Niebuhr suggests
All social co-operation on larger scale than the most intimate social group requires a measure of
coercion. Where the factor of mutual consent is strongly developed, and where standadized and
approximately fair methods of adjudicating and resolving conflicting interests within an organized
group have been established, the coercive factor in social life is frequently covert, and becomes
apparent only in moments of crisis and in the group’s policy toward recalcitrant individuals.306

The normal way of building unity and solidarity is the spontaneous one but there
are certain moments when force is necessary to complete the process of solidarity,
especially in the case of those who are simply stubborn. Such measure of force is
inevitable to hold a state or an institution together. In such a case it is a matter of
choosing between two evils – use of force to bring people together or escalating disunity
among people. In a situation where people are informed and cooperative force is not
necessary. Therefore, people need to comprehend and accept their own situation as well
as that of other people in order to build solidarity. Therefore, education for peace, unity
and solidarity is a crucial endeavor. This suggests that force is sometimes an inevitable
part of the building of social cohesion because of
the limitation of the human mind and imagination, the inability of human beings to transcend their
own interests sufficiently to envisage the interests of their fellowmen as clearly as they do their
own.307

J. Peace: The Most Delicate Challenge to Uganda
The term peace is used here in the Jewish and Christian sense of shalom or
general well-being and harmonious life in human community as explained in chapter two.
In this sense peace also implies security. It is in this context that the condition or factor of
peace remains an impending and delicate challenge in Uganda and shows the failure of
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yet another claim of Ugandan government to provide security to all people in Uganda,
and to their property as stipulated in the ten-point program of the NRM.308
While peace is the desirable thing and what human persons often seek, human
history has consistently shown violent moments. Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi
have rightly argued that human history has recurrently been filled with conflicts, even if
people have loved to live peacefully.
. . . from ancient times human beings have struggled to live peacefully side by side, having
recourse for the most part to the exclusion or marginalization to keep under control whole social
groups or “castes” defined on the basis of their economic activity, their wealth, their ancestry or
their race.309

This is true to a great extent in various societies. One evidence in Uganda is what
Mark Leopold suggests of the West Nile people. He contends that the real expectation of
the people is that government has to deliver or be relevant to them by meeting their needs
or expectations.310 This is a demand, not only relevant for the people of West Nile or
marginalized regions of Uganda, but for any person who cares about human life and
human dignity. Paradoxically, despite the fact than human beings are social and have the
affinity to unity, they also have the tendency to strive to dominate and to resist
domination. Consequently, there are conflicts and a noticeable absence of peace among
people.
Considering seriously what Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest, peace
is the most delicate challenge to efforts towards integral human development because ‘‘it
represents per se the moral progress of humanity decisively oriented towards unity. Unity
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and peace, when liberty unites them, are sisters.”311 If there is unity amidst expression of
human freedom there is real peace. Peace is crucial and demands factors such as concern
for the common good, justice and love, and it is a consequence of these significant
factors. The challenge of peace is compounded, in the Ugandan context, by the prevailing
ethnic, political, economic and religious diversity. Peace is the brain - child of justice and
love - because justice and love lead to peace. However, charity ranks higher than justice
and true Christian justice is a consequence of charity.312 Any violation of justice is a
violation of charity.
Peace is a result of just and charitable mutual action. While justice precedes
peace, some integral education is necessary for attainment of peace. It is not until all
people understand, accept and live the true meaning and value of peace that it can
actually prevail. This is why peace is a delicate principle or condition for integral human
development in Uganda.
If asked whether people are economically and socially peaceful in Uganda, the
fair answer to the question is both yes and no. The rich have economic peace of mind and
heart but not social peace because they always live under the fear of the attack from the
poor. Consequently, all they tend to do is build physical and social walls instead. On the
other hand, the poor are economically, and even socially, not peaceful because they lack
the necessities for a comfortable life. Besides that, if they are poor because of the
injustices in society or because of the rich people, deep in their hearts the poor cannot be
comfortable at all. The evidence is to be seen in what has been happening in the north and
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northeastern part of Uganda where, according to AMSRIU
After twenty years the government has failed to resolve this scandalous conflict! Meanwhile,
nearly two million of IDP (Internally Displaced People) are obliged to live in desperately inhuman
conditions. About 1000 IDP people die every week to the shame of the Government and all of us.
In their desperation, some commit suicide! Concerning the IDP, we find the letter of Mahmood
Mamdani (Daily Monitor of 4-12-05) quite appropriate.313

One of the principal challenges of peace as a necessary condition for true or
integral development is human confrontation with the dignity of other people. We ought
always to keep in mind that every person is important, everybody matters, because of
their human dignity.314 The question of justice and equality are also significant because
true peace is founded, not only on the respect for human dignity, it is also founded on the
respect for human rights, and on justice and equality.315 All principles, virtues and
conditions necessary for human development are related to human dignity. Violation of
any one of them is an automatic violation of human dignity.
Since its independence from the British in 1962 the transition of government in
Uganda has consistently been through armed force or wars. There is yet no hope that it
will ever happen peacefully. After each new government comes to power it claims to be
working for peace but time has proven them to be public liars because authentic national
peace has never been achieved at any time in Uganda’s history since independence. One
part or some parts of the country may have just relative or apparent peace but other parts
of the country are at war either physically, with neighbors or the wrong ethnic groups, or
interiorly in their minds and hearts of people because they are not in harmony. They are
disgruntled because of what is actually happening in the country.
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The years 1966-1967 were characterized by the strife between Milton Obote and
the Kabaka of Buganda and led to the eventual invasion of Kabaka’s palace at Mengo,
and ultimately to his flight into exile in England.316 Soon thereafter was the strife
between Obote and Idi Amin who eventually took over power from Obote by force in
1971.317 From 1971-1985 when Amin, Obote II, the Military Commision, Yusufu Lule,
Godfrey Binaisa and Tito Okello Lutwa, were in power and Museveni launched a
guerrilla war (1980-1985) in the Luwero triangle, there were untold sufferings and
killings in Uganda. In these years the affected people were in Lango, Acholi, West Nile
and Luwero. During this period Archbishop Luwum, an Anglican, was killed (by Amin’s
men), the home district of the Anglican Archbishop Silvanus Wani was vandalized (by
Obote’s men);318 and from 1980-1985 (during the reign of Obote, Tito Okello Lutwa and
Museveni), there were untold massacres in the Luwero triangle. From 1987-1995, as
George Ayittey records, there were also many killings and assassination attempts of both
Ugandan nationals and expatriates. For example, Hussein Musa Njuki, a newspaper
editor was killed in 1995, Andrew Lutakome Kayira, a political activist was killed in
1987, Charles Owor, District Administrator of Nebbi, was ambushed and killed in 1993,
“Peter Forbes, a Canadian Reseacher and his colleague John Ongom were murdered by
government security men, and Monsignor Fredrik[sic] Drandua, a Catholic bishop of
Arua,”319 providentially escaped an assassination attempt in 1994. These are just some of
the known indicators of violence in post-independence Uganda.
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Paul VI’s message of peace from Populorum Progressio persistently challenges
Ugandans. According to Vincent Okot Oburu, Paul VI in one of his messages on the
World Day of Peace, insisted that peace depends on everybody and is, therefore, a
challenge to everybody.320 In this context the struggle for peace is a challenge to all
Ugandans. People should not be apathetic because a region where one comes from or
lives is not affected by any fighting or anything that affects the peace of the residents of
that place, region or nation. In fact any knowledge or news of fighting, hunger,
epidemics, or any form of discrimination and injustice in any part of the country should
be enough to disrupt the relative peace within every Ugandan citizen and beyond. It is on
the bases of such assertions that the words of Paul VI, as stated by Vincent Okot Oburu,
become more forceful:
Peace will never be without a hunger and thirst for justice; it will never forget the effort that has to
be made in order to defend the weak, to help the poor, to promote the cause of the lowly. Peace
will never betray the higher values of life, in order to survive.321

Currently there is the dilemma and uncertainty among the people of Gulu,
Kitgum, Lira, parts of Soroti and Karamoja, and sometimes people of West Nile region,
about their security. Who provides security for them, and who is their enemy – the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) or National Resistance Army (NRA) or Uganda People’s
Defense Forces (UPDF). These people question themselves about who commits atrocities
in their region. The challenge to the current government is whether they are human
beings deserving peace, at least, if not citizens or part of Uganda. Lack of peace has
affected their political, social and economic output or contribution to the country. Since
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1986 they have been, and perhaps they will continue to be, dependent. A government that
claims to be the protector of people ought to do something for the peace of all its citizens.
This is also the real demand of common good as Jacques Maritain affirms.322
There are “more than 300,000 Acholi who are displaced in Acholi land itself and
living in protected camps and in other parts of Uganda.”323 They are refugees on their
own land and in their own country. To claim there is peace in Uganda is false. With
regard to peace what is true about Uganda is to affirm that there is only relative or
fragmented peace.
There is no doubt that the government has tried to fight for peace and tried to
protect some of the people in the named regions. The so-called protected camps have
been created to keep people safe and provide some measures of peace. However, it is
questionable whether these camps are actually protected because sometimes people have
been attacked and abducted from them or they are subjected to untold sufferings.324 In
other words, the camps are unprotected and unsafe to a very considerable extent. Besides
these factors the camps are undignified habitations because people are not able to work
for themselves. They cannot fully exercise their human rights. While to some extent a
relative peace has prevailed, critical caring and loving people who have witnessed the
actual conditions of the people living in the affected parts of the country are still
apprehensive about the possibility of continuous disharmony and the reversal of the peace
process.325 This is not a far-fetched apprehension because peace processes have failed
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many times in the history of Uganda.
Religious institutions in Uganda are often confronted by, and they have also
frequently confronted, the challenge of peace. The Catholic Bishops of Uganda have
consistently done this. In two consecutive years, 2004 and 2005, they have reiterated the
importance of peace for Uganda’s development, not only now but also in the future.326
While the bishops acknowledge positive developments in Uganda since they issued their
pastoral letter, A Concern for Peace, Unity and Harmony in Uganda, they repeated their
appeal for peace in the 2005 pastoral letter, Towards a Democratic and Peaceful Uganda
Based on the Common Good, in the following words:
We must all build peace in our hearts as individuals; we must build peace in our families and
communities and then we shall be able to build peace in our nation. This is a big call we want to
make to our pastoral agents, all leaders in the country to build a culture of peace, security and
tolerance among all individuals and communities in Uganda.327

The real challenge of peace is the challenge of united efforts to create peace, as
was discussed in Chapter Two. It is also a challenge to love, to foster solidarity and to
work for the common good. The challenge of peace is a call to all people to contribute
toward the tranquility and harmony of the country, socially, politically and economically.
Deusdedit R.K. Nkurunziza has rightly observed that the NRM government has not
“given the civil society and NGOs their full participation as key stakeholders of peace
keeping, peace-making and peace building,”328 yet in the past twenty years the
government has provided no feasible solution to the problem of insurgency in northern
and northeastern Uganda. This challenge also confronts these groups to which
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government has consistently denied participation, and the entire nation. The involvement
of the civil society in the peace-building process and good governance in any part of
Uganda is fundamental for far reaching results and ought not to be neglected.329
One of the considerable challenges the question of peace poses for religious
institutions is their failure to achieve the goal of effective preaching of the gospel of love
and peace. While most of the churches have often intervened to negotiate for peace
between warring factions, they have often not been successful because the powers that be
or the warring parties have not cooperated adequately. Instead they have often fought for
their own, and often selfish, interests. To date the seeming failure of the efforts of the
religious leaders in Uganda can be seen in the last twenty years of war in northern and
northeastern Uganda, particularly in Gulu, Kitgum, Lira, Apach, Soroti and Karamoja in
the northeast of the country. There is only a minimum success. The real failure is
suggested by the frustration of the Catholic bishops of Uganda about the failure of
government to resolve the situation in these regions. This is evident in their plea:
We once again reiterate our call to Government to do all it can to end the war in the North without
any further delays. We do understand that significant achievements have been recorded in terms of
security of people and property - reduction in abductions, security on roads and the surrender of
many Lords resistance army (LRA) fighters - thanks to the government and to the Amnesty Act
and the efforts of Ms. Betty Bigombe and the different religious and political groups in northern
Uganda.330

While the bishops acknowledge the successes so far recorded, they are still
emphatic that more needs to be done to improve the situation in the region. There is still a
significant degree of desperation, insecurity and suffering among the people of Northern
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and Eastern Uganda.331 This again consistently demands a concerted effort of all parties.
In relation to the situation in northern Uganda, another challenge to religious
institutions is to embody what true religion teaches. The LRA who have fought since the
NRM government came to power in 1986 claim to be a religious faction that wants to run
Uganda according to the ten commandments of God – thus claiming the fight to be a
religious war.332 They have killed many, abducted and raped women, and subjected many
people to torture. By so doing they denied that the commandments advocate love of all
and care for all, and harmonious coexistence. One would question this type of religion,
and its authenticity. This is a challenge to religious institutions because they are to unite
people to God and to one another. Here is again a failure in understanding what religion
is. In this case religion is also practically an utter failure because it has not united people
but divided them instead. This same failure can be ascribed to the killers at Kanugu, who
are believed to be the religious leaders,333 a story which the government ceased to follow
and which makes one question whether the government is there to protect the people of
Uganda, and whether it cares about the life and dignity of its citizens.334 The challenges
of peace in Uganda are: development of a real culture of universal love, justice, mutual
understanding, and consideration for the common good of the country. However, the
critical challenge in the actual pursuit of peace is that true peace is durable, not restricted
to a few people and not a temporary cessation of violence, “peace must be pursued and
rights defended within moral restraints and in the context of defining other basic human
331
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values.”335 The methodology for pursuing peace should always take into account the
dignity of the human person and the desire to care for everybody.
The attainment of peace requires some specific strategies. One strategy is peace
education which promotes tolerance and mutual trust among people of different
backgrounds.336 The principles of this education are: respect for and defense of human
dignity and rights, that the individual is not subordinate to the state, stewardship of
natural resources and their destiny, defiance of discrimination, participation in social,
religious, cultural and political life of people and the understanding of solidarity, charity,
sense of dialogue and negotiation, common good and justice.337 This education ought to
be carried out nationally and to the different categories or classes of people. It should
constitute part of the education curriculum of Uganda from the lowest level to the
highest. It should, as in the real sense of religion, be part and parcel of the obligation of
all religious institutions.
K. Association: The Challenge of laissez faire or Restricted Association
The principal problems related to freedom of association among the people of
Uganda, both nationally and locally at the level of ethnic groupings and similar smaller
groupings, is the inability to transcend culture, religion, ethnicity and political
differences.338 These had partial roots in the colonial administration that favored some
sectors of the population and disfavored others. There are a few associations such as the
Farmers Associations and Co-operative Societies but they are neither widespread nor
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viable institutions. On the whole there are few credible economic associations or
organizations.
When Uganda got independence from the British it immediately imprisoned itself
consistently in a system of one-party politics, though nominally there were political
parties in the early post-independence years. The first Ugandan leaders after
independence seemed never to believe in democracy and its attendant values such as
justice and the respect for human rights and the common good.339 One of the greatest
political challenges and difficulties regarding association in the history of Uganda since
independence has recurrently been that of not giving opportunity for a multi-party
political system. One regime after another resented multi-party politics for extensive
periods of time. This was most observable in the eight years of Idi Amin’s military rule340
and twenty years of Yoweri K. Museveni’s partly military rule and the later years of a
seeming civilian administration.341 Freedom of political association in the form of
political parties was banned. The second regime of Milton Obote and recently that of
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (February 2006) were perhaps the only ones that allowed
different political parties to function. Nonetheless, all the presidents of Uganda since
independence have used the army as personal machinery for limiting the activities of
other political parties.
On a positive note from 1986 or in the last twenty years the government of
Uganda has been careful in following any attempts by groups of people to form new
339
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parties. Radical groups that have tendencies to disrupt the smooth functioning of the
government and the nation have been restricted, especially radical political groups with
evil ideologies. President Museveni has particularly feared the formation of new political
associations or parties formed along lines of religion. Muslim parties are among some of
the dreaded ones, probably because of their character and the experiences during Idi
Amin’s regime. Mazrui’s explanation is perhaps one of the best to understand
apprehensions about some Muslim groups. He suggests that radicalism in Islamic politics
is because Islam “has not only a tradition of submissive following but also, paradoxically,
a tradition of rebellious leadership.”342
Since the role of government and religion is to help people to meet their needs
and to protect or care for them, any political party that does not meet such standards or
goals is, prudently speaking, not permissible because it defeats the purpose of these
institutions. This has basically been the fear of the NRM government. However, the
banning of political parties by the NRM government in the last twenty years is not
democratically positive.343 The preceeding argument is a support only for the prevention
of the development of radical political groups that would create unrest, not for the
banning of political parties per se. The legislative branch of the government (the
parliament) and the constitution of the country, which is the supreme law of the country,
should be invoked, though not manipulated to satisfy individual interests.
The challenge of the principle of association is that of the choice between liberal
freedom for association and conservative limitation of freedom for association. If people
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are allowed too much freedom to form associations the consequence could be anarchy or
lawlessness. If they are too much restricted from associations the consequence could also
be a violent explosion of anger and revolution. The historical reaction of the “antiBuganda sentiments” 344 of Non-Baganda, created by the colonial administration, better
illustrates the possibility of such reactions. In either case the consequences are negative
and undesirable. This is the dilemma and challenge to the political situation in Uganda.
There should, therefore, be a balance or moderation.
There is freedom of religion and freedom of associations. Religious institutions
are themselves associations. An authentic religious association ought to promote the
human person, dignity and rights, and universal charity. The principal challenge to
religious groups is that they should establish micro-associations within the same larger
group. In Uganda the Catholic church has perhaps performed better than other religious
institutions in this regard.345 Its structural organization provides for different associations
and movements for people of various categories or different age groups in order to meet
different needs of people. The structural organizations of the associations run from the
lowest level of the church through the diocesan level to the national level. Other Christian
denominations have made attempts to do the same but they have not matched the level of
the structural organization in the Catholic church. Muslims have associations of their own
but they are more fragmented because of the various sects extant within the religion.
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L. Participation or Involvement: The Challenge of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity
Participation suggested in this section means involvement of all people in the
development project. It means that every person including people who are not experts in
decisions and actions related to issues affecting them is part and parcel of every decision
related to their life, as Goulet suggests.346 If people, including non-experts, do not
participate in deciding what affects them, they may even have no enthusiasm for practical
action necessary for their development. Depriving them of participation in determining
their own fate constitutes an injustice – namely, social, economic and political injustice.
Participation is important because not only one person or a group of few individuals or a
party has all the right answers and solutions to problems.347 The more people are
involved the more easily solutions can be sought to problems, and the more ideas can be
enriched.
Paul VI underscored the significance of the principle of participation. He
emphasized that “every person and all people are entitled to be shapers of their own
destiny.” 348 As treated in chapter two he advocated that all people need to be involved in
the development process. Museveni similarly states that “government does not work
alone. Poverty-eradication is the business of all citizens of Uganda.”349 Though Museveni
does not state it clearly or explicitly, in a way he suggests that participation is a right.
The exercise of this principle or right is problematic in pluralistic contexts, not
only because people have no opportunity but also because people are sometimes passive.
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Mark Leopold has remarked this of the Lugbara and the Alur in their historical past
where he suggests that they have been “passive victims,” 350meaning that for a long time
they have faced problems without getting involved in confronting them. They observed
situations without doing anything about the prevalent problems while they should have
been part of the problem-solving process. This kind of attitude is a challenge to people
who do not care to participate in confronting issues affecting them or society in general.
While every time one thinks of a nation one, at least theoretically, thinks that it is
an independent entity with united citizens. Most countries either think this is what they
are or this is what they want to be or they are working to build. However, the actual
situation is often different on close observation. This is true even of the most
homogeneous community. Uganda is no exception to such a phenomenon, especially
considering its ethnic and racial diversity. It is for this reason that one of the greatest
challenges to the people of Uganda, the Church or religious institutions and the state is
that “development should involve the participation of the broad mass of the people and
not only of a few. People have to be involved in the work of their development. . . . man
can only develop himself. He cannot be developed by another.”351
For a long time, in the economic history of Uganda, economic activities were
dominated by expatriates or naturalized citizens. Trading merchandise and industrial
activities were, for instance, dominated by the Asians while the indigenous people were
economically and even socially marginalized.352 When Idi Amin became Uganda’s
president in 1971, he expelled all the Asians in 1972 regardless of whether they were
350
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Ugandan citizens or not, confiscated their property and entrusted it to the custodian
board. Idi Amin declared what he called economic war and decided to Africanize
economic activities.353 This in itself was cruel and unjust. However, Amin’s intention
was to entrust the economy of the country to the indigenous Ugandans. It was an effort to
give indigenous Ugandans the opportunity for economic participation. It was at this time
that Ugandans started to, more closely and critically, learn to do business and manage
their economy.
This was an effort towards economic participation, although often uncritically and
negatively viewed by many outsiders and some Ugandans. It was a clear message to the
indigenous Ugandans that they could and ought to do business or take care of their
economy just like the expatriates. This action is, however, opposed to James P. Bailey’s
contention that “economic activity is one way people participate in, and benefit from, the
community; barriers to participation in the economy are to be challenged.”354 In this
context a careful observation suggests that Idi Amin is not exclusively to blame for the
expulsion of Asians from Uganda and economic businesses. Those who established an
economic system that excluded the indigenous people of Uganda - precisely the British
colonial masters355 - are also to blame. However, the injustice of Idi Amin was that of
confiscating the property of the Asians and expelling even those who were Ugandan
citizens. Amin’s Africanization of the economy was also a failure because it led to what
came to be known as the Magendo economy which “was characterized by speculation,
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hoarding, smuggling and black marketeering.”356 This means customers paid high prices
for commodities, not because the commodities were worth the prices charged but,
because business people created shortage of supply in order to raise prices and reap high
profits. This was also injustice to the citizens who offered the market for the business
people involved in the promotion of such economy.
Another notable challenge with regard to the application of the principle of
participation is that participation is determined by the type of development required or in
question. Certain areas of development require specific skills or technical knowhow
while others do not. As Goulet suggests
different kinds of development require different forms of participation. A “people-centered”
development requires participation which assigns priority to satisfaction of basic needs among the
poor, to job creation, self-reliance, and the active preservation of cultural diversity obviously
requires a form of participation in which non-elites play an active role in the diagonosis of their
own problems. If on the other hand, a top-down, growth oriented approach to development is
adopted by a particular country, it is most likely that whatever participation does occur will not be
generated by the people themselves from below. Rather, participation will be imposed by the
government for the purpose of rallying the populace to implement activities planned for it. In this
case bottom-up participation will generally be confined to resistance against imposed plans and
projects, or to micro “do-it-yoursel”activities.357

The critical challenge is to determine what kind of participation is needed in
different development projects. The frequently-made mistake is to impose on people that
they should be involved or for the people to think that they do not have to be involved in
a particular development project. This squares with the difficulty of applying the
principle of subsidiarity. The solution to this problem ought to be sought in appropriate
education that provides for the requisite expertise.
From a political point of view, at the outset it is necessary to note that one of the
main challenges of the principle of participation is that no person, no government or
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political system should ever be considered irreplaceable or indispensable.358 Each person
or system contributes in its own way. Each one has advantages and disadvantages,
weaknesses and strengths.
The question of political participation in Uganda is of profound importance
because the political history of the country shows how much, to date, true political
participation was lacking in one regime after another. It has consistently been a
questionable issue from the time of independence to the present time.359 The colonial
masters designed the political administration in such a way that the Baganda, the most
dominant ethnic group in Uganda, and the first to encounter and interact with the
international world, would be more involved in and take charge of political
administration. From then, and especially from the time of independence from the British
in 1962, this trend of limited political participation has persisted. What Thompson
Gardener affirms is perhaps one of the strongest assertions that testify to this claim. He
says:
participatory democracy based on political parties has been no more welcome in the latter period
than in the former. At both times political parties have been seen as the tool of individual
opportunists, and of interest groups based on ethnicity and/or religion, if not class. First Cohen and
colonialism, then Museveni and the Movement: each has sought to manage political aspiration and
pressure, while inhibiting the growth, exercise and significance of parties.360

When Milton Obote forcefully grabbed power from Kabaka Edward Mutesa with
the help of Idi Amin, the then military commander, it was a reaction to the lack of
involvement or the limited involvement of the people who were marginalized, especially
people of northern Uganda. The consequence was that when Obote himself took over
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power he allied more with the northerners, particularly people of his tribe: the Langi, the
Acholi and the Luo in general.361 This was one of the reasons for Idi Amin’s overthrow
of Obote and his promise to unite all Ugandans. It was welcome news to most Ugandans
but soon frustrated when Idi Amin decided to ally with and mostly involve the Kakwa,
Nubians and Sudanese and alienated the rest of the people of Uganda.362
Disgruntled by this state of affairs Ugandans in exile reorganized themselves to
expel Idi Amin with the help of Tanzanian troops. No sooner was this successfully
achieved than one overthrow after another occurred between 1979 and 1980, from
Yusufu Lule through Godfrey Binaisa to Obote II.363 When Obote returned to the
presidency for a second time in 1980, a clique of Luo and a few extra-luo supporters took
control of Uganda. However, they were soon divided among themselves – a division of
the Acholi against the Langi, leading to the overthrow of Obote, a Langi, by Tito Okello
Lutwa, an Acholi.364 The latter was overthrown by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, a
Munyakole from Western Uganda, in January 1986. He promised to make a fundamental
change, establish what he called a broad-based government, which would provide for the
participation of different categories and ethnic groups of people.365 He did this and it
seemed to work satisfactorily in the first five years of his regime, but as he clung to
power the spirit of participation continued to wane, especially from the point of view of
ethnic representation, religious representation and participation of political parties.
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One of the positive contributions of the NRM government that captured the idea
of participation was the constitutional review and writing process. This involved the
election of representatives from different areas or regions of the country, and different
walks of life to the Constituent Assembly.366 The result was the review of the 1967
constitution, and the writing and promulgation of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic
of Uganda. This was a positive achievement. However, this constitution has posed a
challenge of its own. The implementation of the constitution has already been questioned.
Thompson Gardener has doubts of its actual use. According to him many written
constitutions, including the current one of Uganda, have not been lived and only “few if
any written constitutions achieve the iconic status of the American.”367
What one observes in Uganda is political association or participation based on
ethnicity, religion or political convenience and political parties. One of the challenges
Populorum Progressio presents here is that ethnic or any other type of discrimination is
opposed to the spirit of integral human development, universality of human dignity,
solidarity, the common good, justice and universal charity. A similar trace of
discrimination is also reflected in the number of politicians according to religious
denominations. From the time Muslims lost in the religious wars in 1889, long before
Uganda’s independence and even before a proper establishment and consolidation of
colonialism, they have at best remained at the periphery of Uganda’s political, economic
and social life.368
Compared to Catholics and Protestants, Muslim politicians are very few but
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according to Gifford “there are far fewer Catholics in top political positions”369 than
Protestants. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Catholic leadership has been
asking pastoral agents such as priests, religious, catechists, and justice and peace
commissions in the country to educate people and be prudently and impartially involved
in political affairs, and to help people to adopt just ways of being part of the political
process.370 The Protestant practice of discrimination is believed to have originated in the
pre-independence days when Catholics thought that Anglican politicians, the Church of
England and the Archbishop of Canterbury cheated the Catholics, and the Church of
Uganda (COU) is intimately tied to the state - a feeling of discrimination, which lasts up
to the present day.371
Participation in the political process is important because each citizen has civil or
political rights to exercise. When political participation is lacking, something has not
been done by those responsible for the public good. Precisely, people have either not
been adequately educated or their participation has been deliberately curtailed or
prevented by state/government agents. It is for similar reasons that the Catholic bishops
of Uganda and other people have insisted that the government should create a level
ground for all to participate and compete favorably, political activities should be fully
demilitarized, people should be provided full civic education so that they can freely and
fully participate in the political process in Uganda.372 In other words, human freedom for
political participation should not be limited by any external coercion. These requests have
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been emphasized because the vital principle of participation has been gravely neglected
or abused by the political systems in Uganda. They are a call to radical change in the
systems. It is also for the same reasons that citizens are urged to “avoid passivity or ‘I do
not care’ attitude.”373 They are being reminded of what many have neglected in the past,
even up to recently, namely, their rights, their civic or political duties or responsibilities
to their country and particularly the need to work for the common good of the nation.
The reminder of the Catholic bishops of Uganda is significant, especially to the
Catholic community, because for long in its history Catholic involvement in politics has
been minimal. The observation of Gifford is a testimony to the significance of the
encouragement of the Catholic bishops of Uganda to the Catholic population to
participate in politics. He says: “The Anglican church is smaller, but is much more
powerful politically. All Uganda’s heads of government (except Amin) have come from
Anglican background.” 374 It is possible that Catholic political passivity in the course of
Uganda’s political history is responsible for their lagging behind the Anglicans or
Protestants politically. It is now time for the Uganda Catholic population to realize, as
Sean P. Kealy says, that:
. . . it seems clearer than ever, that there is no real choice between political involvement and noninvolvement for the church. All questions are ultimately religious and in need of theological
reflection in a never-ending circle.375

This challenging issue raised by Kealy is real. The issue or suggestion has been
exemplified in the ceaseless teaching of the Uganda Catholic bishops from the time of
Uganda’s independence until today. The Uganda Catholic population faces this challenge
in a real and special way because of the fact that it is behind the Protestant population in
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participation in politics. The previous and recent advocacy of the Uganda Catholic
bishops also amounts to some very crucial issues in the church-state relationship. They
are suggesting, as Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff contend, that “concentration of
power in a religious group as such easily impairs democracy, in which citizens should
have equal opportunities to exercise political power on a fair basis.”376 Beyond this fact,
Christian mission and duty call all Christians to the fulfillment of this mission. They
should learn from the example of Jesus Christ’s mission in the world of his time with its
attendant problems. Jesus himself was “far more politically minded and far more
concerned with the political life of his nation in relation to God’s all-embracing purposes
than many pious Christians have often supposed.”377
Within the individual religious institutions the question of participation needs to
be addressed. The challenge here is people’s participation in the religious life or activities
in the country. We mentioned earlier that Uganda is dominantly a Christian country with
Catholics leading numerically. There are also other religious denominations. The
question at this juncture is the one of the representation of the religious denominations
and their involvement or participation in Uganda’s political and religious sectors. The
Catholic bishops of Uganda have raised in their pastoral letter With A New Heart and A
New Spirit that some Christians think that the call to holiness is for priests and
religious.378 This issue should also be extended to people’s general participation in the
country. The civil population ought to be encouraged to participate and should participate
in the life of the nation. Unfortunately, the civil population in Uganda often looks to the
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government or head of state for solutions to their problems, thinking that “power belongs
to the head of state” and forgetting that the power of the head of state “is delivered by the
people” because in a truly democratic system “real political power rests with the people,
the governed and not with the governor.”379
The populace of Uganda should be educated to know that participation in the
affairs of the country affecting them is their right. For any Christian and person who
values morals, participation as Goulet suggests, should be seen as “a moral incentive that
empowers hitherto excluded non-elites to negotiate new material incentives for
themselves.”380 The suggestion of Goulet is not merely a motivation or an encouragement
of people’s involvement but also a statement of fact about the significance of
participation in personal and communal development. The ultimate participation is one
where people whose life is affected by decisions related to their life are part of the
decision-making process.
M. Education: The Challenge of Universal, Integral and Relevant Education
The significance of education was much emphasized during the second Vatican
council on the basis of human dignity. The council members were clear that “all men of
whatever race, condition or age, in virtue of their dignity as human persons have, an
inalienable right to education.”381 A correct understanding of education is crucial to the
understanding of its significance and application. While education may be equated to
instruction, teaching, guidance, inculcation, indoctrination, initiation, and similar terms,
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the definition and significance of education suggested by the Catholic bishops of Uganda
suffices for our purpose here: education is “a means to develop the character, intellectual
abilities and moral stature of individuals” and “the civilization of a society is a product of
education.”382 There is no development without education whether formal or informal
education.
At the outset it should be observed that the formal educational system in Uganda
was initiated by the Catholic and Protestant missionaries, and also Muslims.383 They are
the true protagonists of formal education in the history of education in the country. They
continued administering schools until 1960s when the school system was taken over by
the government of Uganda, and “since the mid-1960s, church influence in education has
been significantly reduced through the nationalization of the school system.”384 This
government initiative was not without some negative consequences in the educational
system and management in the country, yet education is one of the crucial factors for
human development. Post-independence Uganda witnessed a significant change in the
education system and administration when government assumed direct responsibility for
financial adminstration of schools because finincial initiatives of the churches
declined.385 This was not, however, only a miscalculation on the part of the government,
it was also negligence on the part of the churches that were aware of the importance of
education.
The purpose of education as a strategy or factor for integral human development
is that it makes the public aware of their conditions and alternative possibilities.
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Education promotes this awareness “in order to win their intellectual and political support
for a normatively better future.”386 Education helps people to improve their life-style
because to change a people’s way and standard of living, one needs to influence their
thoughts, understanding and convictions or vision of life. Effective education can do this.
Since 1970 higher education has rapidly grown in Uganda but the growth has only
been in terms of the number of people enrolled, not the nature and the structure of the
education system adapted to the needs of the country.387 A significant indicator of postindependence decline in Uganda’s educational growth or development and standards is
what George B.N. Ayittey has stated: “In the 1950s Makerere University in Kampala,
Uganda, used to be proudly called ‘the Harvard of Africa.’ Today it is in a state of
dilapidation.”388 Although ranked as one of the 11-15 top African Universities today,
Ayittey’s observation does relate the inside story of Makerere University which is the
first, and actually the biggest of the four State universities where the leadership of the
nation is educated. The dilapidation he has mentioned should be further read beyond
physical dilapidation of the structures to the moral or ethical decay of the university as
told by numerous students and many administrative staff members including some of the
former academic staff like Mamood Mamdani. If the future leadership of a nation is
educated in and by such an institution, the future of development in the nation is also at
stake, and the nation’s claims for development are questionable, to a great degree. As the
conciliar fathers suggested, education should help people “to develop harmoniously their
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physical, moral and intellectual qualities.”389 This is the kind of education integral human
development calls for.
From 1970-1995 “government commitment to funding education was fairly
consistent.”390 However, the educational system and curriculum in Uganda since
independence has remained traditional in the sense that it has not been oriented to the
formation for integral human life. Education is dominantly helping people to be literate
and informed socially, scientifically, religiously, historically and politically. Even this is
not adequately done. The suggestion of the International Bank Committee that more work
needs to be done to “widen the range of human knowledge about Uganda’s physical and
human resources and how they can best be developed”391 is a recommendation to be
noted. Often times, even today, the country relies on the expertise of expatriates to try to
understand itself and its needs better. This is a significant sign that there is still much
work to be done. However, some of the new Universities are attempting to address the
needs of the country. For instance, “Nkumba University offers a variety of programmes
that are linked and related to the job market.”392
For the first time in Uganda’s education history, the Catholic bishops’ conference
of Uganda was able to think more aggressively of integral education for living a good
life, in accordance with their stipulations in the 1997 education policy.393 The Uganda
Catholic bishops decided to open Uganda Martyrs’ University. The relevance of the
University is based on its philosophy. A.B.K. Kasozi states
389
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The philosophy of the Uganda Martyrs’ University is derived from Catholic Christian philosophy
of the human person. Accordingly, its aim is to develop individuals who combine career
competence with a sense of moral responsibility both at the individual and social level.394

The Catholic bishops of Uganda decided to establish Uganda Martyrs University
(UMU) to counteract the immoral atmosphere in the country – an atmosphere that
militates against crucial virtues and principles such as love, justice, peace, participation
the common good, the human person, human rights and human dignity. It seems to be a
success story of education in Uganda’s history because the graduates of the university are
doing well in real work situations. They constitute some of the best and relevant
personnel in institutions where they work. They provide some of the labor force the
moral situation in Uganda calls for. The Institute of Ethics and Development Studies is
particularly oriented to help students live a decent life. The relevance of UMU is also
seen in the fact that it has designed a curriculum that attempts “to address social
concerns” and it delivers “quality higher education with a moral emphasis”395 to pursue
the goal of relevance, and moral as well as academic excellence. Its emphasis on moral
development is evident in what Kasozi states:
The teaching of moral values is integrated in and is part of the curriculum of all other disciplines.
It is core to UMU teaching. Acceptable moral values and their seeping into the general society,
particularly the educated elite, is a legacy that UMU strives to contribute to the Ugandan society
through higher education.396

This is the kind of education system Uganda needs today if it is to develop
integrally. Hence, UMU offers for the education system in Uganda a model of education
to emulate, even at the level of primary and secondary school education. From a social
point of view a challenge that confronts Uganda’s education system is the unequal access
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to higher education. This is a problem that can be traced to the early times in the history
of Uganda. It should be considered a critical challenge because
it was the means by which southerners, particularly Baganda, came to dominate the affairs of the
country. The education system had been started by the missionaries and the first schools were
located in Buganda.397

Traditional attitudes toward education have also often favored men more than
women, who are often considered more resourceful in making wealth, good for marriage
and domestic work.398 In such cases from a Christian anthropological point of view the
female gender is discriminated against, and the understanding of human dignity and
human right is flawed. This is gender inequality or discrimination in education in terms
of gender. To achieve integral development is difficult because of the traditional or
cultural attitude about the education of women. It is this attitude which creates this
gender inequality, a fundamental social injustice that must be eliminated before a positive
step can be made toward increased education of women. This cultural factor also
militates against the promotion of the common good and the operation of the principle of
participation or involvement which were much encouraged by Paul VI as crucial for
integral development, and especially recommended by the Second Vatican Council.399
The education system in Uganda provides for little socio-economic and political
education. It is only in the higher institutions of learning that political science is taught.
At lower levels civics is taught but does not address real or serious political issues and
problems. For instance, serious questions like those of human rights, human dignity and
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peace which are important for political stability, are not part of the education curricula.400
Even in the higher institutions of learning these issues are taught to people who have
specialized in political sciences. This means that a large sector of the population grows
up to be politically ignorant. If politicians triumph over the populace during elections it is
because they prey on the ignorance of the masses.
There is no question that “education is primordial in the development of a
country; it is a prerequisite for civilization and a progressing society can be judged by the
quality of its education.”401 Consequently, one principal challenge to the Uganda
government is to ensure that the whole population is educated. Education would help the
nation to achieve its enduring goals since independence, namely the fight against disease,
poverty and ignorance as advocated first by Milton Obote and continued by the majority
of the successive leaders. Without good, relevant and integral education it is difficult to
achieve these goals.
In 1997 Uganda government introduced Universal Primary Education (UPE).402
This innovation was partly a solution to the problem of ignorance, sickness and poverty
and partly to promote the political or personal agenda of the NRM government.
Nonetheless, the attempt seems to be an utter failure because the products, in the form of
quality education, are extremely poor. This is basically because there are no adequate
rooms, school supplies and other necessary facilities for the students. Pedagogically, this
is not right because in such circumstances students do not receive the badly needed
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integral education or formation. When there are too few teachers the students cannot be
assisted adequately. For example, in the year 2000, there were 59 students for every
primary school teacher.403 In such a case there is no adequate follow-up of students.
Consequently, they cannot be adequately and effectively helped. Compared to the 1970
ratio of teacher to students, which was 34 students for every Primary school teacher, there
is a much better opportunity to help students than in times UPE came into effect about
thirty years later.404 The UPE program is relevant and necessary but its implementation
started without sufficient planning and resources. At most it only contributed to some
political successes for certain individuals, not the nation, because it was used for political
propaganda.
Equal participation in provision of education according to different religious
denominations is significant. Uganda’s history has revealed that some religious
denominations have been deliberately discriminated against for religious and political
reasons. Justus Mugaju observes that “the Anglicans became the de facto established
church in Uganda” and Catholics have often felt “outsiders in the politics of their own
country.”405 The attempt to close some Catholic Teachers’ Training colleges, especially
Lodonga Teachers’ Training college, on March 31, 1999, even if equal opportunity for all
districts was one of the explanations for the closure of some teachers’ training colleges, is
a sign of the failure of implementation of the principle of equal participation or
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opportunity.406 Yet the same year the best performing Teachers Training College was the
Catholic-founded Lodonga Primary Teachers’ College (PTC), one of the teachers’
training colleges slated for closure together with Mbarara, while Kalangala and Ajumani
that were not viable were favored by the policy of closure.407 In the year 2006 the same
college has been the best performing teachers’ college in the whole of Uganda with
79.9% of the students passing their final national examinations, and the best student of
the nation’s PTCs emerging from the same Lodonga PTC out of the 47 PTCs
nationwide.408 This is a challenge the ministry of Education never adequately addressed
until the Catholic bishops questioned the prevailing events.
Church contributions to education in Uganda have been invaluable. Ddungu notes
that “since Vatican Council II (1965), the church in Uganda has made significant efforts
to promote ‘development education’ in order to conscientize people to social and
economic development.”409 This contribution has been through formal and informal
education which the church worked hard to promote wherever it was possible.
One of the principal educational challenges to Christian religious institutions in
Uganda is the teaching of Christian Religious Education (CRE). This has declined since
the government took over the administration of most schools and a joint syllabus was
established. Religious institutions need to ensure that the standard of religious education
taught in schools improves to that of 1963 when government took over the management
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of schools from church institutions.410 This has meant that some aspects of the Christian
faith where there are differences, especially between the Catholics and Protestants or
other Christian denominations, are either not taught or not adequately emphasized
because the syllabi are ecumenical, although this in itself is positive in the sense that it
shows some element of solidarity among religious groups.
Another critical challenge in the field of education, especially to Catholics, is the
problem of educational monopoly. The Protestants should be commended for their
ecumenically forthcoming attitude and shrewdness, founded in the colonial period
because the colonial masters of Uganda were dominantly of Protestant background.411 As
referred to earlier in this chapter, one issue remains challenging to religious institutions
and political leaders of Uganda. It is the Protestant attitude of insistently and consistently
trying to dominate both the political and the educational sector in the country. A typical
example is already cited above, the attempt by the government ministry of education or
parliament, coincidentally or otherwise dominated by Protestants, to close some targeted
teachers’ training colleges in the country. An analysis of the event showed that most, if
not almost all colleges slated to be closed, were Catholic-founded. The challenge to
Catholics in such a case is to question how genuine ecumenical endeavors have been in
the past and whether government is not violating the equalitarian principle according to
which “the state may not give preference to one religion over another”; and also to some
extent the neutrality principle which states that “the state should neither favor nor
disfavor a religion as such or give positive or negative preference to institutions or
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persons simply because they are religious.”412 In either case the Catholic church is a
victim. If a parliament or a government ministry discriminates against certain sectors of
the nation’s population, its sense of justice and respect for this principle is questionable.
The Catholic church and other Christian churches, emphasise that Religious or
Moral education should be compulsory in Catholic schools, especially on the secondary
school level.413 However, Christian churches in general face the challenge that in many
schools CRE is neglected or not emphasized enough. Even if churches can have their
programs for catechesis, one thing to be remembered is the constant or ongoing need for
practical catechesis. The continuity of such a progressive process of religious education is
interfered with in schools if their directors do not consider the question of religious
education seriously, whether they are primary schools or institutions of higher learning.
As a conclusion of the various critical challenges of Paul VI’s vision of integral
human development to Uganda, I would like to adopt what Luke Mbefo Nnamdi states
about Ghandi’s vision of some of the great challenges or evils that confront humanity,
and actually obstruct true human development. He states:
To Ghandi has been ascribed the seven-fold catalogue of deadly sins, namely: wealth without
labour, religion without sacrifice, politics without principles, commerce without morality, pleasure
without conscience, education without character and finally science without humanity.414

The reason for the appropriation of Ghandi’s vision as stated by Mbefo is that the
statement captures the challenges I have outlined in light of Populorum Progressio. It
also captures some of the recommendations that feature in the subsequent section.
Finally, the vision of Ghandi as stated by Mbefo points to the real sources of dishonesty,
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corruption and lack of true human development.
IV. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Integral Education
Education is perhaps the most crucial social factor of human development. The
significance of education is seen in the fruits of human activity and in the quality of life
of people. The criticial statement made by Adam Smith, as quoted by Reinhold Niebuhr,
is significant reminder and summary of the contributions of education towards human
development.
An instructed and intelligent people are always more decent and orderly than a stupid one.They
feel themselves each individually more respectable and more likely to gain the respect of their lawful
superiors. . . . They are disposed to examine and are more capable of seeing through the interested
complaints of faction and sedition, and they are upon that account less apt to be misled into any wanton or
unnecessary opposition to the measures of government.”415

The principal concern of this section is to make some suggestions for Uganda.
One of the greatest challenges for educational development is whether education is
relevant to people’s development needs.416A relevant formal and informal education
helps people to critically see other people’s conditions and their own situation, their
needs and their roles, and to compare their own situation with that of other people and to
realize that they have a dignity that deserves respect and a certain standard of living. It
helps people to reflect and strive to find alternative ways of living. The knowledge of
good and evil or right and wrong is at the foundation of any moral or ethical behavior and
reflection.417 Uganda’s educational institutions, whether public or private, religious or
secular, should emphasize education about moral or ethical values, help students to
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differentiate what is evil and detrimental to society from values that promote society. Any
suggestions for education should attempt to meet these and similar standards.
Integral education suggested here means the complete education of the student.
The education recommended here is what Levis Mugumya describes, after the example
of Paul VI, as an appropriate education to which all people have rights, the type of
education which aims at “developing an individual’s personality, talents, mental and
physical abilities to their fullest potential.”418 It facilitates attainment of the goals of the
type of education (integral) suggested. Integral education is a comprehensive education
for human enhancement and promotion of society, an education that helps people feel
comfortable almost everywhere. Such education incorporates or integrates the history,
geography, cultures, politics, economy, and religions of peoples and should help students
“to develop a sense of civic responsibility”419 as is the goal in most North American
countries. J.C.B. Bigala affirms this as the goal of education when he states that
Integral education should promote the welfare of individuals and of society through providing
intellectual, occupational and professional skills, social, moral and spiritual development.420

The significance of education for national integration and development is
invaluable. As Matthew Habiger states, “education to solidarity is an urgent necessity of
our day.”421 It is one of the first factors necessary to achieve peace and national unity or
integration. It helps develop “in the heart of every individual and in the activities of every
society a true sense of stewardship and solidarity.”422 Besides being a necessary factor to
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achieve peace and national unity, education is a “driver of development.”423
Consequently, the leadership of the Churches should help the government to ensure that
from the lowest level to the highest level, education continues to provide for the
possibility of peace, unity and development.
While universal primary education is a positive or relevant innovation because it
benefits not only individuals but all categories of people, the ministry of education ought
to improve the UPE program in Uganda. The ministry should improve and expand plans
for primary education by providing the requisite conditions for effective universal
education, viz. adequate housing, adequate and regular payment of teachers’ salaries and
any necessary pedagogical resources or requirements.
Uganda’s Poverty Eradication Report suggests that “the introduction of UPE with
free education for four children in every family has transformed the situation of
enrollment”424 in primary schools since 1997. Universal primary education is a positive
proposal of the education system for Uganda because for a long time over 50% of
Uganda’s population was illiterate. The theoretical and practical significance of the
system is compounded by the necessity of education as a basic factor for authentic human
development. It would meet the need of education for all or the development of all.
However, the eminent question is whether UPE meets such needs and the requisite
standards.
Even if UPE is at the lowest level of education, it needs to be planned well for a
solid educational foundation. To date UPE seems a failure because of the poor products
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in terms of students as stated ealier, even if some 60% of parents are said to be “satisfied
with the quality of their children’s education” while “40% are not.”425 The intriguing
question this survey prompts is: Who were the respondents in the survey - the rich or the
poor, politicians or ordinary citizens, the educated or the uneducated? Where and with
whom the survey was conducted determines the validity of the above results. It is not the
purpose of this work to investigate this but it provokes further thinking, especially in light
of the real observable fruits of UPE.
UPE has pushed many people to school because tuition is not required. Those
who had no hope to reach a primary seven standard are now attempting to do so, and
attempting to assert their right to education.426 This seems to many people to be a
success. Unfortunately, the success is only in the quantity of students not the quality of
their education. UPE’s failure is real because education does not meet its real ends stated
above – peace, national unity and development in general. The input in terms of teaching
and formation is poor and consequently the output in terms of the quality of students or
their performance is also poor. For instance, it is incredible and shameful that some
students complete seven years of primary education and they are not capable of fluent
reading in their local languages, let alone in English which is their second language. In
other words, the transformative consequence of UPE is minimal. While government
advocates improvement in “both quality and quantity of primary education”427, in reality
it is a failure. Some of the propagators of UPE are reluctant to send their children to
public/government schools. They prefer to send them to private or well-managed schools,
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sometimes not just within Uganda but outside Uganda.428 This says volumes about
whether UPE is really helpful to the people of Uganda, though it is a relevant innovation.
Teachers have not been well paid and are not promptly paid. Where does
motivation come from? It is not only the question of motivation. Justice demands that
they ought to be given what they and their families need to survive. The challenge for the
government is to recognize and enforce education, without prejudice, as the propelling
force behind people’s development.429 The challenge to teachers is to contribute to the
development of Uganda through the education they provide. Teachers ought to teach
students what can transform their life and the condition of the nation. Uganda’s
development depends on the kind of education they provide, the process it involves, what
the education contributes and does not contribute to the nation and its citizens.
The idea that the first goal of education is to “prepare people for life”430 is very
significant; and it should direct the process of education. Education needs to be oriented
towards development because it is one of the crucial factors for the development of
people. It is for such a reason that Kasozi thinks that university education and universities
in Uganda “must direct curriculum changes that address national needs”431 of Uganda.
Their curriculum should include development ethics and any development related themes
as core subjects of study. The need for education that helps enhance and integrate human
development challenges the human mind that
there is also the urgent need to generate on a greatly expanded scale those human skills and
knowledge that are essential to increase productivity and hence to accelerate economic growth.
This is a problem for education and training. Increased productivity is not of course the only goal
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of education. Another essential goal is equipping people with knowledge to advance a country’s
entire cultural, economic, and political level.432

A critical study of the context intended for development is crucial for
development planning. Education should, therefore, help people to accomplish
knowledge needed for development. This need calls for “co-operative education”433 and
adaptation. Education should be adapted to the real needs of people. Adaptation of
education is necessary for the progress of people and a nation but it demands a critical
study of contexts to be developed. There are other crucial requisites for development,
which education for development should incorporate. Lawrence Harrison has aptly stated
this:
What makes development happen is our ability to imagine, theorize, conceptualize, experiment,
invent, articulate, organize, manage, solve problems, and do a hundred other things with our minds
and hands to contribute to the progress of the individual and humankind. Natural resources,
climate, geography, history, market size, government policies and many other factors influence the
direction and pace of progress. But the engine is human creativity.434

Education for development should first help people to develop their potential and
be creative. It should help people think in a practical fashion and be able to construct
practical solutions from the pieces of information they have been able to lay their hands
on. This is very crucial to integral human development, and should be promoted by all
educational systems. Creativity is at the root of every development and “the society that
is most successful at helping its people – all its people – realize their creative potential is
the society that will progress the fastest.”435 A co-operative education system is one
where industries and educational institutions work together in training students. It is both
432
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theory and practice - a type of internship or apprenticeship. Human creativity for
development should also be expressed in the different sciences and arts as Rose-Marie
Rychner suggests:
Art needs to be more than aesthetics; it focuses on its potential to shape people’s characters both
as individuals and as social beings. Artists in Uganda see their role primarily in the promotion of
peaceful development of political order and stability.436

Fine art is not just something to be enjoyed or a beauty to be beheld. Much as it
has the capacity or power to affect or shape people’s vision of reality, it should be used to
influence people’s developmental process by providing powerful teaching aids. The
Ugandan pedagogy should make a maximum use of the gifts of fine art by involving its
talented fine artists. Education in fine arts should continue to be vigorously rejuvenated
and used to fight ignorance, poverty and diseases such as HIV/AIDS that has tarnished
the image of the health of Uganda since the 1980s.437 Media and all literature should not
be colored by or used for the realization of some personally profiteering objectives. It
should be at the true and disinterestsd service of the nation. Media ought not to be used
merely for propaganda or promotion of individual or personal interests.
Positive objectives can be achieved through an education system that drills people
in upholding and living according to moral values such as already stated of and
propagated by UMU.438 This means that part of what education should do is to teach
people to be honest and sincere in and with the media. Those who communicate should
be sincere and recipients of media information should be critical, not naïve as to take
what they read and hear for gospel truth. The integrity of media should be manifested in
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what they communicate to the public. Ugandan media should be used for true,
responsible moral, political and socio-economic formation of the citizens. It should be at
the true and disinterested service of the nation.
Education should help people to grasp the true meaning of development. The
actual purpose of education is the development of peoples. It aims at helping people to
aim at “struggle against illiteracy, support of political, social and moral development
process, improving the general state of health, stimulation of economic development and
improve the material living conditions of the individual.”439 Human enhancement
demands a critical vision of development and development theories, even questioning the
understanding of development as promoted by the developed nations because often times
they do not have a full view of development. Denis Goulet makes a critical and important
observation to this effect when he observes that:
It is not a case of sound development being exported to sites unsuited to receive it, but rather that
the very conception of development transferred is itself distorted at its point of origin.440

Education systems should adopt methodologies that foster participation of the
people that are practically relevant depending on the contexts in which a particular
category of people find themselves. In other words, “participatory pedagogy, including
techniques that encourage more initiative and cooperation at lower levels” of the system
and emphasize seminars and case-method at upper levels” 441 of education and society
should be encouraged in the school systems. This helps people adapt their approaches
according to the type of community they deal with.
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Continued Church involvement in education and educational institutions is
necessary for an integral education. Religious institutions have a long tradition of
providing education in Uganda and other countries and they should continue this spirit or
mission of providing education. The Church should, therefore, continue to be present in
educational institutions on all levels – universities, higher institutions of learning,
secondary schools and primary schools.442 Parish priests should also be personally
involved in teaching Christian religious education even in primary schools. This is even
more significant than elevating the educational standards or knowledge of those who
have already received substantial or adequate religious education - those in higher
institutions and universities, especially if their religious education has already been well
catered for. Training in character, morality or ethics should help reinforce “practical life
skills.”443
The education needed for integral human development is one that helps people to
live decent, moral or responsible practical life which shows true faith and civility.
Education detached from God breeds broken relationship with God, other people and self,
and ultimately, as Deotis J. Roberts asserts, it is the “foundation for sinful – evil-ridden
community.”444 In the context of Uganda, this demands that the education curriculum
should be revised; both quality and quantity of education should be critically considered
so as to produce people who are well prepared for life.445 It ought to be noted that
education can become a menace if not well directed. Much as it can be a powerful
instrument for creating peace, for example, it can also be used as an instrument for
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creating disharmony. As Niebuhr contends, “when the educational process is
accompanied by a dishonest suppression of facts and truths, it becomes pure
propaganda.”446 Education can be used to meet the needs or achieve the goals of
educators. This indicates that education can be used as an instrument for conflict making
and conflict resolution. Consequently, Niebuhr suggests that educational process alone is
inadequate to resolve conflicts, its established goals ought to be moral or ethical and
adhered to. Therefore, the value of education and its moral dimension ought always to be
judged according to the purpose it serves, especially the enhancement of human dignity.
B. Practical Political Democracy
Democracy is new to Uganda and perhaps does not really exist in its true sense.
From the time of Uganda’s independence up to today democracy has been ignored by one
leader after another. After Museveni’s address to the Catholic Bishops of Uganda in
1986, just five months after he came to power, the Bishops responded after three weeks
by writing the pastoral letter With A New Heart and A New Spirit, suggesting among
other statements of support to cooperate in the development of Uganda with clear
guidelines, that even if they would not identify with any particular political grouping
Uganda should return to parliamentary democracy, universal suffrage, general elections
and multi-party politics which guarantees “freedom of assembly and association.”447
However, there were moments when Ugandans had a glimpse of democracy. For
instance, the process of the review and re-writing of the 1967 Uganda constitution is
generally acknowledged to to have been democratic in terms of presentation and the
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process of electing representatives.448 However, there is much to be desired from
Uganda’s democratic processes. The principal reason for apprehension about practical
political democracy is well stated by George B.N. Ayittey, twenty- one years after NRM
came to power: “Uganda is a defacto ‘one-party state’ with the political arena dominated
by Presudent Museveni’s National resistance Movement.”449 Uganda needs the following
things for true democracy:
1. TOLERANCE
In a practical political democracy tolerance should be understood as unconditional
mutual acceptance despite differences and undesirable factors. The basis of tolerance has
been articulated by Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi as being the recognition and
respect for the equality of people, but they also affirm state:
The concept of tolerance to which we are referring is based on that positive attitude as opposed to
others which draw from nonviolence the strength to endure evil rather than to inflict it on
others.450

Tolerance demands nonviolence among people. To have democracy tolerance is
necessary. In a pluralistic context like Uganda tolerance leads to peace but peace is also a
necessary condition for tolerance to flourish. This suggests that peace education should
also be given to the citizens. Peace education “is an indispensable strategy” not only for
promoting tolerance but also “mutual trust of people belonging to different
backgrounds.”451 There should be mutual political acceptance, an acceptance embraced
for more than the sake of avoiding conflicts and hostile exchanges. The notion of
tolerance suggested here is tantamount to Paul VI’s advocacy for peace where he rejected
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violent reactions to situations of injustice as explained in chapter two. There should be
ungrudging and sincere mutual political acceptance and exchange of views or ideologies.
Tolerance is a relevant and necessary suggestion for a country like Uganda that
has been war-torn for years; a country struggling to attain some solidarity which has been
hard to achieve because of its ethnic, religious, social, economic and political diversity.
All these diversities demand some tolerance. Political tolerance, in particular, demands an
end to Uganda’s many years of apparently one-party system, rule of military juntas, and
so called “no party democracy.”452
The tolerance suggested here should be based on the most fundamental principle
for integral human development much emphasized in this study and especially in chapter
three, namely the human person and human dignity. That is, “the basis for tolerance is the
equality of all people by nature and their aspiration to the same destiny,
‘happiness’.”453There should be a mutual understanding and nobody’s rights should be
trampled upon by anybody.
2. IMPARTIAL DEMOCRACY
A well-defined, understood and applied democracy is necessary. However, I
would not suggest a new definition. The word democracy comes from the Greek word
demos which means “people” and kratos, “strength” or “power”, people power or
government by the people.454 The traditional definition of democracy as: government of
the people, by the people and for the people, serves the purpose of achieving integral
human development, which has been stated in Chapter Two as a democratic process
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itself. It should be a democracy that provides for a less self-seeking service and a more
selfless attitude of the political and civil leadership.This notion of democracy is also
preferable because it fits well in the federal system of government I suggest for Uganda
in this chapter. As Oskar Wermter suggests, true democracy is and should always be
“based on deeply-held convictions of the fundamental equality of all human beings, the
unity of the human race and the value and dignity of the human person.”455
Democracy demands service in accordance with the stipulations of the national
constitution, which is the supreme law of a nation, without changing the constitution for
personal convenience or interests. The Catholic Bishops of Uganda have hinted at such
whimsical changes of the constitution as a possible enduring contentious issue in the
history and future of Uganda.456 They need to be avoided by all means because a
constitution, as the supreme law of the country, should be a lasting ordinance. Moreover,
by its very definition a law is not for personal convenience, it is “an ordinance of reason,
for the general good, made by whoever has the care of the community, and
promulgated.”457 What people ought to guard against is that all these conditions may be
fulfilled in a law-making process but they may also be initiated and imposed by a few
powerful people for their personal good, not the good of the entire community for whom
the law is intended. Other than this issue another challenge is that laws may be made and
promulgated by the responsible people but their correct application may be inhibited by
just a few others or an individual.
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Impartial

democracy

demands

that

government

function

according

to

constitutionally just laws.458 It should always be kept in mind that while the government
is established to take care of the people - the citizens - and to promote their good and
protect them from any external aggressions, the authority of government is derived from
the people through the constitutional law of the country, which determines “what a
government can or cannot do.”459 Therefore, the constitution should always be
acknowledged and respected as the supreme law of the country. It should not be
manipulated at the whim of a president or anybody who assumes authority or may be
entrusted with the responsibility of the care for the nation. The laws of the nation,
including those which govern the behavior of public authorities or servants, should be
fair, not oppressive and arbitrary, because the government is an instrument of service to
people, it is “the trustee of the public interest of its people,”460 not an institution and
instrument for the oppression of its citizens.
Another characteristic of an impartial democracy is expressed in the role of the
army in the life of the nation. Amaza Ori Ondoga claimed that the National Resistance
Army (NRA), now called Uganda People’s Democratic Forces (UPDF) is “a peoples’
army.”461 This claim is questionable because honest Ugandans would agree that Ugandan
leaders have been notorious, since independence, for using the military for personal
political interests. The evidence is the series of coup d’etat that have occurred in
Ugandan history and have been effected by the army. While the current constitution of
Uganda is clear that the army should be and is a neutral body, not owned by the head of
458
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state, any political party or the president, even if he is the commander in chief of the
armed forces, Uganda’s leaders have consistently and in a very protracted way used the
army to achieve their personal ends.462 This is contrary, not only to Christian-ethical
norms but also contrary to the 1995 Constitution of Uganda which states that
The Uganda Peoples’ Defence Forces shall be non-partisan, national in character, patriotic,
professional, disciplined, productive and subordinate to the civilian authority as established under
this constitution.463

Election contestants are aware that if they contest the results of any election, they
and their supporters could be in trouble. This is so, especially if the incumbent president
is proclaimed winner and they and the populace are dissatisfied about the atmosphere of
fear and force created by the army at the time of elections. This has been the consistent
reason for those who lose elections to run to exile or to seek refuge in the bush. They
have no defence because the Commander in Chief owns the army. This constitutes
injustice, lack of participation, violation of freedom of speech or human rights and an
absence of a minimal democracy. The 2005 USAID assessment of democracy and
governance in Uganda provides a clear evidence about the ‘ownership or personalization
of the army’ when it states that
Despite the constitutional provisions that require the UPDF to answer to Parliament and the people
of Uganda, in practice the separation of military and Movemnet as political organization is
ambiguous, and the top military command is drawn predominantly from the southwest. The role of
the army is inextricably linked to the president who is the chairman of the Movement and the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The army has become an integral part of politics,
evidenced in the manner in which the Movement leadership has used it for different political
interventions beyond Uganda’s borders without Parliament’s approval, such as the case in the
464
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). . . .

It is probably for the gravity of the need to nationalize the army that the
November 2005 Pastoral Letter of the Catholic Bishops of Uganda expressed the bishops’
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gratitude about parliamentary resolutions to limit the role of the army, though USAID
assessment is suggesting that it does not happen in practice. The November 2005 report
of the Uganda bishops states in part:
With Uganda’s nasty past the destructive role of the army in politics cannot be taken lightly. We
are happy that the army will no longer be represented in the Parliament. This is a positive
development especially in the era of multiparty political dispensation.465

The religious leaders should help the populace to understand such critical issues.
They should also help people and the government to understand and ensure that there is
equality before the law, the legislative and the executive wings of government support the
judiciary system and functions, the judiciary is independent in executing its functions,
rights of individuals should be respected, and “government must be the representative of
the majority of the citizens.”466 The question of equality before the law is closely related
to the anthropological principle treated in depth in chapter three of this work. The Legal
equality is and should always be based on the principle of imago Dei. All people are
created with equal dignity. It is precisely for this reason that the rights of individuals civil, political and human rights - should be respected. Similarly, Abraham Kiapi
contends that justice and true democracy demand that
The just laws . . . must be impartially administered. All people are, and must always remain, equal
before the law. The law must be consistently and equally applied to all citizens. The status:
whether by birth, marriage, social standing, political importance or economic opulence, must not
be allowed to interfere with the administration of the law.467

The independence of the judiciary is crucial because it is the overall controlling
force in the country. It is not above the law. It is and should always be the custodian and
the authoritative interpreter of the law and its application. Secondly, justice condemns
465
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bribery as unfair and a discriminatory practice. This in turn suggests that
. . . the legislative and executive arms of the state must not interfere with the decisions of the
judiciary in the courts of law, over particular cases. The administration of justice must be the sole
prerogative of the courts of law. . . . Judges and magistrates must not be influenced by extraneous
matters, foreign to the facts established from the submitted evidence and in accordance with the
applicable law.468

The question of political participation is also suggested by the people’s choice of
whom to entrust with the authority to care for the needs of the nation. Governments
should not be chosen by only a handful of people. There should be a general consensus of
the citizens about the government of the state. The issue confronting Uganda, as
Nkrunziza suggests, is “to create a self-sustaining and empowered civil society that does
not depend on handouts from the state.”469 The challenge is to create a civil society that
detests bribes from government, and a state which is founded on truth, universal charity,
justice, option for the poor, affirmative action, subsidiarity and common good.
3. A FEDERAL POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR UGANDA
A federal system of government would be helpful to the integral human
development in Uganda. Ugandan political discussion introduced the notion of
federalism, but the type of federalism under debate was the type of government which the
Buganda government of Mengo wanted and actually referred to as federo
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ordinary sense of federalism. It is the type federalism to which Milton Obote was
opposed, and which led him to abrogate the 1966 constitution and introduce his 1967
constitution.
According to the 1966 constitution of Uganda
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only one region-Buganda-was given separate and substantial powers independent of the center.
The Buganda Lukiko controlled public services, local government, its public debt, and had
separate powers of taxation; furthermore, its revenue was supplemented by grants from the state,
as specified in the constitution. It had its own court system, and subject to the control of the
Uganda inspector-general, its own police force. It selected its assembly indirectly, through the
Lukiko rather than by popular vote. None of these powers could be altered by the Uganda
parliament without the two-thirds concurring vote of the Lukiko.471

This is the type of federalism Buganda demanded in 1993 from the NRM
government. The Buganda region was denied this privilege precisely because such
demands do not provide enough executive powers for the central government over
Buganda. Neither is the federal system advocated here one which provides for too much
power to the central government at the expense of the lower structures.472 It would also
be an injustice to grant this only to Buganda while other regions never enjoy similar
privileges and power. The term federo as understood by the Baganda, and officially
introduced, probably to distinguish it from federalism generally understood, is disputed
and the meaning untenable in the pluralistic context of Uganda.
The federal system of government suggested here is one which provides for all
regions of the country equally. This should be debated and agreed upon in the parliament
after intense consultation with the masses. It should be a system accepted by consensus
because it does not discriminate against any region or ethnic group. The federalism
suggested here is one that is unitary. It should provide for true unity in diversity. It is the
United States and Canadian systems that I suggest.473 The framers of the American
federal system aimed at strengthening the national government but they also aimed at
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“the division of power between the national government and the states.”474 The type of
federalism understood by the majority of the Baganda, which is evidently different,
undesirable and not accepted by majority of the people of other regions of Uganda, is not
feasible in Uganda because the latter is a pluralistic society. The model of American or
Canadian or German and other federal systems, independent of ethnic understanding of
federalism is much more suitable for Uganda. The American federal system was intended
to ensure that “government would not be dominated by any one group and that there were
adequate safeguards to protect individuals and states.”475 This is a democracy relevant for
a nation with people of diverse ethnic groups and divided along ethnic lines.
This is one of the critical and unresolved problems in Uganda’s political system
and structures. However, it should be addressed. In their November 2005 Pastoral letter
the Catholic Bishops of Uganda are very clear about the contentious nature of this issue
and speculate that the controversy over federalism is “likely to remain so for an
unforeseeable future.”476 The federalism suggested here is not only for the Baganda or
certain sections of the country. It should be one uniformly designed for the whole of
Uganda, and work according to the same general or national stipulations. In other words,
the federalism suggested here is that which is amiable to people of the different parts of
the country, and helps to promote national unity.
This kind of federalism helps the promotion of even development in a country.
Decentralization that has been introduced by the NRM government cannot be equated to
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federalism and it does not adequately meet the needs of the different regions.477
Federalism suggested here should not be according to the traditional claims of the
kingdom or monarch beneficiaries. It should not be equated to an instrument or a way to
return to the so-called traditionally owned things, ebyafe or our things which contradicts
the very principle of ownership of property, because nobody has absolute ownership of
resources of nature. The notion of federalism presented by the Mengo government also
contradicts the principles of universal charity, option for the poor, common good, justice
and equity; and the principle of solidarity advocated in Populorum Progressio. To suit
our purpose federalism should be defined anew. It ought not to be seen as exclusivity as
the Mengo government suggests because Uganda is one country. In any case unity would
foster participation or involvement, regional responsibility built on personal
responsibility.
Federalism should not be equated to monarchies. For example, federalism
understood as “the act of unity in a league by agreement of each member to subordinate
its power to that of the central authority in common affairs”478 suffices to be a starting
point from which we can build our own federal system, although not without invoking
the insights, support and understanding of other nations, especially those who have
already established the system and it has so far worked well. Here we maintain our own
autonomy as an independent nation to choose what suits us best as a nation. We should
also not just duplicate the western federal system but use it to help us develop our own.
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4. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POLICIES
In the context of the discussion here, what is suggested as affirmative action is an
aggressive government intervention and action on behalf of those historically
marginalized or discriminated against. This is a notion akin to the American vision that
initiated the notion of affirmative action in the question of political democracy and social
justice.479 The government and the religious institutions should together develop policies
that help people who have been gravely marginalized or discriminated against in the past.
The care for groups that have been marginalized or oppressed in the past has to be
effected, for instance, for the benefit of women, some parts of western Uganda, northern
and northeastern regions of Uganda that have experienced discrimination since the
colonial times, and especially in at least the last twenty years. Specific minority
communities such as the Lugbara, Alur, Kakwa, Madi, Karamojong, Banyarwanda,
Pokot, Basamia, the Bakonjo; and the Muslim community in Uganda should be given
some preferential treatment owing to their past history of being marginalized or
overlooked.480 They should be more adequately supported, especially economically.
The first four tribes named here are often not counted or immediately thought of
when talking about northern Uganda. To many people northern Uganda consists only of
Gulu and Lira or the Acholi and the Langi. West Nile region is often excluded and only
considered labor reserve as from the colonial times, although it is not the only region
marginalized this way.481 The Baganda have been, politically, viewed with great
suspicion because of their privileged position and being instruments of the expansion of
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colonial administration in Uganda before and after independence.
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Politically and

socially they should also be integrated and treated without further suspicions. The
affirmative action in progress, especially in relation to women and their education and
involvement, should be continued with more emphasis. It should more powerfully and
ceaselessly address the bad influence or effect of cultures that perpetuate discrimination
against women and any disadvantaged groups.483
Affirmative action policies and application of the principle of the preferential
option for the poor should be applied in such a way that there is room for those who are
helped to exercise their abilities and not be recipients only. Government and the Church
have the responsibility or duty to help the poor and marginalized, and to create
possibilities for them to function for their well being, but the former have no obligation or
duty to do everything for the latter. The citizens should also be helped to understand and
acknowledge this and the fact that they have also responsibility to meet their own needs
instead of waiting for handouts.
5. HEALTHY CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP
This sub-theme provokes the question whether the church is a political institution
or trying to be one. The answer to such a question is what Sean P. Kealy suggests: “No
church can completely escape a political dimension to its activities and its influence”484
though this is not its primary role, even if other churches have made politics their primary
concern. For true development which is integral to occur the cooperation between the
church and the state is crucial. Consequently, it demands that the relationship between the
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two institutions is healthy and good to promote human persons both as citizens and as
people who belong to religious communities or institutions. They should have a close
working relationship because they are for the promotion of the same people. This
contention suggests that, though distinct from one another church and state are
necessarily related and should not be radically separated. They can be separated as
institutions, but not when it comes to dealing with certain individual issues affecting
people. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff suggest that the two are necessarily
related because “there is no sharp distinction between moral and political issues.”485 The
suggestion is relevant because the duty of both the state and the church is to help people
to live upright lives, be responsible citizens and believers. I think it is right to suggest that
while the church promotes Christian or religious morality the state promotes political or
civil morality. The equivalent word, which captures the notion of morality in both
religious institutions and civil society, is responsibility. The church and state try to make
and expect people to be responsible.
Paul Gifford states that “since Museveni’s accession to power church-state
relations have been of less importance.”486 Gifford suggests that the church-state
relationship has not been emphasized since 1986. While this is not a positive observation,
the assertion is only theoretically correct. Practically it is not correct because the two
institutions have often, whether expressly indicated or not, demonstrated their need for
each other in certain critical moments. Gifford himself noted that Museveni and some
government agents were involved in resolving the crisis in the COU Diocese of Busoga
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and in other issues.487 According to Ronald Kassimir in his address to the Catholic
Bishops of Uganda in 1986, five months after his ascendance to power, Museveni made
explicit that
The National Resistance Movement is not opposed to the role of the churches and religion, if they
can be used positively. The Movement expects the Churches to assume their rightful place in the
development of nations and is indeed committed to the support and encouragment of the spiritual
and moral rehabilitation of our society. This direction is exactly in consonance with the
programmes of the National Resistance Movement which is concerned, among other things, with
the restoration of morality and human dignity.488

The initial statement Museveni made about church-state relations is a crucial one.
If church-state relationship continues to evolve in this line there are good future prospects
for the joint efforts toward the development of the people of Uganda. To ignore this
relationship is to divide the nation because both institutions work for the good of the
same people. That the church and state are each autonomous should always be in sight of
the leadership of either institution, thus maintaining the autonomy of the sphere or power
of each. However, the spirit of dialogue and conversation between the two institutions is
always crucial. They also need to be mutually supportive. The cooperation between
church and state helps to effectively promote and achieve the common good in the
different contexts of time and place.489 There are times the church needs the support of
the state and vice versa. There are also times when the two institutions correct each other
or assist one another with suggestions. If there was a reasonable relationship between the
government and the MRTCG (Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments
of God) the March 2000 tragedy might have been avoided.490 Here the proper application
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of the principle of subsidiarity is also vital.
It is important to note that, working at odds with each other or independently,
neither the church nor the state can achieve much in liberating the people of Uganda from
their problems and lead them into true development. Consequently, the struggle to help
develop Uganda should be done in unity and solidarity between the church and state.
Ddungu has emphasized this point of view by stating that
The state and the church in Uganda have a joint responsibility, based on common interest and
mutual obligation for reshaping the present and the future of this nation. The shared responsibility
should promote harmonious coexistence, effective dialogue and cooperation.491

Church-state relationship should be characterized by mutual understanding of the
goals of both institutions and the needs of the people they serve. There should be no
deliberate antagonism. Instead there should be dialogic relationship evidenced in
harmony between church and state. Ugandan heads of state should learn from the nasty
experiences of church-state relationship in the history of the country; for instance, the one
that led to the murder of the Anglican Archbishop Luwum by Amin and the invasion of
the Anglican Archbishop Silvanus Wani in October 1981 by Obote’s Uganda National
Liberation Army (UNLA) and created tensions and animosities.492 There are other similar
incidences of strife between civil leaders and religious leaders but they have not been
documented or may not be known. All such cases do not give a picture of love, solidarity,
concern for the common good and development of the state and religious institutions.
This issue remains crucial in the history of the relationship between the two
institutions because of the radical attempt to separate church and state. The significant
separation emphasized here is often the separation of powers or domains of
491
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action/function. However, one should also carefully consider the issues Mazrui raised,
namely that, “it is too often taken for granted that to separate Church and State is also to
separate religion and politics. In practice this conclusion is seldom sustained.”493
Mazrui’s contention that although church and state may be separated, religion and
politics have refused to be separated up to today is sound.494 Two questions need to be
answered in order to understand Mazrui. Who constitutes the church and who constitutes
the state? In many instances those who constitute the state also constitute the church or
religious institutions. If the same people constitute both institutions, though functioning
in different capacities, and at the same time they have to be faithful to their commitments,
how is it possible to separate religion and politics? This actually forces one to ask
whether the two institutions are not for the good of those who constitute them, which
indeed is why they exist.495 If they are for the good of people, then they are meant to
procure a due good - the good they owe to people - for people who should be viewed as
spiritual and material in constitution. This affirmation is not a denial that there are certain
things that differ in the two institutions. It is an affirmation against a radical separation of
religion and politics, church and state, which is often advocated by political leaders to
secure their position when they feel threatened.
C. Balanced Socio-Economic and Political Policies
1. SELFLESS INTERESTS AND RELEVANT DEVELOPMENT INNOVATIONS
First, Uganda needs promotion of disinterested development innovations. This
means development projects should be well directed according to government policies
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that help people to understand that whatever they want to do privately or publicly is not
entirely for their personal interests. The intentions of development projects should not be
self-concern. Self-concern was one of the reasons for economic and political disaster in
Uganda’s efforts in the DRC.496 The reason for the failure of most projects is that as soon
as they are started everybody wants personal benefits immediately. This attitude should
be discouraged through moral education. People who undermine development projects
should be prosecuted for the sake of the common good even if the projects are private
establishments. Government should ensure that development enterprises undertaken by
foreign organizations or countries are not established for ulterior motives. The
responsible people and the entire nation should also be educated about such policies.
According to Denis Goulet there is a high possibility for vested interests to dominate
socio-economic and politcal development because the investing nations or organizations
correctly perceive that alternative development strategies are a threat to their own power, wealth,
497
social status, and global mobility, all of which depend on their partnership with foreigners.

This suggests that government agents or the state should be disinterested in the
way they look at private development initiatives or innovations. Government should not
consider private individuals and private institutions as threats to its general control or grip
of the country as long as these innovations or initiatives are not merely for personal
interests; and these individuals or groups can make development innovations for
themselves and the people. This question is tied to the one of the principle of subsidiarity
which permits smaller bodies to do for themselves what they are able to and prohibits
larger bodies from interfering with such initiatives.
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Relevant innovations must be the priority in domestic development strategies, not
just idealistic innovations. Laurenti C. Magesa suggests “a distinctive African vision of
development.”498 He proposes here a vision of development as liberation, not just some
model adopted from outside. This should, according to him, be based on the
understanding and cherishing of the human person, human rights and human dignity. It is
precisely in these areas that Ugandans need some form of liberation. Denis Goulet
cautions about wholesale importation of development ideals or models in the following
words:
. . . strategies were exported from industrially advanced countries to societies where cultural,
psychological, social, and political soil was uncongenial to them. Most Western agents of change
were insensitive to these differences. Introducing the wage system and the commercial mentality,
for example, to people who for centuries have lived on the edge of subsistence, shatters their
fragile social cohesion.499

Denis Goulet rightly cautions nations as they make development strategies. It is
good to make innovations or strategies according to models of foreign nations. However,
what is adopted by the countries struggling to develop should be feasible. This of course
demands that there should always be a team that is able to make critical feasibility studies
before strategies are made, confirmed and implemented.
2. ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OR INVOLVEMENT OF THE EXPLOITED AND OPPRESSED
Hard work is one of the significant recommendations for human development.
This is well summarized in the Lugbara proverb: “Alio oraa okpo ni.” (Alio ma aroo okpo
ni.), translated as “the medicine of poverty is strength,” and meaning that
The remedy for a state of poverty is strength, namely, strenuous work; this is the antidote that will
cure poverty. The proverb suggests that hard work is also preventive medicine to avoid falling into
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the painful condition of poverty. By envisaging work as the genuine cure for poverty, the proverb
implicitly condemns other deceptive surrogates like begging or relying on the property of others,
which do not really relieve one’s poverty.500

Poverty is a serious challenge to the apathy of those who think they may or should
not contribute to development by every means. It is still a more serious challenge if there
are people who think that they have nothing to offer. This indeed is a negative attitude,
which unfortunately, many ordained ministers, religious leaders and lay people have
cultivated and maintained in both political and socio-economic fields.501 Enlightened
religious and civil leaders should help such people and all oppressed people to appreciate
self-involvement in their developments as individuals and as groups, and to discover the
value of self-reliance and especially to do away with the “survival mentality.”502
In Uganda lack of development is sometimes blamed on or “traced to overt
colonialism, economic exploitation, racial discrimination, or less overt forms of social
control.”503 To a great extent such blame merely serves polemical purposes. Development
is possible when people are aware of their own current conditions and convince
themselves that they can actually come out of such conditions using their own efforts and
available resources. Therefore, all people including the disadvantaged and the poor
should be educated that the evils that confront them are no longer tolerable, there is a
better alternative for them, and “large numbers of oppressed people must become
convinced that changes proposed to them can succeed.”504 Such a conviction cannot be
achieved from the blue. People must be taught or educated, whether formally or
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informally, depending on the learning and understanding capacity of the people in
question. Secondly, as Goulet contends “great leaders must appear at the horizon to help
the weak to overcome their passivity and accept risk,”505 although such leaders are rare.
Participation or involvement of the poor and oppressed also demands education
about the value of hard work. The Lugbara proverb; ‘Nga bori nya bori’ already done,
already eaten” 506 says much about the value of work and should be invoked for a further
understanding. It means when a person has worked hard that person has also assured
himself or herself of food and sustenance. The poor and weak should be helped to realize
the importance of hard work, especially if they are capable of being productive.
Therefore, it is important that the poor, weak or handicapped people are helped to
develop “positive-thinking about life and self.”507 They ought not to develop a crippling
attitude, surrender to fate and think that they are useless and incapable of anything.
The oppressed or exploited people are those who suffer because of injustice or
they are mentally or physically or materially incapacitated. Their incapacity may be no
fault of theirs but due to unjust structures or sicknesses. When they have the ability to be
productive it is necessary to involve them and strengthen their participation.508 Such
involvement and participation could be through establishment of institutions. Such
institutions could be organizations or associations of such people, especially when they
are mentally capable or institutions established and managed with the assistance of
capable people who help involve them in decision-making so that they have a say in
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improving their life and they can protect themselves against those who are intent on
exploiting them.509
3. STRONG AND HEROIC LEADERSHIP.
Achieving development demands formidable leadership. Without people prepared
intentionally for supervision of national, regional, local and private development projects
the attainment of development remains a mere dream. This requirement is necessary
especially at the grass roots. Goulet suggests relevant and significant qualities, which I
think serve the need for Uganda to promote effective development leaders. First,
development leaders should have “an intuitive grasp of the larger historical dimensions
latent in local struggles.”510 This means the leader must be aware of the explanation
behind the persistent struggles of the people in the past and the present. This is a
significant quality because a leader should be informed since (s)he sometimes acts as the
conscience of the people. A leader determines the will of the people towards the
achievement of the general good of the people.511 Secondly, a leader has “the ability to
reconcile multiple class alliance.”512 This means that a good leader has the ability to
influence people across ethnic, regional and professional categories and bring them
together for positive purposes which are for the good of these different categories. This
means a good leader is one who has the ability to foster universal love and solidarity.
Thirdly, a trait of a good development leader is moral and physical courage.
Courage enables them to run risks, to persevere in the face of defeat, to reject temptations to
compromise along the way, and to face death unflinchingly. At the very least, symbolic death
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must be faced in the form of politically suicidal decisions necessary to preserve integrity.
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A true leader should be ready to make serious sacrifices so that good may be
achieved not just for oneself, but for all. Frederick Drandua notes that if good is to come
out of an evil situation there is need for heroic leadership.514 Drandua has argued that in
order to change a bad status quo one should also be guided by one’s conscience and
remain faithful to the demands of divine law. This is one of the greatest challenges
imposed upon Christians if not all believers. It is a real challenge in the sense that
“heroism is sometimes called for in order to remain faithful to the requirements of the
divine Law.”515A Nigerian proverb supports the significance of the suggestions and
arguments of Goulet and Drandua. Luke Mbefo Nnamdi quotes the proverb as stating that
“the possibility of losing one’s life is not a sufficient reason for refusing to fight for a just
cause.”516 The trio emphasize that the virtue of courage is necessary in the efforts towards
true development. They also suggest as Mbefo explicitly states that the ultimate human
concern must be the care for the human person who has a God-given dignity.
An observation is necessary here in the light of the doctrine of Populorum
Progressio. This advocacy is not encouraging violence. It is in line with Paul VI’s
teaching because of its emphasis of moral courage. Just as Paul VI and Martin Luther
King Jr., the 1960s-protagonists of development, love, justice and peace, were opposed to
violence as a solution to face injustice, Drandua, Mbefo and Goulet call for a pressure
that is governed by Christian values or moral principles and common sense. A critical
reading of their texts implies that they do not think or suggest that a good leader is violent
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and violence is a moral means to achieve any objective.
The fourth quality of good development leaders is the ability to effectively and
tacitly “communicate their own vision of possible success to less imaginative or less
experienced masses,” and the final quality of a good leader “is the ability to learn quickly
from their mistakes.”517 A good leader for development should be capable of articulating
his/her ideas and plans in an intelligible fashion, and should be quick to realize or
discover why mistakes happened in the past and what should be done to rectify or avoid
them.
4. INNOVATIONS THAT AIM HIGHER
Uganda has had some poverty reduction goals, especially from around the year
2000 or a little earlier. For instance, reduction of the under-five mortality rate, universal
primary education, reduction of the rate of infection in Humano Immuno Virus/Acquired
Immunity Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) and the reduction of fertility or births, but
so far the results are not conspicuous.518 In Uganda asset development policies for the
nationals, with greater emphasis upon the poor, is necessary for any development. In
particular, it is more important for integral development in a context such as that of
Uganda where development is absolutely fragmented; there are critical economic
differences between people. As James P. Bailey infers from the teaching of Leo XIII, this
is the way for closing the gap between the rich and the poor.519 The poor should be
helped to save money and to build assets. The significance of this suggestion is
compounded by Bailey’s assertion that
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income-based approaches to poverty reduction help address the injustice of economic
arrangements, but they need to be complemented by asset-development policies that help give the
poor greater access to the economy and greater control over their lives.520

Development demands that capital is derived from income but it also demands
that part of the income is saved for future development or any eventualities. It is for this
reason that Bailey’s suggestion that a combination of both asset-based and an incomebased approaches to the problem of poverty are more preferable and in line with Christian
ethics than the exclusive use or application of an income-based approach to the problem.
Any strategies or policies that the government or any development institution attempts to
make for uplifting the condition of the poor should consider this suggestion seriously.
The suggestion provides two alternative options to be applied jointly, although the assetbased approach is more reliable because of enduring results and advantages, and the
possibilities it offers, especially in moments of economic upheaval.521
The government should, therefore, employ and engage experts to develop and
articulate policies that facilitate the savings and asset development of the poor people.
Assets are valuable things owned by a person or group of people or business, namely the
resources such as cash, machinery, equipment and estate as opposed to one’s income that
is used for the daily running of affairs.522 The policies would particularly help people
who live on resources from hand to mouth, and perpetually lack the basic necessities of
making livelihood. This is the main problem confronting the majority of Ugandans. For
instance, in 1993, 55% of the Ugandan population lived below the poverty line and in
1992 about 36.7% of them had lived on an income below US $ 1.00 a day and 77.2%
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were below an income of US $ 2.00 a day.523 It is difficult to envision how people in a
situation of poverty would save money or purchase and develop assets on their own,
especially in a situation as in Uganda, where the majority of people are not well educated.
However, some authors suggest that with support and incentives from institutions, such
as the state and other organizations, there is a possibility for the poor people to
“substantially increase their savings.”524 While it is true that the state is instrumental for
people’s development, the development of people should be based on individuals and
smaller groups. This is also in line with the development principle of subsidiarity. The
grass-root growth, however, ought to move towards including a larger number of people.
The suggestion of Denis Goulet that there should be transition from micro to
macro arenas of action stands as a strong suggestion in support of the fact that
development is a progressive process, which he states in the following words:
Grassroots movements must not become mere havens for disenchanted anti-modernists, a kind of
parallel counter-culture, and no matter how self-sufficient or viable. On the contrary their goal is
to serve as an alternative development paradigm for the entire nation, to lead it into a new way of
being modern, one which safeguards national culture and traditional values.525

5. POPULATION POLICIES
The rate of development of a country partly depends on the number of people who
constitute it. The Governments of Uganda have not been consistent in following
demographic changes, even from the time of colonial administration.526 Negligence about
population growth is sometimes counterproductive to any socio-economic and political
planning and development because development processes or people’s needs cannot be
monitored well.
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From the moral standpoint the church has the duty to address the population and
family issues, at least in a pastoral letter and articulate clearly the stance of the church as
she has done on several other social issues. The Uganda Catholic Bishops should,
therefore, emulate examples offered in history regarding population and family issues.
Historically, from Pius XII to John Paul II, popes have “stepped into the picture of family
planning and population control.”527 The religious leadership in Uganda should help the
government, in conjunction or consultation with religious leaders and educational
institutions, not to attempt to stipulate radical demographic policies. As Herbert F. Smith
proposes, the recommendation offered by John Paul II urging the “the development and
the teaching of NFP” (Natural Family Planning) in his Apostolic Exortation on the
Family, and inviting “married couples, doctors and experts”528 to help in instructing all
married people and young adults, before marriage, should be seriously considered. A
frequent or constant oversight in demographic changes, the reasons for the variation and
facilitating the knowledge of the government, the church and people and assessment of
their condition; and planning for the promotion of a dignified life for the people of
Uganda are necessary priorities in demographic matters.
One of the challenges for the government and the church or religious institutions
in Uganda, and the citizens, is the question of opposing views about population as
suggested by Edward K. Kirumira who states that
It is worth noting that the population debate in Uganda is also peculiar in that, much as the
emphasis may be placed on the stand of the churches, for example, it is virtually impossible to
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characterize opposing views. The churches, government and public opinion are equally likely to
adopt pro-natalist as anti-natalist positions.529

This is a pertinent problem that needs to be resolved because of the differences in
the stance about population growth – the pro-life group and the anti-life group. The
former is the position the churches ought to maintain. The Catholic church is clear on this
and stands for life, and this position endures until today. The validity of the position is in
the fact and value of human life and human dignity. Life is the greatest gift of God to be
protected and nourished. It would also be logically correct to recommend that the
Catholic church, in particular, should help the government to understand and adopt the
same position because every government has the duty to create conditions that favor the
flourishing of its citizens. Creating conditions that protect life should be the priority of
Ugandan government. This is what the churches or religious institutions should foster in
their various communities. Like the government they are to safeguard people – created in
the image of God with both biological and spiritual values - and help create conditions
that promote the God-given dignity of people in their care.530
Population explosion is one of the main problems hindering human development.
It was also one of the concerns of Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. His concern, as
presented in Chapter One, was the rapid demographic growth but principally it was
human dignity.531 This concern developed out of Paul VI’s historical experiences in the
less developed countries or world – namely, Asia, Africa and Latin America. These parts
of the world had similar concerns. The experiences and concerns testify that rapid
population growth in low income countries is a serious issue in human development. This
529
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experience is more evident in the majority of large-size families in the rural areas.532 It
does not only hinder human development, it also causes human suffering. Overpopulation
is a serious problem that affects the well-being of the human person.
The experience of the past decade offers convincing evidence that if low income countries are to
develop rapidly they must avoid or extricate themselves from the “population trap,” by which we
mean rates of increase in population growth so large that they approach the feasible rates of
increase in economic output, thus preventing significant growth in per capita output.533

The rate of population increase should not out-pace the ability to comfortably
maintain the population. The Committee for Economic Development was definitely not
making suggestions for population control from a religious perspective. The concern of
committee about population growth is growth in the per capita output of the nation, “yet
human resources are the key to unlocking all resources”534as Smith suggests. In other
words, production is not possible without human labor. Our concern here is the
maintenance and enhancement of human dignity and the human person. However, the
Committee’s contention should not be considered just from a secularistic point of view.
The suggestion has in view the dignity of the human person and the value of human life.
This assertion is better explained by the contention of Dietrich von Hilderbrand which
suggests the divine intention with regard to procreation and demographic growth. He is of
the idea that when necessary or if there is a compelling reason to avoid conception, it can
only be by means of natural birth control. He states
It is clear, therefore, that in the intention itself of avoiding another child for serious reasons there
is not a trace of irreverence toward the mysterious fact that God has entrusted the birth of a person
to the spousal love. We see that only during relatively brief intervals has God himself linked the
conjugal act to the creation of a man. . . . The fact that conception is restricted to a short time
implies a word of God. It not only confirms that the bodily union of the spouses has a meaning
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and value in itself, apart from procreation, but it also leaves open the possibility of avoiding
conception if this is desirable for serious reasons.535

von Hilderbrand is apparently suggesting that life may not be brought into the
world to experience or cause needless suffering. His suggestion has, however, to be taken
with caution. There is possibility of making every reason to control birth a serious one.
This is where the church or religious leadership of Uganda ought to intervene as a
conscience of the nation to define or outline the serious reasons in a pastoral letter as
suggested earlier in this section. They should make it abundantly clear that the aim of
family planning is to help parents to “rear their families in dignity and happiness”536 as
suggested by Mother Teresa.
Most of Uganda may not yet be overpopulated in the real sense, but some parts
are experiencing demographic explosion. Kigezi is one of the regions consistently
affected by population growth since the colonial times. This was a consequence of over
propagation of children, immigrants from Rwanda due to famine, and because of
ecncouragment from the chiefs whose salaries depended on the number of people under
their jurisdiction at that time.537 This has resulted in land shortage in Kigezi or the Kabale
region in Southwestern Uganda where some people are migrating to neighboring areas
which are less densely populated. As early as 1946 some of the people from the Kigezi
region settled in Ankole after negotiations and agreements with the chiefs in the latter
region.538 As the population continued to grow in Kigezi further negotiations were made
with the leadership in Toro and some of the people of Kigezi moved to Toro, and even
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until recently they have been migrating to Toro.539 It is good to take precautions before
the situation worsens but the measures taken should conform to moral values, not just
economic values as suggested by the Committee for Economic Development, which
states that
So long as unrestricted population growth continues, resources that might otherwise be available
for investment will have to be used for current consumption. The expanded outlays for food and
for basic health services will limit the resources available for education and for improving skills . .
. . Clearly, the fundamental purpose of economic development – to raise living standards and
540
broaden man’s opportunities for a more enriched life – is being put in jeopardy.

The concerns of the Committee are real but they lack balance of emphasis. The
critical issue addressed by the Committee is that unrestricted population growth does not
allow investment because the immediate daily needs of people ought to be satisfied. This
concern is related to the question of asset development treated earlier in this chapter.
When material resources are limited, provision for education and eventually
improvement of skills is also affected. Consequently, development is also affected
because improved skills, which are actually acquired through education, are lacking, and
there are no savings or assets for further development. The validity of this assertion is
founded on the fact that family expenditure is always proportionate to the size of the
family. The more people there are in a family the higher the expenses and vice versa. It is
right to conclude from this assertion that “large family size tends to increase poverty over
the generations.”541 This is one fundamental fact about which population-study and
religious institutions should inform the government and educate the masses. It is
encouraging to know that government has taken keen interest in issues of population
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increase and quality.542 However, in a context like that of Uganda which is affected by
the AIDS pandemic, restricted population - just from a secular, not moral point of view affects labor force negatively. AIDS needs to be checked because the “size and quality of
labour force”543 are particularly affected by it. The government concern and interest in
population issues should yield a dignified life of the population of Uganda. It ought to be
in a manner that promotes both moral and material development of individuals and of the
nation.
The question of population has often been controversial in Uganda because of
ethnicity and religion.544 The church leaders in Uganda should through the populace,
ensure that the government does not exploit the controversy for political purposes. It
should explain the real significance of censuses, namely for integral development
planning and human promotion. It is significant to emphasize here that church
institutions, especially the Catholic church, should ensure that addressing the question of
population does not undermine the fundamental principle of human dignity. Human
dignity and innocent human life should always be protected by any laws of Uganda.
Uganda should not be developed materially at the expense of human life, human dignity
and morality.
The church or religious institutions ought to be, and have the challenge to be
informed of the demographic issues of Uganda. They also have the duty to disseminate
such information and their judgement and recommendations about such knowledge to the
masses. They should regularly and squarely confront national population problems. This
542
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is necessary because radical secular solutions may be suggested in the name of human
development. The Committee for Economic Development, for instance suggested that
to meet the population problem effectively, programs of family planning must play a part. Parents
should have access to family planning information services. Such access is not merely
indispensable to producing desired results with respect to economic development but is consistent
with human dignity and the right of men and women everywhere to be aware of the problem and
contribute to its solution.545

Though seemingly relevant, the type of family planning advocated by the
Committee is not specific while from a Catholic perspective the recommended method is
Natural Family Planning (NFP). The main concern in family planning should be about
the rural population which constitutes the majority of Uganda’s population. About 8689% of Uganda’s population lives in the countryside.546 Of this percentage the majority
are young people, less educated, and who marry when they are not prepared for marriage
and the implications of family life. The countryside is where the church or religious
institutions should intervene aggressively to stipulate and explain relevant population and
family planning procedures. The guidelines should, however, be morally justifiable or
desirable. It is for this reason that the church in Uganda, especially the Catholic church,
should spearhead this endeavor of addressing demographic issues and articulate its
position regarding family planning clearly in the course of this endeavor. The following
reminders are of grave importance:
First, Uganda’s Poverty Eradication policy states that “family size is an individual
choice”547 but people need to be helped to make choices responsibly and morally, and
they should be assured of a minimized infant mortality rate. Secondly, as Anthony
Zimmerman states, while we may not and “we do not sit in judgement on which family is
545
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better or more heroic,” it ought to be made abundantly clear that “in regard to family size
couples are not subject to arbitrary government interference.”548 Parents should propagate
children according to the possibilities of caring for them. As Zimmerman further
suggests, “when parents omit family planning and accept children as they come, they act
laudably so long as this is within the bounds of prudent human foresight.”549 This
assertion is reasonable and does not contradict the position of the Holy See.
Thirdly, the responsible parenthood recommended by Paul VI in Humanae Vitae
which, among other elements of responsible parenthood, suggests that parents should
propagate children knowing that they will be taken care of, should be seriously
considered.550 It is immoral and against human dignity to propagate life that is subjected
to suffering or dehumanizing living conditions.
Finally, Uganda has so far been blessed to a great extent with regard to population
issues. Michael Twaddle and Holger Bernt Hansen correctly state that “successive
governments have been keen not to antagonize religious groups, especially the Catholic
Church, with regard to methods of population control and prevention of AIDS.551
Catholics, as well as Protestants, should maintain their stance on population policies and
keep developing deeper and convincing explanations and the underpinning reasons for
their explanations and stance. Consequently, it is important that Catholics and Catholic
leadership and institutions, in particular, hold onto and articulate the Catholic position
which Matthew Habiger quotes from Archbishop Renato R. Martino.
548
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The position of the Holy See regarding procreation is frequently misinterpreted. The Catholic
Church does not propose procreation at any cost. It keeps on insisting that the transmission of, and
the caring for human life must be exercised with an utmost sense of responsibility. It restates its
constant position that human life is sacred; that the aim of public policy is to enhance the welfare
of families; that it is the right of the spouses to decide on the size of the family and spacing of
births, without pressures from governments or organizations. This decision must fully respect the
moral order established by God, taking into account the couples responsibilities toward each other,
the children they already have and society to which they belong. What the Church opposes is the
imposition of demographic policies and the promotion of limiting births which are contrary to the
objective moral order and to the liberty, dignity and conscience of the human being.552

6. UGANDA’S INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a charter to be
followed by all nations, including Uganda, which is a member of the United Nations, is
one thing that comes to mind when thinking of international laws. What the UN
advocates in its charter is conspicuously present in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic
of Uganda.553 What Uganda has incorporated from the UN should not just remain
theoretical. It needs to be studied again and again by the citizens through both formal and
informal education. By virtue of being a member of the international family it is
suggested that Uganda needs to ensure that its citizens are duly educated about their
rights, and this is an essential aspect of the education of the citizens in and out of schools.
They should have a distinctive vision of human dignity, know and understand human
rights and civil rights and any other freedoms.554 These should always be explained and
understood in a social context as well as the context of an individual based on human
dignity as the principal and commonly shared foundation.
The government should always ensure that there is “respect for international
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law.”555 This contention is significant in the context of integral human development.
Development cannot be achieved in isolation. No person or nation is self-sufficient as
Lebret observed, according to George Higgin’s reading of the former, as stated in
Chapter One of this work. The respect for international law is a mutual demand on
nations. Uganda is not an exception if it is to develop with the help or support and
cooperation of other countries. This call is particularly important with regard to Uganda’s
relationship with her immediate neighbors. While the government of Uganda has the duty
to protect the citizens of the country from external aggression, it should not invade
neighbors or other nations for selfish economic and political interests under the guise of
protecting the people of Uganda. This is clearly stipulated in the 1995 constitution and it
should be respected.556 It ought always to be kept in mind that both domestic stability and
the stability of the global community depend on the spirit of universal charity, mutual
respect and a serious consideration for international law because “events in one country
can affect other nations or even the whole world”.557
One factor that guarantees national dignity and good reputation in the global
context is peaceful or amicable co-existence of a nation with its neighbors and other
nations. Amaza Ori Ondoga, a deceased staunch NRM propagandist, contends that
Uganda’s relationship with the neighboring countries was stormy before 1986.558 He did
not categorically state the fact that thereafter its relationship with the neighboring
countries continued to be sour until today. For instance, Uganda is the context in which
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the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990 can be better understood.559
Uganda has had a series of wars that have drained its meager resources and cost
her lots of lives. This is a trait of the nation since independence with just a few interludes
of quiet periods in its history. Another evidence that remains a challenge and contradicts
or refutes Amaza Ori Ondoga’s implication that after 1986 Uganda had good relations
with other countries or its neighbors is what has recently been cited by AMSRIU in their
strong statement:
According to the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the UPDF committed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) horrendous inhuman acts of torture and killings, incited
ethnic conflict, trained child soldiers and looted the Congo to the tune of 10 billion dollars. This
debacle has ruined the reputation of our country and has brought enormous shame to the whole
nation! The government is answerable to all this.560

Uganda should work hard and maintain a status that befits a nation that claims to
be developed or developing. Uganda ought to become conscientious about the human
person, human life, human rights and human dignity, regardless of sex, age, state of
health, ethnicity, nationality and social, religious and political affiliation and status. For
instance the provision of material support to the RPF to return to Rwanda without coming
back to Uganda was near to, if not an active participation in, the invasion of Rwanda.561
Above all it never took into consideration the dignity and the value of the lives of those
who would eventually suffer. It was an undignified support. Peaceful co-existence with
neighbors ought to be taken seriously. This issue has been repeatedly emphasized by the
Catholic Bishops of Uganda in many of their pastoral letters but especially in the 1986

559

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001), 159.
560
The Executive, Association of the Major Superiors of Religious Institutes in Uganda, 7.
561
Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
Rwanda, 183-184.

519

letter, With A New Heart and A New Spirit.562
The tendency to be at war with neighboring countries has colored especially the
reign of Idi Amin and the NRM government.563 This tendency should stop and Uganda
should radically change its foreign policy of fighting in order to secure resources for the
country or certain individuals, and provide peace for the neighbors and its citizens instead
of fear and unrest. Peace would also provide both the opportunity to get to work and to
develop. The sum total of our being created in the divine image and not to be used as
objects should be maintained in our international relationship. Neither should we use
other nations and peoples, and their resources for our selfish interests as it, unfortunately
happened in the DRC where, according to George B.N. Ayittey
President Museveni himself, together with the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, were directly
accused by a United Nations panel of taking advantage of the civil war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo and engaging in systematic plunder of the country’s mineral resources. The United
Nations Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth of Congo . . . found ‘mass scale looting’ of stockpiled minerals, coffee, timber, livestock,
and money by the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.Military and government officials then
exported the diamonds, gold, and a composite miniral called coltan to line their own pockets and
enrich a network of shell companies owned by well-connected associates. . . . 564

The same report continued to show how these countries had increased exports in
minerals which they had in little deposits or they were not known to be producers of prior
to the civil war. For instance coltan, niobium and diamond which Uganda does not have
were being exported by Uganda. Policies for international relations should be clearly
articulated, and provide for a sincere and uncompromised autonomy of the nation and its
neighbors. Any foreign policies that are costly to domestic policies in terms of affecting
the development of the people of Uganda should not be encouraged or executed.
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The 1995 Constitution of the republic of Uganda suggested that in terms of
international relationships Uganda would promote “the national interests of Uganda.”565 I
would like to strongly suggest here that the national interest should not be liberally
interpreted to mean the invasion of other nations, and designed to ransack or deplete their
economic resources to enrich Uganda or a few individual Ugandans.566 This is a violation
of the right to own private property, it is injustice and uncharitable. The national interest
proposed here should be understood to be selfless national interest.
A dignified nation respects, promotes and protects the rights of its citizens and
resident aliens, not just the personal interest of a few individuals. This picture is partly
reflected through the political processes at home. A country where there is coup d‘etat
occurring with alarming frequency, where leaders cannot relinquish power without
physical or armed force, where foreign nationals rush out of the country before or during
elections, and elections are rigged, where the legal system is broken and losers cannot
concede their defeat with dignity and must escape to the bush to begin again the vicious
circle, is not dignified at all. This is one area where concerned Ugandans are always
apprehensive before, during and after elections.567 This is not the type of nation anyone
would like to be part of. Neither can it be respected internationally nor represent the
dignity of a true nation.
D. Relevant and Sound Religious Policies
Religion is perhaps the most fundamental element or aspect of education
contributing toward integral human development because the climax or fulfillment of
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integral development is realized in the religious dimension and life of the human person.
Religion contributes greatly to the moral fibre of society.568 Its contributions need to be
positively effective to achieve complete human progress. For this reason I concur with
Bujo who points out what he thinks John S. Mbiti rightly observes, namely that
religious beliefs, values, rituals and practices are directed towards strengthenening the moral life
of each society. Morals are the food and drink which keep society alive, healthy and happy. Once
there is a moral breakdown, the whole integrity of society also breaks down and the end is tragic.
(The last point does not apply to Africa alone) This is why communities in Africa are very much
interested in the individual ethical conduct. And the individual’s growth in wisdom depends on the
ethical health of the community as a whole.569

1. INTERDENOMINATIONAL COOPERATIVE ACTION
Uganda’s religious institutions need a more genuine faith, love and cooperation.
They also need sincerity, honesty, transparency, and less time-wasting in the name of
diplomacy, which easily ends in lies and flattery. The good example which religious
leaders set is crucial for the different denominations and the rest of the nation. Such
cooperative actions are already in progress in the Uganda Joint Christian Council
(UJCC), which is important in the follow-up of political processes in Uganda and should
be encouraged to continue its work.570 However, such cooperation needs to be extended
to other spheres of human life and activity, and should include more people than so far
accommodated. In other words, a more broad-based cooperation is suggested here.
Any cooperative action demands some tolerance between the different
denominations too. I would like to adopt the three levels of tolerance suggested by
Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi. These are “the personal sphere, the micro-social
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sphere and the macro-social sphere” 571 of tolerance. By the personal sphere they affirm
that one should first be able to forgive oneself before pardoning other people. Secondly,
one should be able to tolerate those with whom one relates closely or intimately on the
level of the smallest groups such as family. It is precisely this ability one translates into
larger social relations. Finally, by macro-social sphere they suggest that one should be
able to tolerate or forgive people who are furthest in terms of social and blood relation
and interaction - those in the larger social setting or sphere such as people of other tribes,
races, socio-political and religious ideologies and nationalities.
2. LEADERSHIP FORMATION AND PROMOTION
Leadership formation referred to here is both religious leadership and civil
leadership. The Catholic church can be commended for the formation of her religious
leadership in the country – no church in Uganda matches her efforts in this regard. The
Anglican church or, in general, Protestant churches in Uganda are to be praised for being
aggressive in the preparation of civil leaders - a real challenge to the Catholic church.572
The Catholic church needs to do much more in this regard and learn more from the
Protestant counterparts. While the Catholic church has the means and ability to educate
people, and actually excels in this regard the, de facto numerically and otherwise, inferior
Protestants unquestionably tower over Catholics in the political arena of Uganda. The
Catholics and Muslims ought to question their own planning for preparing leaders in the
future.
There is no doubt the Catholic church has done a lot in the field of education but
we need to ask if this has been done with very specific intentions and orientations,
571
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especially in preparing people for the crucial areas of economics, civil service and
politics. The religious preparation of leadership has, no doubt, been well done though not
without flaws. For instance, good planning for the aggiornamento, especially of priests as
recommended by the Catholic church law, and of religious and other crucial pastoral
agents and church employees has often not been well implemented.573
The Second Vatican Council suggests differences in the formation in the Catholic
Seminaries, both minor and major, religious institutions and universities, according to the
levels or ages and circumstances. However, formation should help students to be more
aggressive in combating the harsh situations of poverty, injustice and any situations of
immorality. The conciliar fathers were explicit concerning seminary formation that it
ought to be a pastoral oriented formation but also a comprehensive training where all
elements of seminary formation - spiritual, intellectual and disciplinary - “should be
coordinated with this pastoral aim in view.”574 The Uganda Martyrs University was
established for such a purpose and should be commended for what it is doing but other
institutions should emulate this example as well.
The curriculum designed and followed in religious institutions should help them
prepare to face difficulties and to live decently; and help them to understand that this is
demanding in terms of preparation and their personal input. The imperative value to be
strongly inculcated in all participants in educational or formation programs should be the
value and dignity of work and of the value of the human person. This contention points to
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the suggestion that there is an inevitable need for an integral education of the candidates
to priesthood and religious life because their impending future ministry is the service of
people and this demands a spirit of hard work and an appreciation of the human persons
they encounter is various sorts of problems.
In this vain the Second Vatican Council fathers were explicit that students
preparing for priesthood should be helped to cultivate openness of “their hearts in a spirit
of charity to various needs of fellow men.”575 The ability to freely accept to do humanly
undesirable physical work should, therefore, be one of the main conditions for promoting
a student intending to be a priest or religious, not just excellent theoretical academic
performance. The fundamental reason for the emphasis on the value of work is that the
majority of people are apparently addicted to free handouts. Ronald Kassimir has rightly
observed this of the Catholic church:
The relative wealth of the Church, enhanced greatly by its access to international Catholic donor
community, has led to dependence on transnational Catholic networks, and to patronage relations
with the laity that are not conducive to mobilization.576

Formation programs ought to help candidates to be self-reliant, and to prepare a
leadership that is not patronizing to the people it serves. This is the grave mistake of the
past still being perpetuated. Many also think that education is only for those doing whitecollar jobs. This indeed is one of the critical challenges to white-collar-job seekers,
perpetual dependents, bishops or religious leaders and superiors of dioceses and
congregations in terms of attitude and the requisite formation for pastoral agents.577
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Continued teaching of practical subjects or sciences should be encouraged as part
of leadership preparation, even in seminaries and formation houses of religious and other
pastoral agents, not just studies in humanities. A more all-round formation than what we
have today is necessary for the formation of future leadership in the Church and the civil
society. Good leadership needed by the church and society today does not just consist in
humility and charity. Charity should help people to relentlessly pursue the cause of
justice, respect for the dignity and rights of people, peace, reconciliation, option for the
poor and affirmative action. Many examples from the Scriptures suggest how Christ
either changed values or invigorated them, and overturned the undesirable situations of
his time aggressively.578 The leadership of people today should do likewise.
Catholics and Muslims in Uganda have lagged behind for a long time. This is not
necessaily because they, especially Catholics, are incapable but because there was not
critical planning on their part. It is appropriate and right to suggest that Catholics and
Muslims, and other religions that are in this category in Uganda have to try to live up to
this challenge while their Protestant counterparts who have done much better in this
regard should continue with the same spirit. However, all groups other than Catholics
need to do much more to improve their formation of religious leadership, because they
are far behind Catholics.

the majority of the dioceses, entertaining such thoughts is a dream and really utopian because of the
financial conditions. The question to which every person should find an answer and work to realize the
answer is; What can I do to help myself and the religious institution or others ?, not What can others or the
religious institution do to help me? Or not Who can do something to help me? This last question is of a
desperate person and at the same time undignified in relation to a normal human person.
578
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3. EFFECTIVE BASIC RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: RELEVANT ONGOING CATECHESIS
Small Christian or religious communities provide an ideal opportunity for easy
interaction, practical living of faith and for sharing experiences - joys and sorrows - and
for mutual encouragement. Historically, they have played a significant role in the life of
the Church, especially in proclaiming and developing love of God and mutual love of
people.579 Therefore, they can provide an avenue for the promotion of integral
development of people. Consequently, I suggest here basic religious communities, not
only basic Christian communities, because it would be good if all religious institutions
organize themselves in small groups too. It is African and easier for people to interact
freely and act more responsibly in their small groups. This kind of organization leads to
an easy possibility for practical action. Small Christian communities have been and are
fundamental pillars of the church.580 The idea of small/basic Christian communities was
first initiated in the early church in the Acts of the Apostles, but it was activated in East
Africa in 1976 by the AMECEA bishops, and it was to be considered a priority.581
However, it needs to be more emphasized in the current situation of the Catholic Church
in Uganda because not every diocese and religious institution in Uganda has effectively
established such communities as required. Neither has it remained a priority in every
diocese. If it does, its effectiveness needs to be emphasized in every local situation.
A strong community and development foundation depends on strong basic
communities or individuals.582 As part of their on-going formation program church
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leaders or religious institutions should incorporate the social teachings of religious
institutions, emphasize the notion of authentic human development, and encourage
people to study the social teachings of the church. The social teachings of the of Catholic
church treat a diversity of themes critical to social, economic, political, and cultural
matters, all of which affect people directly. The people should be informed of these
issues. These should no longer be down played as Peter Henriot and others suggest.583
They should be part and parcel of evangelization and on-going catechesis.
Small Christian communities are ideal places for educating people and for helping
them to implement their education. Churches or religious institutions should use these
small communities to inculcate religious values and the requisite ideas for true human
development. Significant themes already treated, e.g. population policies, democracy,
tolerance, the value of the human person, human dignity, human rights and all necessary
principles for human development should be taught to members of the SCCs/ BCCs. This
is the way to empower them, and to make them to realize that they are spiritually,
economically, socially, culturally and politically effective instruments, and above all
invaluable for the promotion of general human society.
4. FAMILY AND PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION
The family is a significant basic institution; good parents and good family provide
good foundation for the education of children and their eventual personality
development.584 Family is where love and peace begin and are nourished. Developed
people and families contribute to personal and general human development. The family,
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also a foundation for small Christian or religious communities, is “an intimate
communion of life and love” 585 and hence fundamental for human development. This is
an issue parents ought to consider carefully. However, education is not one moment of
achievement, and nor is it a responsibility of one person or a few groups of people. As a
point of reflection for all, not only West Nile, it is worth pondering on Mark Leopold’s
suggestion that “Amin was at least as much a creation of West Nile’s past as he was a
shaper of its future.”586 His past upbringing affected his life and the future of West Nile.
Precisely, the life of one person affects others and their future too. Hence, education of
one person affects other people too and is the responsibility of all in the society to ensure
that people are offered moral education.
Education involves as many people as can provide for a needed education. A
comprehensive education involves parents, teachers and religious agents - precisely, it
involves parents, the church, government and society.587 Such education should above all
emphasize moral values and the significance of hard work in human life as a dignified
activity or an activity that promotes the dignity of the human person. This means any
institution or nation needs a coordinated education system. It demands cooperation from
leaders at different settings, spheres and levels.
Parents, teachers and the church’s pastoral agents and community need to
cooperate in the education of young people as suggested by the conciliar fathers.588 They
should do so through collaboration in various ways, not independently. They should
585

Catholic Bishops of Uganda, With A New Heart and A New Spirit, 56.
Leopold, 6.
587
The Uganda Episcopal Conference, Education Policy 1997 (Kampala; Marianum Press, Kisubi, 1997),
4-5 and 19.
588
Austin Flannery, Ed. , “Gravissimum Educationis: Declaration on Christian Education”, in Vatican
Council II: The Conciliar and Postconciliar Documents, (Leominister, Herefords, England: Costello
Publishing Company, 1981), 3-5, 728-731.
586

529

promote mutual exchange of information about the children’s behavior. They should
sincerely share their personal experiences and knowledge of the children so that at every
moment and stage of their life the children are assisted where there is need. This is
necessary because discontinuity in the formation process causes flaws in the education
process and frustrates the efforts and enthusiasm of interested education agents.
Parents, teachers and religious agents need to follow or apply such significant
development principles as solidarity, participation and more especially subsidiarity. They
should recognize their need for one another. They, each, should do their part in
formation. Where their counterparts are responsible and capable, they should avoid
unnecessary interferences or transfer of responsibilities to other people. This means
parents should not leave the burden of bringing up children entirely upon teachers or
religious leaders and vice versa. Neither should the latter two think that their colleagues
in formation should do it by themselves. The trio - teachers, parents and religious agents should not take over the burdens or responsibilities of the children when the latter are
capable. As Bernard Haring and Valentino Salvoldi suggest: “in the family parents must
educate their children not to have recourse to them when they can obtain by their own
efforts a determined result.”589 Parents should intervene to help their children only when
it is absolutely necessary. Children should be given education for independent living
rather than for dependence.
V. CONCLUSION
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the study in this chapter. First, one
of the principal challenges to Uganda is that its successive leaders since independence
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have neglected, to a great degree, human dignity, human rights and human person,
universal love and justice as basic principles and virtues. These principles and virtues
would supplement feasible strategies for developing the country as a unit. The leaders
assended to power with divisive mentalities and prejudices. The people need to be helped
to be sincerely, mutually intelligible and united in their view of life, and especially the
crucial principles for true human development. These are: the human person, human
dignity, human rights, democracy, justice, participation, affirmative action, option for the
poor, subsidiarity, common good, and ownership of property, charity, peace and
association.
Uganda needs a theology, sociology, economics, education and politics of human
development, which makes the dignity and the rights of the human person central, and
recognizes and acknowledges human dignity as the most fundamental principle for true
human development.
The question addressed in this chapter was whether Uganda’s development claims
face the challenges of Paul VI’s vision of human development. Populorum Progressio’s
challenges to Uganda are suggested by the claim that
Populorum Progressio does not give a privileged position to the economic dimension of human
development any more than to the cultural, psychological, political, ecological or religious
dimensions. Rather it challenges Christians to take full account of the non-economic elements - for
instance to recognize the value of different cultures and of basic human rights.590

Paul VI was cautious about limiting the number of criteria for true human
development. He advanced the thoughts of Lebret to clarify his point of view. They are
thoughts that question development claims, including that of Uganda.
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Growth expressed in terms of increased national income per inhabitant can disguise an increase in
the incomes of the rich and a corresponding impoverishment and regression in the incomes of the
poor.591

The challenge and concern of Lebret and Paul VI is that development should be
judged from different perspectives. Imbalances in the distribution of resources and the
growing gap between the rich and the poor are indicators of lack of true development. He
suggested that “the greatest evil in the world is not the poverty of those who are deprived,
but the lack of concern on the part of those who are well off.”592 Balanced distribution of
resources is consequent to love, care or concern for the needs of all, regardless of tribe,
socio-economic and political status, cultural background and political or religious
affiliation. From the study in this chapter this is the very opposite of the status quo in
Uganda where there is inadequate psychological, social, cultural, political, economic and
spiritual human development, properly called integral human development. 593 A further
challenge to Uganda is that
. . . progress or development takes place when freedoms can find their expression in institutions,
norms of exchange, patterns of social organizations, educational efforts, relations of productions
and political choices which enhance the human potential. What is ultimately sought are basic
conditions under which all persons may fulfill themselves as individuals and as members of
multiple communities.594

Common good, freedom, education, harmonious social relations, mutual respect,
and relevant or democratic political systems are indicators of real development. The
Ugandan context does not adequately provide for the requisite conditions that facilitate
the enhancement of the lives of individuals as well as communities. It is such a state of
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affairs that the central aspects of Populorum Progressio challenge.
Paul VI was concerned about the development of the entire person - spiritually,
economically, culturally, politically, psychologically and socially, and of all people in a
similar fashion. The development of all is also the responsibility of all. According to him
true development is realized in a spirit of solidarity and participation, which are not so
much the Ugandan spirit as the study in this chapter shows. This assertion was
emphasized in Paul VI’s claim:
But each man is a member of society and therefore belongs to the entire community of men.
Consequently not merely this or that man, but all without exception are called to promote the full
development of the whole human society.595

The statement evinces that the human person is a social being. It is also an
evidence of the crucial need for a right understanding of the human person and human
responsibility. The fact that there is always an intimate relation between persons remains
challenging to Ugandans.
In the context of integral human development, such a claim challenges the
practice of dependence, segregation, discrimination, tribalism, regionalism and division,
which are some of the characteristic problems of Uganda.596 These practices suggest a
misguided understanding of the human person, an understanding which radically
differentiates one person from another and, consequently, leads to a misconception of
human dignity and human rights. They also explain why one of the core problems of
Uganda, a challenge of Populorum Progressio, is insufficient respect for the human
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person, dignity and rights. At the heart of the document is “the concern for the human
person and all people.”597 All the arguments and principles of the document suggest this
assertion or gravitate towards it.
The study in this chapter attempted to demonstrate that the practical application of
the doctrine of Populorum Progressio, to a great extent, is questionable in the case of
Uganda. The document calls for an acknowledgement and respect for the value of human
life, the dignity and the rights of the human person. The principles, virtues and conditions
that enhance the human person and dignity are necessary for the promotion of the human
person as Paul VI advocated in the document. The major concern of this chapter was to
establish that he status quo in Uganda does not, to a great extent, reflect the doctrine of
Paul VI in Populorum Progressio because Uganda condones attitudes, practices and
behaviors inconsonant with the teaching of the document, and many of the prevailing
attitudes, practices and conduct in Uganda are counterproductive to complete human
development.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
In this study the forces that influenced Pope Paul VI’s vision of true human
development, which he called integral human development, the development principles in
Populorum Progressio were outlined, interpreted and applied to the context of
development in Uganda. The overarching conclusion from the study and application of
the principles is that the development claims of Uganda do not meet the standard of
development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. This conclusion is based
on an anthropology relevant for integral human development – precisely, a critical notion
of the human person and human rights, and an understanding of and respect for human
dignity. Such an anthropological vision implies what Denis Goulet calls ethical
rationality which, he suggests
takes as its goal the creation, nurture, or defense of certain values considered worthy for their own
sake – freedom, justice, the inviolability of persons, the “right” of each to a livelihood, dignity,
truth, peace, community, friendship, or love.1

I suggested in the study that, in the context of Uganda, education for development
is imperative for attaining integral or authentic human development. The scope and
challenge of education about human dignity and moral principles is that it must respect
and promote human dignity. This ought to be emphasized and accepted as one of the
most crucial challenges of Populorum Proressio to Uganda. The doctrine of human
development in the document is a perennial challenge to all individuals, groups or
institutions, tribes, races and nations.
The study grappled with a number of questions in the context of Uganda and Paul
VI’s vision of integral human development in Populorum Progressio. The principal
1
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questions addressed in Chapter One of the study were: Why and how Paul VI conceived
of development the way he did. The answer to this question is his childhood experieces,
encounters with people of different life experiences, and his international trips and
professional experiences all shaped his understanding of human development as
presented in Populorum Progressio.
In Chapter Two I grappled with the problems Paul VI was addressing and
attempting to resolve and what he suggested about true human development in
Populorum Progressio. Precisely, I outlined such problems as poverty, avarice, inequality
and injustice, cultural development, population explosion, nationalism and racism or
tribalism – all of which affect humankind. There was also a misconstrued notion of
human development, which had gained ascendancy, and Paul VI thought should be
reconstructed or corrected and replaced. Consequently, he suggested a notion of human
development that considers everyone as the subject and object of development. He called
this integral human development. It was this very notion, which I applied to Uganda’s
development claims to ascertain whether Uganda’s development claims match the
standards set by Populorum Progressio. To attain this kind of development Paul VI
suggested principles such as solidarity, the common good, right to private ownership of
goods, universal charity, aid to the weak and equity in trade relations. He proposed other
development principles and conditions such as: peace, option for the poor, subsidiarity,
affirmative action, association and participation. He identified education as a necessary
means for development. I used the principles to interpret the situation in Uganda and
discovered that some attempts were made to apply them, but few attempts were
successful and many principles for authentic human development have been violated.
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In Chapter Three I dealt with the core principle for integral human development,
namely human dignity as related to human person and human rights. Paul VI’s teaching
about integral human development and the principles for integral human development are
relevant, but he presumed that the understanding of the human person, the value of
human life, human dignity and human rights did not need to be emphasized and related to
other development principles. This argument was necessary and inevitable as suggested
by Peter Henriot’s reading of Gaudium et Spes.2 Paul VI mentioned and many times
referred to human dignity, human rights and the human person in Populorum Progressio
but loosely or implicitly related them to other principles for integral human development
in the said document.3
The principles need to be explained, related and emphasized because they are
fundamental starting points for arguing for and developing an authentic understanding of
integral human development.4 They are a means to a focused view and comprehension of
integral human development and efforts toward its achievement. The importance of
underscoring the understanding of the human person, rights and dignity can never be
emphasized too much because a relevant political, social, economic and religious system
is the one that provides “goods and services essential to a life of human dignity.”5
Consequently, I contended that human dignity and a proper understanding of the human
person and human rights is the foundation from which integral human development can
2
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be explained, understood and achieved. However, human person, human dignity and
human rights need to be understood both individually and collectively. This is significant
because
To recognize the social nature of the human person is to recognize that human beings need one
another in order to be what they are - human. Human life is not possible in isolation…. Human
development cannot take place apart from a human community.6

This vision and similar notions situated the understanding of the human person,
and integral development, in the context of both the individual and community.
Development is, exclusive and inclusive, individual and communal. In the study I
reiterated that the principles for integral human development such as charity, justice and
equity, participation or involvement, common good, subsidiarity, solidarity, preferential
option for the poor and peace as presented by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio should
be explained in relation to an appropriate understanding of the fundamental principles human person, human dignity and human rights - without which they are superficial and
do not make much sense. This is a call where the real need for an understanding of the
human person or a relevant anthropology, is necessary for integral human development.
Since Paul VI’s basic intention in Populorum Progressio was not, fundamentally,
to suggest an anthropology for development, a relevant anthropology needed to be
constructed from his frequent references to the human person, human rights and human
dignity in Populorum Progressio. The anthropology facilitates a practical application of
his advocacy for integral human development. The human person, human dignity and
human rights were the center of my arguments against Uganda’s development claims. All
other principles stated or implied in Populorum Progressio are necessary for human
6
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development but human dignity is the de facto basic principle to be recognized,
underscored, understood and acknowledged as the genesis of integral human
development. This is the monumental task and challenge of Paul VI’s teaching on
integral human development in Populorum Progressio.
That the basis and focal point of all arguments in the work is human dignity is
evident, and consistent from the first chapter to the last chapter. In the study I postulated
that all arguments about integral human development should protect or promote the
human dignity of all people. Consequently, on the basis of human dignity integral human
development is consistently and emphatically presented as the development of the entire
individual and of all individuals regardless of age, sex, socio-economic and political
status, tribe, race and color.
In Chapter Four the fundamental and recurrent issue I addressed was whether or
not the development initiatives and efforts undertaken in Uganda respect, protect and
enhance human life, the human person and, human dignity and rights. To some extent
certain government and church initiatives promote the human person and human dignity,
but they do not reach the extent suggested by the notion of integral human development
according to Paul VI’s doctrine in Populorum Progressio. I showed in Chapter Four that
the teaching of Populorum Progressio regarding integral human development is relevant
and offers enduring pertinent challenges in the Ugandan context. I applied the principles
in the document to the context of Uganda. A conclusion from the application of the
principles yielded the suggestion that the development claims of Uganda do not meet the
standards of development advocated by Paul VI in Populorum Progressio. This
conclusion is based on the understanding and respect for human dignity – the overriding
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human development principle in Populorum Progressio and any Catholic social doctrine.
The most fundamental principle for integral human development is human dignity, but
the most fundamental factor is the practical education about human dignity and all other
development principles.
In the study I made suggestions for the context of Uganda. Education about
human dignity and moral principles that respect and promote human dignity is, among
other suggestions, to be emphasized and accepted as the most crucial challenge if Uganda
is to measure up to the doctrine of human development in Populorum Proressio. The
challenge of the document is, however, a perennial challenge to all individuals, groups or
institutions, tribes, races and nations.
The document is current, relevant and challenging to the status quo in Uganda.
The notion of integral human development presented in Populorum Progressio and its
application to Uganda showed the challenges of the document to the context of Uganda.
The prevailing situation in Uganda guarantees the need for implementation of the
teaching of the document to interpret and confront the social, political, economic and
religious, structures or systems in the country.
Paul VI provided excellent principles for integral human development and
appealed to the altruism of the agents of development. The wealthy nations have the
liberty to support the poor nations. I have argued in the study that in the Ugandan context
the most crucial and effective action is relevant and effective education, and
empowerment of smaller groups and individuals in addition to the responsible actions of
top administrators and managers of institutions and structures. As Louis Joseph Lebret
argued, development is a simultaneous responsibility and action of individuals, those at
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the grassroots and those in the topmost administration and management of institutions
and structures.7
Institutions and structures that can counteract or combat prevalent evils need to be
created, well established and supported. The operation of existing structures should be
improved. This demands that both individuals and groups are conscientized about their
mutual rights and responsibilities. Conscientization contributes to creativity and enables
people to raise appropriate questions in the proper context - those in charge of institutions
and structures. Educational programs and systems are crucial in this effort. All of these
need careful research and planning, which is possible only with relevant education. As
Denis Goulet contends, development process demands a clearly articulated plan in terms
of goals, analysis of development process, comprehensive guidelines for the various
sciences and a coherent theoretical framework.8 This is a process that demands more than
a fickle, shallow and irrelevant education. The needed education ought to be centered on
the human person – a challenge to individuals, the church and state. The church, the state
and individuals are a failure if they cannot defend and protect the human person, human
dignity and rights. Both institutions and individual members belonging to them are for the
good of the human person.
Finally, it is important to note that the notion of integral human development
presented in Populorum Progressio sets extremely high standards of the notion of human
development. It is the litmus test for authentic human development. Any claims of
development, even by the most developed countries, fail to measure up in terms of
7

Louis Joseph Lebret, The Last Revolution: The Destiny of Over-and Underdeveloped Nations, trans. John
Horgan (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), 211.
8
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reaching the standards set in Populorum Progressio because each society has elements of
the abuse of the human person, human rights and the human dignity. However, this does
not mean that the document is utopian; nor does it excuse continued efforts to work for
the integral development of all people. The standard is an enduring challenge to
individuals, peoples, groups and nations to, ever faithfully, try to strive to do better in
developing themselves and others. The standard of development advocated in Populorum
Progressio will always stand in strong opposition to development claims and it will be
judged and challenged, only by whether people have become more human beings and less
non-human beings than ever before – whether there is a “qualitative human
enrichment”9or not. This is a challenge to governments, religious institutions, any human
society or grouping and to both those who have adequate material possessions and those
who do not.

9

Denis Goulet, Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice, 6-7.
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